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Abstract 
Natural Philosopher Francis Bacon (1561-1626), in his attempt to revise all of 
knowledge, observed that ‘the sense of hearing striketh the spirits more 
immediately than the other senses’, contributing to contemporary dialogues on 
the relationship between the mind and the senses and the reliability of sense 
perception in discerning truth. Though music’s role in the so-called Scientific 
Revolution is well represented in scholarship, most accounts do not consider 
how individual songs might have contributed to ongoing debates on 
representation and the nature of reality.  
 
This thesis is an interdisciplinary investigation into the role of music in the 
development of metaphysical thought in late-Elizabethan and early-Stuart 
music. First, it considers contemporary understandings of the mechanics of 
sense perception and the way music presented questions about the relationships 
between the mind, body, passions, and the soul, drawing out examples of multi-
voiced domestic music that explicitly address topics of human consciousness. 
Next, it demonstrates how music and text could work together in conjunction 
with mythology and satire to confront assumptions about reality and 
representation in the music of Thomas Weelkes. Subsequently, it considers the 
role of dialogue in early seventeenth-century cultural production and discusses 
how dialogue (in its variety of forms) was linked to changes in knowledge 
building, focussing on music by John Dowland, Martin Peerson, and William 
Byrd. Finally, it considers the role of the experience of music (emotion in 
action) and how this repertoire can contribute to our understanding of the ways 
contemporary awareness was shaped and structured.  
 
Drawing insights from musicology, the history of ideas, the history of science, 
and literary theory, this dissertation elucidates the relationship between the 
texts and practice of domestic music making and the developing changes in 
approach to knowledge that mark the seventeenth century as one of the most 
pivotal eras in our intellectual history. 
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Editorial Notes 
 
1) All quotations by William Shakespeare are from The Arden Shakespeare, 
Shakespeare Complete Works, Revised Edition (London: Bloomsbury, 2015) with 
modern spelling.  
 
2) Unless otherwise noted, all quotations from Francis Bacon’s Sylva sylvarum 
are from the edition by James Spedding et al. to maintain consistency with a 
majority of Bacon scholarship. It is cited in the following format: 
(century.experiment number). 
 
3) Editions of four pieces by Thomas Weelkes were transcribed for this thesis 
by Francis Bevan: clefs have been modernised and regular barring added, but 
original note values and time signatures have been maintained. Early modern 
spellings, including irregularities in spellings between parts have been 
maintained as well. Ties have been introduced where notes split across bar lines. 
Ficta above the staff is editorial.  
 
4) Modern editions of the music of Martin Peerson were edited for Antico 
Editions by Richard Rastall.  
 
5) Unless otherwise noted, all primary source music prints, song lyrics, and 
quotations (excluding critical editions), are from Early English Books Online 
(<www.eebo.chadwyck.com>). Where possible, I have cited sources with 
signature numbers. Short Title Catalogue numbers and the host library of the 
source consulted are cited in the bibliography.  
 
6) I have maintained early modern spelling, except when citing from 
modernised editions (i.e. Arden Shakespeare, Spedding). In song lyrics, there 
are occasional spelling discrepancies between parts, so for consistency texts 
have been taken from the Cantus/Superius part, unless otherwise indicated.   
  
7) Modern and critical editions of texts and music are categorised with 
secondary sources in the bibliography because I more often cite editorial 
paratexts.   
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Introduction 
In the introductory preface to Henry Lichfild’s First Set of Madrigals of 5. Parts: apt for 
both Viols and Voyces (1613), poet Christopher Brooke, a friend of Philip Sidney, 
contributed two sonnets in honour of the music’s composer, one of which, ‘To the 
Avthor vpon his Musicall Muse’, states: 
  
 Ovr Times so curious, and our wits as nice, 
 And all as changing as the Fashion is; 
 No Art for any certaine Truth hath price; 
 All by Opinion goe: and therefore this 
 Which th’ Angell (propper to thy Musicks skill) 
 Hath here expos’d to Fashion, Time, and Wit, 
 Looke not t’haue simply crown’d for Good, or Ill, 
 But as thy humorous Censor shall think fit. 
 Fortune in these Things rules; (That all know blinde) 
 As blinde are they that censure out of Humor; 
 But if some few judiciall in this Kinde, 
 Shall grace thy Muse; force not the idle Rumor: 
  For thy knowne worth, in Their just approbation, 
  Shall wage with Wit, with Humor, Time, and Fashion.1  
 
In this poem Brooke not only acknowledges the fleeting nature of trends, but also 
addresses pressing questions on subjectivity in artistic meaning. Brooke advises 
readers to rely on their own judgement and acknowledges the role of sense perception 
in knowing. He suggests that in self-reliant judgements, the truth in art, or rather, art’s 
true value, will prove itself.   
The potential truth bearing capabilities of the arts was one of the foremost aesthetic 
questions of late-sixteenth, early-seventeenth century England, particularly 
surrounding music in worship and the ability of poetry to positively affect society.2 At 
the same time, natural philosophers like Francis Bacon were adjusting metaphysical 
perceptions of the human mind, and with it, as Jairo Moreno ascertains, the 
conception of ‘the individual subject as the locus of all representations … emerges with 
unprecedented capacities for discernment … [these philosophers] ground a kind of 
knowledge founded in an individual subject defined precisely by full awareness of 
                                                       
1 Henry Lichfild, First Set of Madrigals of 5. Parts: apt both for Viols and Voyces (London: printed for M.L.I.B and 
T.S[nodham], 1613), sig.A1v.  
2 See Ch. 2, 87-88.  
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these capacities. At the same time this knowledge is objective and universal’.3 Susan 
James observes a more general revival of metaphysical interest around the passions in 
this period, evident in a variety of treatises and fictions.4 For example, Thomas 
Wright’s Passions of the Minde (1604) contains a list of questions called ‘Problemes 
concerning the substance of our Soules’.5 Here he asks questions about the quality of 
knowledge (‘What is evidence and certitude in Knowledge, and how they differ’ and 
‘How knowledge and perfit Science, differ from credulity and opinion, and whether 
feare be necessarily included in every opinion’6), as well as questions about the internal 
processes related to sense perception and representation (‘How a corporall imagination 
concurre to a spirituall conceit’, ‘How doth Reason direct and correct Sense?’, ‘What is 
Arte? what the Idea in the artificers minde, by whose direction hee frameth his 
woorkes…’ and ‘What is our fantasie or imagination’).7 In these unanswered questions, 
Wright demonstrated his own uncertainty about what constituted certain knowledge, 
how it was formulated, and through what evidence one might prove it. He also touched 
on the influential role of scepticism in the discernment of truth. After his list of 
questions, Wright acknowledged  
 
[t]hese Questions I might propound, but GOD knowes, who was, is, or ever 
shall bee able to answere them exactly; I know superficiall Schollers and 
vngrounded Philosophers, who … will thinke these easie to bee resolved, 
because they can say what they know; but that will not suffice, because the 
Sphere of knowledge doth infinitely exceede the limites of theyr capacities. As 
much as I have delivered in this matter, might be sayd of touching tasting, and 
smelling; of laughing, weeping, sighing … the substance, scituation, 
correspondence, and vse of all partes of a mans body … No man, I thinke, can 
be learned, who may not plainely perceyve what an infinite matter I have 
propounded here of knowledge, and yet how little, even the wisest know … 
Onely I will inferre our extreme Ignorance, that few or none of these 
difficulties, which conerne vs so neere as our soules and bodies are throughly as 
yet, in my iudgement, declared even of the profoundest wits.8  
                                                       
3 Jairo Moreno, Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2004), 
51. 
4 See James quotation, Ch. 2, 70. Susan James, Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century 
Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 65. 
5 Thomas Wright, The Passions of the Minde in Generall. Corrected, Enlarged, and with Sundry New Discourses 
Augmented (London: printed by Valentine Simmes [and Adam Islip], 1604), sig.V7v.  
6 Wright, The Passions of the Minde (1604), sig.V8r. 
7 Ibid., sig.V7r, sig.X2v.  
8 Wright, The Passions of the Minde (1604), sig.X3v-r. Though some have argued that, as a Jesuit, Wright’s 
perspectives were atypical in Elizabethan England, Erin Sullivan has argued that Wright’s curiosity about 
the mechanics, quality, and metaphysical relationships between functions of body and mind ‘retained scope 
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These statements, amongst others on the nature of the passions, the senses, about 
dreaming and memory, and other physiological and psychological processes, 
demonstrate the connection between problems of mind and body and the concept of 
certain knowledge within a fundamentally Aristotelian early seventeenth-century 
intellectual framework ('How are the Soul and Body, Spirite and Flesh coupled 
together, what chains, what fetters imprision a spiritual substance, an immortal spirit in 
so base, stinking and corruptible a carcasse').9 The relationship between art and 
knowledge is of particular note, as his question on the experience of music contained 
within it a fundamental mind-body question: ‘For what reason corporal Music and 
Consorts of Instruments so ravish and abstract a spirit, a soul, transporting it almost 
into a Paradise of Joy?’.10 He views music as corporal, of the physical world, yet does 
not understand how then it might interact with immaterial spirits.   
 This dissertation addresses how these questions and others were both reflected and 
addressed through the routine practice of music making. As Lawrence Kramer posits, 
music is not just a ‘vehicle or reflection of culture, but a form of human agency that 
shapes and intervenes’.11 Though music’s important role in this period of intellectual 
history has been somewhat explored from the perspective of the history of science and 
mathematics, it has yet to be approached from an interpretive musicological 
perspective. Through a focused examination of music’s contribution to change in 
understanding certain truth, as well as its role in the intellectual development of the 
period, my intention is to show how music not only reflected changes in episteme, but 
also actively participated in its generation. Though historians such as Steven Shapin 
have explored changes in approach to knowledge in England at this time, he does not 
cover the arts in any depth. Similarly, Penelope Gouk has investigated music’s role in 
natural philosophy and Baconian inquiry, but never took the step to connect any of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
for more dualistic and disembodied approaches to emotional experience’ with implications for ‘both local 
contexts and the influence of multiple intellectual frameworks in the study of early modern emotion,’ as 
Wright’s Thomist approach to the affections was one of multiple influential strains of thought at that time. 
Erin Sullivan in Richard Meek and Erin Sullivan (eds.), The Renaissance of Emotion: Understanding Affect in 
Shakespeare and his Contemporaries (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), 26, 27. 
9 Wright, Passions of the Minde (1604), sig.V7r. 
10 Ibid., sig.X3v. John Dee wrote in the ‘Mathematical Preface’ to Henry Billingsley’s translation of Euclid’s 
Elements (1570), ‘the difference between scientia and ars is reduced to one of procedure, while the knowledge 
produced by both is shown to be qualitatively the same’, as cited in Judy Hayden, Travel Narratives, The New 
Science, and Literary Discourse, 1569-1750 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 2. 
11 Lawrence Kramer, Interpreting Music (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 21. 
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these epistemic themes to specific musical works, nor did she partake in any musical 
interpretation.12 With regard to musicological study, my work fills a glaring gap in the 
existing scholarship on the English domestic genres, as I will explain shortly. Unlike 
previous studies, this thesis positions the historical experience of music, including the 
examination of individual songs, within existing literary and historical scholarship on 
representation, sense perception, and approaches to knowledge in early seventeenth-
century England. My aim is to emphasise music’s role as a common practice that 
readily presented many of the metaphysical problems to ways of knowing that were of 
importance to the development of English thought from the sixteenth to seventeenth 
centuries. Through musical case studies, I demonstrate how music was not only a 
reflection of greater epistemic change, but also subtly contributed to its evolution. The 
performing arts in particular, as Stephen Greenblatt says, ‘offered men the power to 
shape their worlds, calculate probabilities, and master the contingent’, a way to 
‘theatricalise culture’.13 As shown here, domestic vocal music, too, could powerfully 
imply ‘that human character itself could be similarly fashioned, with an eye to audience 
and effect’,14 all posited in contrast to an interchangeable Other.  
 My parameters are approximately 1588-1640, as I limit my project to printed 
music, beginning with the secular music of Thomas Morley and William Byrd in the 
late 1580s and ending with Martin Peerson, Walter Porter, and other publications 
from before the Civil War. It is more difficult, however, to contain intellectual history 
within such dates—these ideas will draw from a wider and more fluid timeline and 
geographical area, in line with the idea that practice can both pre-empt and equally lag 
behind the full articulation of theory. My scope is limited to printed resources with 
musical notation (excluding, for example, ballad sheets) mostly for practical reasons, 
though there are conclusions to be extrapolated from what it meant to be published, 
particularly in terms of wider trends concerning which genres of vocal music were 
printed (lute song, multi-voice, instrumental, etc.). As I will justify in more detail later 
in this chapter, I include any music that could have been sung with multiple voices, 
                                                       
12 See Penelope Gouk, Music, Science and Natural Magic in Seventeenth-Century England (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1999). 
13 Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 162. 
14 Ibid. 
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regardless of any perceived ‘intention’ on the part of the composer or anachronistic 
ideals of form imposed by later musicologists.15  
 
 Stereotypes of the 'English Madrigal’  
This study focuses on late-Elizabethan, early-Stuart domestic vocal repertoire, a body 
of music that is relatively under-appreciated and marginalised in modern performance, 
recordings, and musicological scholarship. Though the English madrigal usually gets 
mentioned in undergraduate survey courses on the history of Western music or 
programmed in a token ‘light’ concert here or there, it has a reputation as less valuable 
than English sacred polyphony, which is kept alive in both concert choirs and via the 
Anglican and Catholic cathedral choir traditions. Moreover, English domestic music is 
often viewed as overly quaint and frivolous when compared with its more ‘serious’ 
Italian relative, which tends to get more respect, at least in scholarship.16 In this section 
I will highlight a few issues of historiography that have plagued English domestic 
music, problems and stereotypes that I argue need reassessing in light of changes 
within related fields of scholarship.  
Firstly, early-twentieth century studies on the English madrigal tended to focus on 
comparisons between English and Italian madrigals, the latter often regarded by 
modern scholars as more textually and harmonically interesting than their English 
counterparts.17 The English madrigal was perceived as the ‘light’ offspring of the more 
evocative, more mature tradition first set by Italian musicians like Marenzio and 
Croce, and continued by Gesualdo, Monteverdi, and Vecchi.18 Though Joseph 
Kerman’s The Elizabethan Madrigal (1962) is the only comprehensive monograph-length 
study dedicated to the English madrigal genre, his work still fixates on a formal 
musical comparison of the English madrigal ‘in relation to the great Italian 
development’, without paying due attention to the sociological, cultural, and historical 
                                                       
15 See Introduction, 23.  
16 See Introduction, footnote 21.   
17 Such publications include Alfred Einstein, “The Elizabethan Madrigal and ‘Musica Transalpina’”, Music & 
Letters XXV(2) (1944): 66-77 and Denis Arnold, “Croce and the English Madrigal”, Music & Letters 35.4 
(1954): 309–319. In Jerome Roche’s The Madrigal (1972), ‘The Madrigal in England’ is but a short chapter in 
a book otherwise totally Italianate. 
18 This view on the matter, however, is not completely a-historicised in that the English had a marked 
fascination with the foreign and more ‘exotic’ Italian tradition, as demonstrated by multiple textual and 
musical sources such as Nicholas Yonge’s Mvsica Transalpina (1588). Even Thomas Morley defines the ‘ayre’ 
as ‘light’ music, an idea to which I shall return. Thomas Morley, A Plaine and Easie Introdvction To Practicall 
Mvsicke … (London: printed by Peter Short, 1597), sig.Aa4v. Also see Introduction, 17.  
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context in which the traditions existed.19 Though his work was seminal in reviving 
interest in English domestic music more generally, his book still paints the English 
madrigal as an imitative genre lagging behind the rest of southern continental culture.20 
Since Kerman’s publication, there have been multiple influential monographs 
dedicated to the Italian madrigal, but none that explicitly focus on the English form.21 
Another stereotype about English domestic music that particularly afflicts the madrigal 
is the belief that English composers were ‘less literary’ than those in the Italian 
development.22 Kerman argues that for the English composers, musical composition, 
not the text, was the primary consideration, marking this as one of the major 
differences between English and Italian multi-voiced music at the time.23 On the other 
hand, Italian composers have been depicted in modern scholarship as poetic geniuses, 
with a deep understanding of poetry’s relationship with music.24 Moreover, Kerman’s 
rhetoric betrays judgement upon those composers who wrote in a ‘native’ or ‘archaic’ 
                                                       
19 Though Kerman’s account of William Byrd does attempt to link Byrd’s music to the social-religious realm 
more so than other composers covered in his book. Joseph Kerman, The Elizabethan Madrigal: A Comparative 
Study (New York: The AMS, 1962), xvi. 
20 Kerman quotes Edmund Fellowes, who said: ‘[n]othing is more astonishing in the whole history of music 
than the story of the English school of madrigal composers. The long delay of its appearance, lagging behind 
the Italian school by no less than half a century: the suddenness of its development … [and] the brevity of its 
endurance … all these features combine to distinguish the madrigal school as the strangest phenomenon in 
the history of English music.’ Kerman suggests that this time-lag was closing, however, as more composers 
wrote lute song, as this ‘backwardness’ was specifically affiliated with the madrigal genre. Kerman, The 
Elizabethan Madrigal, 37, 255. 
21 Influential monograph-length literature on the Italian madrigal includes: Susan McClary, Modal 
Subjectivities: Self-Fashioning and the Italian Madrigal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Gary 
Tomlinson, Music and Renaissance Magic: Towards a Historiography of Others (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1993); Mauro Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera: Monteverdi’s Staging of the Self (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2012); Iain Fenlon and James Haar, The Italian Madrigal in the Early Sixteenth-Century: 
Sources and Interpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Martha Feldman, City Culture and 
the Madrigal at Venice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Anthony M. Cummings, The Maecenas 
and the Madrigalist: Patrons, Patronage, and the Origins of the Italian Madrigal (Philadelphia: American 
Philosophical Society, 2004).  
22 Kerman says that one of the reasons Fellowes left Martin Peerson’s Mottes or Graue Chamber Musicke (1630) 
and Priuate Musicke (1620) out of the English Madrigal School series is because Peerson’s work was a bit too 
modern, and was ‘as literary a musical publication as one can find anywhere on the Continent’ a style ‘once 
removed from the madrigal’. Kerman, The Elizabethan Madrigal, 14. 
23 I will discuss the issue of ‘unliterary’ English composers in greater depth shortly in relation to Thomas 
Weelkes and William Byrd. Ibid., 254. 
24 According to Gary Tomlinson, ‘[f]or a musician of humanist leanings like Monteverdi, the expressive 
power of music was a function of its relation to text … The highest goal that music could seek … especially 
in works from the years around 1600, was to form a syntactic and semantic union with its text so perfect that 
the distinction of musical and non-musical elements seemed to fade before the heightened oratorical power of 
a single musical speech. To composers like Monteverdi, musical expression without text must have seemed a 
contradiction in terms, if indeed they ever conceived of the subject in such terms at all’. Though this is 
probably an accurate assessment of the ideal, in reality practices like contra facta, replacing the text of a 
madrigal with a sacred one to make it more marketable and religiously acceptable, was widely practiced. If 
music and text are so perfectly fused as to become a ‘single musical speech’, how it is possible to replace one 
text with another? This may be symbolic of the difference between an aesthetic ideal and practical 
application. Tomlinson, Monteverdi and the End of the Renaissance, 29. 
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style versus the vogue ‘foreign’ style.25 Though he clearly respects some composers that 
did not conform to the Italianate madrigal fad, notably Orlando Gibbons and William 
Byrd, he tends to group most of those who did not adhere to the Italian models as 
‘insignificant musicians’ like Richard Carlton, John Mundy, and Richard Alison.26 
These composers (Gibbons and Byrd included) wrote in what Kerman frequently calls 
‘the archaic style’, though he clearly believes some composers wrote ‘old-fashioned’ 
music through choice, while others wrote this way through incompetence.27 At this 
early stage in his career, Kerman’s form-based judgement of collections or composers 
he saw as ‘lesser’ was not uncommon.28 As will be discussed shortly, the early to mid-
twentieth century rhetoric describing the English domestic forms as ‘archaic’ has had, I 
believe, a lasting effect on the genre’s reputation. Also, the perception that many of the 
English madrigal composers were incompetent or second-rate musicians has certainly 
contributed to the lack of scholarship on their music. The time seems overdue to 
reconsider works by lesser-known composers, as the idea that only the ‘great masters’ 
have historical value is outdated in current historiography.29  
                                                       
25 Kerman, The Elizabethan Madrigal, 221.  
26 Ibid., 254.  
27 Kerman says there is ‘no doubt that with Byrd and Gibbons the obstinate use of the old-fashioned English 
style was a matter of very deliberate choice’. With Carlton, Alison, and J. Mundy, however, ‘no doubt, 
preservation of the archaic style was less a matter of deliberate choice than of unsophistication; their writing 
certainly seems more crude than that of any of the Italianate writers, even the least able’. Ibid.,127, 254. 
28 The valuation of form over expression or interpretation is one of the more divisive aspects of musicological 
historiography. As Lawrence Kramer explains, most ‘musical analysts will now readily admit (or at least 
admit when pressed) that statements about form or structure do not represent music positivistically, “as it 
really is.” Instead such statements constitute descriptions relative to an implicit or explicit, formal or informal 
theory of musical articulation. The statements are true to the theory more than to the music itself. Yet a 
positivist ideal is continually reinstated by the assumption that statements about form or structure are more 
fundamental and more reliable than statements about expressive content. Analytical descriptions are still 
widely taken to have priority over hermeneutic ones’. Lawrence Kramer, Expression and Truth (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2012), 22. 
29 In the last several decades, the perceived prominence of the ‘masterwork’ has vastly changed both within 
and outside musicology, catalysed in part by what is sometimes described as the ‘cultural turn’, 
encompassing New Historicism and cultural history. Through developments in literary and historical studies, 
objects and texts previously deemed of little importance have been made relevant in weaving cultural 
narratives. Historians consider marginalia and personal letters in addition to official treatises, ‘read’ the 
significance of everyday objects like cutlery or cookbooks, and interpret the works of Shakespeare as 
historical documents. Though this approach to scholarship has been around since the 1980s, these 
developments have allowed ‘everyday’ music, from all groups of society, to be re-examined as culturally and 
musically important, regardless of any modern or contemporary judgements of ‘quality’. I will not be 
undertaking this sort of ‘vertical’ study, and, for mostly practical reasons, I will be re-examining the more 
‘courtly’ domestic music looked at by early twentieth century musicologists, but within broader contexts of 
the way music was understood and the role it played in contemporary understanding of the world. As Steven 
Shapin supports, ‘there is no necessary opposition between writing the history of sites and of the masses’ and 
assuming ‘formal scientific knowledge is made through mundane processes of social interaction, there is no 
necessary opposition between the study of “high” … forms of elite culture and the study of the everyday 
  15 
English domestic music is also often seen as less important than English ‘sacred’ 
music (a problematic moniker in its own right), and this is reflected in domestic music’s 
scant representation in modern performance culture.30 Firstly, there is a practical issue 
in the availability of English domestic music scores for public use, which 
understandably reflects a problem of supply and demand in the economics of 
publishing. The most readily available source of this repertoire in modern notation is 
The Oxford Book of English Madrigals (1978), which is sometimes used in performance, 
but is still a rather hefty, unwieldy volume.31 Some of the most frequently performed 
works are available through crowd-sourced websites like the Choral Public Domain 
Library (<www.cpdl.org>), though these are of varying accuracy and quality. There is 
Edmund Fellowes’ English Madrigal School series, which I will discuss in more detail 
shortly, but which until recently has been far too impractical and expensive for 
performance.32 Modern notation for some domestic collections doesn’t exist, for 
example, Walter Porter’s Madrigals and Ayres (1632), which was never edited by 
Fellowes.33 Additionally, a lot of domestic music requires specialist instruments, which 
could be perceived as a barrier to more frequent performance of this music. Though 
ease or frequency of performance isn’t necessarily commensurate with academic 
interest, it can be viewed as a marker of perceived importance in the canon.34 Though I 
don’t have specific data on this, it is my observation that in recordings as well, a similar 
bias towards sacred English polyphony can be seen, with a majority of albums focusing 
on church repertory.35 It is my hope that as this music is reassessed and rediscovered, it 
                                                                                                                                                                            
modes in which people deal with each other’. Stephen Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in 
Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), xxii. 
30 For more on issues of genre, see Ch. 4, 185-7.  
31 This collection contains a selection of 60 of ‘the very best’ SATB ‘madrigals’. Philip Ledger (ed.), The 
Oxford Book of English Madrigals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).   
32 Thanks to Stainer & Bell for recently making this collection available online in a far more affordable and 
portable PDF format. 
33 As far as I can tell, only one of the pieces from this collection has been published in modern notation, 
‘Praise the Lord’, which is included in Peter le Huray, The Treasury of English Church Music 1545-1650 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 232. This piece and its inclusion in le Huray’s collection is 
indicative of the historiographical problem pertaining to labels of ‘domestic’ or ‘secular’ music. See also 
Stanley H. Boorman, 'A critical study and partial transcription of Madrigals and Ayres by Walter Porter 
(London, 1632)', unpublished MA Thesis, King's College, London, 1968.  
34 Lute song has a niche following that overlaps with the multi-voiced repertoire, made more visible by early 
music ‘stars’ like Emma Kirkby. Though ensembles like iFagiolini, Rose Consort of Viols, and Fretwork 
have taken large steps towards making audiences more aware of this repertory, sacred a cappella polyphony 
(whether originally liturgical or not) remains the staple repertoire of many professional and amateur early 
music ensembles. 
35 That said, iFagiolini and Fretwork are currently working on an album of Martin Peerson’s Mottects or graue 
chamber musicke (1630). Vocal ensembles like The King's Singers, Amaryllis Consort, Anthony Rooley’s 
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will stand up against its own reputation, proving itself intellectually significant and 
worthy of deeper understanding.  
 
The Issue of Genre: Contemporary and Modern 
Though this analysis only provides a partial insight into how the reputation of English 
domestic music has developed as it has, many of the problems outlined above point to a 
larger issue of how this music has been categorised. The problem of genre within this 
repertoire has roots in contemporary conceptions of music, but it is very much tied to 
modern historiography. To begin, it is my observation that contemporary voicing and 
instrumental parts were often published to be as flexible as possible, so domestic 
music-makers could be successful with whom or whatever they had on hand, allowing 
for music making to be either a private or social activity. It was common to have 
interchangeable lines performable by ‘voyces or viols’ (for example, Martin Peerson’s 
Priuate Musicke [1620]), yet there were many other factors that complicated how 
domestic music was performed, as songs were frequently composed with optional 
instruments, optional multi-voiced choral refrains, optional duets, and other 
possibilities, presumably to maximise both utility and profits.36 For example, Thomas 
Ford’s Musicke of sundrie kinde (1607) was written so ‘the greatest number may serue to 
play alone, very easie to be performed’.37 John Coprario’s Funeral teares (1606), was 
‘[f]igured in seauen songes, whereof sixe are so set forth that the wordes may be 
exprest by a treble voice alone to the lute and base viole, or else that the meane part 
may bee added, if any shall affect more fulnesse of parts. The seauenth is made in 
forme of a dialogue, and can not be sung without two voyces’.38 Or Martin Peerson’s 
Mottects or Graue chamber musique (1630), which ‘[c]ontaining songs of fiue parts of 
seuerall sorts, some ful, and some verse and chorus. But all fit for voyces and viols, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Consort of Musicke, Deller Consort, and iFagiolini, have been integral to propagating this repertory in 
recorded form. Instrumental ensembles and soloists have also been vital to public awareness of this music, 
including Emma Kirkby, Rose Consort of Viols, Fretwork, Red Byrd, Phantasm and others. At the same 
time, English ‘sacred’ repertory has been the staple repertory of vocal ensembles like The Tallis Scholars and 
Stile Antico (who have one domestic/vernacular album each). Naturally, the repertoire recorded and 
disseminated by the famous English chapel and cathedral choirs like King’s College, Cambridge, and 
Westminster Cathedral focus on music that is considered liturgically traditional and useful. 
36 For more on issues of genre, see Ch 4. 185-7. Robert Jones' First set of madrigals (1607) was written for 
‘viols and voices, or for voices alone, or as you please’. Robert Jones, First set of madrigals … (London: 
printed by John Windet, 1607), sig.A1r.   
37 Thomas Ford, Musicke of sundrie kinde (London: printed by Iohn Windet, 1607), sig.A1r.   
38 John Coprario, Funeral teares … (London: printed by Iohn VVindet, 1606), sig.A1r. For more on 
Coprario's dialogue, see Ch. 4, 191-2.  
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with an organ part; which for want of organs, may be performed on virginals, base-
lute, bandora, or Irish harpe’.39 Tobias Hume wrote ‘an inuention for two to 
play vpon one viole’.40 To me, this flexibility of instrumentation and voicing suggests 
that contemporary approaches to domestic composition appear more concerned with 
the practicalities of home use, and less so on the ideal of a specific form or singular 
authorial intention.  
  The flexibility (yet occasional specificity) of this repertoire is intriguing not only 
because it complicates subjectivity, but also because it displays some dissonance with 
the way modern musicologists have categorised this music, which seems to me an 
anachronistic approach overly focused on form. Amongst the canzonets, consort songs, 
and madrigals, a lot of the music in this thesis could be broadly categorised as an ‘ayre’. 
By Thomas Morley’s definition, the ‘generall named called ayres’ should encompass ‘all 
other kinds of light musick saving the Madrigal’.41 This is not to say form did not hold 
meaning, or that contemporaries did not acknowledge differences between forms, as 
they certainly did. But publications such as Thomas Tomkins’ vaguely titled Songs of 4. 
5. or 6 parts (1622) or the way Byrd published multi-voiced underlay for his consort 
song collections, challenge some of the stricter categorisations modern scholars have 
imposed upon this type of repertory.  
 When Edmund Fellowes compiled his early-twentieth century 36-volume series, 
the English Madrigal School, he choose to include most of the printed, non-liturgical, 
somewhat secular, potentially multi-voiced, (mostly) English language unaccompanied 
music from the period, including non-madrigalian imported forms like ballett and 
canzonet, as well as Byrd’s consort song collections.42 In addition to volumes 
contemporarily titled with reference to those three forms, he also included more 
vaguely titled collections, like the one by Tomkins mentioned above, Richard Alison’s 
An Howres Recreation in Musicke (1606), and Thomas Vautor’s Songs of Diuers Aires and 
                                                       
39 Martin Peerson, Mottects or Graue chamber musique (London: printed by Willaim Stansby, 1630), sig.A3r. 
40 Tobias Hume, The First Part of Ayres, French, Pollish, and others … (London: printed by John Windet, 1605), 
sig.A1r.  
41 Morley, A Plaine and Easie Introdvction (1597), sig.Aa4v.  
42 Though Byrd's music is no longer published under that series, and is now part of The Byrd Edition instead. 
The series changed names from The English Madrigal School, to The English Madrigalists, presumably when re-
released and revised under Thurston Dart. As Philip Brett says in the introductory words to Byrd’s Psalms 
sonets and songs (1588), published under The English Madrigalists, ‘Dr Fellowes … could hardly conceal his 
disappointment at Byrd’s rather serious non-madrigalian style’. Philip Brett in Preface (1963) to William 
Byrd, ‘Psalms, Sonnets and songs’, (eds.) Edmund Fellowes and Thurston Dart (London: Stainer & Bell, 
1963), v.  
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Natures (1619).43 He later began additional series of publications, such as The English 
Lutenists, and The Byrd Edition, which attended to some of the combination 
instrumental-vocal forms that didn’t fit into the madrigal series. Though it is 
understandable why he had to create series parameters for the purposes of modern 
publication, it raises some interesting questions about genre, form, and how modern 
publication forces anachronistic categorisation onto a repertoire that in some ways 
resists formal and topical categorisation by the meters frequently used by publishers 
today. For example, the modern divide between secular and sacred music is very 
difficult to apply to Elizabethan and Stuart music. Modern series like Early English 
Church Music have been inconsistent in what they consider to be ‘church music’ 
versus ‘domestic music’. Tallis and Byrd’s Cantiones Sacrae (1575), Byrd’s Masses, 
Tomkins’ ‘When David heard’ settings, and other staples of Anglican church repertory 
published today through EECM were originally published by the composers for 
domestic use. Much of the music published contemporarily for domestic use would, by 
today’s standards, be considered sacred (though perhaps not liturgical).44  
 While early moderns appeared to take a somewhat fluid approach to genre in their 
publications, Fellowes wished to publish his series in line with a particular form or set 
of forms, a practice only sometimes followed during the early modern period.45 Even 
collections that were advertised as a single genre, like Richard Carlton’s Madrigals 
(1601), weren’t necessarily strictly so.46 Sometimes composers appeared to have their 
own ideas about what gave their publications organisation or unity. Byrd’s Psalms, 
Sonets, & songs (1588) is an eclectic book organised on the affection of the text, or as 
Byrd introduced it ‘[m]usic of various sorts, and to content diuers humors. If thou be 
                                                       
43 Stainer & Bell added to this series with additional editors after Fellowes’ death, including volumes like 
Giovanni Croce’s Musica Sacra (1608), settings of sonnet-form translations of the seven penitential psalms 
that were published by Thomas East. Though Croce was contemporarily praised as a madrigalist, the 
inclusion of this publication in the English Madrigal School series still illustrates the problem of genre discussed 
here. 
44 In addition to those collections by Byrd and Croce just mentioned, even texts without overtly religious 
sources were often moralising, for example nearly every piece in Richard Carlton’s Madrigals (1601). 
45 I imagine Fellowes immediately ran into problems of what volumes to include in his series. For example, 
Thomas Morley’s First Booke of balletts to fiue voyces (1595), contains mostly balletts for five voices. But then 
Morley sticks a ‘dialogue to seven voices’ for two choirs in at the end. One example of a contemporary 
publication that does stick to the form advertised on the cover is Henry Youll’s Canzonets to Three Voyces 
(1608). But more often than not, forms were mixed within contemporary music books, even when a single 
form was advertised as the primary focus of a publication.  
46 Kerman calls Carlton’s works ‘so-called madrigals’ multiple times, as his texts are ‘the most solemn of all 
the English secular publications’, as the composer’s attempts to emulate the Italian form appear somewhat 
half-hearted and the texts don’t necessarily follow the expected tropes. Kerman, The Elizabethan Madrigal, 
119. 
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disposed to pray, here are Psalms. If to be merry, here are Sonnets. If to lament for thy 
sins, here are songs of sadness and piety’.47 Even if most of the publication was consort 
song (underlayed for all voices), Byrd’s conception of the collection was still as ‘music 
of various sorts’, raising questions about what Byrd considered in his assessment of 
variety.48 Michael East’s Third set of bookes (1610) is exemplary of the ‘genre problem’ as 
it comprises of ‘Pastorals, Athemes, Neoplitaines, Fancies, and Madrigales, to 5. and 6. 
parts: Apt for both Viols and Voyces’.49 Another example would be Orlando Gibbons’ 
The first set of madrigals and mottets (1612), which Kerman says are ‘neither madrigals 
nor motets, but mature compositions in the individual idiom which Gibbons developed 
to great lengths from the basic abstract polyphonic style practiced by Byrd, as well as 
by a number of second-rate composers’.50 Without the qualification of ‘second-rate’, 
there is actually a substantial body of work that falls into this ambiguous ‘abstract 
polyphonic style’, and called madrigals or ayres or songs, whether formally madrigalian 
or not. Though the madrigal had its beginnings in a very specific form, style, and type 
of poem, what a ‘madrigal’ came to mean within a few short years, to consumers, 
composers, and publishers alike, was very much expanded from that original ideal. It is 
for this reason that I include many different types of potentially multi-voiced music in 
this study, regardless of adherence to any form. Furthermore, I assert that domestic 
                                                       
47 William Byrd, ‘Epistle to the Reader’, Psalms, Sonets, & songs of sadness and pietie, made into Musicke of fiue 
parts … (London: printed by Thomas East, 1588), sig.B1v. Most would classify this collection, as well as his 
1589 Songs of sundry natures, as consort song for single voice and viols. Byrd probably added underlay to some 
pieces and advertised it as ‘for voices or viols’ for added flexibility and marketability, perhaps piggybacking 
off the popularity of other multi-voiced genres. As suggested by Philip Brett in the ‘Preface’ to William Byrd, 
‘Psalms, Sonnets and songs’, ed. Edmund H. Fellowes, revised under the direction of Thurston Dart 
(London: Stainer & Bell, 1963), iv. As Jeremy Smith points out, so much in ‘Byrd Studies has been on the 
musical nature of the songs, i.e., on what they are’. Jeremy Smith, Verse and Voice in Byrd's Song Collections of 
1588 and 1589 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016), 7.  
48 J. Smith, Verse and Voice, 7-8.  
49 In Fellowes’ original edition of this book, he omitted the verse anthems and viol fantasies, an act corrected 
by Thurston Dart in his revised edition, ‘so East’s book may be seen as a whole’. Reviser’s Note, Thurston 
Dart in Michael East, Third Set of Books, (eds.) Edmund Fellowes and Thurston Dart (London: Stainer & 
Bell, 1960), ii. There is a similar ‘issue’ in East’s Fourth set of bookes (1618), and verse anthems, motets, and 
songs (with both pastoral and psalm texts). Those pieces originally cut by Fellowes for being ‘outside the 
scope of this present edition’ were included in the later editions. As Fellowes says, ‘East’s first two Sets alone 
of his seven published volumes consist solely of Madrigals, in the strict sense of the term. The fifth, sixth and 
seventh books lie entirely outside the range of the English Madrigal School Series; but the third and fourth 
books, which are of a miscellaneous character, contain a considerable number of madrigals’. It is tempting to 
read East’s progression away from a strict madrigalian form to more miscellaneous collections as illustrative 
of the progressive diversification of domestic music forms. East, Third Set of Books (eds.) Fellowes and Dart, 
iii. 
50 Kerman, The Elizabethan Madrigal, 123. 
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music more generally reflects the legacy of the madrigal’s influence on text setting, and 
the persuasiveness of its profitability, if not the actual form itself. 
 This study proceeds with the understanding that in spite of the relatively short-
lived publication history of the English Madrigal, its prolific and influential nature 
helped stylistic tropes of the genre become well known and well established. Its 
popularity coincided with a surge in music publishing activity towards the end of the 
sixteenth century, when music publishers expanded their efforts beyond liturgical 
chant and psalm books to produce collections with a much broader coverage of 
different musical genres.51 With new technology and availability, features of the 
madrigal proper permeated other styles of music including lute song, consort song, and 
even motet. Though the first English madrigals strove to imitate earlier Italian models, 
the genre morphed, as one might imagine, into something distinctly its own. Even those 
composers that were writing specifically against the madrigalian fad (Byrd, 
Ravenscroft, Campion, etc.), were still writing with the influential genre in mind, even 
if as a model of what not to do. As will be discussed in Chapter Four, English domestic 
musical forms were highly adaptable, sometimes (to the categorising musicologist) 
frustratingly so, both in form and instrumentation, as well as textual subject matter.52 
Therefore, if occasionally I refer to a piece as a ‘song’ or ‘domestic music’ or more 
generally to ‘madrigals’, even if the specific piece in question has a more specific or 
slightly variant form, it isn’t out of ignorance, but rather a desire to not qualify the 
parameters of ‘late-Elizabethan, early-Stuart potentially multi-voiced somewhat secular 
domestic music’ in every instance.  
 
Revisions of Reputation 
This thesis also hopes to begin to reframe the reputation of multi-voiced domestic 
music as intellectually and culturally significant, a conception sometimes reserved for 
the ‘inward’ or ‘contemplative’ reputation of solo lute song. In spite of an affiliation 
between the English madrigal and frivolity, this thesis will demonstrate that many 
forms, not just lute song, could have highly evocative, emotional, critical, and 
                                                       
51 For more on music publishing and secular music, see David Price, Patrons and Musicians of the English 
Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
52 An argument could be made that this adaptability stems from composers having to quickly adapt and 
readapt to changing church music reforms with changing religions and monarchs. 
  21 
philosophical texts. In spite of Morley’s definition, the ayre and indeed domestic music 
more generally are not strictly synonymous with ‘light’ music in our modern sense of 
the word as ‘unthinking’ or ‘not ponderous’.53 Moreover, this thesis challenges the 
stereotype that lute song, for example in Sebastian Klotz’s estimation, is ‘the genre best 
equipped to explore the new economy of the senses’, a stereotype of lute song that 
seems romanticised.54 The bias towards solo lute song as the most ‘intimate’, ‘interior’, 
‘self-reflective’, ‘poetically sensitive’ genre seems challenged by much of the repertory 
examined in this thesis.55 As will be discussed later, perhaps private self-reflection, a 
lone singer accompanying himself on the lute, is not the best or only way to know the 
self. I understand, however, that the modern reputation of solo lute song as ‘deeper’ 
than the madrigal has come partially from contemporary resistance to the foreign 
madrigalian trend. Kerman notes that the madrigal, renowned for the Italianate device 
of ‘dittying’ music to text, came under contemporary scrutiny.56 For example, Robert 
Jones acknowledged the controversy over word setting in the ‘To the Reader’ of his 
First Booke of Songes & Ayres (1600) by conceding ‘I will not saie my next shall be better, 
but I will promise to take more paines to shew more points of musicke, which now I 
could not do, because my chiefest care was to fit the Note to the Word.’57 And Thomas 
Campion wrote in 1601:  
 
there are some, who to appeare the more deepe, and singular in their iudgement, 
will admit no Musicke but that, which is long, intricate, bated with fuge, chaind 
with sincopation, and where the nature of eurie word is precisely exprest in the 
Note; like the old exploded action in Comedies … But such childish obseruing 
of  words is altogether ridiculous, and we ought to maintaine, as well in Notes as 
                                                       
53 “light, adj.1.”, OED Online. Oxford University Press, March 2016 (accessed 12 March 2016). 
54 Sebastian Klotz, ““Were Euery Thought an Eye”: Musical Action and the Crisis of Visionary Language in 
Dowland’s Lute Songs” in Nicole Schwindt (ed.), Gesang zur Laute: Trossinger Jahrbuch für Renaissancemusik 
(Kassel: Barenreiter, 2003), 188. 
55 As Daniel Fischlin summarises, ‘the ayre, by virtue of its internalized theatricality, rejects many of the 
conventions of public spectacle to stage something quite different: the highly accomplished “individual” 
singing carefully wrought words and music as an expression of the very power of words and music to stage 
that individual’s voice … The ayre as a performance genre implicitly repudiates mass spectacle, whether 
musical or theatrical, cultivating instead the staging of introspection, solitude, and dialogical intimacy as part 
of its aesthetic appeal, even if it does so in public’. I am not arguing that this is incorrect, but rather that the 
social element of self-knowledge may play a greater role than the ‘interior’ emphasis often given to lute song 
and ayre might suggest. Daniel Fischlin, In Small Proportions: A Poetics of the English Ayre 1596-1622 (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1998), 21.  
56  Kerman, The Elizabethan Madrigal, 35-37. 
57 ‘To the Reader’ in Jones, The First Booke of Songes & Ayres, sig.A4v.  
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in action a manly carriage, gracing no word but that which is eminent and 
emphaticall.58  
 
Such criticism of the madrigalian trend must be taken with a grain of salt, however, 
because the genre was still deemed a marketable title for a music collection into the 
1630s with Walter Porter’s contribution.59 Moreover, it is worth noting that Campion 
accuses those who prize polyphony as trying too hard to ‘appear more deep’, which is 
somewhat at odds with modern suppositions about the two forms.  
 Lastly, though I’ve taken pains to avoid the messy implications that accompany 
‘intentionality’ on behalf of individual composers, this thesis will still contribute to 
recent scholarship that has rethought contemporary approaches to text setting, 
particularly in relation to Thomas Weelkes and William Byrd. Theories on Byrd’s 
approach to text setting have changed substantially over the last eighty years, mainly 
shifting away from a more formalist/modernist approach to musicology.60 Early 
twentieth-century musicologists such as Edward Dent and Bruce Pattison propagated 
a perception of Byrd as ‘a very unliterary musician’.61 But recent scholarship by Kerry 
McCarthy, John Milsom, Jeremy Smith, David Trendell, and others has convincingly 
refuted any remaining perceptions of Byrd as ‘unliterary’ through textual analysis, 
musical interpretation, and further investigation into Byrd’s biography.62 As McCarthy 
summarises, ‘Byrd was acquainted with a wide variety of texts—poetry and prose, 
secular and sacred, courtly and rustic’, and was, in her opinion, ‘arguably the first 
                                                       
58  Note that Campion also emphasises the importance of ‘action’ or the singer’s body, in effectively delivering 
a piece of music, an idea I shall bring up again later. While it is not certain that Campion is the author of the 
‘To the Reader’ in Rosseter’s collection, most agree this is the case, and this is attributed to Campion in the 
English Short Title Catalogue. See Bruce Pattison, “Philip Rosseter, Poet and Musician”, The Musical 
Times 72.1065 (1931): 986–990; Philip Rosseter’s A Booke of Ayres set foorth to be song (London: Printed by 
Peter Short, 1601), sig.B1v. 
59  Walter Porter, Madrigales and Ayres. Of two, three, foure and fiue Voyces (1632).  
60 For a related discussion of the nineteenth-century revival of English music, see Suzanne Cole, “Who Is the 
Father? Changing Perceptions of Tallis and Byrd in Late Nineteenth-Century England”, Music & Letters 89, 
no. 2 (May 1, 2008): 212–26. 
61 Pattison continues: ‘[Byrd’s] inspiration is entirely musical, as was that of the Netherland masters and the 
early church school in which he learned his art. If there were no words at all to his songs, the effect would be 
just as great: one cannot imagine the same of Marenzio's madrigals’. Bruce Pattison, Music and Poetry of the 
English Renaissance (London: Methuen and Co., 1948), 86. 
62 For example, see: Kerry McCarthy, Byrd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Kerry McCarthy and 
John Harley. “From the Library of William Byrd”, The Musical Times 150.1909 (2009): 17–30; John Milsom, 
‘Byrd, Sidney, and the Art of Melting’, Early Music (2003), 437–49; J. Smith, Verse and Voice; Oliver 
Neighbour, “Byrd's Treatment of Verse in His Partsongs”, Early Music 31.3 (2003): 413–422; David 
Trendell, “Aspects of William Byrd's Musical Recusancy”, The Musical Times 148.1900 (2007): 27–50.  
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composer to treat [distinguished Elizabethan poets’] poetry with the art and 
seriousness it deserved’.63  
 Many assumptions about Weelkes’s person, on the other hand, have been drawn 
from his record as a public drunk.64 Moreover, in the dedication to his 1600 madrigal 
set, Weelkes wrote, ‘I confesse my consience is vntoucht with any other arts’, which 
some scholars took for face value.65 This led Kerman to believe that ‘[Weelkes’s] 
tendencies seem more English than those of his colleagues. Perhaps on account of his 
confessed literary unsophistication, the poetry he sets is almost always native in 
appearance’.66 Conversely, I support Eric Altschuler and William Jansen’s reading of 
Weelkes’s dedicatory ‘confession’ as false humility. They argue that Weelkes ‘employs 
a sophisticated literary language, full of puns on both literary and scholarly topics’, 
including allusions to Shakespeare. Additionally, they speculate that ‘Weelkes's lyricist 
may have collaborated with Shakespeare or someone close to Shakespeare’, and that 
his texts may ‘have often been prepared for musical setting, rather than just ‘found’ 
somewhere and subsequently set’.67 Their analysis suggests Thomas Weelkes was 
certainly a ‘man of letters’, and entirely capable of crafting sophisticated art based on 
text.68 This thesis will provide further support for the literary sophistication of 
domestic music composers, particularly of the two individuals discussed here.  
 
Texts and Multi-Voiced Music  
Though I won’t fully disclose why I chose to focus this study on ‘potentially multi-
voiced music’ until the conclusion of this thesis, I’ll admit I was intrigued by the idea 
                                                       
63 McCarthy, Byrd, 81. 
64 According to David Brown, in 1616 Weelkes was reported to the Bishop as ‘noted and famed for a comon 
drunckard and notorious swearer & blasphemer’. In 1619, his name pops up again in the records as, ‘very 
often come so disguised eyther from the Taverne or Ale house into the quire as is muche to be lamented, for 
in these humoures he will bothe curse & sweare most dreadfully, & so profane the service of God … and 
though he hath bene often tymes admonished … to refrayne theis humors and reforme hym selfe, yett he 
daylye continuse the same, & is rather worse than better therein’.  As cited in David Brown, “Weelkes, 
Thomas.” Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online. Oxford University Press (accessed 1 Jun. 2015). 
65 Thomas Weelkes, ‘To the Trvely Noble’, Madrigals of 5. And 6. Parts, apt for the Viols and voices (London: 
Printed by Thomas Este, 1600), sig.A2r.  
66 Though in Kerman’s defence, he goes on to state that Weelkes took in ‘the dramatic aesthetic of Marenzio 
and Gesualdo, which allowed them to break apart a madrigal for poetic effect’, a reading of Weelkes’s style I 
find quite accurate. Kerman, The Elizabethan Madrigal, 224. 
67 Eric Lewin Altschuler and William Jansen. “Shakespeariana in a Thomas Weelkes Dedication from 
1600”, The Musical Times 146.1892 (2005): 83–91, 83.  
68 Assuming Weelkes wrote his own dedications, he clearly has a way with words as well as a sense of 
humour, and it seems unlikely to me that the composer capable of so evocatively setting ‘When David Heard’ 
would thoughtlessly set these subtle, yet unmistakably weighty texts. 
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that one develops and builds truth socially, as will be discussed in the following 
chapter. As an avid choral singer, I have experienced what group singing can do to 
develop the self, and was curious as to how the social aspects of domestic music 
making were reflected in historical conceptions of self. Focusing this study on multi-
voiced music was a way to symbolically ensure multiple human bodies in participation, 
as one person can play lute or viol and sing at the same time, but two singing voices 
require another body. Additionally, multi-voiced music also offers a way to look at how 
one could interpret ‘Self’ and ‘Selves’ (collective and divided) when experiencing music 
in performance, an idea I shall return to in the conclusion to the dissertation.69 For 
now, however, it is worth noting that the ‘issue of genre’ within this repertoire adds 
interest to the meaning of multiple voices, perspectives, and bodies in interpreting 
music’s role in self-knowledge.  
Throughout this study I edge around the question: ‘what does the addition of music 
bring to a text that oration alone cannot do?’ If, as Susan McClary has argued, the 
illusion created by music potentially allowed for a wider spectrum of independent 
responses than other less subjective art forms such as literature, conceivably it is this 
very quality that helped individuals, including philosophers, contemplate emotion, self, 
and sensory experience in a way poetry alone could not.70 One starting place for 
building an answer to this timeless question is in comparing the similarities and 
differences between oratory and sung text. Early moderns like Francis Bacon, as well 
as modern intermediality theorists like Werner Wolf, have reflected upon this aesthetic 
query. Moreover, the differences in each thinkers’ approach to the same question are 
highly reflective of early modern rhetorical strategies. Werner Wolf outlines that  
 
[t]he general similarity between musical and verbal literary signifiers which is 
most frequently commented on consists in their both being originally of an 
acoustic nature and in the fact that they dynamically unfold on the axis of time 
rather than in space … A further similarity is that their acoustic signifiers, 
which originally necessitate an acoustic channel, may be transcribed into visual 
ones: both arts can therefore make use of written text as a channel … The 
common acoustic nature of both music and literature provides the basis for a 
whole set of more detailed similarities between the two arts: as is especially clear 
                                                       
69 Who is the speaker in the moment of performance? The composer? Poet? Singer? 
70 Susan McClary, Modal Subjectivities: Self-Fashioning in the Italian Madrigal (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2004), 7. 
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with respect to poetry, their signifiers share the qualities of pitch, timbre, 
volume, and rhythm (in rhythm an additional temporal element is involved).71  
 
Wolf believes that music differs from spoken literature in that ‘[g]enerally speaking, the 
kind of precision often reached in music as to pitch, timbre, volume and rhythm can 
never be attained in literature’.72 On the other hand, Francis Bacon observed, as 
Aristotle did, that ‘there be in music certain figures or tropes; almost agreeing with the 
figures of rhetoric, and with the affections of the mind and other sense.’73 Bacon 
continued:  
  
First, the division and quavering, which please so much in music, have an 
agreement with the glittering of light; as the moon-beams playing upon a wave 
… The sliding from the close or cadence, hath an agreement with the figure in 
rhetoric which they call praetor expectatum; for there is a pleasure even in being 
deceived. The reports and fugues have an agreement with the figures in rhetoric 
of repetition and traduction; the triplas and changing of times, have an 
agreement with the changes of motions; as when galliard time and measure time 
are in the medley of one dance.74 
 
Though living centuries apart, Wolf and Bacon make a similar set of observations: 
music is similar to oratory in that both forms have a reliance on metre, rhythm, phrase 
and cadence, as well as a relationships to time. But the precise differences between the 
two prove much more difficult to articulate. What is most interesting, however, is that 
there is something uniquely rhetorical and descriptive about Bacon’s theory that is not 
shared by Wolf’s, which is clearly of another time and intellectual milieu. Bacon 
answered this aesthetic philosophical question in a way that was utterly indicative of 
his New Science—based on observation and method, yet inherently tied to rhetoric.75 
Though this point might initially seem a departure from the topic at hand, this example 
importantly demonstrates how a ‘musical question’, like how music relates to poetics, 
                                                       
71 Werner Wolf, The Musicalization of Fiction: A Study in the Theory and History of Intermediality (Atlanta: Rodopi, 
1999), 15. 
72 Wolf, The Musicalization of Fiction,16. 
73 Francis Bacon, Sylva Sylvarum: The Phenomena of the Universe; Or, The Model of a Repository of Materials,: For 
Erecting a Solid and Serviceable Philosophy, on the Basis of Experiment and Observation, (eds.) James Spedding, 
Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denton Heath (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1900), Vii.113. 
Sylva was originally published by William Rawley in 1627, shortly after Bacon’s death. Spedding’s edition is 
a transcription of Rawley’s publication.  
74 It is also worth noting Bacon’s use of metaphor in this passage. For someone sometimes deemed one of the 
pioneers of the scientific method, this sort of writing is still quite descriptive and poetic. Bacon, Sylva 
Sylvarum (ed.) Spedding, VII.113.  
75 For more on Francis Bacon, see Ch. 2, 81-84; Ch. 3, 116-8.  
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can actually reveal larger developments in knowledge production. The domestic music 
texts considered in this thesis are not simply passive literary works, reflective of 
changes in the world, but fiction capable of actively forming the way the world was 
perceived. As Elizabeth Spiller outlines,  
 
What these texts [like Bacon’s] demonstrate is that early modern science is 
practiced as an art and, at the same time, that imaginative literature provides a 
form for producing knowledge. Within this framework, literary texts become 
more than just topical commentaries on new scientific discoveries or 
intellectually (but not truly scientifically) interesting examples of the cultural 
work that literature might produce in the face of changing scientific knowledge. 
It is not just that fiction serves as a (more or less accurate) record of, as John 
Donne puts it, how the “new philosophy calls all in doubt.” Rather, literary 
texts gain substance and intelligibility by being considered as instances of early 
modern knowledge production … science maintains strong affiliations with 
poetic fictions because, in ways that are rarely acknowledged, its practice 
emerges out of a central understanding of art as a basis for producing 
knowledge.76  
 
Moreover, both scientific and literary works from this period should be read in this 
way, as our distinctions between them are less relevant in contemporary rhetorical 
traditions. This comparison of Wolf and Bacon demonstrates that it is not only what 
was said by early moderns that had implications for the epistemic climate of the 
seventeenth century, but also how it was said. This approach to early modern fictions 
not only gives us a hint for how to better read early modern texts in general, but also 
helps make clearer the contemporary connections between fictions and the so-called 
Scientific Revolution, and how fundamental questions about music contributed to 
these discussion.  
To briefly return to what music added to words that recitation of poetry alone 
could not achieve, George Wyther described his theories as such in A Preparation to the 
Psalter (1619): 
 
I would aduise touching the Musicke of these divine Hymnes … that men should 
be carefull to let it bee such as were graue, & suitable to the quality of those 
Songs. For, Musicke hath many Species, and is of very different operations: 
insomuch, as if that been not obserued, and the qualitie of the subject well 
considered, with what Straines it most naturally requires; the Song and the Tune 
will as improperly sute together, as a Clownes habit, upon a graue Stateman. 
                                                       
76 Elizabeth Spiller, Science, Reading, and Renaissance Literature: The Art of Making Knowledge, 1580-1670 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 2. 
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Yea, the inarticulate sounds have, in themselues, I know not what secret power, 
to move the very affections of mens soules, according to the qualitie of their 
Straines … And if they would remember themselves, they could truely say, that 
when they have been eceedingly merily disposed, one deepe solemne Straine 
hath made them, suddenly and extremely melancholy: And that, on contrary 
againe, at another time, when they have been oppressed with sadnesse, a touch 
or two of sprightly Musicke, hath quickly raised their hearts to a pitch of jollity.77 
 
Withers states that text and music must suit each other, lest something more satirical 
(like a ‘Clownes habit, upon a graue Stateman’) is created. Yet, in spite of this, he 
observes that music has a quality within itself, a ‘secret power’ to move men’s souls. 
The rhetoric of this quotation situates the question about the relationship between text 
and music as not only a part of aesthetic, philosophical, and scientific debates, as 
described above, but also music’s spiritual connection to the soul and passions.78 
Though the author makes attempts to describe music’s affects, ultimately he lacks an 
understanding of the mechanics of the passions to do so in terms that are more specific 
and less poetic. This quotation is just one of many that shows how a fundamental 
understanding of music’s affects on man might lead to broader physiological-
psychological questions, to be discussed in Chapter Two. But I introduce the idea here 
to provide a brief introduction to how music, text, science, and knowledge are 
interwoven aspects of contemporary thought.  
 
Musical Intellectual History and Music as Science 
Surprisingly, there is relatively little literature on the connection between individual 
pieces of music and the intellectual history of seventeenth-century England. That said, 
some scholarship on John Dowland has extended to ideas of metaphysics and 
philosophy.79 Also, Daniel Fischlin’s In Small Proportions (1998) focuses on literary 
                                                       
77 George Wyther, A Preparation to the Psalter (London: printed by Nicholas Okes, 1619), sig.H2v-r.   
78 As Gallagher and Raman summarise, ‘[t]hat the ways we describe the world shape the ways we experience 
the world has become a virtual shibboleth for contemporary cultural materialist studies on the senses and the 
emotions’. Lowell Gallagher and Shankar Raman (eds.), Knowing Shakespeare: Senses, Embodiment, and 
Cognition (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 6. 
79 As Harvey Gross’s work argues, ‘the world of Dowland’s song remembers the sixteenth-century-episteme, 
but, at the same time, aspects of technique and sensibility, as well as historical moment, locate the song as a 
cultural product of the early seventeenth century’. Klotz also situates Dowland’s music amongst 
contemporary epistemology, asserting ‘[o]ne could go a step further by saying that Dowland explores a 
paradoxical or even paralyzing actio against the background of a fundamental mistrust of both the senses and 
of specular language. The will allow him to unfold a new poetic subjectivity of the speaking and singing 
persona.’ Harvey Gross, ‘Technique and Episteme: John Dowland’s “Can she Excuse my Wrongs”’, Bulletin 
of Research in the Humanities, USA 86/3 (1983–85), 318–34, 330-1; Klotz, “Were Euery Thought an Eye”, 
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features of the English ayre, and makes some argument for its role in metaphysical 
development.80 There are excellent resources on the aesthetic conceptions of and 
practical use of music more generally in England, and even some that draw conclusions 
for episteme, but not one that considers meaning within particular compositions 
(rather than treatises).81 This thesis builds off important work by Rebecca Herissone’s 
Music Theory in Seventeenth-Century England (2000), as well as the work of Penelope 
Gouk and her multiple publications on music’s role in the Scientific Revolution, 
including the perspectives of Francis Bacon, Robert Hooke, and Isaac Newton.82 H.F. 
Cohen has written substantially on the musical-mathematical treatises of Kepler and 
Mersenne (Quantifying Music: The Science of Music at the First Stage of the Scientific 
Revolution [1984]), but focuses primarily on the mathematical-physical properties of 
music, rather than the aesthetic-physical aspects.83 The late Claude Palisca’s book 
Music and Ideas in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (2006) shares many thematic 
similarities to my project, but to a very different end and through very different 
means.84  
                                                                                                                                                                            
181. 
80 As Fischlin says, ‘lyric was endowed with the not insignificant capacity for moral precept and “natural 
Problemes.” The latter quality perhaps hints at lyric’s ability to address problems of both human nature and 
of nature more generally, a concept that had for the Renaissance specific resonances relating to fixed and 
eternal laws governing the material world’. Fischlin, In Small Proportions, 31. 
81 Rebecca Herissone, Music Theory in Seventeenth-Century England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); 
Christopher Marsh, Music and Society in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010); Bruce R. Smith, The Acoustic World of Early Modern England: Attending to the O Factor (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1999); Gouk, Music, Science and Natural Magic in Seventeenth-Century England.  
82 Herissone’s monograph shares many sources with my study, though as my focus is on aesthetic concepts 
(music speculativa) of music rather than practical music theory (musica practica), it is distinctly different from 
her work in approach. Her thesis states that most of the important aesthetic thinkers came from the 
continent and England was distinctly lacking in this area (though, as a possible consequence, England made 
major developments in music theory). She argues that despite translations of theory texts from 
Ornithoparchus, Descartes, and Alstedt appearing in English translation, English theory was not influenced 
much by these works. However, I think it an error to assume that just because no major treatises from 
England survive that these were not problems recognised and negotiated through other means, like fictions. 
Herissone, Music Theory in Seventeenth Century England, ix. Much of the legwork on the role of music and 
sound within scientific works of the seventeenth century is indebted to Penelope Gouk and Bruce Smith.  
83 H.F. Cohen, Quantifying Music: The Science of Music at the First Stage of the Scientific Revolution (Dordrecht: D. 
Reidel Publishing Company, 1984). 
84 Published after the author’s passing, but before the book’s completion, Palisca’s work is mostly a summary 
of music’s intersections with ideas from intellectual history through major figures like Descartes, Zarlino, 
Kircher, and Mersenne. His survey is broadly sweeping and focuses a lot on the ancient origins of these 
intellectual themes. The focus of Palisca’s work is more on continental theory’s ancient origins rather than its 
presence in composition (though he does, for example, connect a piece by Orlandus Lassus with rhetorical 
themes). Yet the fact that this topic was the ‘summation Palisca’s life work’ reinforces the need for further 
dialogue on music’s role in the study of seventeenth century intellectual history. As the preface says, ‘the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries present a special opportunity to study the relationship between music 
and ideas because it was a time when the general ferment of ideas and thinking about music often ran 
parallel, strongly affecting as well the practical composition and performance of music.’ Claude V. Palisca, 
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 The time seems right for a re-examination of early English domestic repertoire, 
without the form-based judgement calls that perhaps have limited some of the 
scholarship of this music in the past.85 Though there have been persuasive publications 
on English domestic music in recent years, these have primarily focused on cultural 
phenomena without analysis of particular pieces or, if addressing individual works, 
have appeared in shorter article forms or within critical editions.86 As I will address 
throughout this dissertation, change in epistemology was not only reflected in works of 
art, but also actively invigorated through dialogical presentation of this art. In this way, 
the act of performance is an act of negotiation, dynamically furthering dialogue that 
evaluated the quality of the self and reality through experience. In Mauro Calcagno’s 
terms, ‘the performer symbolically subsumes in herself all the other agents [patrons, 
composers, poets, etc.] by projecting a self that is constantly shifting. The performer’s 
“I” works as a catalyst of such identity shifting’.87 This requires one to look at not only 
both the music and texts of the works under consideration, but also their potential 
mode of presentation or experience.88  
  
                                                                                                                                                                            
Music and Ideas in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, (ed.) Thomas J. Mathiesen (Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 2006), iii.  
85 Some of the older monograph-length books on Tudor, Elizabethan, or Stuart Music, other than the ones 
already mentioned, include: David Wulstan, Tudor Music (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1986); David 
Brown, Thomas Weelkes: a biographical and critical study (London: Faber and Faber, 1969); Diana Poulton, John 
Dowland, second edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Edmund Fellowes, Byrd (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1948); Peter LeHuray, Music and the Reformation in England 1549-1660 (London: 
Herbert Jenkins Ltd, 1967); Donald William Krummel, English Music Printing, 1553-1700 (London: The 
Bibliographical Society, 1975); to name a few. Morrison Comegys Boyd’s Elizabethan Music and Musical 
Criticism (1940) is primarily descriptive, though it does provide a few textual examples of madrigal and song. 
Similarly, there are older volumes from the literary side that discuss domestic music texts, but without 
consideration of the music, like Edward Doughtie, English Renaissance Song (Boston: Twayne, 1986); John 
Hollander, Untuning of the Sky (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); some of the shorter articles and 
critical editions to which I refer are cited throughout this thesis. 
86 These more recent monograph-length publications that discuss domestic music have tended to focus 
entirely on a biographical, cultural, or textual study: McCarthy, Byrd; Herssione, Music Theory in Seventeenth 
Century England; Jeremy Smith, Thomas East and Music Publishing in Seventeenth Century England (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003); J. Smith, Verse and Voice; Christopher Marsh, Music and Society in Seventeenth-
Century England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Fischlin, In Small Proportions; Katherine 
Butler, Music in Elizabethan Court Politics (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2015);  to name a few. 
87 Mauro Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera: Monteverdi’s Staging of the Self (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2012), 2. 
88 Though as Lawrence Kramer cautions, ‘Autonomy, ineffability, and performance … have learned to become 
dialogical terms rather than absolutes, the better to regain the upper hand. It is hard to sort out the 
conceptual from the ideological motives in such efforts, though to be fair the same difficulty besets contextual 
efforts, too, my own of course included. Still, it is helpful to identify the values that shape the thought. We 
have no choice about being ideological, but we may still have some choice about which ideologies we 
endorse’. Lawrence Kramer, “Music, Historical Knowledge, and Critical Inquiry: Three Variations on the 
Ruins of Athens”, Critical Inquiry 32.1 (2005): 61–76, 62. 
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 Historical Phenomenology: Music, Expression, and Knowledge 
In order to analyse modes of presentation, one must value the role of expression in the 
creation of musical meaning. In Lawrence Kramer’s book Expression and Truth: On the 
Music of Knowledge (2012), Kramer points out that recent scholarship in musical 
aesthetics has focused more on what music is ‘about’ in social, rather than expressive 
terms.89 As this thesis is historical, it is mostly a part of the former category, but as an 
examination of music’s function in the development of early modern thought, it also 
requires an acceptance of expression’s role in the experience of truth.90 Kramer explains 
that this trend ‘connects with the desire for a historically grounded understanding of 
musical meaning’ yet without the delusion that expression or feelings (or the passions, 
in early modern terms) are ‘universals unaffected by history’ as former generations of 
academics may have glibly assumed.91 As one sees time and again, early modern 
thinkers struggled just as much as ancient and modern-day philosophers with the ‘gap’ 
between the capacities of language and musical expression itself. In this, ‘language’ 
refers to the terms we attempt to use to adequately describe musical expression in 
contrast to the actual experience of playing or listening.92 Kramer asserts that, from an 
hermeneutic standpoint, ‘it is precisely the semantic gap between interpretation and the 
object interpreted that is constitutive of meaning’, and the ‘gap must be preserved, not 
closed, to speak effectively of the artwork’.93 What my study aims to do is offer a mode 
for accessing the meaning within musical experience, a slightly different focus from 
                                                       
89 Kramer, Expression and Truth, 2. 
90 Kramer says ‘[o]nly if we have an adequate understanding of musical expression can we begin to 
understand the wider role of music in acoustic experience and auditory culture’. He furthers this notion by 
suggesting that it is only through an adequate understanding of musical expression that we can even begin to 
understand expression in general, let alone its connection to truth, thus challenging the assumption that ‘that 
music itself is silent on matters of history and criticism’. Kramer, Expression and Truth, 2; Kramer, “Music, 
Historical Knowledge, and Critical Inquiry: Three Variations on the Ruins of Athens”, 61. 
91 Kramer, Expression and Truth, 2. 
92 As I expressed earlier, the early modern rhetorical tradition in some ways put contemporary writers at an 
advantage when attempting to discuss these ineffable topics. This is similar to the seemingly disconnected 
terminology common in wine tasting compared to what one actually experiences on the palate. 
93 ‘Meaning’ is of the utmost concern to both the arts and the social sciences, as it is a uniquely human 
construction vital to any assessment of aesthetic value. Warren J. Samuels, ““Truth” and “Discourse” in the 
Social Construction of Economic Reality: An Essay on the Relation of Knowledge to Socioeconomic 
Policy”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 13.4 (1991): 511–524, 516. The idea that meaning resides in a 
semantic gap between object and interpretation is similar to an observation by art historian Edgar Wind on 
renaissance use of mythology to understand the divine, which is worth keeping in mind for Chapter Two. In 
both musical expression and interpretation of the divine, there is an inevitable yet subjectively meaningful 
gap between the suitability of words and the object of description itself. As explained by Peggy Muños 
Simonds, Myth, Emblem, and Music in Shakespeare’s Cymbeline (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1992), 
67; Kramer, Expression and Truth, 19. 
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Kramer’s that is, as I envision it, orientated towards the specific cultural variables of a 
single historical moment.94 As John Richardson has put it, ‘[b]y minding the gap 
between expression and re-expression, constructive descriptions have the power to 
capture something of the qualitative richness of musical experiences while nesting them 
within a discourse that inscribes its own historicity’.95  
One possible way of accessing the experience of music historically is through 
historical phenomenology. As many have problematised, it is difficult to study the 
history of experience or sensing without an interpretive model that grounds emotional 
experience in language that can accommodate an appropriately dynamic and 
speculative line of inquiry. Like meaning in music, phenomenological history requires 
hermeneutic interpretation because emotions don’t exist in unmediated forms. As 
Kevin Curran and James Kearney explain, the phenomenological approach developed 
by Bruce R. Smith is somewhat different from the term’s philosophical origins, as 
affiliated with mid-century philosophers like Martin Heidegger. To Smith, historical 
phenomenology is the study of sense experience during a specific historical past.96 
Kevin Curran and James Kearney explain that historical phenomenology ‘stands at the 
intersection of sensory history, the cultural history of emotion, and the affective turn 
within the social sciences’.97 According to Sean McDowell, the ‘goal of historical 
phenomenology is to reconstruct early modern thinking about self-experience, so that 
interpreters of literature can interpret representations of the interior life with greater 
sophistication’.98 Historical phenomenology is just one hermeneutic tool to help us 
better access past emotional experience.  
Bruce R. Smith first defines historical phenomenology in his MLA article 
‘Premodern Sexualities’ (2000). In examining the experience of early modern love, he 
determines that erōs inherently resists objectification. He reasons ‘[i]t can be given a 
scientific name, sexualitas, and thus be turned into an object of systematic investigation, 
                                                       
94 John Richardson cautions, ‘Analysts embarking upon constructive descriptions would do well to remain 
mindful of this encoding function [of language to become saturated with historical assumptions] and the 
necessity of bridging the distance between first-hand experiences and the recollection of those experiences in 
writing’. John Richardson, “On Music Criticism and Affect” in Stan Hawkins (ed.), Critical Musicological 
Reflections: Essays in Honour of Derek B. Scott (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), 141.  
95 Ibid. 
96 Kevin Curran and James Kearney, “Introduction”, Criticism: Vol. 54: No. 3 Shakespeare and Phenomenology, 
Article 1 (2012), <http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/criticism/vol54/iss3/1>, 354. 
97 Curran and Kearney, “Introduction”, 354. 
98 Sean McDowell, “The View from the Interior: The New Body Scholarship in Renaissance/Early Modern 
Studies”, Literature Compass, 3 (2006), 778-91, 779. 
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but for the historical subjects who felt it, no less than for the critic who reads its textual 
record, erōs remains a subjective experience’.99 Ergo, a mode of interpretation for 
dynamic experience was required, which Smith terms historical phenomenology. 
Though we cannot reconstruct historical experience ‘from within’, by casting a mould 
around the object of inquiry we can get a glimpse of its general shape, an idea he takes 
from new historicism. Smith asserts that ‘[b]y reading fictional texts against the 
evidence of diaries, conduct books, medical treatises [etc] … we can surround the 
unrepresented (perhaps unrepresentable) moment’ of emotion in action.100 This 
requires the interpreter to ‘take words, not as symbols, signs with only an arbitrary 
relation to the thing toward which they point, but as indexes, signs with a natural or 
metonymic connection with somatic experience’.101 Only then can we begin to 
hermeneutically access something as ephemeral, elusive, and subjective as historical 
experience.102 Phenomenology is the study of the structures of experience, by which I 
mean, as Harris Berger defines, ‘the relationships between parts in experience and the 
ways in which awareness is shaped and organized’.103 Curran and Kearney 
demonstrate that, 
 
[t]here are two important premises at work in historical phenomenology. First, 
that feeling and sensing have a history. The way we feel sad is different from the 
way Shakespeare felt sad; the way we smell perfume is different from the way 
Queen Elizabeth smelled perfume. This is because the two experiences occur in 
distinct cultural, institutional, and discursive contexts. Having said that—and 
this leads to the second premise—feeling and smelling are not historical 
artefacts in the same way that we might argue a book, a building, or even an 
event is since feeling and sensing are embodied, subjective processes. They 
resist objectification because they are always, in part, inside us, even as they 
also depend upon social and material environments to occur. Historical 
phenomenology, therefore, embraces the dynamism and nebulousness of feeling 
and sensation by thinking in terms of ecologies rather than artefacts, 
experiences rather than objects, and by abandoning neat distinctions between 
persons and things. In this way, historical phenomenology has, in the decade or 
so since the publication of Smith’s article, offered scholars of Shakespeare and 
                                                       
99 Bruce R. Smith. “Premodern Sexualities”, PMLA 115.3 (2000): 318–329, 325. 
100 B. Smith, “Premodern Sexualities”, 326. 
101 Ibid.  
102 As Berger points out, ‘That experience has a shape and structure that can be described and analyzed, and 
that this shape depends on more than individual caprice, is one of the basic ideas of phenomenology’, Harris 
Berger, Stance: Ideas about Emotion, Style, and Meaning for the Study of Expressive Culture (Middletown: Wesleyan 
University Press, 2009), x.  
103 Ibid., xi. 
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his world new ways to explore visual, tactile, aural, olfactory, and emotional 
dimensions of early modern culture, which might otherwise resist critical 
engagement.104 
 
Objects and textual evidence are still of central importance in this sort of reading, but 
‘historical phenomenology emphasizes how meaning accrues from the way sensing 
bodies experienced and perceived objects.’105 Smith has argued that recent criticism has 
unnecessarily divided experiential possibility from traditional history: ‘[t]heatrical 
phenomena versus social facts, appearance versus reality, imaginative joy versus 
rational analysis: must we choose between these binaries? Why can’t we embrace 
both?’106 Though we are always outsiders speculating what experience was like in a 
particular time, Smith believes that through this type of interrogation, we can approach 
subjective experiences like musical expression in culturally specific and politically 
aware terms.107 He does not believe we can replicate what it was like to be a subject in 
that time, but, still, exploration of phenomena like emotions of the past are worthwhile 
and scholarly rigorous endeavours.108  
 As seen in this thesis, phenomenology uses text as the core object of interpretation, 
but, as Berger points out, ‘the meaning scholars seek to study is not the product of 
texts; it is the product of texts in experience’.109 As Roman Ingarden has observed, what 
we hear in a performance is always much more than what is indicated on the score.110 
                                                       
104  Curran and Kearney, “Introduction”, 354. 
105  Ibid.  
106  Bruce R. Smith, Phenomenal Shakespeare (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 6. 
107  Ibid., xvi. 
108  In this thesis, phenomenology sets a precedent for the more theoretical aspects of performance 
experience, ideas common in contemporary theatre and literary studies, but less so within historical 
musicology of this period. Phenomenology shares some points of interest with historically informed 
performance (HIP), and consequently is at risk for some of the same downfalls or misinterpretations. 
Practically speaking, ‘authentic recreation’ is the goal of neither mode, as that would be impossible. To Gary 
Tomlinson, the ‘authentic meaning of a musical work is not the meaning that its creators and first audience 
invested in it’ as many misinterpret historical performance to be. As Tomlinson outlines, ‘[t]he historian’s 
conversation, just like the anthropologist’s, aims to widen our understanding of human concerns, beliefs, 
actions, and so on by juxtaposing our culture with some inkling of another. The conversation is, in other 
words, an attempt to broaden our own humanity by confronting the foreignness of other modes of thought 
and action’. Without the juxtaposition with our own experience, we cannot hope to interact with, let alone 
hypothesise about another’s experience. Both HIP (as theorised by Tomlinson) and phenomenology are 
modes of shaping musical meaning, that embrace the importance of our own experience in interpreting 
historical structures of experience. Gary Tomlinson “The Historian, The Performer, and Authentic Musical 
Meaning”, in Nicholas Kenyon (ed.), Authenticity and Early Music: A Symposium (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), 120. 
109  Berger, Stance, xi. 
110  Bruce Benson, The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue: A Phenomenology of Music (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 80. 
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This is perhaps even more so in early music, where, by modern standards, so little was 
indicated in scores and improvisation was a common practice. Moreover, not much is 
known for certain about contemporary domestic performance practice. Still, the gap 
between what was written on a score and what occurred in the moment of performance 
(called Unbestimmtheitsstellen by Ingarden, or ‘places of indeterminacy’)111 is often 
where the ‘magic’ happens. As Bruce Benson says, ‘it is precisely what is not to be 
found in the score that we often most value’.112 This idea is also deeply embedded in 
contemporary debates about musical poetics and form. As poet-composer Thomas 
Campion said in Philip Rosseter’s Book of Aires (1601), ‘[a] naked Ayre without guide, 
or prop, or colour but its owne, is easily censured of euerie eare, and requires so much 
the more inuention to make it please’.113 Campion’s defence of the simplicity of the ayre 
seems to agree with Benson’s observation about the importance of performance in the 
creation of meaning and affect. To Campion, the ayre allowed the skill of ‘expert 
masters’ to shine, asserting that the performer’s ‘action’ was as important as the 
‘Notes’.114 Though as Gary Tomlinson rightly cautions, ‘since the meaning of a musical 
work does not wholly reside in the work, it cannot be conveyed fully by means of 
performance’, as meaning is ‘located anew by each perceiver according to the work’s 
participation in his or her own context of meaning’.115 It is through phenomenology 
that we can begin to approach this subjectivity of meaning and contextualised 
experience that appears to inherently resist critical engagement.116  
 The phenomenological approach embraced in this study understands music as a 
guide into the historical, temporal experience of early modern emotion and thought 
processes. Historical phenomenology allows for a symbiotic examination of domestic 
song in its textually-based discursive context, alongside the historical experience of 
sensory phenomenon. Phenomenology is one way music demonstrates itself to be, as 
Kramer has said, not just a reflection of culture, but a form of human agency that 
                                                       
111  Ibid., 81. 
112  Ibid., 84. 
113 For more on this quotation, see Conclusion, 242. Rosseter, A Booke of Ayres (1601), sig.B1v. 
114 ‘For the Note and Tableture, if they satisfie the most, we haue our desire, let expert masters please 
themselves with better … we ought to maintaine as well in Notes as in action a manly cariage’. Rosseter, A 
Booke of Ayres (1601), sig.B1v. 
115 Tomlinson in Kenyon (ed.), Authenticity and Early Music, 122. 
116 As Berger says, ‘phenomenology can make a fundamental contribution to the interpretation of meaning in 
the study of expressive culture’. Berger, Stance, ix. For more on phenomenology and expressive cultures, see 
ibid., vii-xix. 
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shapes its creation.117 By positing music as a dialogue between human agents, it 
demonstrates how this social, discursive process (performance as dialogue) actively 
contributed to changes in the contemporary conception of knowledge, an idea I shall 
return to in the conclusion of this dissertation. 
 
 Overview of Chapters 
Chapter One sketches out both the modern theory and contemporary justification for 
my approach to early modern knowledge building, a vital part of the cultural and 
intellectual context for my argument. This includes an explanation of my approach to 
the intellectual history of the period more broadly and provides necessary context for 
modes of thought in the early seventeenth century, including humanism, Protestantism, 
travel, and the New Science.  
Chapter Two outlines contemporary understanding of the mechanics of sense 
perception, in addition to ideas on the relationship between the senses and the soul. It 
explores why there was a resurgence of interest in understanding the basic principles 
of sense perception around the turn of the seventeenth century. The precise 
relationship between the body and soul raised many questions about the quality of the 
soul, and how the senses interacted with the material body as well as the immaterial 
spirit or soul. It surveys various contemporary understandings of hearing and its 
special relationship with the spirits. Attention is paid to Francis Bacon and his attempts 
to understand the hearing-to-soul relationship through observable phenomena. Music 
and poetry, in particular, were seen to have special abilities to motivate people’s souls 
and move them to action. Moreover, music, in its ability to resonate with both body 
and soul, was believed by some to have the power to change not only our actions, but 
our very selves.  
Chapter Two also draws out examples of multi-voiced domestic music that 
explicitly address topics of human consciousness through discussions of sense 
perception and its mechanics, limits, and reliability. It considers the state of dreaming, 
illustrating its metaphorical connection to music in the early modern period. Both the 
process of dreaming and ‘music’s power’ raised metaphysical questions about external 
realities and the reliability of sense perception, a recurrent theme in domestic music, as 
                                                       
117 See Introduction, 10.  
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well as contemporary drama. These examples demonstrate domestic repertory to be 
poetically sensitive to the ‘metaphysical turn’ described by Susan James, that included 
not only a resurgence of interest in the basic principles of sense perception, but also a 
sceptical re-examination of the realities created by them. Finally, Chapter Two 
challenges the idea that music, or the arts in general, had no impact on intellectual 
developments in the so-called Scientific Revolution.  
Chapter Three demonstrates two ways music and text could work together to 
confront assumptions about reality and representation. It introduces domestic music’s 
strong affiliation with the mythical and pastoral, and how those modes (and fiction 
more generally) could work to build truth. It highlights Philip Sidney’s Defence of Poesy 
(1595) for evidence on how counterfeits of reality can move men to actions that alter 
society, and also establishes the importance of self-awareness in the creation of 
meaning. This chapter also looks at Francis Bacon and his use of fiction in the creation 
of new knowledge. Like Sidney, he believed mimesis was useful to instigate actions of 
change and reveal hidden truth.  
Chapter Three then discusses contemporary and modern use of mythology and the 
pastoral mode. Using theories by Eero Tarasti on mythology in music, I argue that 
multi-voiced domestic music’s strong affiliation with the mythical persisted in certain 
musical forms even when their texts discussed only tangentially mythical (or indeed 
non-mythical) topics. I outline theory on musical irony using Julian Johnson and Esti 
Scheinberg, and argue for satire’s role as a discursive practice, an interaction through 
which we work to define knowledge. I then apply this theory to three case studies from 
Thomas Weelkes’s Ayeres or phantasticke spirits (1608).  
Chapter Three also looks at Weelkes’s ‘Thule, the period of Cosmographie’ (1601), 
a madrigal without explicit mythological reference, in which mythology still feels very 
present in its presentation of seemingly fantastical events with real worldly origins. I 
discuss how travel and mythology melded together in travel accounts, creating an 
environment in which those who observed phenomena abroad were seen as both 
providers of new truths, but also as liars. The chapter touches on the relationship 
between travel and the New Science, as well as the way it changed approaches to 
knowledge. I argue that all of the images in Weelkes’s ‘Thule’ could have been inspired 
by a single source: Richard Hakluyt’s The Principall Navigations (1589-1600), and 
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demonstrate how the rhetoric of the poem echoes passages in Hakluyt’s publication. 
Finally, I analyse how Weelkes’s vivid madrigalisations work to not only provide 
verisimilitude, but to invoke a sense of wondrous Other. Though not the mythical 
Other expected from the madrigal genre, the ‘real’ foreign Other of ‘Thule’ proves just 
as effective in transporting the subject to another place. This madrigal, as do the ayres 
discussed in this chapter before it, provokes questions about representations of reality 
presented through a musical medium where musical form is used to stimulate additional 
meaning not necessarily present in text alone, demonstrating one way musical meaning 
could interrogate assumptions about the nature of reality.  
Finally, Chapter Four considers the role of dialogue in early seventeenth-century 
cultural production and discusses how dialogue (in its variety of forms) links to 
changes in knowledge building over the seventeenth century, focussing on the example 
of Francis Bacon, as well as existing scholarship on dialogues and music by Cristle 
Collins Judd. I survey the substantial presence of dialectics as a contemporary mode 
for learning and make an argument for why one needs to approach the study of 
dialogue dynamically, as it only exists in relation to experience. I then turn to the 
musical form known as the musical dialogue, and briefly trace its history from its 
Italian origins to its presence in England. In the case studies, I look at several examples 
of English musical dialogue and the variety of issues these works invoke regarding 
form and genre, both within this study and in the historiography of the repertory.  
The ubiquitous presence of dialogue in verbal conversation, epistolary exchange, 
and dialectical literature, had a perhaps unexpectedly large influence over non-
dialectical forms. Persistent remnants of the dialogical form allowed for contradiction, 
alternatives, unfinishedness, and binary possibilities within non-dialogical works. This 
is seen very clearly in the oeuvre of Philip Sidney, the author of the poem for the case 
study that follows, William Byrd’s ‘O you that heare this voice’ (1588). Though not in 
an explicitly dialogical form, dialogue’s palpable influence over this poem helps to 
explain its most pressing musical curiosity, as I discuss at the end of the chapter.  
 38 
Chapter 1: Aspects of Early Modern 
Knowledge Building 
 
In some ways, this chapter is an extension of the introduction, as it surveys 
contextual aspects of early modern knowledge building that are of relevance to 
my argument, including both contemporary perceptions and modern theory. It 
connects the fictive arts with issues of representation and how people probed 
and established certain knowledge through imagination. As I discuss elsewhere, 
fictions and the arts contributed to contemporary discourse on the nature of 
reality and its representations.1 Jonathan Sell points out that any discussion of 
representation requires ‘slippery’ terms like ‘reality’ and ‘truth’.2 As it is 
necessary to define a series of impossibly multifaceted terms in any thesis, I will 
start with the most glaringly provocative two, namely truth and knowledge. I 
am primarily concerned with an historical, social conception of truth, one that is 
dynamic and without strict linear direction.3 In Steven Shapin’s A Social History 
of Truth (1994), the author describes ‘knowledge’ as a body of shared 
understanding, a ‘collective good’, that does not stand outside of practical 
activity, as it is made and sustained through the practices of daily life.4 He 
argues that ‘absolutely everything which individuals know about the world—
natural and social—is potentially relevant to their assessments of new 
knowledge-claims’. 5 For the sociologist or historian, truth can be viewed as a 
social institution, for, as Shapin says, ‘there is no other way of conceiving truth 
save through the study of what people do collectively’.6 As such, truth has 
motion. It is through normal daily activities, like music making, that people 
                                                       
1 For more on fiction and truth, see Ch. 4, 112-19.  
2 Jonathan Sell, Rhetoric and Wonder in English Travel Writing, 1560-1613 (London: Ashgate, 2006), 23. 
3 This view of history has much precedent in literary studies. For example, Henry Turner explains 
his use of this methodology in his book English Renaissance Stage (2006): ‘Methodologically, the book 
follows recent work by scholars in the history and sociology of science who have revised the 
“history of ideas” as it has traditionally been practised in favour of a historical account of 
‘epistemology’ that emphasizes the social and institutional production of knowledge, as well as the 
representational modes through which knowledge is legitimized and transmitted’. Henry S. Turner, 
English Renaissance Stage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), viii. 
4 Shapin, A Social History of Truth, xxv, xix. 
5 Ibid., xxvi. 
6 Ibid., 6, 7. 
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negotiate and actively form what knowledge is.7 Changes to ‘ways of knowing’ 
(how we acquire knowledge about the world around us) often first appear within 
the contradictions or dialogues of mundane life. Shapin concedes that the 
parties need not agree, as ‘knowledge of the world is given its shape as 
conversation proceeds’.8 Pragmatist philosophers like William James have 
noted that, ‘[t]rue ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and 
verify … truth happens to an idea’.9 This conception of truth as an action or 
process is something that is constantly accruing and shedding aspects of itself. 
As Shapin says, ‘[t]ruth consists of the actions taken by practical communities 
to make the idea true, to make it agree with reality’.10 And it is this communal 
effort of making truth that also builds knowledge, as ‘no single individual can 
constitute knowledge’.11 As Andrew Barnaby and Lisa Schnell write, ‘[t]o 
seventeenth-century thinkers … [q]uestions about how thought functioned, 
what constituted the conditions of right knowing, or how to attain a certain 
knowledge of things were inseparable from questions concerning the social 
contexts in which knowledge could be properly employed’.12 Not only is the 
creation of knowledge a social endeavour, it is not simply transferred, it is made. 
As Elizabeth Spiller summarises, ‘[r]ather than thinking about the 
“constructedness of knowledge” simply as social fact’, one needs to instead ‘see 
Renaissance literature and science beginning in aesthetic acts’.13 This is crucial 
to frameworks of knowledge because ‘knowledge cannot simply be given to 
                                                       
7 One seemingly separate yet central aspect of knowledge building, however, is trust. Shapin 
maintains that the thing that bonds together (the ‘moral bond between the individual and member of 
the community’) the collective in the building of knowledge is trust. As will be addressed in Chapter 
Two, social, political, religious, and other change around 1600 created an environment of notable 
scepticism, one evident in the writing styles of the day that almost formulaically or stylistically 
required its author to attest to the writing’s truthfulness. Ibid., 7. 
8 If knowledge is built upon collective ‘conversations’, how is this process complicated by a medium 
that relies on a little understood and highly subjective activity like the experience of music? Though 
scepticism and issues of trust are evident in verbal or written testaments of truth, I intend to explore 
how ‘conversations’ about truth occurred with and through music, a complicating medium that 
relied on subjective experience, yet also socially contributed to the negotiation of knowledge. Ibid., 
16, 33. 
9 William James, “Pragmatism’s conception of truth”, in idem, Pragmatism, 88-91 as cited in Shapin, 
A Social History of Truth, 6.  
10 Shapin, A Social History of Truth, 6. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Andrew Barnaby and Lisa Schnell, Literate Experience: the Work of Knowing in Seventeenth-Century 
English Writing (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 2. 
13 Spiller, Science, Reading and Renaissance Literature, 3. 
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readers but must be in some way produced by them’.14 In this way, common 
knowledge is a collected body of individual truths, as developed by a group. If 
‘knowledge is the result of a community’s evaluations and actions’ as a part of 
the process Shapin calls the economy of truth, then it is for this reason that I 
sometimes use the terms interchangeably.15 As, in Warren Samuels’ words, 
‘knowledge equated with Truth is difficult to produce’,16 the truth I speak of 
here is not the absolute sort, but a collectively understood version. Samuels also 
accepts that knowledge is epistemologically and paradigmatically specific; 
knowledge is sociologically and discursively grounded, and therefore 
confirmation of truth comes from consonance with that world-view.17 Ergo, for 
the purposes of this thesis, ‘knowledge building’ refers to the collective process 
that an institution or group undergoes to make, create, or establish the truths 
that contribute to knowledge. The science of hearing and the role of fiction in 
truth building are crucial to my argument because, as Spiller articulates, ‘early 
modern literature and science share a language of making that grounds their 
claims to knowledge’,18 and the same, I argue, is true of music making.  
Another word that needs addressing is ‘episteme’, a weighty term with a 
long history in philosophy, sociology, critical theory, and intellectual history. To 
Plato, episteme referred to true or absolute knowledge, in contrast to doxa, which 
was common belief or opinion, and techne, crafts or the creative arts.19 Stemming 
from Plato’s use, epistemology was also of primary concern for twentieth-
century theorist Michael Foucault, and it is from him that many modern-day 
perceptions of episteme are influenced. In his L'Archologie du savoir (1969), he 
writes, 
 
[b]y episteme we mean ... the total set of relations that unite, at a given 
period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, 
                                                       
14 Ibid. 
15 Shapin, A Social History of Truth, 6. 
16 Warren J. Samuels, ““Truth” and “Discourse” in the Social Construction of Economic Reality: An 
Essay on the Relation of Knowledge to Socioeconomic Policy”, Journal of Post Keynesian 
Economics 13.4 (1991): 511–524, 514. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Spiller, Science, Reading and Renaissance Literature, 4. 
19 Precise translations of these words as different philosophers use them are an entire area of study 
unto itself. Mary Louise Gill and Pierre Pellegrin (eds.) A Companion to Ancient Philosophy (Malden: 
Blackwell, 2006), 215-16.  
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sciences, possibly formalized systems ... The episteme is not a form of 
knowledge or type of rationality which, crossing the boundaries of the 
most varied sciences, manifests the sovereign unity of a subject, a spirit, 
or a period; it is the group [ensemble] of relations that can be discovered, 
for a given period, between the sciences when one analyses them at the 
level of discursive regularities.20 
 
As Ian Maclean assesses, this ‘notion of “episteme” offers access to the past, but 
an untotalizable past characterised by regularities, not rules, and by modes of 
discourse in which truth, knowledge, and power somehow cohabit but are not 
mastered by the human subjects who inhabit them rather than use them’.21 
Episteme is not a structure, but an ‘ensemble’ without fixed organising 
principles.22 As the human subjects that develop this ‘group of relations’ are not 
necessarily masters over their discoveries, this understanding of episteme allows 
for an examination of the system without concern regarding ‘consciousness’ or 
‘intent’ on behalf of the individuals. These changes in episteme are not linear or 
immediate, but circuitous and gradual, eventually evolving over time as new 
possibilities.23 In broad terms, the seminal development in intellectual history 
that unfolded from the late sixteenth century through to its eventual articulation 
by René Descartes in his Meditations (1641) was a shift from an Aristotelian 
perception of truth, one established by input from the external senses, to a truth 
founded on inward intellectual discernment.24 
 
 Before Descartes 
Few would argue with the assertion that the mid-late seventeenth century was a 
watershed period in Europe for change in approach to knowledge building; this 
change would be the major marker of modernity in the western canon of 
                                                       
20 As translated in: Ian Maclean, “Foucault's Renaissance Episteme Reassessed: An Aristotelian 
Counterblast”, Journal of the History of Ideas 59.1 (1998): 149–166, 150-51.  
21 Ibid., 151.  
22 Ibid.  
23 In 1966, Foucault wrote: ‘What I am attempting to bring to light is the epistemological field, the 
episteme in which knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria having reference to its rational value 
or to its objective forms, grounds its positivity and thereby manifests a history which is not that of 
its growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions of possibility.’ “episteme, n.”, OED Online. 
Oxford University Press, March 2014 (accessed 30 April 2014). 
24 This new attitude, though emerging in earlier texts, is fully articulated in Descartes’s words ‘cogito 
ergo sum’, ‘I think, therefore I am’ (or ‘I think, I exist’) from his Second Meditation; René 
Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume II, (eds.) John Cottingham, Robert 
Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 17. 
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intellectual history. Indeed, in philosophical terms, Descartes is often named the 
father of modernity, or at the very least an important benchmark in the 
trajectory of the Western philosophical canon.25 In terms of epistemology, the 
seventeenth century remains a period of robust interest in western intellectual 
scholarship.26 Though it is necessary to have an idea of the overarching 
trajectory of the major developments in intellectual history over the course of 
the seventeenth century, what is of more importance here is not how 
epistemological change occurred, but that it did occur. For this thesis, figures 
like Descartes work more as a milestone of epistemic change within the canon, 
rather than as an individual agent creating it. Change in worldview does not 
begin with the canonical figures who articulate new possibilities; individuals like 
Descartes are enabled by the intellectual milieu of those before them. For 
example, in regards to sixteenth-century humanism and Protestantism, Henry 
Sussman reminds us that, ‘[t]he philosophy of Descartes is often cited as the 
herald to objective as well as subjective conditioning in modernity, but I would 
argue that much of what is treated as most “modern” in Descartes is already 
conditioned by the arguments concerning freedom, mediation, and political and 
corporeal corruption in Luther, Calvin, and related theological thinkers of the 
sixteenth century’.27 Though Descartes articulated these concepts in far more 
precise terms, his ideas didn’t spring out of nowhere. This study supports the 
idea that practice pre-empts theory, or as Elizabeth Hanson has superbly 
expressed, the understanding that ‘new epistemic possibilities began as 
improvisations around the fissures between the material conditions of life and 
the conceptual resources already in place in … culture’.28 Hanson’s assertion 
proposes that the necessary components of Descartes’s theories had already 
                                                       
25 ‘Modern philosophy, we are accustomed to think—or at least to say—begins with René 
Descartes’s. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (eds.), Descartes in Seventeenth-Century England (New 
York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2002), 1.  
26 Tad Schmaltz cautions that while ‘[t]here can be no doubt that Descartes deviated in some 
significant ways from the psychology of Aristotle and the later scholastics … the deviations are 
linked less to epistemological preoccupations with external world skepticism than to a concern to 
articulate a new metaphysical conception of the mind and its relation to the material world’, or in 
other words, the mind-body problem. Donald Rutherford (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Early 
Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1, 136. 
27 Henry Sussman, The Aesthetic Contract: Statues of Art and Intellectual Work in Modernity (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1997), 37.  
28 Elizabeth Hanson, Discovering the Subject in Renaissance England (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 3. 
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been socially cogitated and negotiated indirectly through seemingly mundane 
daily practices prior to their full declaration.29 My intention is not to backdate 
the development of Descartes’s concepts, but rather to draw attention to the 
idea that, as Hanson has said, ‘new ways of knowing are often profoundly at 
odds with the consciously held commitments of the people who began to 
articulate them, emerging not as principles from which a world order can be 
derived, but as contradictions in discourse and social practices’.30 The 
hermeneutic approach of this thesis examines contradiction and thematic 
material in the social practice of music making, while still fully aware of the 
historian’s privileged stance when interpreting the past.31  
 I acknowledge that long-term change occurred differently in different parts 
of Europe, and I am not claiming that Descartes’s work directly influenced 
writing in late sixteenth-century England. As Sussman says, the work of 
Descartes was conditioned by significant events and intellectual movements 
prior to its crystallisation in Meditations and other works. Though Descartes was 
French, all of Western Europe felt the impact of historical events like the 
printing press, the Reformation, the wonders of exploration, and humanism. It 
is the influence of those events and perspectives that came before Cartesian 
dualism that are of greatest interest to this project.32 Donald Rutherford 
                                                       
29 Tadié and Scholar agree that aspects of Descartes’s theories in the 1640s came out of the 
‘philosophical revolution of the 1630s, the most telling feature of which is the almost simultaneous 
convergence of several philosophers’ views, echoing Galileo’s discoveries a decade earlier’, an idea 
that can be seen particularly in theories on optics and vision where ‘the question of likeness is 
crucial’. This not only supports the idea that practice comes before theory, but also reminds us that a 
single genius (whether Hobbes or Descartes) cannot claim full responsibility for the ‘great 
philosophical discovery of modernity—that sensible qualities exist in us alone’. Tadié and Scholar, 
Fiction and the Frontiers of Knowledge, 74. 
30 Hanson, Discovering the Subject in Renaissance England, 3. 
31 In Gail Paster, Katherine Rowe, et al. the editors emphasise how ‘pre-Cartesian psychophysiology 
may have affected early modern self-experience’, arguing that ‘the very language of physiology … 
helps determine phenomenology’. This type of scholarship reminds us how the language of 
experience can help us understand the discourses and events that contributed to reassessments of 
the self, though prior to full articulation. Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd-
Wilson (eds.), Reading the Early Modern Passions (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press), 16. 
32 For example, as will be discussed in Chapter Two, dreaming was central to the evolution of 
Descartes’s theories but also played a significant role in late-sixteenth, early-seventeenth century 
questions about the role of our minds in establishing reality. Though it would be another twenty 
years before he would articulate the cogito, young Descartes was shaped in a similarly Aristotelian, 
dream-obsessed world as the early Stuarts. These formative experiences were of the utmost 
importance, in spite of the fact they came prior to articulation. For more on the role of dreaming in 
Descartes, see Gregor Sebba and Richard A. Watson (eds.), Dream of Descartes (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1987); see also Ch. 2, 102.  
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cautions against a view of philosophy separate from influential historical events, 
as it is out-dated to envision seventeenth-century philosophy as the point where 
ancient and medieval philosophy turned modern.33 Rather than just focusing on 
the ‘great epochs’, it is now acceptable to investigate the transitions between 
epistemai. That said, I believe it is useful to have not only a basic understanding 
of the foundations of sixteenth-century thought in regards to sense perception 
and truth, but also an idea of where it was headed by the time Descartes 
articulated many of these changes in the 1640s.34 As Sean McDowell reminds 
us, ‘[t]o write off the discourse of immaterial selfhood as merely a figment of the 
Cartesian mind/body split is to miss the varying degrees of embodiment 
described in the soul-body discourse of Elizabethan and Stuart England’.35 It is 
generally assumed that the ‘problem of knowledge’ is a fundamental question 
that forever followed the wake of the Cartesian cogito,36 but as will be discussed 
in greater depth in Chapter Four, earlier writers like Francis Bacon, arguably 
less prominent within the philosophical canon, were also rewriting frameworks 
of knowledge, reminding us that the ‘problem of knowledge’ was relevant before 
Cartesian articulation.37  
 
 
                                                       
33 Rutherford, The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, 3. 
34 As Tadié and Scholar remind us that Descartes’s world was, still, a fundamentally Aristotelian 
one: ‘We need to ascertain what characterises specifically modern philosophy as it is formulated in 
the 1630s: is it a new mechanistic explanation of nature, which breaks with Aristotelianism by way 
of its denial of final, material and formal causes and its assertion of the power of efficient causality 
alone, or is it a dogmatic and rational assertion that the real world in no way resembles the world 
that we perceive? The choice is perhaps less decisive than some historians of philosophy would have 
us believe. Why? Because for the philosophers in this pivotal decade, the assertion of the fictional 
character of the perceived world relies on an attempt to understand the production of our 
perceptions by means of a mechanistic explanation, within a framework that is still Aristotelian. We 
have not yet reached Berkeley’s intellectual universe: the hypothesis of a world of sensible qualities 
without any material substance as their external cause has not yet occurred to any serious 
philosopher. In other words, if Hobbes and Descartes do share a common view of sensible qualities 
as strictly representative of external objects, they also share the idea that the world made out of 
those sensible qualities is the result of a causal production by way of a perceptive mechanism’. Tadié 
and Scholar, Fiction and the Frontiers of Knowledge, 75. 
35 Sean McDowell, “The View from the Interior: The New Body Scholarship in Renaissance/Early 
Modern Studies”, Literature Compass, 3 (2006), 778-91, 787. 
36 Donald R. Kelley, History and the Disciplines: The Reclassification of Knowledge in Early Modern Europe 
(Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 1997), 3. 
37 Jean Bodin (1530-1596), Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) and other sixteenth-century thinkers 
were also concerned with this ‘problem of knowledge’. Ann Blair, “Bodin, Montaigne and the Role 
of Disciplinary Boundaries”, in Kelley, History and the Disciplines, 29. 
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Thinking With Shakespeare 
New Historicism and changes in approach to cultural history over the last 
several decades have, in spite of their shortcomings, opened doors for literary 
and non-literary texts to be read interchangeably.38 Shakespeare is often one of 
the first figures to receive thorough treatment from new critical perspectives, as 
his immovable position within the Western canon and his popularly held 
reputation as a ‘teller of truth’ contribute to a field constantly eager for 
reinterpretation.39 Shakespeare studies, therefore, offers a useful starting point 
for theories on interpretation and new ‘ways in’ to an artistic-historical text.40 As 
William Poole and Richard Scholar argue, Shakespeare’s works can be 
considered ‘philosophical’ in that they deal with ‘ethical, political, 
epistemological, and metaphysical matters of general human concern’.41 This 
view is shared by Lowell Gallagher and Shankar Raman, who further this idea 
by arguing that ‘[t]he fictive worlds anatomized on the early modern stage 
disclose a fundamental characteristic of skeptical reasoning: the renewed 
attention to sense perception as a problem … Correspondingly, natural 
philosophy examined with new urgency the question of whether human reason 
and sense perception could provide the criteria for certain and infallible 
knowledge’.42 Though Gallagher and Raman look to David Hume as the ‘logical 
end point of early modern discourses on the senses and cognition’, their study 
provides precedent that ‘[l]ooking back upon the early modern period from 
Hume’s perspective allows us to reassemble the body by starting with the senses 
and the forms of cognition, experience, and discernment they make available’.43 
                                                       
38 These movements have also given value to arts, objects, texts, and peoples that were previously 
marginalised in traditional history. For more on reading Shakespeare historically, see Lisa Jardine, 
Reading Shakespeare Historically, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 1996), 17. For the aims of cultural 
history, see Peter Burke, What is Cultural History? Second Edition (Malden: Polity, 2008). 
39 Shakespeare is often quoted in popular culture as a source of proven or time-tested wisdom, much 
in the same way the Bible and aphorisms attributed to Confucius are often used. 
40 For example, there has been excellent research as of late on Shakespeare and the senses and 
cognition: Holly Dugan, Shakespeare and the Senses; Bruce Smith, Phenomenal Shakespeare; Kinney, 
Shakespeare and Cognition; Craik and Pollard, Shakespearean Sensations. 
41 William Poole and Richard Scholar (eds.), Thinking with Shakespeare: Comparative and 
Interdisciplinary Essays (London: Legenda, 2007), 1. 
42 Lowell Gallagher and Shankar Raman (eds.), Knowing Shakespeare: Sense, Embodiment and Cognition 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 10. 
43 Unlike Descartes before him, Hume insists ‘on sense perception as the unmitigable basis for 
knowledge; his assertion of the veracity of belief produced by sensory impressions as the ground for 
rational judgement; his defence of a probabilistic knowledge resting on inductive inferences drawn 
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They aren’t asserting that Hume’s theories are pre-conceived in Shakespeare, 
but that contemporary scepticism of sense perception demonstrated how ‘the 
sixteenth-century revival of skepticism produced or reconstituted the senses as 
objects of inquiry and analysis’, in Shakespeare's plays, focusing on features of 
Humean scepticism which they believe ‘can be traced to the re-envisioning, over 
the course of the long sixteenth century, of knowledge and the role of the senses 
in its acquisition’.44 This thesis takes a similar approach in its use of late 
sixteenth-, early seventeenth-century domestic music, by examining their 
contribution to ongoing contemporary discussions on sense perception and the 
nature of reality and its representations, contributions that have implications for 
changes in approach to knowledge articulated by later philosophers. Poole and 
Scholar say that a useful investigation of Shakespearian literature’s greater 
philosophical attitudes relies on the belief that literature plays a unique role in 
wider philosophical discussions, which should be used in conjunction with non-
literary texts.45 They assert that one ‘understands literature best by placing it in 
dialogue with non-literary, philosophical modes of thinking … [and that] such a 
project is by no means “unhistorical”’.46 Though Poole and Scholar aptly point 
out that in order for such a dialogue to be fruitful, it must address what 
Shakespearian literature uniquely enhances within an understanding of 
seventeenth century intellectual development—mainly what fiction allows one 
to think and express, and how it does so.47  
 
The history of philosophy, particularly early modern philosophy, is 
written in terms of competing traditions and their recurrences; and 
notions such as ‘Shakespeare could not have thought that’ have come to 
seem overbold in terms of what is now emphasised about the rhetorical 
culture of Shakespeare’s age, a culture that prized disputation in utramque 
                                                                                                                                                              
from a posteriori experience of the world: these distinctive features of Humean skepticism can all be 
traced back to the re-envisioning, over the course of the long sixteenth century, of knowledge and 
the role of the senses in acquisition’. Gallagher and Raman (eds.), Knowing Shakespeare, 2-3. 
44 Ibid., 2, 7. 
45 ‘Philosophies’ in the loosely defined sense. This includes the questions raised by Shakespeare’s 
work that also relates to other modes of thinking (theology, law, natural philosophy, etc.). It also 
includes, however, instances of philosophising that engaged with recognisable philosophical 
traditions, while ‘at other times they appear innocent of any such frame of reference'. Poole and 
Scholar (eds.), Thinking with Shakespeare, 1, 3. 
46 Ibid., 3. 
47 Poole and Scholar (eds.), Thinking with Shakespeare, 3. 
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partem, the classroom-originating exercise on why Brutus was right to kill 
Caesar and why he was also wrong.48 
  
Poole and Scholar argue, as others in the fields of history and literature have 
before, that one can usefully reflect on philosophies in a Shakespearian text that 
were not yet codified in the playwright’s day.49 To Poole and Scholar, thinking 
with Shakespeare means ‘both thinking about the questions that Shakespeare’s 
work explores and thinking through the modes of their exploration’.50 The 
music considered in this dissertation is simply a part of a cultural and 
philosophical tapestry: negotiating, weaving, and reworking what would 
eventually and posteriorly be deemed ‘major epistemic change’. The important 
idea for this thesis, as it is for Gallagher and Raman, is that the relationship 
between the material under investigation and the eventual change in intellectual 
history is not a directly causal one, but one that simply demonstrates how 
fictions like the plays of Shakespeare (or domestic music) could participate in 
contemporary discourse that would become relevant to later change in theories of 
knowledge.51  
 
 
                                                       
48 ‘In both directions’. Ibid., 3. 
49 They argue that ‘the intellectual culture of Shakespeare’s age is robust enough to bear many 
speculations that we might too hastily deny it, and we can expect historical riches when we do so’. 
The people and concepts addressed in this thesis are ‘closer’ in time and place than, say a 
Kierkegaardian reading of a Shakespearian play, but nevertheless, I feel the need to address the 
main criticism of the ‘exterior approach’ to philosophy, wherein one might be tempted to imply that 
Shakespeare (or any composer, artist, etc.) ‘anticipated’ the later philosophical system. Though that 
kind of posterior philosophising certainly has its place, and indeed one could counter argue that all 
critical theory is doing this kind of posterior exterior philosophising, I’d like to reiterate that this is 
not the approach I am taking in this thesis. Nor am I, however, applying an explicitly interior 
approach that attempts to find a codified philosophy within a body of literary works. What Colin 
Burrow considers the ‘major pitfall of both approaches’ is the ‘extreme modes’ in which they 
operate. Both modes ‘operate on an understanding of aesthetics that concerns itself with art objects 
rather than artistic processes’. Colin Burrow, “Why Shakespeare is not Michelangelo” in Poole and 
Scholar (eds.), Thinking with Shakespeare, 11; Poole and Scholar (eds.), Thinking with Shakespeare, 3-4. 
50 For example, John Lee has argued that while Shakespeare was ‘profoundly Elizabethan in terms 
of style’, he was ‘also quite un-Elizabethan in the ways some of his dramatic persons … conceive of 
their identity’. To Lee, Hamlet is notable in that the character seems to have ‘found the materialist 
theories of his age unsatisfactory.’ John Lee, ‘Shakespeare, Human Nature, and English Literature’, 
Shakespeare, 5 (2009): 177-90, 184; Poole and Scholar (eds.), Thinking with Shakespeare, 2. 
51 Some have, however, taken the step to state that figures like Shakespeare outright anticipate 
philosophies articulated later by Descartes and Spinoza. Margherita Pascucci does this in her book 
Philosophical Readings of Shakespeare, but does so from a somewhat outlying philosophical perspective. 
She claims Descartes’s cogito can be seen as anticipated and also subverted in Hamlet’s self. 
Margherita Pascucci, Philosophical Readings of Shakespeare (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 8. 
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Descartes and Music 
In order to argue that music’s contribution to contemporary discussions on the 
nature of reality and its representation had implications for the theories of later 
philosophers, it seems necessary to at least demonstrate how music, more 
generally, affected the work of said philosophers. At the very least, this 
establishes an idea that could easily be assumed—that music making was an 
important and thought-provoking part of the daily life of philosophers like 
Descartes, as it was to so many of his contemporaries, throughout much of 
Europe.52 Though for this dissertation Descartes is only a benchmark within the 
philosophical canon, it is still worth mentioning that music played a role in his 
philosophical development, and at a time very much contemporaneous to this 
study. Earlier in his career, Descartes strove to understand music’s effects in 
mathematical terms, mostly based on the Platonic-Pythagorean idea of the 
harmony of the spheres. He wrote his Compendium Musicae in 1618, a 
preliminary methodology to the study of the senses, and the physical and 
psychological manifestations of music, setting the stage for his later work. As 
Dennis Sepper articulates, this treatise shows that ‘by late 1618 Descartes had 
already taken at least the first steps toward working out a theory of the 
communication of proportions from the external world to the senses’.53 As music 
could be conceived in mathematical terms, it seemed logical that music’s effects 
on the passions could also be understood in quantifiable measure, an important 
line of inquiry for his later work.54 Though Descartes had not yet shown his 
doubt of the reliability of the senses in this early work, he does determine that 
the reasons for differing opinions in music are not a physiological matter, but an 
                                                       
52 Perspectives on music by contemporary philosopher, Francis Bacon, will be discussed in greater 
depth at Ch. 2, 81-4. 
53 Descartes’s Compendium musicae was not published in English until 1653. Dennis L. Sepper, 
Descartes's Imagination: Proportion, Images, and the Activity of Thinking (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1996), 42.  
54 It was Descartes’s ‘radical doubt’, articulated in Meditation 1 that would later question the ability of 
sense perception in building knowledge. Descartes argues against an Aristotelian perception of 
knowledge as built off of what is perceived by the senses from the external world. Since one does 
not know what anything in the external world is like without sense perception, it is possible to doubt 
the external world. Descartes builds a clear distinction between appearance and reality, suggesting 
that the world may be nothing like how it appears, denying that the senses reveal the natures of 
substances. He determined that the human intellect is able to perceive the nature of reality through 
a purely intellectual intuition. René Descartes, Meditations and Other Metaphysical Writings, (ed.) 
Desmond M. Clarke (London: Penguin Books, 1998), xxix, xxx-xxxi.  
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emotional one, asserting the autonomy of the body and hinting at the finality of 
sense perception.55 As Larry Jorgensen argues, ‘[t]he way Descartes goes about 
his study of music represents a fundamental change in approach; he is moving 
away from a simple study of an object of sense perception towards a study of 
both the object and the observer’.56 Reasons for the anomaly of the self in an 
otherwise material world motivated and evaded philosophers throughout the 
seventeenth century, a discourse that pervaded many types of artistic and 
pseudo-artistic creation. The quality of the self remained, in an otherwise 
observable, measurable world, elusive. 
 Jairo Moreno’s Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects: The Construction of 
Musical Thought in Zarlino, Descartes, Rameau, and Weber (2004) includes a chapter 
with an insightful interpretation of Descartes’s Compendium Musicae. He argues 
that a) the work in Compendium Musicae is fundamentally aesthetic and could be 
thought of as a theory of representation, and b) ‘[a]t stake is not the nature of 
the object (e.g., whether or not time in music might fit with Aristotelian 
categories of substance, quality, quantity, relation, and so on), but rather the 
manner in which that object can be truthfully known … we may say, then, that 
the Compendium and the Rules share a conception of the subject that is 
determined by the epistemological requisite of truth defined as 
certainty’.57 Moreover, Moreno’s interpretation of Descartes’s writing 
demonstrates a consideration of the ephemeral nature of an experience of sense 
                                                       
55 Bertrand Augst, “Descartes's Compendium on Music”, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 26, No. 1 
(Jan.-Mar., 1965), 119-132, 121. 
56 Larry M. Jorgensen, “Descartes on Music: Between the Ancients and the Aestheticians”, British 
Journal of Aesthetics, 2012 52: 407-424, 410.  
57 Moreno says that questions about perception and its representation in the Rules and Le monde 
‘strongly echo a concern made explicit by Descartes at the very opening of the Compendium, where 
he tersely states, “of this [music] the object is sound” (huius objectum est sonos). 
Uncompromisingly programmatic, the statement not only proclaims the centrality of the external, 
physical, and empirical manifestation of sound to his inquiry about music, but also, albeit indirectly, 
makes of perception the fundamental issue about knowledge of music … the Compendium is at heart 
a treatise on aesthetics (understood mainly as a theory of sense perception but one that is dependent 
on a theory of beauty). The Compendium, however, has a broader agenda: (1) the mathematical and 
physical explanation of sound; (2) the nature of sensory perception and the explanation of the 
pleasure afforded to the sense of hearing; (3) an account of the rules of counterpoint and a theory of 
modes.’ Moreno, Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects, 55, 67. 
 50 
perception, which resonates with my phenomenological suggestions.58 
Additionally, Moreno discerns that  
 
Descartes’s manoeuvre entails the intentional representation of sensorial 
experience by the subject’s imagination. Representation by (not merely in) 
the imagination does not constitute a less real and secondary enactment of 
something more authentically experienced without mediation. This 
understanding of perception carries an interesting extrapolation, namely, 
that an unmediated sensorial experience might be intrinsically deficient. It 
would follow then that all perceptions must become virtual apperception.59  
 
Such a reading of Descartes’s work is useful in connecting my close readings of 
domestic music texts (and music in general) to larger issues on the source and 
quality of truth, as well as to my later discussions on the relationship between 
music and imagination.60 To be clear, I am not suggesting that this early work 
by Descartes was read in England around the time of its original creation, as 
evidence remains elusive either way, but rather that it is at least worth 
acknowledging the role that music played more generally in his formative work. 
Moreover, Compendium musicae reminds us that even Descartes was raised with 
the same Aristotelian assumptions as the late sixteenth-century figures 
considered throughout this thesis, though it was he who eventually articulated 
the radical doubt that challenged that worldview. 
 
 
                                                       
58 As Moreno reasons, ‘Aristotle attributes to the imagination a processual character, as does 
Descartes when he establishes the imagination as a cognitive conduit bringing together sense 
experience and the intellect. Similarly Descartes’s account suggests that in dealing with musical time 
the senses can offer only fragmentary account of experience, and so he assigns to the imagination 
the responsibility of synthesising the metric proportions in music. Significantly the synthesis that 
takes place in the imagination does not negate the fact that the “whole melody”, in Descartes’s 
expression, remains a sonorous and sensorial experience, however much it may be mediated by a 
mental activity and expressed in the language of musical proportions. Descartes’s account also 
suggests that he might have been interested in addressing the evanescence intrinsic to our 
experience of music, albeit indirectly, and thus he summons the imagination to apprehend it in a 
single act of perceptual cognition. An intentional agent, the imagination elevates the immediacy of 
sensorial experience to a higher cognitive plane’. Ibid., 65; for more on phenomenology, see 
Introduction, 30-35; Conclusion, 233.  
59 Ibid., 65-66. 
60 For more on imagination, see Ch. 2, 84-88.  
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1.1 Harmony of the Spheres: Mechanical 
and Metaphorical  
 
This next section will look at various components of music that contributed to 
contemporary frameworks of knowledge. Though each of these topics are 
capable of filling a dissertation of their own, these summaries should provide the 
necessary context for my later arguments on music’s role in debates about sense 
perception, the body, and the passions.61 In John Dowland’s 1609 translation of 
Andreas Ornithoparchus’s Micrologvs (1519), Dowland translated ‘[t]he worlds 
musicke is an Harmonie caused by the motion of the starres, and violence of the 
Spheres’.62 He goes on to explain that even though we cannot hear proof of this 
'Harmonie' with our human ears, we can know it is true through its reflection in 
earthly weight, number, and proportion, as created by God, reflecting the idea 
of the harmony of the spheres. As Christopher Marsh summarises, ‘[t]he “music 
of the spheres” was an ancient concept, strongly associated in western 
philosophy with Pythagoras and Boethius. In its revised Christian form, it 
clearly remained something of a commonplace during the early modern period, 
despite Francis Bacon’s scepticism concerning the “Mysticall Subtleties” that 
had dominated musical theory for so long’.63 According to Claude Palisca, in 
‘the dominant view at the beginning of the sixteenth century, music existed to 
give pleasure and solace while leading people to moral behavior. This view was 
handed down by Plato … Music pleases us because its form resembles the 
structure of the human soul’.64 As will be seen in examples introduced at a later 
point, this conception of music’s mechanics was frequently echoed in plays, 
musical paratexts, and other readily consumed written records.65 Musical 
                                                       
61 I discuss the mechanics and affects of sense perception and the passions in much greater detail in 
Chapter Two. One point to keep in mind, however, is that, in Rutherford’s words, ‘during the early 
modern period, “philosophy” does not designate a unitary enterprise’. As we will see time and again 
in this study, ‘[b]oth diachronically and synchronically, [philosophy] is a constellation of loosely 
related investigations of fundamental questions about nature, humanity, and God’. ⁠ Rutherford (ed.), 
The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, 7. 
62 Andreas Ornithoparchus, Ornithoparcvs His Micrologvs, or Introdvction: Containing the Art of Singing 
(trans.) John Dowland (London: printed for Thomas Adams, 1609), sig.C1r.  
63 Marsh, Music and Society in Seventeenth Century England, 40. 
64 Palisca, Music and Ideas, 9, 13. 
65 For example Thomas Tomkis’s play Lingua (1607); Ch. 2, 75-77.  
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metaphor became the preferred language to describe the ideal society.66 But the 
mechanics behind how music interacted with the body and soul was 
complicated, as it was related to another unknown relationship, that of the body 
and soul alone.67 Yet, as will be discussed in Chapter Two, music seemed to 
have a particular way of presenting problems of body and soul, one related to 
the mechanics and reliability of sense perception, and their relationship to the 
passions.68  
I am certainly not the first to recognise something special about the years 
around 1600 in terms of its pivotal position in the trajectory of the arts’ role in 
the history of ideas and the so-called Scientific Revolution. Elizabeth Spiller 
also recognises this time period as one in which art accumulated status as a form 
that could produce knowledge.69 Regarding music and fiction more specifically, 
Erin Minear has also observed, as I will explain in greater detail in Chapter 
Two, that the late sixteenth century was a peculiar time for the nature of sound 
and its implications for worldly truths: ‘Shakespeare and Milton wrote during a 
time of transition, where the ancient Pythagorean conception of the universe, 
with its harmoniously ordered spheres and its concordant microcosms and 
macrocosms, contended with new theories about the nature of sound and the 
structure of the world’.70 Though the terms through which music was discussed 
remained fundamentally Platonic-Pythagorean throughout the early Stuart 
period, because the New Science challenged many assumptions about the 
nature of the world, Minear detects a rhetorical shift that reflects an uneasiness 
with the old assumptions about the Harmony of the Spheres, even as writers 
continued to demonstrate an understanding of music in those terms.71 She 
                                                       
66 See quotation by Thomas Elyot, Ch. 2, 189.  
67 For my definitions and uses of the terms ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ see Ch. 2, 77.  
68 As Palisca notes, in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, sound still had a place in 
physical reality, as ‘Aristotle … defined sound as motion, and the Pythagorean tradition [was one in 
which] musical sound was sonorous number’. As universal harmony became more of a metaphor to 
thinkers like Johannes Kepler, Marin Mersenne, Athanasius Kircher, and Galileo Galilei, 
philosophers began to believe that ‘sound had no physical reality outside the consciousness of 
hearing animals’, an idea that contradicted the theories of Aristotle and Pythagoras, yet helped to 
ease some of the mind-body problems presented by music. Palisca, Music and Ideas, 27. 
69 Spiller, Science, Reading, and Renaissance Literature, 2-3. 
70 Erin Minear, Reverberating Song in Shakespeare and Milton: Language, Memory, and Musical 
Representation (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 2. 
71 For example, John Donne wrote ‘God made this whole world in such uniformity, such a 
correspondency, such a concinnity of parts, as that it was an Instrument, perfectly in tune’, John 
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determines that ‘[t]he connection between earthly music and heavenly 
“harmony,” never entirely certain, was on the verge of a breakdown at the end 
of the sixteenth century, but even as the conception of the harmonious cosmos 
lingered between the literal and the figurative: a half-dead metaphor still 
possessed of an insistent, and sometimes uncanny, life’.72 This reminds us of the 
importance of interpretation in reading early modern ‘scientific’ texts of all 
sorts, as continued use of older rhetoric is not necessarily an indication of 
unquestioned faith or an acceptance of literal meaning. As Spiller says, ‘[o]nce 
science is understood as a practice for creating knowledge, the textual qualities 
to scientific texts cannot simply be understood as secondary to the scientific 
work that is at stake. Everything that comprises the physical existence of the 
text—its literary and rhetorical strategies; its illustrative and textual practices; 
the authors and the readers who create knowledge by making sense in and 
through texts—are expressions of the same practices for creating knowledge that 
define science itself’.73   
 
 Ancient Origins: Legacies of Aristotle and Plato 
Though Renaissance understandings of physical and mental processes were 
generally of Aristotelian or Neoplatonic origin, one must keep in mind that early 
modern cognisance of these philosophies was rather different from their 
‘original’ form or how one might philosophise about them today.74 Even if an 
early modern writer did directly read the works of Aristotle and Plato, whether 
in Greek or in translation, often their interpretations were not in line with 
modern analyses, or even necessarily consistent with other readings of their own 
                                                                                                                                                              
Donne, A Lent Sermon Preached at Whitehall February 12, 1618 as quoted in Marsh, Music and Society in 
Seventeenth-Century England, 44. Even those who were highly suspicious of all the metaphoric arts, 
like Richard Braithwaite, resorted to musical metaphor when describing the body-soul relationship: 
'I will reserue that moderate care for the health of my bodie, that like a good instrument, it may euer 
yeeld cheer|full musick to the eare of my soule'. Richard Braithwaite, Essaies vpon the fiue senses 
(London: printed by E. G[riffin], 1620), sig.H3r. Also see, Marsh, Music and Society in Seventeenth-
Century England, 35. 
72 Minear, Reverberating Song in Shakespeare and Milton, 2. 
73 Spiller, Science, Reading, and Renaissance Literature, 5. 
74 Even modern philosophers, for example, find it is essentially impossible to agree on a single 
‘Platonic view’ of the soul. 
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time.75 More often, it was through reading Ancient-influenced continental 
treatises on the arts, sense perception, and related topics, that English writers 
acquired their understanding of the processes.76 As Anne Sheppard has pointed 
out, continental writers often read Neoplatonist texts from late-antiquity that 
combined Aristotelian and Platonic ideas.77 From these basic conceptions, 
continental writers selected aspects of various sources in a way that fit their 
requirements, and indeed Neoplatonists often saw little difference between 
Aristotle and Plato on many fundamental epistemological matters.78 Many of the 
early modern anecdotes by composers and others writing on music speak in 
generalised platitudes that reflect this broad understanding of ancient 
epistemology.79 Therefore, the following is not an assessment of Aristotelian or 
Platonic writing directly, but an outline of a more general Renaissance 
understanding of ancient wisdom via basic sixteenth- and early seventeenth-
century English conceptions of Aristotelian and Platonic sense perception.80 
                                                       
75 The first English translations of the seminal works by these philosophers do not appear in English 
until around 1600, it is thought. Lawrence D. Green, John Rainold's Oxford Lectures on Aristotle's 
Rhetoric (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1986), 12. Susan James describes how Classical 
philosophy was adapted by philosophers like Thomas Aquinas to be made compatible with the idea 
of a Christian God. James, Passion and Action, 47-64.  
76 Katharine A. Craik and Tanya Pollard (eds.), Shakespearean Sensations: Experiencing Literature in 
Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 12. 
77 Anne Sheppard, The Poetics of Phantasia: Imagination in Ancient Aesthetics (London: Bloomsbury, 
2014), 48. 
78 Svetla Slaveva-Griffin, Pauliina Remes (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism (New York: 
Routledge, 2014), 266. 
79 For example, composer Robert Jones wrote: ‘Plato and Aristotle, the profoundest of their times, 
thought the best education to bee defectiue, without knowledge in Musicke, and Cicero reporteth, 
that although Themistocles was endowed with many graces, yet was hee the lesse esteemed, being 
ignorant thereof, and such regard hath all antiquity had thereto that wee not onely find them to 
loue, but practise it, for amongst the rest, Saint Augustine recordeth that S. Ambrose Bishoppe 
of Millan, who ouerwatcht the Church, (then vnder persecution of the Arrians) intertainde the time 
with songes and Musicke, and though the death of Nero, was exceeding ioyfull to the people, yet was 
it much lamented, that his excellency in Musicke, should perish with him’. Robert Jones, The First 
Set Of Madrigals, of 3.4.5.6.7.8. Parts (London: Printed by Iohn Windet, 1607), sig.A2r-A3v. Another 
example of the vague way Ancient knowledge was used is demonstrated by Robert Burton in his 
Anatomy of Melancholy: ‘[m]any men are melancholy by hearing musicke, but it is a pleasant 
melancholy that it causeth, and therefore to such as are discontent, in woe, feare, sorrow, or 
deiected, it is a most present remedy, it expells cares, alters their grieued minds, and easeth in an 
instant. Otherwise, saith Plutarch, Musica magis dementat quam vinum. Musicke makes some men mad; 
like Astolphos horne in Ariosto: and Theophrastus right well prophecied, that diseases were either made 
by Musicke, or mittigated.’ Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy … (Oxford: Printed by Iohn 
Lichfield and Iames Short, 1621), sig.Aa5r. 
80 As Dmitri Levitin cautions, ‘[t]o turn texts into “ideologies” and then to chart the play of 
ideologies through various periods is tempting: it brings a familiarity to the material, and allows far 
easier descriptions of philosophical “traditions” and their development through centuries of textual 
Renégotiation. But this is to ignore specificity of reception, and the fact that readers, in our case, 
seventeenth-century Englishmen and women, have unique and contingent attitudes towards 
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Though one could argue that many of these early-seventeenth century English 
conversations on the Ancients were derivative or indeed bastardisations of 
continental treatises and classical texts, Penelope Gouk concludes that in spite 
of this, the ‘Cartesian synthesis’ which was born from this type of questioning of 
the relationship between the senses, the soul, and body nevertheless ‘knitted 
together threads from numerous existing intellectual traditions … [and still] 
radically altered the terms of discourse from the middle of the century’ even in 
England.81  
  Early moderns looked to the ancients to comprehend many aspects of 
knowledge: for an understanding of the quality of knowledge (and its 
relationship to sense perception), to understand the mechanics of sense 
perception, and to understand the function of artistic representations (mimesis) 
and its potential for building truth. Though a full discussion is outside the focus 
of this study, in the simplest terms, the main difference between the two 
philosophers is in their approach to knowledge building: Aristotle believed that 
the intellect had no innate ideas, and one could not know anything that was not 
first received by the external senses.82 To Plato, however, ‘the senses provided 
us with no more than shadows in contrast to the reality of Forms or innate 
Ideas’.83 Plato believed the senses have the potential to lead one astray from true 
knowledge, whereas Aristotle understood that, in Alice Sanger and Siv Tove 
Kulbrandstad Walker’s words, ’knowledge and virtue may be gained by the 
correct application for their potential’.84 Therefore, to Aristotle (as discussed in 
                                                                                                                                                              
philosophical texts’. Dmitri Levitin, Ancient Wisdom in the Age of the New Science: Histories in the 
Philosophy of England, c. 1640-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 4. One should 
not, however, discount the influence of medieval beliefs about sense perception as well. Medieval 
Christians were highly sceptical of the senses, believing that it was through them that sin penetrated 
the body. Simonds, Myth, Emblem, and Music in Shakespeare’s Cymbeline, 300. 
81 Penelope Gouk, “Some English Theories of Hearing in the Seventeenth Century: Before and after 
Descartes” in Charles Burnett, Michael Fend, and Penelope Gouk (eds.), The Second Sense: Studies in 
Hearing and Musical Judgement from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century (London: The Warburg 
Institute, 1991), 96. 
82 Palisca, Music and Ideas, 47; Simonds, Myth, Emblem, and Music in Shakespeare’s Cymbeline, 301. 
83 Plato argued his stance in Book VII of The Republic through the Parable of the Cave. As Simonds 
explains, ‘Here the soul or mind is shown figuratively to reside within a dark cave, which is 
analogous to the body. Since the soul receives information only through the imperfect senses, any 
knowledge it acquires can be no more than opinion’. To Plato, Truth lies beyond sensory 
appearances and can only be accessed by the trained elite through philosophical dialectic. Simonds, 
Myth, Emblem, and Music in Shakespeare’s Cymbeline, 301. 
84 Sanger and Walker explain, ‘[t]o Renaissance thinkers, as to the Ancients, the senses were the 
keys that unlocked the doors of knowledge but, as such, they provided potentially hazardous 
 56 
Poetics), the catharsis provided by the mimetic arts made them worthy pursuits 
(‘productive sciences’).85 Conversely, there was no need for poets or poetry in 
Plato’s The Republic86 and Plato takes what Gouk calls a ‘strongly prescriptive 
attitude toward the role and function of music in society’.87 But as John 
Cocking cautions, Plato's attitude on art ‘is neither simple nor obviously 
consistent’.88  
 Consequently, early modern analyses of both Plato and Aristotle could be 
interpreted or selected to suit the needs of the writer. Those who wished to 
defend the passions looked to Aristotle, ‘for he recognized their importance to 
oratory, music, and poetry.89 As Palisca explains, ‘[in] the Politics, [Aristotle] 
observed how the passions could be moved and purged through music, and in 
the Poetics through tragedy’.90 On the other hand, Neoplatonic mistrust of the 
senses sat well with Protestant or indeed Puritanical suspicion of the senses. For 
example, Sussman notes the ‘uncanny affinity’ between Plato, Luther, and 
Calvin, though he doesn’t provide exact links.91 The general conception, 
however, was that poets (and by extension most any art) seduced their listeners 
with pleasure, corrupting their souls.92 Neoplatonic epistemology believed, as 
John Rastell wrote in 1530 that, ‘the soule of man’ had ‘knowledge … and 
understanding … without any helpe of the bodye or any of hys v sences’,93 
leaving little space for the arts in the creation of true knowledge. Still, 
                                                                                                                                                              
conduits for temptation and sin. Commentators recognised their collaborative capabilities as 
channels between body and mind/soul. Aristotle taught that sensations were not condemnable in 
themselves … “for both too much exercise and too little ruin one’s strength, and likewise too much 
food or drink and too little ruin one’s health”. In his estimation, the same held true for “temperance, 
courage and the other virtues”’. Alice Sanger and Siv Tove Kulbrandstad Walker (eds.), Sense and 
the Senses in Early Modern Art and Cultural Practice (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), 6-7. 
85 For a summary of Aristotelian and early modern English perceptions of catharsis see Alice Lotvin 
Birney, Satiric Catharsis in Shakespeare: A Theory of Dramatic Structure (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1973), 4-10.  
86 Donald R. Kelley and David Harris Sacks (eds.), The Historical Imagination in Early Modern Britain 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 3. 
87 Penelope Gouk, “Newton and music: From the microcosm to the macrocosm”, International Studies 
in the Philosophy of Science, 1:1 (1986): 36-59, 38. 
88 Cocking explains, ‘For Plato, art improves its status as it moves away from naked feeling to moral 
judgment and uses its spell-binding power to promote virtue rather than to awaken thrills’. John 
Cocking, Imagination: A Study in the History of Ideas (London: Routledge, 1991), 2, 7. 
89 Palisca, Music and Ideas, 182. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Sussman, The Aesthetic Contract, 42.  
92 Toon can Hourdt, Jan L. de Jong, Zoran Kwak et al. (eds.), On the Edge of Truth and Honesty: 
Principles and Strategies of Fraud and Deceit in the Early Modern Period (Boston: Brill, 2002), 13. 
93 John Rastall, A new boke of purgatory … (London: printed by John Rastall, 1530), sig.C4v.  
 57 
Neoplatonists (perhaps understandably) sought a way to justify participation in 
passionate experiences. According to Simonds, ‘Renaissance Neoplatonists 
attempted to combine these two incompatible views’ to ‘save’ the senses so that 
‘artists can exploit it as a vehicle for truth’, further muddying early modern 
conceptions of ancient wisdom.94 In any case, ‘the problem of the senses as 
easily duped and yet as necessary sources of information for the soul was 
constantly debated during the Renaissance and depicted through the various 
arts in England’.95 
Contemporary discussions on the relationship between perception, 
representation, and reality took form through discussions of imagination.96 The 
internal sense of imagination (phantasia) was central to Aristotle’s view of 
mental processes.97 Even competing Neoplatonic ideas about sense perception 
(which tended to divide perception between the intellective and the sensual) 
placed imagination as a mediator between the two.98 As Stuart Clark claims, 
‘[w]hat was new in early modern theoretical psychology gave the imagination a 
unity and a uniqueness that were impossible in the context of late medieval 
Aristotelianism … it became the single mediator between the incorporeal soul 
and the corporeal human body’.99 Consequently, imagination has had a 
remarkable presence in recent scholarship on the early modern period, from 
                                                       
94 Simonds, Myth, Emblem, and Music in Shakespeare’s Cymbeline, 302. 
95 We will see this attention to the idea of sense perception in several musical case studies in this 
thesis. For more on Renaissance Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism, see C. B. Schmitt, Aristotle and 
the Renaissance (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983); G.H.R Parkinson (ed.), The 
Renaissance and Seventeenth‐Century Rationalism (London: Routledge, 1993), 16–69; E. Kessler, “The 
Transformation of Aristotelianism during the Renaissance”, in S. Hutton and J. Henry (eds.), New 
Perspectives on Renaissance Thought: Essays in the History of Science, Education and Philosophy; In Memory of 
Charles B. Schmitt (London: Duckworth, 1990), 137–47; Verena Olejniczak Lobsien, Transparency 
and Dissimulation: Configurations of Neoplatonism in Early Modern English Literature (Berlin: De Gruyter, 
2010); James Deotis Roberts, From Puritanism to Platonism in Seventeenth-Century England (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968); Sears Jayne, Plato in Renaissance England (Berlin: Springer-Science 
+ Business Media, 1995). 
96 As Robert Jones explains in his A Musicall Dreame (1609), his music was ‘set forth for pleasure, not 
for purposed poyson to infect imagination, no, but as a showre falling in a needfull season’. Robert 
Jones, A Musicall Dreame. Or the Fovrth Booke of Ayres … (London: printed by Iohn Windet, 1609), 
sig.A3v.  
97 To Aristotle, imagination was vital to dreaming, the grasp of universals, perceiving, thinking, and 
was an essential step before memory. The internal senses are described in more detail in Chapter 
Two. 
98 Stuart Clark, Vanities of the Eye: Vision in Early Modern Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 43. 
99 Ibid.  
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nearly every historical discipline.100 Though imagination was a crucial part of 
early modern understanding of psychological processes, it has since been 
recognised as a fundamental part of the contemporary worldview.101 That said, 
while contemporaries knew of and wrote about imagination’s importance, they 
were also wary of its deceitful properties.102 As Daniel Tuvil said in his Essaies 
politicke, and morall (1608), imagination could be a ‘deceitfull Counsellor, seeking 
to blinde the eyes of the Iudge’.103 As will be discussed more in Chapter Two, it 
was imagination’s duty to translate sense impressions from the external world 
into mental images for ratio to cogitate.104 As imagination was capable of both 
building knowledge and deception, Francis Bacon concluded, in consonance 
with Aristotle, that imagination, therefore, must be firmly controlled by 
reason.105 As David Novitz points out, this understanding of our relationship 
with imagination was uneasy, as it presented an inherent challenge: 
 
For to insist that our knowledge of nature is the product of our own fanciful 
imaginings is to allow that what we know, like what we say, does not 
straightforwardly reflect a settled reality. And it is but a short step from this 
to many varieties of irrationalism—whether it be cast-iron solipsism, a lapse 
into inarticulateness, or, which is the same, a surrender to a radical and 
indefensible relativism.106  
 
Many texts from this period, as we shall see, reflect this uneasy relationship 
with imagination.107 And as will be discussed in Chapter Two, one of the most 
thought-provoking aspects of imagination manifested in dreaming, where one 
could imagine things one had never before seen in waking life, triggering 
                                                       
100 This has reflected recent scholarly interest in fictions and emotions, even in relation to 
unexpected areas, like mechanical invention. See Jonathan Sawday, Engines of the Imagination: 
Renaissance Culture and the Rise of the Machine (London: Routledge, 2007). See also, Meek and Sullivan 
(eds.), The Renaissance of Emotion, 3.  
101 Clark, Vanities of the Eye, 43. 
102 Cocking, Imagination, viii. 
103 Daniel Tuvil, Essaies politicke, and morall (London: printed by Humphrey Lownes, 1608), sig.D1r.  
104 Cocking, Imagination, viii.  
105 Ibid., xi. 
106 David Novitz, Knowledge, Fiction & Imagination (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 3. 
107 In Shakespeare’s words from A Midsummer Night’s Dream (1600), ‘imagination bodies forth, / The 
forms of things unknown’ (V.i.14-15), as it was through imaginative processing that the mind was 
able to conceive of things a person had never experienced; something both wondrous and a bit 
scary. 
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fundamental questions about the line between imagination and reality.108 
Imagination was both an essential part of discerning truth, but also the most 
convincing source of falsity—an uneasy gateway through which our perceptions 
must pass before knowledge about the world can be built.109  
 
Humanism, Protestantism, Travel, and the New Science 
The following section considers some of the major ‘events’ or intellectual 
currents of the sixteenth century (and earlier) that contributed to the worldview 
of the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the advent of the so-called 
New Science. As Ian Green has observed, perceptions of early modern English 
humanism have changed markedly in recent decades.110 Moreover, what Tudor 
humanism’s effects were on politics and religious happenings has proved 
difficult to determine.111 In spite of the vastness of this complex topic, however, 
it is worth highlighting a few points from recent scholarship. As Jonathan 
Woolfson says, ‘[w]ith its origins deep in the Middle Ages, [humanism] was 
predicated on the recovery, assimilation, reinterpretation and dissemination of 
the textual remains of antiquity; and from Italy it spread in the fifteenth century 
all over Europe, including to England’.112 The spread of humanism was greatly 
influenced by the advent of the printing press with moveable type in Germany 
                                                       
108 For more on dreaming, see Ch. 2, 102.  
109 Though Gallagher and Raman remind us that Aristotelianism was not the only relevant mode of 
thought in early Stuart England, as ‘Biblical tradition covered a wide range of devotional and 
mystical idioms that mobilized variously spiritualized senses of sensation. Notably, Shakespeare’s 
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of the mystical envelope surrounding and penetrating the human sensorium … these legacies, 
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named important branches of the era’s lingua franca of sensory experience.’ Gallagher and Raman 
(eds.), Knowing Shakespeare, 5. 
110 For example, recent scholarship has been less tempted to produce a single unified ‘humanist 
movement’ across Europe. Historiographical changes in approach to humanism are explained in 
detail in Ian Green, Humanism and Protestantism in Early Modern English Education (Abingdon: 
Ashgate, 2009), 9-11. 
111 Some, like James McConica (1965) and Douglas Bush (1939) believed that the Protestant 
Reformation in northern Europe was an extension of humanist movements, whilst earlier scholars 
like Frederic Seebohm (1867) thought the Reformation displaced humanism altogether. For a more 
complete overview of recent scholarship on humanism in England, see Mary Thomas Crane, “Early 
Tudor Humanism” in Michael Hattaway (ed.), A New Companion to English Renaissance Literature and 
Culture (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2000), 13-26. 
112 Jonathan Woolfson (ed.), Reassessing Tudor Humanism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 
1. 
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(around the 1450s).113 According to Mary Thomas Crane, English humanism 
began to emerge in the fifteenth century and northern European humanism was 
exemplified in English grammar schools. Crane explains that the humanist 
pedagogical method was ‘especially appealing to Christian humanists … 
because it provided a way to make classical literature more compatible with 
Christianity’.114 It is well known that one of the most influential early figures in 
the Italian humanist movement was fourteenth-century writer Francesco 
Petrarca (Petrarch), a scholar whose poetic style was the impetus for the 
madrigal form in Italy as well as in its later English counterpart. English poets 
from Chaucer to Thomas Wyatt copied Petrarch and later poets like Sidney 
imitated Italian poetic style.115 I support Crane’s conclusion that humanist 
institutions influenced the course of late Tudor thought as ‘humanism in 
sixteenth-century England effectively shaped practices of reading, writing, and 
thought as well as the ways in which subjects imagined themselves and their 
social and political roles’.116 Though a full argument in support of this assertion 
is outside the scope of this project, it is worth noting that with humanism came a 
sort of cultural relativism: Petrarch in his On His Own Ignorance (1367) said, ‘I 
certainly believe that Aristotle was a great man who knew much, but he was a 
human and could well be ignorant of some things, even of a great many 
things’.117 This relativism reassessed the ancients as fallible humans. Also, as has 
been noted before, humanist approaches to the self meshed well with 
Protestantism’s ‘inward turn’.118  
 The Protestant Reformation certainly shook one foundation of truth for 
Christian Europeans, that much can be assumed. Its effects were practical, 
philosophical, physical, theological, political, and physiological. Of relevance to 
                                                       
113 Crane in Hattaway (ed.), A New Companion to English Renaissance Literature and Culture, 93. 
114 Crane also explains the general differences between the Northern and Italian iterations of 
humanism. Ibid., 98. 
115 Doughtie, English Renaissance Song, 80. 
116 Crane in Hattaway (ed.), A New Companion to English Renaissance Literature and Culture, 92. 
117 Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, John Herman Randall (eds.), The Renaissance Philosophy of 
Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 74. 
118 It has been suggested that the ‘inward turn of Protestantism may have facilitated the increasing 
preoccupation with the contents of the mind. In this respect, it may not be accidental the René 
Descartes was a student of William Ames at the University of Franeker in the 1620s’. William A. 
Dyrness, Reformed Theology and Visual Culture: The Protestant Imagination from Calvin to Edwards 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 5.   
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this study is the effect of Protestantism on the conception of the self, and the self 
in relation to the physical and spiritual realm. Though the effect of the 
Reformation on selfhood is too vast a topic to cover thoroughly here, I must still 
acknowledge the Reformation’s contribution to the development of the 
seventeenth-century European self.119 Henry Sussman puts forth the theory that 
Protestantism ‘becomes one way of naming the modern ideological framework 
in which an individual and collective subject is engulfed and tormented by a 
freedom that has either been won or foisted upon it’.120 Perceptively, he 
ascertains that ‘[t]he issue of the Protestant Reformation that plays a role in this 
study, then, is not so much the genesis of a new religious or ethnic category as it 
is the removal of a substantial system of mediation with the 
Transcendental’.121 When the human body and spirit can communicate directly 
with God, it inevitably provokes questions of human agency, the quality of the 
soul, and the soul’s relationship with its fleshly body: in short, mind-body 
problems. Subjectivity is, in Sussman’s words, the ‘the sense of individuality, 
autonomy, discretion, and agency held by [a] person’, all concepts echoed in the 
rhetoric of Protestantism.122 As will be discussed later, the Reformation had 
powerful implications for the sensory experience of worship, as Protestants 
removed or downplayed sounds, smells, tastes, and other sensory aspects of 
churchgoing.123 This, of course, included debate over the place of music in 
worship, and its capacity to motivate morality or incite sin.124 On the grand 
scale, Diarmaid MacCulloch has made the influential case that the Protestant 
reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation were among the great 
discontinuities in European and world history, events that changed forever not 
only religion, but politics, thought, society and culture, at all levels. 
                                                       
119 However the Reformation surely influenced domestic music for worship at home, apparent not 
only in Catholic publications for home use like Byrd’s Masses, but also in works like Martin 
Peerson’s Mottcts, or grauve chamber musicke (1630). 
120 Sussman, The Aesthetic Contract, 36. 
121 Ibid., 38. 
122 Ibid., 3. 
123 See Ch. 2, 72.  
124 The threat to the metaphoric arts like music were two-fold, as those who support music’s benefits 
had to argue with both Puritanical Protestantism, as well as Plato. See Ch. 1, 53-59.  
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MacCulloch’s scholarship is innovative in that it stresses the power of ideas, 
rather than politics alone, as a motivator of change.125  
 Another ‘event’ that influenced conceptions of knowledge building in this 
period was foreign travel and its accompanying discovery.126 Jonathan Sell 
argues that the move towards empiricism was symptomatic of the onset of 
scientific materialism—obviously and symbiotically linking science with 
discovery, meaning public interest in travel was very much connected to the 
shift towards observation as the foundation of scientific inquiry.127 If changes in 
ways of knowing begin as improvisations around incongruities in life, it is 
understandable that the ‘discovery’ of the New World and the wondrous 
treasures (both real and imagined) brought back from the long and treacherous 
journeys at sea were a persuasive and inspirational source of curious 
contradiction, as travel inspired new ways of establishing truth based on 
observation or experience, but also spawned many travel accounts of dubious 
truth-content.128 Tara Pedersen notes ‘that sea voyages and their sometimes 
fantastic accounts, be they the explicit written records of journeys or artefacts 
gathered/encountered on those journeys, became critical to Europeans both in 
terms of their marketability and as an “important epistemological model for 
knowing” in a world where the lines between the new science, travel, patronage, 
and the marvellous/exotic were becoming increasingly economically complex’.129 
To demonstrate this, one only need glance at an early modern world map to 
                                                       
125 Diarmaid MacCulloch, Reformation: Europe’s House Divided 1490– 1700 (London: Penguin, 2003), as 
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(Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), 28.  
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visualise the melding of ideas about the Americas that much of Europe 
experienced during this period of exploration. Giacomo Gastaldi and Matteo 
Pagano’s 1550 world map shows North America and Asia joined by a land 
bridge, complete with lions and elephants depicted in what would be Canada 
(see Fig 1.1). 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Giacomo Gastaldi and Matteo Pagano, ‘Dell Vniversale’ c. 1550. 
Used with permission from British Library Maps C7.c.17. 
 
A merman with a shield swims off the coast of modern-day Burma (Myanmar); 
a crocodile-like creature dips, mouth agape, south east of Madagascar; a 
reptilian unicorn is placed near Peru; and a dragon-like serpent west of 
Antarctica. There is also a group of humanoid figures (possibly angels?) that 
appear to be riding (maybe battling, as two figures have raised clubs) atop two 
more mermen. Framing the map, famous cosmographers and explorers, holding 
the tools of their trade, are set upon clouds as if looking down on the world 
from heaven, including Columbus, Ptolemy, Marco Polo, and Strabone. A 
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woman bearing a glowing chalice (possibly the Holy Grail) and cross leans in 
the southwest corner of the map. These icons are typical examples of the 
blurred lines between myth, religion, and the science of cosmography. Some of 
the illustrated creatures that dot the open oceans are recognisable as stemming 
from real animals (i.e. the crocodile, some of the fish, etc.) and others, like the 
merman, unicorn-lizard, and dragon, were perhaps inspired by popular myth. 
While the map heralds the progressive mathematical tools used by the masters 
of cartography and displays faith in a Christian heaven, it also accommodates 
beliefs in ancient myths. In the preface to the 1606 English translation of 
Abraham Ortelius’s map of the world, Ortelius says: ‘I hope it will be a thing 
very well pleasing to all such as are readers and students of old Histories and 
Antiquities’ before confirming that, where possible, he included both the 
contemporary and ancient names ‘mentioned by old writers’.130 In many ways, 
this gesture exemplifies how early modern scholars (and lay people) 
accommodated the variety of ideas available to them by understanding both old 
and new versions of history, an idea that transferred to many kinds of art.131  
 Lastly, I consider the historiography of what has been termed the New 
Science that began in the seventeenth century. Though the epistemic shift of 
this traditionally heralded ‘great epoch’, only began to percolate in the period 
considered in this thesis, I believe pointing out some of its historiographical 
issues aide in contextualising aspects of my argument. Claude Palisca argues 
that an ‘important achievement of the Renaissance was to bring music theory 
and practice back in touch with empirical science, as distinct from magic, 
                                                       
130 Abraham Ortelius’s Theatre of the Whole World (1606 English translation of Theatrum Orbis 
Terrarum [1570]). ‘Abraham Ortelivs … to the courteous Reader’ in Abraham Ortelius, Theatrum 
orbis terrarium Abrahami … (trans.) ‘W.B’ [William Bedwell?] (London: printed by Iohn Norton 
[and John Bill], 1606), unpaginated.  
131 As Dmitri Levitin observes, even by the late seventeenth century, ‘to be able to speak of the 
philosophical past was a cultural expectation’. Even the most innovative of thinkers ‘were expected 
to have an automatic familiarity with the history of ancient and medieval philosophy, despite no 
doubt also being taught, and having an interest in, its modern counterpart’. The idea that the old 
departed with the advent of the new (moderns vs. ancients) is overly simplistic. Levitin, Ancient 
Wisdom in the Age of the New Science, 31. Also, ideas surrounding advancement in travel infiltrated the 
arts in many ways, most obviously with the integration of New World rhetoric, metaphors, and 
imagery. As will be discussed in Chapter Three, paintings or songs that consider items such as 
tobacco, unicorns, pearls, and marmosets need not directly mention the New World to invoke 
images and fantasies from what it might be.  
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numerology, and astrology’.132 Science has traditionally played a role in the 
music history of this period because many of the most often studied treatises on 
speculative music are from the centuries’ most well-known philosophers, like 
Galileo, Kepler, Mersenne, and Kircher. But these same philosophers working 
on the mechanics and aesthetics of music were also cultivating a new 
worldview. For example, Galileo Galilei is often thought of as the first 
philosopher to clearly draw the lines between primary and secondary 
qualities—primary qualities being objective inherent bodies that exist in the 
external world, and secondary qualities, subjective perceptions that occur in the 
observer’s mind, such as taste or beauty.133 As a secondary quality would not 
exist without the primary quality, ‘science’ should, therefore, focus just on those 
primary things that can be objectively measured, an idea that has, both in 
contemporary thought and modern historiography, been viewed as an important 
step for empiricism more generally.134 Also, some historiography claims that the 
New Science presented Renaissance thinkers with incompatible intellectual 
traditions, ultimately resulting in a clash between authorities of truth and modes 
of discerning knowledge. This is the version of the history as presented by Gary 
Tomlinson, who writes, 
 
[i]n the face of the geographical, cosmological, technological, and other 
discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the scholastic 
deference to authority sometimes hardened into dogmatism, a turn from 
observation and practical experience to the security of ancient thought 
that Galileo would ridicule mercilessly. In an era of rapidly expanding 
intellectual horizons, sixteenth-century scholastics emphasised the claims 
of reason and theory over the imperfect conclusions drawn from 
observation and practice. The inability of these late scholastic thinkers to 
assimilate novel ideas stimulated important questions about scientific, 
scholarly, and artistic innovation in sixteenth-century intellectual circles 
                                                       
132 Palisca, Music and Ideas, 135. 
133 Mi-Kyoung Lee in Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and 
Ongoing Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 15-16. 
134 As Henry Turner states, ‘Mario Biagioli (1993) has demonstrated how Italian court culture was 
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Renaissance Stage, 13. 
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and ultimately helped to provoke the first querelles of the ancients and 
moderns.135 
 
Though Tomlinson’s overall point is still valid, his assumption about the 
seventeenth-century worldview has been challenged, or at least complicated, by 
recent scholarship. As Dmitri Levitin cautions, it would be folly to assume that 
interest in the ancients was forgotten with the new science. He argues 
throughout his book Ancient Wisdom in the Age of the New Science (2015) that ‘men 
and women of letters throughout this period continued to live in a world in 
which the intellectual landscape was dominated by the past’.136 He observes that 
in the traditional historiography of the history of philosophy, the key markers of 
change continue to be philosophical works from men like Bacon and Descartes 
for reasons of historiography, rather than because said change began with 
philosophy.137 Throughout his monograph Levitin argues for the following:  
 
the continued vitality of humanist traditions of scholarship; the centrality 
of historical arguments to debates about natural philosophical methods 
and doctrines; the importance of the post-Scaliger type of grand history 
of paganism for ideas about the history of philosophy; the uselessness of 
categories like prisca theologia and “ancients versus moderns” to describe 
seventeenth-century worldviews; the extreme precariousness of the 
category of “enlightenment”, at least on this subject; the weak connection 
between political-ideological aims and historiographical change … not all 
early modern intellectual history has to be reduced either to politics or to 
a set of philosophical presuppositions.138 
 
Levitin’s work supports this dissertation because it makes room for older and 
newer sources of truth to coexist, and indeed for tropes of late humanism to aide 
in the pioneering of innovative narratives normally attributed to thought that 
was believed to depart completely from the ancient ways. It muddies the ‘great 
epochs’ often delineated by traditional views of the history of ideas, and allows 
for the development and continued use of ancient wisdoms (that dominated the 
sixteenth-century worldview) in ways that greatly impacted the ‘progress’ of the 
New Science in England. 
                                                       
135 Tomlinson, Monteverdi and the End of the Renaissance, 5. 
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137 Given these works claim to be works of historical scholarship. Ibid., 5. 
138 Ibid., 22. 
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 Lastly, I believe we must turn to fictions in order to acquire a more nuanced 
view of late-sixteenth century English modes of thought, even when dealing in 
subject matter that would, to us, fall under the umbrella of ‘science’. Henry 
Turner argues that ‘a movement towards a recognizably modern ‘scientific’ 
mode of thinking occurs in sixteenth-century England … [a movement that] has 
been largely ignored in scholarship on the history of science, which has tended 
to focus on developments within the fields of mechanics, natural philosophy, or 
astronomy (those fields of inquiry most contiguous with modern science), and 
their implications for the empiricism and mathematical modelling of the 
seventeenth century’.139 Therefore, to get a sense of what the New Science is, 
one mustn’t be limited to what we would consider now to be fields of ‘science’. 
140 As Turner observes, 
 
[i]f we examine the distinctive habits of reasoning that preceded modern 
experimental method and the mathematical world-view of the 
seventeenth century, we find ways of thinking that would help to define 
the “new science” in unexpected places: scattered throughout sixteenth-
century poetic discourse; crowded into marginal annotations; mentioned 
casually in letters about the importance of moral philosophy; motivating 
simply manuals that sought to popularize geometry among new classes of 
readers.141 
 
Though the New Science traditionally begins with the mathematical, 
philosophical, and scientific ‘discoveries’ of men like Galileo, it is worth 
reminding ourselves that evidence of new ways of thinking are often most 
evident in earlier practices, and are sometimes even made through other aspects 
of culture by people other than philosophers.  
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Chapter 2: The Music of Sense Perception 
This chapter covers the musicalised texts that most explicitly address music’s 
relationship with questions of body and mind and of spirit and passion(s). Its content 
deals with music on a conceptual level, rather than ‘the notes’ of any particular case 
study, but is still important for drawing the links between music and knowledge that 
are significant to this study as a whole. In order to see how and why music was an ideal 
vehicle for the contemplation of consciousness, we must first outline music’s 
relationship with sense perception and the passions. The first part of this chapter will 
look at the place of emotion in the critical discourse of early modern England, a 
complicated area of study for many reasons.1 To some, the study of early modern 
emotion resists critical inquiry because of the post-modern futility of ‘knowing’ based 
on ephemeral or subjective evidence requiring innovative modes of interpretation. To 
others, the arts are assumed to lack the power to influence philosophy, particularly 
when viewed on a linear model of ‘progress’ from point A to point B, a concept I take 
to be an out-dated model. For example, in Stephen Toulmin, Douglas Bush, James 
Ackerman and Claude Palisca’s volume Seventeenth-Century Science and the Arts (1961), 
Toulmin concludes that 
 
since we are concerned with an interaction between science and the rest of 
thought and art, the question arises: In what direction did this interaction take 
place? … Is it really the case that seventeenth-century science developed 
autonomously, of itself, and then in turn acted as an influence on men’s other 
ideas and activities? Was science the prime mover, the locomotive, which pulled 
the other arts along behind it? Or was it a boxcar that moved and changed 
because it too was being pulled, by philosophy, say, or religion? It is true 
enough to say that science was at any rate not pulled by poetry or the visual 
arts. However different the poetry and drama, the music and architecture of the 
seventeenth century had been, the cosmological revolution would have 
happened, in all its essentials, exactly as it did; whereas, to mention one example 
only, if Kepler and Galileo had both died in infancy, Milton’s Paradise Lost 
would have been a very different poem.2 
                                                
1 This is partially to do with the variety of texts addressing the passions as well as the variable terminology 
used to describe emotion. See ‘Difficulties of Approach’ in Amy M. Schmitter, “17th and 18th Century 
Theories of Emotions”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), (ed.) Edward N. Zalta  
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/emotions-17th18th/>. The study of emotion has 
hermeneutic peculiarities that benefit from a discussion of phenomenology: Introduction, 30; Conclusion, 
233.  
2 Stephen Toulmin, Douglas Bush, James S. Ackerman, Claude V. Palisca, Seventeenth-Century Science and the 
Arts, (ed.) Hedley Howell Rhys, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 11-12.  
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Though I appreciate the words of caution that come with this reasoning, as well as the 
spirit behind it, I take issue with a few points in this quotation. Firstly, I see the 
metaphor of a ‘train of episteme’ that chugs along any sort of pre-laid canonical rail as 
detrimental and misleading, as, in my assessment, seventeenth-century thought is 
better visualised as a highly intricate, non-linear web. Moreover, the train metaphor 
implies that 1) one of these areas has autonomous motion without the animation 
provided by people and 2) that the relationship between philosophy, art, and science is 
hierarchical, with one pulling the others. Even the assumption that philosophy, art, and 
science are indeed defined and separable entities is an anachronistic assertion at best.  
 Lawrence Kramer reminds us that interpretation can be invalidated, but never 
validated.3 Just because hermeneutics provide possibility rather than something more 
material does not mean that possibility lacks tangible meaning to those who engage with 
history in that way. Kramer believes that ‘[w]hat interpretation seeks to know about 
the world is not how it is, but how it is recognized, experienced, represented, 
addressed, and symbolized’.4 This chapter develops a landscape for how domestic 
musical texts (and eventually performances) engaged with early modern questioning 
about the mind, body, senses, and human consciousness. This type of engagement was 
characterised by intense questioning surrounding reality and its representations as 
portrayed to us by our passions, our senses, the aesthetics of fiction, how these 
concepts relate to love and morality, as well as more metaphysical questioning about 
the meaning of life and death. Though variations on Aristotelian or 
Pythagorean/Platonic understandings of the mechanics of music still dominated in the 
period under question (as well as a predominately Aristotelian view of music’s affects), 
as Susan James argues, pre-Cartesian philosophical suspicion of Aristotle’s 
understanding of the passions, dating from Thomas Aquinas, had significant 
implications for episteme over the seventeenth century, and indeed the art created in 
the process: 
 
The objections to Aristotelianism that rapidly became standard during this 
period … had grave implications for [Scholastic theories of the passions] which 
                                                
3 Kramer, Interpreting Music, 29. 
4 Ibid. 
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exercised philosophers of a systematic bent. A discontent with the deep-dyed 
habits of the Schoolmen first surfaced in natural philosophy, where it stimulated 
the development of novel accounts of bodies and thus of the relations between 
bodies and minds. This change in turn generated a revival of metaphysical 
interest in the passions, and a need to reconsider at the most basic level what 
they are. What sort of states of the soul are the passions? What sort of states of 
the body are they? And if they are both, how are these two components related? 
Attempts to answer these questions were in many cases shaped by the need to 
avoid Aristotelian doctrines that had become unacceptable.5  
 
 
Though this revival of metaphysical interest, as described by James, was demonstrated 
in the work of the so-called metaphysical poets, like John Donne and George Herbert, 
this interest in the quality of the passions was also a central theme in the verse of 
domestic music, even if often by anonymous authors.6 We are reminded by Paster, 
Rowe, et al. that ‘the period’s most categorically “scientific” discourses on the passions 
are in themselves not only socially invested representations but also cultural scripts’,7 
and therefore metaphysics was of concern to artists and natural philosophers alike.  
 In addition to demonstrating the multiplicity of ways in which domestic multi-
voiced music contemplated elements of consciousness, this chapter hopes to show how 
music was not only a reflection of culture (an assertion that Toulmin would probably 
find little argument with), but also played a role in its formation. We cannot recreate 
the early modern sensory experience. Yet as I will explain by the chapter’s end, there 
are ways to access the meaning of experience, primarily through art. As Simon Smith, 
Jackie Watson, and Amy Kenny explain, ‘[d]espite the ephemerality of sensation, 
artworks … often preserve examinations of the senses, representations of sensory 
encounters, and even accounts of the sensory experiences that articulated everyday life 
for early modern subjects’.8  
 
 
                                                
5 James, Passions and Action, 65. 
6 I will not discuss the metaphysical poetry tradition further, as that is a whole discipline unto itself. When I 
use the word metaphysical, I am referring to a more general concept rather than this school of poetry 
specifically. 
7 Paster, Rowe, et al., Reading the Early Modern Passions, 16. 
8 Simon Smith, Jackie Watson, and Amy Kenny (eds.), The Senses in Early Modern England (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2015), 1. 
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2.1 Early Modern Sensing  
In the dedicatory remarks to Robert Jones’s Ultimum vale (1605), Jones explained that 
‘[a]lmost all our knowledge is drawn through the senses, they are the Soules 
Intelligencers, whereby she passeth into the world, and the world into her, and 
amongst all of them, there is none so learned, as the eare, none hath obtained so 
excellent an Art, so delicate, so abstruse expressed, but done, and done by no skill but 
its own’.9 Though it is not surprising that Jones, a composer, would declare the ear as 
the most learned sense, this passage also exhibits the common belief that knowledge is 
fundamentally reliant on sense perception.10 A recurring concept stemming from 
antiquity, the mechanics of and higher purpose of sense perception was a pervasive 
and dynamic enigma that persisted in written and creative works throughout the 
Medieval and Renaissance periods.11 Contemporary understanding of sense perception 
surrounded two main questions: firstly, can we trust our senses and can they lead us to 
truth? And secondly, how do they work? In early modern England, it was generally 
held that there were five external senses: taste, touch, sight, hearing, and smelling. 
These external senses appealed to the three internal senses, common sense or reason, 
memory, and imagination, which resided in the mind.12 One of the reasons sense 
perception was such a ubiquitously discussed area of concern was because it was the 
domain of many intellectual arenas. The mystery that was the mechanics of the senses 
gripped the attention of all who explored components of human consciousness. 
Consequently, the five senses were highly allegorised figures, appearing in plays, the 
visual arts, and music, and often discussed and questioned directly in scientific and 
philosophical treatises, pamphlets, and religious texts.13 One can imagine how the 
practical and conceptual function of the senses was of importance to the anatomist, as a 
part of our physical body. It was of concern to the natural philosopher, particularly if 
they were curious as to what sound, touch, sight, taste, and smell tell us about our 
                                                
9 Perhaps Jones’s reference to ‘no skill but its own’ is similar to Bacon’s observation that ‘tunes and airs, 
even in their own nature, have in themselves some affinity with the affections’, as quoted in the next 
paragraph. Robert Jones, Vltimum Vale, with a triplicity of musicke (London: Printed by J Windet, 1605), 
sig.A4r.  
10 And also that the senses are the mode through which the soul is able to interact with the material world. 
11 Sanger and Walker (eds.), Sense and the Senses in Early Modern Art and Cultural Practice, 6-7. 
12 For the purposes of this thesis, I will be using ‘reason’, ‘ratio’, and ‘common sense’ as interchangeable as 
was often the case contemporarily. Clark, Vanities of the Eye, 43. 
13 Sanger and Walker (eds.), Sense and the Senses in Early Modern Art and Cultural Practice, 3. 
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selves and the external world. It was of concern to the artist, as each art form worked 
to justify the passions as a valid part of healthy living, particularly in the wake of 
Puritan disapproval. The senses were on the mind of the explorer in the New World 
who saw something wondrous for the first time, and had to testify to the reliability of 
his sight when reporting his experiences back home.14 They were of utmost importance 
to religious parties on both sides of the Reformation, as Protestantism effectively 
removed mediation with the transcendental, altering the nature of the body-soul-God 
relationship.15 Conversely, Catholics had to justify their sensory approaches to worship 
at the Council of Trent.16 On a more practical level, the senses’ role in piety was a 
central point of controversy for reformers. The sight of religious art, the smell of 
incense, the taste of the Eucharist, and the sounds of music were all issues to undergo 
reform. As Matthew Milner summarises, ‘in attacking idolatry, reformers attacked 
sensuality’.17 Writers and artists discussed not only the relationship between the senses 
and the body, but whether the relationships between senses were symbiotic or 
competitive, and which sense was of the most importance.18 Though writing 
specifically about hearing, many of the contemporary concerns about sense perception 
outlined here by Penelope Gouk were shared across the senses: ‘the kaleidoscopic 
variety of sources … outlined, [demonstrate] a small range of shared concerns … How 
sound is received by the ear and brain, how it affects the mind, soul, or body; and how 
it is retained in the memory. Such concerns bridge the modern categories of acoustics, 
perception, psychology, and so forth, and are clearly not quite equivalent with them’.19 
Though many scholars, both contemporary and modern, have emphasised the role of 
the eye and the power of observation in connection with the ‘Scientific Revolution’, I 
would like to extend evidence that the ear also presented many of the most difficult 
questions that led to changes in the way many perceived the world. Well-known men 
of natural philosophy, not only those discussed explicitly in this thesis, but also Robert 
                                                
14 As Thomas Harriot had to in his Brief and True Report of the New found land of Virginia (1588). As Marsh 
observes, ‘the rise of scorn and scepticism owed something to the development … of an experimental brand 
of science that emphasised observation, measurement and precise physical explanation, distrusting the more 
speculative theorising that had characterised musical philosophy since classical times’. Marsh, Music and 
Society in Seventeenth-Century England, 34. 
15 Sussman, The Aesthetic Contract, 38. 
16 Andrew Casper in Wietse de Boer and Christine Göttler (eds.), Religion and the Senses in Early Modern Europe 
(Leiden: Brill, 2013), 52. 
17 Matthew Milner, The Senses and the English Reformation (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 2. 
18 Sanger and Walker (eds.), Sense and the Senses in Early Modern Art and Cultural Practice, 1. 
19 Penelope Gouk in Burnett, Fend, Gouk, The Second Sense, 95. 
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Hooke and Isaac Newton, all wrote about music because it wielded undeniable power, 
complicating the search for truthful knowledge, whether one of mathematical, 
religious, astronomical, historical, or other foundation. To study the history of Truth in 
the early modern period, it is necessary to also study the emotional Self, the ‘passion’, 
that was integral to understanding even the most empirical or observational of 
sciences.20 Both natural philosophers and musicians, though to different ends, had an 
interest in the mechanical and spiritual elements of sense perception. 
William Webbe summarised nicely the working parts of musical perception in a 
poem at the beginning of Thomas Greaves’s Songes of sundrie kindes (1604): ‘Straines … 
Delightes the sences, captivates the braines; / Wrapping the soule in contemplation, / 
With sweetest musickes delectation’.21 This phrase lists all the components necessary 
for understanding music’s effect on the body and soul in contemporary poetic terms, 
reiterating many ideas that one encounters time and again in rhetoric on the power of 
music. It was commonly understood that the secret of music’s affect somehow involved 
the senses, the brain, and the soul, yet in what proportion and relation and level of 
trustworthiness, they did not agree. In grasping the mechanics of the senses, however, 
Aristotelianism remained the foundation for seventeenth-century understanding, 
though not exclusively.22 As Gouk outlines, other standout influences for 
understanding sense perception in England included Galen, the Platonic tradition 
‘filtered through Italian Renaissance Neoplatonism’, anatomists like Bartolomeo 
Eustachio and Guilio Casserio, as well as the work of natural philosophers like 
Mersenne.23 While many understandings of music’s mechanics, to be discussed in more 
detail later, were essentially Platonic-Pythagorean, the common understanding of how 
hearing worked was primarily Aristotelian. Sound was thought to be created by two 
                                                
20 ‘Passion’, being the physical manifestation that bridge emotion and action. James, Passion and Action, 4. 
21 Thomas Greaves, Songes of sundrie kindes … (London: printed by John Windet, 1604), sig.B1v. ‘Straines’ 
could refer to either musical phrases or to lines of verse that are either explicitly musicalised, or at least 
reference the inherent musicality of poetry. A verse of strophic song from this period is sometimes called a 
‘strain’, even in modern performance practice, as it also was by Tobias Hume. He says ‘play one straine with 
your fingers, the other with your Bow’. Hume, The First Part of Ayres, French, Pollish, and others (1605), sig.Q1r; 
“strain, n.2.”, OED Online. Oxford University Press, December 2015 (accessed 20 January 2016).  
22 As Susan James explains, ‘Among the features of Aristotelianism that endure is the centrality and scope of 
the opposition between action and passion, which, in most cases, continues to underpin physical and 
psychological explanations, and to span the workings of the body, senses, and intellect’. James, Passion and 
Action, 64. 
23 Gouk in Burnett, Fend, Gouk (eds.), Second Sense, 95-96. 
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material bodies striking one another, which then moved through a medium to the ear.24 
This meant that sound was viewed as originating from a physical phenomenon, which 
also suggested its materiality, in spite of being intangible, at least until it went into the 
ear.25  
In line with Aristotle, early moderns found a place in sense perception for ‘animal 
spirits’, or other similar spirits.26 These animal spirits, once set in motion by sound 
entering the ear, for example, conveyed sensation throughout the body from the 
external senses, via the brain, to the heart.27 As Bruce Smith explains, ‘[t]he older 
explanation, going back to Aristotle and confirmed by Galen, situated the nexus 
between external sounds and internal perception in the “implanted air” of the inner ear. 
Fixed ideas about the soul dictated that this internal air be different in kind from the 
external air of the listener’s environment’.28 The information perceived from the 
external senses was projected into images (formes) through imagination (one of the 
internal senses), which were then ready for uptake by the mind.29 It was through 
imagination’s ‘translation’ of sense perception that knowledge could be conveyed to the 
brain.30 For example, in a 1621 English translation, Nicholas Coeffeteau explained that 
 
the knowing powers are two sorts, that is to say, the Exterior and the Interior 
… Knowledge, which this sence doth gather from the Obiects whose formes are 
presented vnto it by the Exterior sences, be not lost by their absence, it sends all it 
hath gathered Compared and Distinguished, to another Power meerely Knowing, 
which is called the Imaginatiue; as that wherein are grauen the formes of things 
which are offred vnto it by the Common sence, to the end the Knowledge may 
remaine after they are vanished away.31 
                                                
24 Francis Bacon worked off this Aristotelian model when he tackled what he believed to be one of the 
‘profound secrets of nature’, the cause of musical sympathy. As Gouk says ‘[n]ow known as sympathetic 
vibration, this was regarded in scholastic terms as an “occult” or mysterious phenomenon, in that its causes 
were not manifest to the senses and therefore not susceptible to physical examination’. Gouk in Burnett, 
Fend, Gouk (eds.), Second Sense, 98-99. 
25 Bruce Smith summarises Bacon’s inquiry into the material nature of sound in B. Smith, The Acoustic World 
of Early Modern England, 105. As John Davies explains, ‘So in the Eares labrinth the voyce doth stray, / And 
doth with easie motion touch the braine’. John Davies, Nosce teipsum (London: printed by Richard Field, 
1599), sig.G2r. 
26 Gouk in Burnett, Fend, Gouk (eds.), Second Sense, 105. 
27 Ibid., 104. 
28 B. Smith, The Acoustic World of Early Modern England, 103. 
29 Thomas L. Hankins and Robert J. Silverman, Instruments and the Imagination (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), 6. 
30 As John Davies said, ‘Thus by the organs of the Eye and Eare, / The Soule with knowledge doth her selfe 
endue; / Thus she her prison, may with pleasure beare, / Hauing such prospects, all the world to view’. 
Davies, Nosce teipsum (1599), sig.G3v. 
31 Nicolas Coeffeteau, A Table of Humane Passions With their Causes and Effects (trans.) Edw. Grimeson 
(London: printed by Nicholas Okes, 1621), sig.A12r.  
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The Aristotelian notion that all knowledge is built from sense perception is readily 
apparent in Coeffeteau’s explanation. Additionally, a conception of the mechanics of 
sound featuring animal spirits can be seen in Robert Burton’s explanation of music’s 
physiological effects. He cites the Italian humanist scholar Julius Caesar Scaliger 
(1484-1588), stating that Scaliger ‘giues a reason of these effects … the spirits about 
the Heart, take in that trembling and dancing aire into the Body, & are moued 
together, & stirred vp with it, or els the mind, as some suppose, harmonically 
composed, is rowsed vp at the tunes of Musicke’.32 This explains how sound can 
interact with both the spirits and corpus, reflecting an Aristotelian conception of sound 
as a vibrating material that moves the animal spirits through some form of sympathetic 
vibration. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the fundamental mechanics of sense 
perception, including animal spirits, remained essentially the same by the late 
seventeenth century, in spite of other Cartesian ‘advancements’ that questioned the 
role of the observer in matters of sense perception.33  
 Though physiological treatises are useful, works of fiction provide us with one of 
the wealthiest sources for understanding early modern sense perception.34 In Thomas 
Tomkis’s academic play Lingua, or the combat of the tongue and the five senses (1607), the 
character of hearing, Auditvs, sings to himself nonsensically, confusing Common 
Sense, who assumes Auditvs must be mad.35 It is up to Phantastes, the character of 
imagination, to explain to Common Sense why Auditvs behaves as such.36 Phantastes 
attempts to quell Common Sense’s confusion, explaining: ‘Let him alone, his musicall 
head is alwaies full of crotchets’. Still Common Sense ‘know[s] not, what to thinke on 
him’, as he cannot hear the harmony of the spheres as Auditvs can. Auditvs implores 
                                                
32 Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), sig.Aa4r.  
33 Gouk in Burnett, Fend, Gouk (eds.), Second Sense, 95. Smith, The Acoustic World of Early Modern England, 
105. 
34 As Richard Meek and Erin Sullivan argue, ‘If we do want to historicise the early modern passions, then, 
we need to give more attention to other systems of knowledge and representation that people used to 
conceptualise and articulate emotional response’ outside of medical theory and humoralism, including works 
of fiction, religion, rhetoric, and performance. Meek and Sullivan (eds.), The Renaissance of Emotion, 6. 
35 Edmund Spencer’s influential Faerie Queene (1596) also uses this trope of the senses personified in Book II 
in Alma’s House of Temperance, which represents the human body, and is occupied by Common Sense, 
Memory, and Fantasy. Edmund Spencer, The Faerie Queene, (ed.) Thomas P. Roche, Jr. (London: Penguin 
Books, 1978), II.ix.  
36 Common Sense, another character, was thought to be one of the ‘internal senses’ along with the likes of 
Memory and Imagination. 
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him ‘Are you then deafe? do you not yet perceive the wondrous sound [?]’37 The 
character of Memory could once hear the harmony of the spheres, but can no longer, 
as he explains, ‘Our eares are so well acquainted with the sounde, that we neuer marke 
it’. At a loss, Common Sense asks, ‘Haue you no other obiects to iudge by, than these 
Auditvs?’, to which Auditvs replies that Common Sense should look to nature, to the 
babbling of a brook, or the chirping of a songbird, to hear beauty.38 Many commonly 
held conceptions about the senses and their relationship to inner mental processes can 
be discerned from this amusing interaction. As many Shakespeare scholars have noted, 
affiliating music with madness was one explanation offered to fill the gap left by a lack 
of an understanding of sense perception.39 It was thought that one indication of 
insanity was an imbalance between ratio and emotion, resulting in hallucinations or 
similar misfiring of the senses.40 In this scene, the only arbiter between Common Sense 
and Auditvs is Imagination, emphasising Imagination’s role as communicator between 
these two forces that don’t seem to understand each other directly. It turns out that 
Auditvs isn’t mad, he just appears so because he has abilities that Common Sense 
doesn’t understand. Logically, since Common Sense cannot hear the music of which 
the others speak, he asks for another object by which he can make a judgement. But 
the only thing that Auditvs can offer are the sounds of natural beauty, an imitation or a 
product of the harmony of the spheres rather than the music itself—the next best 
thing.  
 Though Tomkis’s understanding of music is clearly Pythagorean that does not 
mean his understanding was old fashioned. The transition away from a Pythagorean 
conception of music as the harmony of the spheres was by no means linear, as Bacon’s 
conception of music was primarily Aristotelian, whilst Isaac Newton’s was largely still 
Pythagorean. Yet debates surrounding the categorisation of music as a persuasive, 
mimetic art or physical, mechanical science were central tenets of discussion about the 
nature of hearing. The way figures from different backgrounds—natural philosophers, 
composers, and laypeople— tried to understand the sense of hearing is of importance 
                                                
37 Act II, scene vltima, Thomas Tomkis, Lingua: or the combat of the tongue, and the fiue senses for superiority 
(London: printed by G. Eld, 1607), sig.G3r-G4v.  
38 Ibid., sig.G4r. 
39 Kendra Preston Leonard, Shakespeare, Madness, and Music: Scoring Insanity in Cinematic Adaptations (Lanham: 
Scarecrow Press, 2009), 3. 
40 Michael MacDonald, Mystical Bedlam: Madness, Anxiety and Healing in Seventeenth-Century England 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 181. 
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to my thesis because of the particular way that hearing, according to some, presented 
problems about how truth and knowledge are built.  
 
 Senses and the Soul 
I must address one caveat about the vagueness of the terms ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’, 
particularly when dealing with music. As Erin Minear has also discerned, the exact 
meaning of ‘spirits’ is rather ambiguous from author to author, or indeed even within a 
work by a single author.41 Sometimes references to ‘spirits’ seem to classify them as 
entirely physiological phenomena, and at other times they appear to be almost 
synonymous with the soul.42 Minear observes that music’s ‘motions’ ‘were sometimes 
compared to the movement of the spirits, sometimes directly linked to the movement of 
the soul’.43 Indeed, music’s physiological abilities to powerfully move the bodily spirits 
‘were not always clearly distinguished from metaphysical accounts of its effect on the 
soul’.44 It is commensurate with contemporary approaches to keep these terms vague 
and interchangeable.  
 Sense perception is at the crux of metaphysical questions about the nature of reality 
because of one unanswerable question: how did a substance with material origins (like 
sound) enter the body and interact with the immaterial soul?45 What was at stake, 
however, wasn’t simply how the body and soul communicated via the senses, but one 
                                                
41 Minear cites two different uses of ‘spirit’ from The Merchant of Venice as evidence - one suggesting its 
physiological role, and the other its spiritual. Minear, Reverberating Song in Shakespeare and Milton, 37. 
42 As Sean McDowell cautions, ‘[a]t present, however, the emphasis on the body has caused some 
interpreters to avoid using the term “soul” when discussing Renaissance psychology, even though this term 
was the predominant one for describing mental and affective operations. No doubt, this emphasis may be a 
reaction to the older history of ideas approach, which tended to treat the soul as too disembodied. Moreover, 
it also appears to be a conscious effort to transcend the Cartesian mind-body split. The present influence of 
Descartes on modern assumptions about these matters, however, does not mean that earlier Western 
cultures located notions of selfhood exclusively in the material’. McDowell, “The View from the Interior “, 
787. 
43 Minear, Reverberating Song in Shakespeare and Milton, 37. 
44 Though some authors like Bacon had a better-defined differentiation between ‘spirit’ and ’soul’, most were 
more ambiguous. For Bacon, ‘spirits’ were somewhat observable and physiological. Collectively, the animal 
spirits constitute the ‘sensible soul’, this is subservient to man’s ‘rational soul’, which contain Aristotle’s three 
internal senses, memory, imagination, and reason. In Bacon’s terms, however, the ‘rational soul’ was created 
by divine intervention at the fall of man, and was therefore not subject to the laws of nature as the ‘sensible 
soul’ was. This explains, therefore, why things like imagination, in Bacon’s words, ‘which, not being bound 
by any law and necessity of nature or matter, may join things which are never found together in nature and 
separate things which in nature are never found apart’. Clark, Vanities of the Eye, 45. Lisa Jardine, Francis 
Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 89-91. Minear, 
Reverberating Song in Shakespeare and Milton, 37. 
45 As Bacon observed, sound was known to have material causes. Where it lay on a spectrum of materiality, 
Bacon tried to discern. Discussed in detail in B. Smith, The Acoustics of Early Modern England, 105-6. 
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of fundamental importance in approach to religion, science and epistemology in 
general. Matthew Milner states that ‘[u]ltimately the issue resided in whether the spirit 
itself was an instrument of the soul, or whether traditional anthropologies had 
conflated aspects of the immortal soul with the world of spirit’.46 Was there a mortal 
‘organic spirit’ that animated the body in addition to the immortal soul? Or was the 
only soul the immortal, rational one? As Milner explains, renewed interest during the 
Renaissance in ‘pure’ Aristotelian and Neoplatonic forms coloured and complicated 
medieval perceptions of sensation (which were also essentially Aristotelian).47 To 
Aristotle, as described in De anima, the soul is by and large not separable from the 
body, but has a relationship more akin to the one between form and matter.48 Milner 
observes that a ‘virtual explosion’ of De anima commentary over the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries led to what would be an overall shift in perception of the soul/body 
relationship. In addition to semantic debate on the meaning and interchangeability of 
the words ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’, ‘[t]he ultimate trajectory of these pressures was transition 
from a tripartite anthropology of the body, spirit and soul, at the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, to a dualist model of body and mind at the end, eventually finding 
articulation in Descartes’.49 It is clear that, in Sanger’s words, ‘the senses continued to 
be at the heart of questions on the conflict between the body and the dignity of the 
soul’.50 When Thomas Wright asked ‘[h]ow a corporal imagination concur to a 
spiritual conceit’,51 his questioning reveals the central issue at stake that was presented 
by (and through) sensory activities like music making, namely how a sensible object 
could directly affect (or contain) a spiritual faculty.52  
 
 Hearing, Knowledge, and the Soul 
Multiple sources deemed hearing the sense best suited for the acquisition of 
knowledge.53 For example in Vanitie of the eie (1608), George Hackewell asserted: ‘And 
                                                
46 Milner, The Senses and the English Reformation, 175. 
47 Ibid., 174. 
48 Michael Fuller (ed.), The Concept of the Soul: Scientific and Religious Perspectives (Newcastle: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2014), 10.  
49 Milner, The Senses and the English Reformation, 175-6. 
50 Sanger and Walker (eds.), Sense and the Senses in Early Modern Art and Cultural Practice, 8. 
51 Wright, The passions of the minde in general (1604), sig.V7r. 
52 Minear, Reverberating Song in Shakespeare and Milton, 35. 
53 Aristotle acknowledged a connection between hearing and knowledge building through oration and drama, 
but debates about the interactions between knowledge, hearing, and music were also pertinent, especially 
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surely for the gaining of knowledge … the eie … in most things ca[n] it not possibly 
without the helpe of hearing, hunt out the trueth, since as well in the works of art as 
nature’.54 Hackewell pointed out the Socratic notion that ‘the sense of hearing, makes 
more to the vnderstanding of the true nature of things, then that of seeing; and in this 
case one eare witness is of more valew then ten eie-witnesses’.55 Hackewell also noted, 
as Aristotle did, that blind men still become famous thinkers, but rarely do men born 
deaf.56 The deaf are ‘ranged among mad men, lunatike persons, and children’, and 
cannot be held responsible for their actions.57 Since knowledge comes with hearing, the 
deaf aren’t capable of knowledge.58 Richard Braithwaite, a man sceptical of the effects 
of unbridled passion upon the Christian soul (though himself a poet), also took from 
the ancients this idea that hearing is the sense most suited for the acquisition of 
knowledge. He wrote: 
 
HEARING is the organ of vnderstanding; by it we conceiue, by the memorie 
we conserue, and by our iudgement wee revolue; as maine riuers haue their 
confluence, by small streames, so knowledg her essence by the accent of the 
eare. As our eare can best iudge of sounds, so hath it a distinct power to sound 
into the centre of the heart. It is open to receiue, ministring matter sufficient for 
the minde to digest; some things it rellisheth pleasantly, apprehending them 
with a kinde of enforced dellight … The eare is an edifying sence, conveying the 
fruit of either morall or diuine discourse to the imagination, and conferring with 
iudgment, whether that which it hath heard, seeme to deserue approbation.59 
	
In Braithwaite’s estimation, hearing’s effectiveness in knowledge acquisition is due to 
its ability to communicate with both the heart and the mind, though judgement was 
still needed to filter this input.60  
 In addition to its affinity for knowledge acquisition, hearing was believed by some 
to have a particular relationship with the soul or spirit. As the following three examples 
demonstrate, those writing explicitly about hearing and its relationship to the soul 
come from a variety of backgrounds. I offer the ideas of the moralist, Richard 
                                                                                                                                                  
with texted music. Those who wanted to support the arts or defend the passions often used Aristotle in this 
way. Palisca, Music and Ideas, 182. 
54 George Hackewell, The vanitie of the eie… (Oxford: printed by Ioseph Barnes, 1608), sig.E5r-E6v.  
55 Hackewell, The vanitie of the eie (1608), sig.E6r.  
56 Clark, Vanity of the Eye, 20-21. 
57 Hackewell, The vanitie of the eie (1608), sig.E7r.  
58 Ancient reliance on hearing for the building of knowledge is connected with rhetoric. 
59 Braithwaite, Essaies vpon the fiue senses (1620), sig.A8r, sig.B1v. 
60 As will be discussed later, Helkiah Crooke also believed hearing’s power for building knowledge stemmed 
from its ability to better effect the ‘heart’ in addition to mind. See Conclusion, 240-41.  
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Braithwaite, the physician, Robert Fludd, and the natural philosopher, Francis Bacon. 
Those in favour of using the passions to the benefit of the soul believed that by 
tempering the passions with ratio, one could use them to the soul’s advantage. 
Braithwaite wrote: 
  
The Eare is one of the actiuest & laborioust faculties of the soule: pitty then it is 
that the soule should be by her intangled, or by her meanes to such base subiects 
enthralled, being for the succour of the soule principally ordained. I haue thought 
long time with my selfe, how I should imploy this Sence best for my soules 
aduantage: wherein I tooke a suruey of all those subiects, to which this peculiar 
sence of Hearing was especiallest extended.61 
 
Braithwaite made several common assumptions here that are of note: 1) he assumed 
that the senses are the faculties of the soul, 2) that the passions needed to be and could 
be tamed through rational thought, and 3) that the ear’s principal responsibility was 
the soul (‘ordained’). Interestingly, though Braithwaite pondered how to use the sense 
of hearing to his soul’s advantage, and elsewhere acknowledged music’s ability to affect 
the mood and the body,62 in some parts of his essay he doubts music’s ability to effect 
real change at all.63 In spite of Braithwaite’s doubts about music’s permanent benefits, 
however, what is of note here is how he emphasised the special yet complex connection 
between the sense of hearing and the soul.  
 Robert Fludd’s Mosaicall philosophy grounded upon the essentiall truth was first 
published in 1638/9 (Latin), then in English in 1659 (both posthumously).64 Fludd’s 
theories were largely controversial and built on the Bible and astrology, and his 
conception of how music interacts with the soul, like Bacon’s, was largely one of 
Aristotelian sympathetic resonance. He believed that external music was but an 
imitation of the spirit, yet it still played a central role in wisdom building (specifically 
religious enlightenment): ‘all mysticall and miraculous Arts and discoveries, are effected 
and brought to light by it, confirming that place in Scripture, where it is said, Caeterae 
                                                
61 Braithwaite, Essaies upon the senses (1620), sig.B3v. 
62 Music can cure melancholy but only ‘if grounded on the melodie of the heart’. Ibid., sig.B1r.  
63 ‘I found the Eare much delighted with Musicke; but finding it but an aërie accent, breathed and expired in 
one instant, I thought there was no abiding for my attentiue Sence; fitter to be employed in a delight more 
permanent’. Ibid., sig.B3v.  
64 According to Rebecca Herissone, Fludd was one of the few English writers contributing to music 
speculative, though it was ‘rarely Boethian in character’. Herissone, Music Theory in Seventeenth-Century England, 
1-2. Robert Fludd, Philosophia Moysaica (Govdae: printed by Petrus Rammazenius, 1638), text from Ghent 
University, digitised by Google Books.  
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sunt ancillae hujus, All sciences are but the handmaids unto this wisdom’.65 In a neo-Platonic 
allegorical tradition, ‘wisdom’ (Sophia) is a given Truth, and the arts are but her 
handmaids. Fludd wrote that ‘[a]fter the imitation of [universal harmony] melodious 
tunes and concords, all the accords of our externall musick, as well vocall, as 
instrumentall, are typically framed, which are in respect of the true and essentiall 
symphony of this spirit, even as a shadow is unto a true subject, or an image unto a 
reality’.66 Though his conception of the mechanics of music are nothing novel, the idea 
that the arts served a purpose in teaching wisdom is of note, as it shows another 
conception, mostly built upon ancient authorities, of how the ear works to move the 
spirits.  
 Francis Bacon made attempts to understand the hearing-to-soul relationship 
through observable physiological phenomena.67 Following an Aristotelian perception of 
music as a sounding phenomenon, Bacon dismissed music’s wider connections with the 
harmony of the spheres, believing that the tangible effects of music were too powerful 
to be immediately deemed inferior to philosophy.68 He wrote about music and the sense 
of hearing sporadically throughout several of his treatises, as well as in New Atlantis 
(1627), but most specifically in Sylva Sylvarum (1627), a work that demonstrated his 
method for compiling natural histories.69 Like others, Bacon’s conception of hearing 
recognised both spiritual and material elements and believed that most natural 
phenomena, including music and the influence of the stars over man, could be 
explained by the interaction of spirits and tangible matter.70 He thought one key to 
understanding the interaction of the spirits and matter could be observed in 
sympathetic vibration (observed when a tuned string, plucked, makes another string 
tuned to the same note vibrate too, even if at a distance from the first string). Bacon 
wrote, ‘[w]e see also that several airs and tunes do please several nations and persons, 
                                                
65 Robert Fludd, Mosaicall philosophy (London: printed for Humphrey Moseley, 1659), sig.D1r.  
66 Ibid., sig.D1r.  
67 B. Smith, The Acoustic World of Early Modern England, 106. 
68 Penelope Gouk, ‘Music in Francis Bacon’s natural philosophy’, Paolo Gozza (ed.), Number to Sound: the 
musical way to the scientific revolution (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), 143. 
69 Sylva (which included New Atlantis at the end of the volume) was published after Bacon’s death by William 
Rawley. Francis Bacon, Sylva syluarum, (ed.) VVilliam Rowley (London: printed by I[ohn] H[aviland and 
Augustine Mathewes]. Additionally, Gouk argues that critiques of Bacon’s theories, like the one written by 
Edmund Chilmead, attest to Bacon’s pervasive impact on English musical theory as early as the 1630s and 
1640s. Gouk in Benett, Fend, Gouk (eds.), The Second Sense, 96; Mordechai Feingold and Penelope Gouk, 
“An early critique of Bacon's Sylva Sylvarum: Edmund Chilmead's treatise on sound”, Annals of Science, 40:2 
(1983), 139-157, 145.  
70 Gouk, Music, Science, and Natural Magic, 165. 
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according to the sympathy they have with their spirits’, suggesting that the spirits and 
music have a sympathetic-style relationship.71 Moreover, as ‘it is no marvel if they alter 
the spirits, considering that tunes have a predisposition to the motion of the spirits in 
themselves’, Bacon suggested that tunes could ‘alter’ or change the spirits, rather than 
just move them.72  
 As Bacon’s theories were based on observation, he could not escape the idea that 
the relationship between hearing and the soul was inextricably linked to the passions, 
as emotion was one of the few observable phenomena Bacon had to work with. The 
idea that these passions worked in ‘inclining men’s minds’ could be used to man’s 
advantage.73 Bacon’s writing pointed to a belief that there was something more to 
discover about the source of music’s power over man’s emotions and behaviours than 
numbers. Gouk ascertains that Bacon’s fascination with music was not a minor part of 
his pursuit of Truth, but ‘an essential element of his ambitious scheme to dominate and 
control the forces of nature and the elements, to tame them for the service of man’.74 In 
Bacon’s usual ‘manner’, he acknowledged that ‘[m]usic, in the practice hath been well 
pursued, and in good variety; but in the theory, and especially in the yielding of the 
causes of the practice, very weakly; being reduced into certain mystical subtleties of no 
use and not much truth. We shall, therefore, after our manner, join the contemplative 
and active part together’.75 He discerned: 
 
It hath been anciently held and observed, that the sense of hearing and the 
kinds of music have most operation upon the manners; as to encourage men and 
make them warlike; to make them soft and effeminate; to make them grave; to 
make them light; to make them gentle and inclined to pity etc. The cause is, for 
that the sense of hearing striketh the spirits more immediately than the other senses, and 
more incorporeally than the smelling. For the sight, taste, and feeling, have their 
organs not of so present and immediate access to the spirits, as the hearing hath. 
And as for the smelling, (which indeed worketh also immediately upon the 
spirits, and is forcible while the object remaineth,) it is with a communication of 
the breath or vapour of the object odorate; but hearing, entering easily, and 
mingling not at all, and coming with a manifest motion, doth by custom of often 
affecting the spirits and putting them into one kind of posture, alter not a little 
                                                
71 Bacon, Sylva Sylvarum, (ed.) Spedding, II.114. 
72 Though he qualifies this by saying ‘generally music feedeth that disposition of the spirits which it findeth’, 
so tunes can only alter the spirits within a certain range. Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Gouk, Music, Science, and Natural Magic, 149. 
75 Bacon, Sylva Sylvarum, (ed.) Spedding, II.101.  
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the nature of the spirits, even when the object is removed. And therefore we see 
that tunes and airs, even in their own nature, have in themselves some affinity 
with the affections: as there be merry tunes, doleful tunes, solemn tunes; tunes 
inclining men’s mind to pity; warlike tunes, etc. … But yet it hath been noted, 
that though this variety of tunes doth dispose the spirits to variety of passions 
conform unto them, yet generally music feedeth that disposition of the spirits 
which it findeth … tunes have a predisposition to the motion of the spirits in 
themselves.76 
 
Notably, Bacon does not explain here how sound, a physical phenomenon, might 
interact with, let alone ‘striketh’ the immaterial spirit.77 Interestingly, Bacon cited 
physiological reasons for hearing’s strong connection to the soul, a notable divergence 
from Plato’s, which were ontological.78 To Bacon, sound is communicated through 
motion, with waves of sound striking the ear’s membrane, thus making it a physical, 
material phenomenon.79 Bacon suggested that, of the five external senses, it is hearing 
alone that can directly resonate with the soul because of the shared or sympathetic 
qualities between the air of sounds and the special air of the spirit.80 In contrast to 
other contemporary conceptions of music’s effects on the soul as ephemeral (like 
Braithwaite’s), Bacon hints in the above passage that because of its more immediate 
access to the spirits, hearing can actually alter the spirits in a more lasting fashion 
(‘even when the object is removed’). He does qualify this, however, by stating that the 
music usually works off some pre-existing disposition of the spirit.81   
 
 
 
                                                
76 Ibid., II.114. Emphasis my own. 
77 Bacon hypothesised that all matter contained ‘spirits’ of varying quality and materiality (on a scale from 
immaterial to material), and even identified eight varieties of transmission or communication between matter. 
Communication was viewed as a transfer of ‘spirit’ from one thing to another. B. Smith, The Acoustic World of 
Early Modern England, 106. 
78 Ibid., 103. 
79 Ibid., 105. 
80 Ibid., 106. 
81 The idea that music can be used to ‘trigger’ a certain state is a common conception of the benefits of music, 
an idea Byrd and others call to ‘content humours’. Byrd acknowledges such a use in the ‘Epistle to the 
Reader’ in his 1588 set: ‘here is offered unto thy courteous acceptation, Music of sundry sorts, and to content 
diverse humours. If though be disposed to pray, here are Psalms. If to be merry, here are sonnets. If to 
lament for the sins, here are songs of sadness and piety’ etc. Byrd, Psalmes, sonets, & songs of sadnes and pietie 
(1588), sig.B1v.  
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2.2 Passion's Persuasion  
As the anonymous author of Praise of Musicke (1586) wrote, young men in Aristotle’s 
day were instructed in the ‘knowledge of Musicke, not the provocation of wantonnesse 
… but to the restraining and bridling of their affections, under the rule and moderation 
of reason’.82 The passions were a curious thing, as they presented themselves through 
the physical body, yet were thought to reside in the mind and lack a material form.83 
The imitative arts were seen as the most direct way to elicit specific emotions.84 As 
mentioned before, many believed that the passions, through catharsis, could be 
beneficial to healthy living, but also warranted caution.85 The precise quality of the 
relationship between the senses, passion, and imagination varied, but it is generally 
something like what Thomas Wright explained in his Passions of the Minde (1604): 
 
[W]hatsoeuer we vnderstand, passeth by the gates of our imagination, the cosin 
germane to our sensitive appetite, the gates of our imagination being prevented, 
yea, and welnie shutte vp with the consideration of that obiect which feedeth 
the passion, and pleaseth the appetite; the vnderstanding looking into the 
imagination, findeth nothing almost but the mother and nurse of his passion for 
consideration, where you may well see how the imagination, putteth greene 
spectacles before the eyes of our witte, to make it see nothing but greene, that is, 
serving for the consideration of the Passion.86 
 
‘Understanding’ cannot emerge from the gates of an imagination too clogged by 
passion, as it blocks knowledge from coming forth. Therefore reason needs to guide 
imagination from getting carried away by passion. Similarly, Nicholas Coeffeteau 
added that the passions ‘cannot be held good nor bad, so when as they suffer 
themselues to be moderated and gouerned by reason’.87 But, importantly, he concluded 
that the ‘Passions are in the soule, as the sinnews in the body … so by the operations 
                                                
82 Though often attributed to John Case, the most recent scholarship doubts this attribution. Anonymous, 
Praise of Musicke … (Oxenford: printed by Ioseph Barnes, 1586), sig.E2r. For more on the attribution, see: J. 
W. Binns, “John Case and ‘the Praise of Musicke’”, Music & Letters 55.4 (1974): 444–453.  
83 For my purposes, assume the modern term ‘emotions’ is synonymous with contemporary terms ‘affect’ and 
‘passions’. Meek and Sullivan (eds.), The Renaissance of Emotion, 3. 
84 Even specific modes were thought to bring out particular traits, as described by Dowland via 
Ornithoparchus: ‘Dorian, both because it is manly & also doth delight valiant men, & is a discouerer of 
warlike matters’. Ornithoparchus, Micrologvs, (trans.) John Dowland, sig.M1v. 
85 For more on catharsis, see Ch. 1, 56.  
86 Wright, The Passions of the Minde (1604), sig.E2r. For more on the meaning of ‘green’ with regards to the 
passions, see Bruce Smith, The Key of Green: Passion and Perception in Renaissance Culture (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2008).  
87 Coeffeteau, A Table of Humane Passions, (trans.) Grimeson (1621), sig.E2r.  
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of Passions, wee carry our selues to good or euill’.88 One can see how this statement, the 
‘passions are in the soule’, might provoke questions regarding the quality of the soul, 
the passions and imagination, and how they can interact between planes of 
materiality.89 Moreover, the idea that we can ‘carry our selues’ as a result of feeling 
emotion was problematic philosophically.90 As Susan James points out, in spite of the 
ubiquity of the Aristotelian understanding of the passions, there existed an unease with 
the fundamentals of that understanding, stemming from the passions’ relationship to 
will and action, explained in depth in her book Passion and Action: The Emotions in 
Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (1999). She says that ‘[t]he existence of different orders 
of philosophical priorities is particularly evident in the range of innovative analyses of 
the passions developed in the seventeenth century, each of which hits on a different 
solution to the problem of how to conceptualize the passions as states of both body and 
soul’.91 Furthermore, ‘the project of extending the New Philosophy to the passions 
sometimes ran into problems which cast doubt on the metaphysical and physical 
positions around which this philosophical system was organized. For some writers, the 
passions therefore proved subversive, a troublesome afterthought that, true to their 
character, threatened the order and purity of systematic philosophy’.92   
 In the musical world, this scepticism planted by early new philosophers like Galileo 
acted like an irritating grain of sand in an oyster. As English men like Francis Bacon 
tended to focus on the physics of music rather than its ‘grander, cosmological 
aspects’,93 Marsh has consequently argued that ‘references to cosmic harmony became 
increasingly superficial’ in England over the seventeenth century, as ‘the focus of 
attention shifted towards the purely emotional effects of music on humans’.94 Though 
references to cosmic harmony are still plentiful in musical paratexts, some of the 
musicalised texts themselves reflect the unease with existing metaphysical systems and 
                                                
88 Ibid., sig.E3v.  
89 As Erin Sullivan points out, ‘[f]or some of Wright’s contemporaries, the fact that the intellective part of the 
soul was wholly incorporeal and thus not dependent on the body for its functioning was one of its chief 
virtues, but for Wright … the intellective soul’s separation from the materiality of the body proves 
problematic, making it more difficult for communication with God to move beyond mental abstraction’. Erin 
Sullivan, “The passions of Thomas Wright” in Meek and Sullivan (eds.), The Renaissance of Emotion, 32. 
90 James explains that much attention was paid ‘to the complex antecedents of action, and a variety of forms 
of conflict and dislocation are worked out in terms of the tripartite soul, and the divisions within its sensible 
and rational parts’, James, Passion and Action, 255. 
91 Ibid., 81. 
92 Ibid., 66. 
93 Marsh, Music and Society in Seventeenth-Century England, 35. 
94 Ibid., 25. 
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a scepticism toward the mechanics of sense perception as described by James. One 
could say that a pearl took form in the resurgence of art and writing from the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth-centuries that cogitated and reconsidered the 
fundamental nature of the passions.95 
 
Music and the Passions 
In the commentary that accompanied George Sandys’ translation of Ovid’s 
Metamorphosis (1632), Sandys noted, as many others did, that ‘musick in it selfe most 
strangely works vpon our humane affections … the sence of hearing stricking the 
Spirits more immediatly, then the rest of the sences’.96 Robert Burton observed in 1621 
that ‘[i]n a word [music] is so powerful a thing, that it ravisheth the Soule, and carries 
it beyond it selfe, helpes, eleuates, extends it’.97 Its power over the passions was so 
effective that it could calm babies, could incite bravery in soldiers prior to a battle, and 
‘extenuate feares and furies, appeaeseth cruelty, awakeneth heauinesse, and to such as 
are watchfull, it causeth quiet rest, it takes away splene and hatred, and cures all 
irksomnesse and heavinesse of the Soule’.98 In matters of the soul, one was often 
presented with what was, in effect, a rhetorical problem in describing the relationship 
between music and the soul. For example, John Dowland’s translation of Andreas 
Ornithoparchus’s Micrologvs (1609) stated that ‘[h]uman music is the concordance of 
diverse elements in one compound, by which the spiritual nature is joined with the 
body, and the reasonable part is coupled in concord with the unreasonable, which 
                                                
95 James, Passions and Action, 65. 
96 I cannot be certain Sandys read Francis Bacon’s Sylva sylvarum (1627), but it appears they knew of each 
other. The rhetorical similarities between their conceptions of hearing as ‘striking the spirits more 
immediately than the other senses’ is worth noting; regardless of whether one influenced the other, they were 
both drawing from an earlier tradition, or it was independently conceived. James Ellison, George Sandys: 
Travel, Colonialism, and Tolerance in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: D.S Brewer, 2002), 91. Sandys rejected 
the universal harmony embraced by many of his contemporaries as the source of music’s power, resonating 
more with a Baconian or Aristotelian conception of sympathetic vibration. Sandys wrote, ‘Yet musick in it 
selfe most strangely works vpon our humane affections. Not in that the Soule (according to the opinion of 
the Platonists) consisting of harmony, & rapt with the sphearicall musick before it descended from Heauen to 
inhabit the body, affects it with the like desire (there being no nation so barbarous, or man so austere and 
stupid, which is not by the melody of instruments and numerous composures, either incited to pleasure or 
animated to Virtue) but because the Spirits which agitate in the heart, receaue a warbling and dancing aire 
into the bosome, and are made one with the same where with they haue an affinity; whose motions lead the 
rest of the Spirits dispersed through the body, raising or suppressing the instrumentall parts according to the 
measures of the Musick; sometimes inflaming: and againe composing the affections’. George Sandys, Ouids 
Metamorphosis Englished … (Oxford [and London]: printed by Iohn Lichfield [and William Stansby], 1632), 
sig.Tt2v, Tt3v.  
97 Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), sig.Aa4r. 
98Ibid., sigAa4r. 
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proceeds from uniting body and soul’.99 To this author, music is the reflection of 
universal harmony, which acts as a bow, tying together body and soul, allowing for the 
coexistence of rational thought and irrational passion. In this way, music is viewed as 
the harmonious by-product of the fissure between body and spirit. Similarly, Thomas 
Wright observed that ‘musicke hath a certaine secret passage into mens soules, and 
worketh so divinely in the mind, that it elevateth the heart miracuously, and 
resembleth in a certaine manner the voices and harmonie of heaven’.100 In this 
explanation Wright acknowledged both the divine and fleshly aspects of music’s 
power, in spite of the fact that his conclusion seems to be the easy way out, resorting to 
the metaphor of a secret passage. In a rather unsatisfactory conclusion, Wright 
determined that some musical ‘experience is so sensible’, and therefore so real, there is 
little point in trying to prove its realness through words.101 As demonstrated by both of 
these anecdotes, early moderns often resorted to musical metaphors for metaphysical 
concepts that were little understood, like the experience of music.102 As precise words 
frustrated, metaphors or poetic imagery took their place.103 As Shakespeare’s Benedict 
says, ‘Now divine air! Now is his soul ravished! Is it not strange that sheep’s guts 
should hale souls out of men’s bodies?’ (Much Ado About Nothing, II.iii.57-59).   
 Music’s effect over soul and body was viscerally felt by so many, and although the 
mechanics were left a mystery, music’s positive effects were thought to be harnessable 
through its ability to move men to action. It was through action, perhaps, that the arts 
could make a tangible mark upon society.104 As Susan James summarises,  
 
Alongside the view that passions can motivate us to acquire knowledge, and 
that intellectual activity is itself accompanied by pleasurable affections, we find 
in seventeenth-century philosophy a further, internally complex conception of 
knowledge which is still more closely linked to emotion. To know something, 
                                                
99 Ornithoparchus, Micrologvs, (trans.) John Dowland (1609), sig.C1r.   
100 Wright, The Passions of the Minde (1694), sig.M3v.  
101 The effeminising effects of some music are so obvious, and ‘the experience is so sensible, that it were 
superfluous to proceed any farther in proofe’. Wright, The Passions of the Minde (1694), sig.M4v. 
102 Often in the form of mythological tropes, for example Bacon casting Orpheus as Universal Harmony in 
his Wisdom of the Ancients. Metaphor allowed for what Michael Spitzer calls ‘the relationship between the 
physical, proximate, and familiar, and the abstract, distal and unfamiliar’. Michael Spitzer, Metaphor and 
Musical Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 4. 
103 Perhaps this is what the anonymous author of The Praise of Musicke was referring to when they said that 
music ‘hath a certaine diuine influence into the soules of men, whereby our cogitations and thoughts … are 
brought into a celestiall acknowledging of their natures’. Anon., Praise of Musicke (1586), sig.C5v.  
104 Lodi Nauta and Detlev Pätzold (eds.), Imagination in the Later Middle Ages and Early Modern Times (Leuven: 
Peeters, 2004), 72. 
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according to this account, it is not enough to understand it or be able to prove 
it—one must also be capable of acting on it. The ability to act, however, 
depends on the possession of appropriate volitions, which are in turn conceived 
as identical with emotions, or as so closely connected that the two always occur 
together. Either way, action and emotion are both intrinsic to knowledge, and 
can be used as criteria for distinguishing it from epistemically inferior states. 
The fact that people may be incapable of acting on claims they profess to know 
is an indication that they have not attained knowledge after all. Equally, the 
presence of certain emotions (typically love) can be evidence for the correctness 
of a particular view.105 
 
James reminds us that in order to understand the fickleness of passion-motivated 
action (sometimes we can control ourselves, sometimes we cannot), one need examine 
how the passions relate to other kinds of thought, and how we might temper our 
emotional urges.106 As will be seen throughout this thesis, the problem of self-control is 
often embodied or allegorised in poetry in terms of Beauty (the passions) and her 
complicated and antagonistic friendship with ratio (which is also referred to as the 
mind), or its personification, Reason.   
 
(Re)Creating the Self Through Music 
Perhaps the action best elicited through music was an action towards self-change. In 
Martin Fotherby’s words from 1622, music possessed not only a ‘kindred with the 
soule’ but ‘a kind of affinitie with the Body’.107 Though there was a variety of ways 
music’s power was thought to affect the body, mind and soul, for good or for evil, I will 
here focus on how the power of music was thought to change, create, and mould the 
self.108 Music’s medicinal applications for the body and mind were well documented.109 
Of utmost relevance here was the belief that the arts could work to move men to 
actions of social good. As Sidney argued in his Apology for Poesy (1595), it was believed 
                                                
105 James, Passion and Action, 225. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Martin Fotherby, Atheomastic: Clearing Foure Truthes, against Atheists and Infidels (London, 1622), as quoted 
in Marsh, Music and Society in Seventeenth-Century England, 64. 
108 Though one might assume that a basic understanding of the mechanics of music and how music influences 
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points out that this was not necessarily the case. He makes an argument for other channels of education, 
such as the theatre, as evidence that ‘sophisticated ideas about the power of music circulated among a 
substantial cross-section of the population’. He reminds us that Shakespeare, while exceptional, did not come 
from the gentry and still demonstrates a grasp of contemporary philosophical ideas on music. Marsh, Music 
and Society in Seventeenth-Century England, 33. 
109 It was commonly believed that listening to certain types of music (and indeed in certain modes) could 
affect one’s body and health. Marsh, Music and Society in Seventeenth-Century England, 64-70. 
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that the mimetic arts could be used to sculpt society, thus having a physical impact 
upon the material world.110 This also applied specifically to music, as demonstrated by 
Thomas Elyot, who believed that ‘the perfecte understanding of musike’ was required 
‘for the better attaynynge the knowledge of a publike weale’.111 This practical 
connection between music and the health of the body reinforces the idea that, as we 
shall see in greater detail later, the act of music making was believed to have abilities 
capable of affecting both physical and spiritual entities, suggesting music’s power 
might span the material and spiritual worlds.112  
One undeniable recurrence in the primary literature describes music’s ability to 
move ‘inward’ or ‘inside’ the body and thus affect our very self. Braithwaite described 
the ‘inward operation’ of the ear.113 This was related to the idea that hearing, other than 
smell, was the only sense that required a physical material to enter the body.114 As Erin 
Minear has constructed, discussion of music’s power ‘tended to require language of 
depth’.115 Richard Hooker said music could ‘expresse and represent to the minde more 
inwardly than any other sensible meane the very standing rising and falling, the very 
steps and inflections every way, the turnes and varieties of all passions whereunto the 
minde is subject: yea so to imitate them’.116 Calvin, too, used this rhetoric of inwardness 
when he expressed that it ‘is true that, as Saint Paul says, every evil word corrupts 
good manners, but when it has the melody with it, it pierces the heart much more 
strongly and enters within; as wine is poured into the cask with a funnel, so venom and 
corruption are distilled to the very depths of the heart [au profound du coeur] by melody’.117 
Moreover, some believed that polyphonic vocal music or ‘artificiall singing’ exceeded 
‘plain Musicke, for it striketh deeper, and worketh more effectually in the hearers’.118 
                                                
110 This is echoed by composer Robert Jones, who stated that a commonwealth is ‘but a well tunde Song 
where all partes doe agree’. Robert Jones, Vltimum Vale, with a triplicity of musicke (London: Printed by J 
Windet, 1605), sig.A1r. 
111 Thomas Elyot, The Boke Named the Governour (London: Printed by Thomas Berthelet, 1537 [1534?]), 
sig.C7r.  
112 For more on the medical aspects of music’s power, see Craik and Pollard (eds.), Shakespearean Sensations, 
6. Marsh, Music and Society in Seventeenth-Century England, 50-59, 64-70. 
113 Braithwaite, Essaies vpon the fiue senses (1620), sig.C2v.  
114 B. Smith, The Acoustic World of Early Modern England, 106. 
115 Minear, Reverberating Song in Shakespeare and Milton, 34. 
116 Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiasticall Politie: The Fift Booke (London: printed by John Windet, 
1597), sig.H2r.  
117 As quoted (and emphasised) by Minear, Reverberating Song in Shakespeare and Milton, 35. From John 
Calvin, Preface to The Geneva Psalter, in Source Readings in Music History, (eds.) Oliver Strunk and Leo Treitler 
(New York: Norton, 1998), 366. 
118 Anon., The Praise of Mvsicke (1586), sig.I8r.  
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Though I shall return to this quotation in my discussion of multi-voiced music in the 
conclusion to this thesis, it is worth noting that it is the depth of polyphonic music that 
makes it so effective.  
In 1599, Richard Alison framed devotion as a full-body, fully sensory experience 
when he wrote,  
[a]nd that our meditations in the Psalmes may not want their delight, we have that 
excellet gift of God, the Art of Musick to accompany them: that our eyes beholding 
the words of Dauid, our fingers handling the Instruments of Musicke, our eares 
delighting in the swetenesse of the melody, and the heart obseruing the harmony of 
them: all these doe ioyne in an heauenly Consort, and God may bee glorified and 
our selues refreshed therewith.119  
 
As sound entered in our bodies via the ear, this inwardness and directness (as 
perceived by some) allowed for music to not only renew us, but to change us. In John 
Dowland’s translation of Ornithoparchus’s Micrologvs (1609) the author argues against 
those who disapproved of music’s use in church: ‘Now farewell they that forbid 
Church-men to use Music; what solace (setting singing aside) can they have either 
more healthful, or more honest? For whilst we recreate our selves with singing, all evil 
thoughts, and speech, all back-biting, all gluttony, and drunkenness, are avoided’.120 I 
will return to why I interpret ‘recreate’ as ‘re-create’ rather than as simply ‘recreate’ (as 
in recreational) in the conclusion of this thesis.121 I ask that you keep in mind music’s 
potential to aid in the formation of selves when considering how music interrogated 
issues of human consciousness, as it does in the following examples. 
 
2.3 Contemplating the Senses in Song 
The following section surveys multi-voiced domestic music texts that contemplate all 
aspects of sense perception, whether it involves acknowledging their capacity for 
deceit, or questioning the relationship between the passions and reason. These 
examples fall into two larger categories, texts that cogitate sense perception directly, 
and texts that contemplate the senses via sleep and dreaming, a state in which one’s 
                                                
119 Richard Alison, The Psalmes of Dauid in Meter … (London: printed by William Barley, 1599), sig.A2r-A3v. 
120 Ornithoparchus, Micrologvs, (trans.) Dowland (1609), sig.V2v. Emphasis my own. 
121 As Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson state, '[e]arly modern subjects experienced strong passions as self-
alteration'. Paster, Rowe, et al (eds.), Reading the Early Modern Passions, 16.  
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senses are at rest, yet one’s imagination is bursting with activity. Though these are 
often poems about love, it was often through this powerfully passionate aspect of 
human consciousness (which included, but was not exclusively, romantic and Godly 
love) that man was thought to be motivated to seek knowledge.122 I demonstrate that 
musicalised poetry cogitating the reliability of the senses is a particularly effective 
representation of how epistemic conversation could occur within a seemingly mundane 
daily practice, even at the surface level. The words overtly contemplated the reliability 
of sense perception via love, a powerful element of human consciousness, while the 
music brought the affect that struck to the core of one’s body and spirit, physically 
presenting related questions about the passions and sense perception that were 
pondered in the text. And, vitally, this music-making process was self-reflective, as it 
was experienced in an utterly sensorial and temporal event, an idea to which I shall 
return.  
 As Susan James suggested, the beginnings of the New Philosophy paved the way 
for a revival of metaphysical questioning that sought to reconsider our understanding 
of the passions on the most basic level.123 The questioning in these musicalised texts 
does not take any grand philosophical leaps, yet they are notably contemplative about 
relevant topics of philosophical concern to the more canonical thinkers. Tom Sorell 
reminds us that though Bacon and Descartes are routinely named as the first 
exponents of the new methods that founded modern philosophy, the ‘the dividing line 
between Aristotelians and partisans of the new science was blurred by some 
seventeenth-century philosophers … [and] it is even a question whether Descartes or 
Bacon themselves … really broke as decisively from Aristotle or Aristotelianism as is 
                                                
122 As James explains: ‘This heady analysis draws on two palimpsestic traditions—Platonism and 
Augustinianism. From Plato, early-modern philosophers inherit a hierarchical conception of knowledge as 
love, which many of them put to work in their interpretations of the relation between natural and moral 
knowledge. Superimposed on this is the influence of Augustine (famous for his remark that Plato is the most 
nearly Christian of the pagan philosophers) whose doctrine of the will lends authority to the association 
between emotion and volition. Error, as Augustine sees it, lies not so much in misperception as in the 
disorder of the human will, in our inability to keep our volitions, and hence our actions, in line with our 
understanding. But since we experience volitions as emotions, this failing is simultaneously an emotional one, 
an inability to feel appropriate loves and hatreds. To bring order to our wills, we must do our best to redirect 
our emotions so that we love and hate the right things, and although Augustine thinks that our ability to 
achieve this end is limited, he nevertheless believes that we have a responsibility to make whatever progress 
we can. Only by learning to reshape our feelings, then, can we produce the orderly volitions that are intrinsic 
to knowledge’. James, Passion and Action, 225-6. 
123 Ibid., 65. 
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often assumed’.124 This muddiness is important to keep in mind because it reinforces 
the idea that change in episteme can be gradual, serpentine, and messy, and Sorrell’s 
caution can go both ways. In other words, precursors to articulated change can be 
present in types of metaphysical questioning, even if the rhetoric of that inquiry 
remains fundamentally chained to assumptions belonging to old or current 
understanding.  
 The intellectual climate described by James and Sorrell suggests a subtle 
dissatisfaction or unease with an Aristotelian foundation for sense perception and the 
role of the passions, resulting in a surge of metaphysical questioning in works of art, 
well before the canon-changing Cartesian works heralded as the beginnings of 
modernity.125 Surely these articulations of the new philosophy did not, as Toulmin 
seemed to suggest earlier, suddenly appear out of the ether.126 Furthermore, this was 
not an urge relegated to philosophers, but many people who tried to understand what 
motivated mankind to action, including poets and musicians defending their trades. 
One might note that the following texts come from a variety of potentially multi-voiced 
domestic genres, including the madrigal, consort song, canzonet, and ayre, and that the 
‘introspective’ or metaphysical topics are not exclusive to any one form.  
 
Singing Sense Perception 
The most common trope involving the passions and the senses posits beauty (usually 
representing carnal desire) against reason. Examples of this sort of juxtaposition 
include Weelkes’s ‘Like two proude armies’ (1600), Giles Farnaby’s ‘Ay me poor heart’ 
(1598), Richard Carlton’s setting of Edmund Spencer’s ‘Nought under heaven’ (1601), 
or Thomas Tomkins’ ‘Fond men that do so highly prize’ (1622).127 To show just one 
example, Weelkes’s ‘Like two proude armies’ states: 
 
  Like two proude armies, marching in the field, 
                                                
124 Tom Sorell in Tom Sorell (ed.), The Rise of Modern Philosophy: The Tension Between New and Traditional 
Philosophies from Machiavelli to Leibniz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 3.  
125 James, Passion and Action, 65. 
126 Though sense perception was questioned in previous centuries, C.M. Woolgar argues that ‘[f]rom the late 
medieval period comes considerable evidence for change in the day-to-day realities that intertwined with 
beliefs about perception’. C.M. Woolgar, The Senses in Late Medieval England (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2006), 270. 
127 All of these texts are found with modernised spellings in Edmund Fellowes, English Madrigal Verse 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1920), 220, 95, 70, 193.  
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  Ioyning a thundring fight, each scorns to yeeld, 
  So in my heart, your beautie and my reason, 
  one claims the crown, the other sayes its treason. 
  But oh your beautie shineth as the Sunne, 
  And dazled reason yeelds as quite vndone.128 
 
Some of these ‘beauty versus reason’ examples specifically draw out the senses’ role in 
this debate, often the eye for falling for beauty’s charms, as do Byrd’s settings of ‘O 
you that heare this voice’ (1588) and ‘Where fancy fond for pleasure pleads’ (1588).129   
In ‘Where fancy fond’, for example, the poet positions the personifications within a 
trial-like situation (the bar of sweet delight). Beauty, arguing powerfully for Fancy, is a 
persuasive lawyer thus making the ruling seem obvious. 
   
  My eyes presume to iudge this case,  
  whose iudgement reason doth disdaine: 
  but beautie with her wanton face, 
  stands to defend, the case is plaine: 
  and at the barre of sweet delight,  
  she pleads that fancie must be right.130  	
In other examples, love or the passions are accused of confounding man, leading him 
astray from ratio or moral truth, as is the case in Thomas Bateson’s ‘Loue is the fire 
that burnes me’ (1618)131 and in several moralising examples by Byrd, including ‘All as 
a sea’ (1588) which states ‘Our passions be the Pirates still that spoyle, / and ouerboard 
cast’s out our reasons fraight’, or his ‘If in thine hart’ (1589), which argues that reason 
                                                
128 Thomas Weelkes, Madrigals of 5. And 6. Parts apt for viols and voices (London: printed by Thomas Este, 1600), 
sig.C3r.  
129 ‘O you that heare this voice’, which proceeds directly after ‘Where fancy fond’ in Byrd’s 1588 collection, is 
discussed in detail in Ch. 4, 221-35. Though the author and source of the ‘Where fancy’ text remains 
uncertain, Phillip Brett has suggested that it could have been from ‘Four Foster Children of Desire’, a play 
that some, including Katherine-Duncan Jones, believe to have been the conceptual or actual work of Sidney, 
possibly with three of his compatriots, Greville, Windsor, and Arundel. Plus, within the context of Byrd’s 
publication, it shares many themes with the Sidney text before it, though the strongest argument against it 
being by Sidney is that nobody attributed it to him, given contemporaries were quick to attribute works to 
the courtier. Woudhuysen, Sir Philip Sidney and the Circulation of Manuscripts, 250; Katherine Duncan-Jones, 
“‘Melancholie Times’: Musical Recollections of Sidney by William Byrd and Thomas Watson”, in Caldwell, 
Olleson, Wollenberg (eds.) The Well-Enchanting Skill, 170-180. 
130 Verse two only. For the whole song, see Appendix I(a). ‘Where fancie fond’ in Byrd, Psalmes, sonets, 
& songs (1588), sig.D3r.  
131 ‘Loue is the fire that burnes me / The smoakes are thoughts confused / Which dimmes my soule And hath 
my sense abused’. ‘Love is the fire that burns me’ in Thomas Bateson, The second set of madrigales to 3. 4. 5. and 
6. Parts (London: printed by Thomas Snodham), sig.B1r. 
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must rule the heart.132 Some pieces discuss more generally the inner workings of the 
passions and senses, such as Martin Peerson’s tripartite setting of Fulke Greville Lord 
Brooke’s ‘Loue the delight of all well thinking minds’ (1630), which states: 
 
  Loue the delight of all well thinking minds 
  delight, the fruit of vertue deerly lou’d 
  vertue the highest good, that reason finds; 
  reason, the fire where in mens thoughts bee prou’d,  
  are from the world, by natures power bee reft  
  and in one creature, for her glorie left, 
 
  Beautie her couer is the eyes true pleasure  
  in Honour's fame shee liu’s, The eares sweete Musicke, 
  Excesse of wonder growes from her true measure, 
  her worth is passions wound and passions Physicke,  
  From her true heart Cleere springs of wisdome flow,  
  which imaged in her words and deeds men know.133 
 
John Coprario (Cooper)’s ‘Deceitful Fancy, why delud’st thou me’ (1606) 
contemplates imagination’s capacity for deceit.  
 
  Deceitfull fancy, why deludst thou mee,  
  the deade aliue presenting?  
  My ioies faire Image caru’d in shades I see,  
  O false yet sweet, contenting?  
  Why art thou not a substance like to mee,  
  or I a shade to vanish hence with thee? 
  
  Stay gentle obiect, my sense still deceiue  
  With this thy kind elusion: 
  I die throgh madnes if my thoughts you leaue.  
  O strange? yet sweet, confusion?  
  Poore blisselesse harte that feels such deep annoy,  
  Only to loose the shadowe of thy ioy. 134    
 
Though the speaker rationally knows his lover has not returned from the dead and 
remains within the immaterial realm of imagination, he is still comforted by her false 
and substance-less presence. He wishes he too were of an immaterial substance, so that 
                                                
132 ‘All as a sea’ can be found in William Byrd, Psalmes, sonets, & songs (1588), sig.F2v. For ‘If thine hart’, see 
William Byrd, Songs of sundrie natures some of grauitie, and others of myrth, fit for all companies and voyces (London: 
printed by Thomas East, 1589), sig.H2r.   
133 Martin Peerson, Mottects or Graue chamber musique (London: printed by William Stansby, 1630), sig.B1r-
B2v.  
134 John Coprario, Funeral teares (London: printed by Iohn VVindet, 1606), sig.E1v.  
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then he could at least exist on the same plane as she. The speaker is in a problematic 
situation, as without this delusion, he fears he will ‘die through madness’, as if he is not 
already presenting signs of madness through visions of his departed lover. Fancy is so 
powerful a force that his passions are temporarily contented, even though he knows his 
visions are not real. In this way, Fancy, not the passions, is portrayed as more powerful 
than reason.  
Even by this time, the idea that ‘love is blind’ was a common adage, and a recurrent 
theme in musicalised poetry. A couple of exemplars include Giles Farnaby’s ‘Blind 
Loue was shooting’ (1598)135 and Thomas Morley’s ‘Ioy, ioy doth so arise’ (1593).136 
On the other hand, some examples take issue with the proverb, adding nuance to its 
presumption that it is Love itself that is blind. In Michael Cavendish’s ‘Loue is not 
blind’ (1598), the speaker acknowledges their active role in choosing their own path 
when they state ‘Loue is not blind, but I my selfe am so / with free consent blind-
foulded by desire, / that guides my will along the paths of woe / to seeke refreshing for 
a needeless fire’.137 In Bateson’s ‘If loue be blind’ (1604) this speaker, too, takes 
personal responsibility for passion’s persuasion, excusing Cupid from blame. 
 
  If loue be blind, how hath he then the sight, 
  with beauties beams my careless heart to wound: 
  Or if a boy, how hath he then the might, 
  the mighti’st conquerors to bring to ground. 
  O no, he is not blind, but I that leese 
  My thoughts, the wayes that bring to restless feares: 
  Nor yet a boy, but I that liue in dread, 
  mixed with hope, and seeke for ioy in teares.138 
 
These examples demonstrate interesting variations in thought about personal 
responsibility and action when dealing in matters of the passions. Do we rely on 
ancient tropes like Cupid and accept that we are powerless in the face of the passions, 
                                                
135 ‘Blind Cupid’ is another common variation on the theme. Farnaby’s text with modern spelling can be 
found in Fellowes, English Madrigal Verse, 93. 
136 ‘That seeing makes mee blind through too great pleasure, / But if such blinding, sweet Loue, doth so 
delight thee, / Come, Loue, and more thus, blind mee still & spight mee’. Thomas Morley, Canzonets or Little 
Short Songs to Three Voyces (London: printed by Tho: Est, 1593), sig.B2v-r. For full text see ‘Ioy, ioy’: 
Appendix I(b).   
137 Michael Cavendish, 14. Ayres in tabletorie to the lute expressed with two voyces (London: printed by Peter Short, 
1598), sig.C1r.  
138 Thomas Bateson, The first set of English madrigales to 3. 4. 5. and 6. voices (London: printed by Thomas Este, 
1604), sig.C2r. 
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or should we focus our analysis away from external allegory, and reinsert the 
responsible self (or, in Cavendish’s potentially weighty terms, the ‘free consent’ of the 
‘will’)? It is clear that these texts have weighty metaphysical implications. They are not 
simply descriptions of romantic love, or how romantic love makes one feel, but texts 
that interrogate fundamental assumptions about autonomy, free will, and the material 
nature of human consciousness and reality.  
 
Walter Porter: ‘Tell mee where the beautie lyes’ 
Walter Porter’s madrigal ‘Tell mee where the beautie lyes’ (1632) takes this idea a step 
further by addressing the question of Beauty’s ‘seat’, whether in the object or the eye of 
the beholder.  
 
Tell mee where the beautie lyes, 
In my Mistress or in my eyes  
Is she fair? I made her so.  
Beautie doth from liking grow, 
Bee she fayrer whiter than  
Venus Doues or Leda’s Swanes,  
What's that Beauty if neglected,  
Seene of all of none respected,  
Then tell my Mistresse that I loue her,  
Think her faire, cause I approue her.139 
 
The subjective version of beauty described in this text looks not towards the object of 
sense perception to find the quality of beauty, but to the role of the observer, even 
implying that the only reality is the one created by the observer (‘I made her so’). This 
is portrayed as more real than external measures of beauty like skin colour, which are 
measured by mythical (and therefore fantastical) rubrics, rather than anything rooted 
in reality. The line ‘What’s that Beauty if neglected’ questions whether beauty even 
exists outside of the mind that believes it. Though the overarching message of the poem 
is just a variation on the idea that ‘Love is blind’ (not that love is blinding as in the 
other examples, but that one can love in spite of the faults of the object of affection), as 
well as an argument for the subjectivity of beauty, the way it posits the first question is 
                                                
139 Text from Tenor partbook. Walter Porter, Madrigales and ayres (London: printed by William Stansby, 
1632), sig.C2r. Italicised text is not in the tenor partbook, and was taken from Fellowes, English Madrigal 
Verse, 581. 
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of note here: ‘Tell mee where the beautie lyes / In my Mistress or in my eyes?’. The 
poet notably does not call it ‘her beauty’, but a more objective ‘the beauty’. 
Furthermore, the two options are clear: either beauty lies in the object of perception, or 
in the eyes of the beholder. This is reminiscent of the type of questioning that would 
become of pertinence to the Cartesians, who moved away from an Aristotelian 
perception of truth built off external objects of sense perception, to a truth elicited 
from within the observer. This example by Porter demonstrates the subtle ways 
questions about love and perception could negotiate ideas about the nature of reality 
and representation in ways that don’t appear to depart from topical norms like 
romantic love.   
 
John Dowland: ‘Tell me, true Loue’ 
In this anonymous text from John Dowland’s Pilgrim’s Solace (1612), the speaker 
addresses a personification of True Love (whether romantic or religious), asking ‘what 
is the quality of Love? Where does it exist?’.140 Though at first blush this poem could 
be discussing romantic love, the True Love sought by this speaker is of a more Godly 
sort, and moreover, a type of knowledge.141 The following is a Neo-Platonic reading of 
Dowland’s text that requires a brief step back into some theory that is specific to this 
example. Susan James explains:  
 
For some philosophers, the distinction between knowledge of nature and 
knowledge of God belongs within a hierarchical order of stages through which 
the soul can ascend in its search for perfection. A number of versions of this 
doctrine were espoused during the seventeenth century. One cluster of 
interpretations is basically Platonist in allegiance, and draws from 
chronologically scattered sources the common conviction that because reason 
yields only one, relatively poor kind of knowledge, the mind must move out 
beyond it to a knowledge more akin to feeling. Only love or knowledge of the 
                                                
140 Though the text author is anonymous, I will refer to this as 'Dowland's text' because it was Dowland who 
set it to music. The same caveat goes for the anonymous texts set by Thomas Weelkes that I discuss in 
Chapter Three.   
141 This poetic ambiguity could reference the knowledge gained by the fall. James describes more generally ‘a 
desire to resolve the dilemma created by the recognition that, in order to acquire knowledge, we must run 
the risks to which the passions expose us, while knowing at the outset that we are unlikely to be able to resist 
their strength and cunning. Milton's reading of Genesis tells the history of this flaw; Adam's insufficiency 
and desire for love can only be satisfied by Eve, who brings about his Fall, and with it the uncontrollable 
human passions that stand in the way of knowledge’. James, Passion and Action, 252. 
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heart can yield true insight into the nature and commands of God, and thus into 
the good.142 
 
This approach to knowledge building led most seventeenth-century philosophers to 
‘draw a distinction between two kinds of knowledge—the demonstrative knowledge 
we can attain through the human power of reasoning, and the emotional knowledge 
lying at the very edge of our natural capabilities’.143 This latter kind is the key to 
understanding true love, or the nature of God, and was categorised as a love or 
knowledge of the heart. Dowland’s 1612 composition reflects the emotional dimension 
of knowledge via True Love, an idea that ‘made space’ for later philosophers like 
Descartes and Spinoza to craft a conception of knowledge as feeling, but in more 
explicit terms.144  	
Tell me, true Loue, where shall I seeke thy being. 
In thoughts or words, in vowes or promise making, 
In reasons, lookes, or passions neuer seeing, 
In men on earth or womens minds partaking. 
Thou canst not dye, and therefore liuing,  
tell me where is thy seate, Why doth this age expell thee? 
 
When thoughts are still vnseen, and words disguised; 
vowes are not sacred held, nor promise debt: 
By passion reasons glory is surprised, 
in neither sexe is true loue firmely set. 
Thoughts fainde, words false, vowes and promise broken 
Made true Loue fly from earth, this is the token. 
 
Mount then my thoughts, here is for thee no dwelling. 
since truth and falsehood liue like twins together: 
Beleeve not sense, eyes, eares, touch, taste, or smelling, 
both Art and Nature 's forced: put trust in neyther. 
One only shee doth true Loue captive binde 
In fairest brest, but in a fairer minde. 
 
O fairest minde, enrich’d with Loues residing. 
retaine the best; in hearts let some seede fall, 
In stead of weeds Loues fruits may haue abiding, 
at Harvest you shall reape encrease of all. 
O happy Loue, more happy man that findes thee,  
                                                
142 Ibid., 234. 
143 Ibid., 240. 
144 Ibid. 
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Most happy Saint, that keepes, restores, vnbindes thee.145 	
 
‘Being’ is a multifaceted state, encompassing not only the dwelling, essence, or 
condition of a subject, but also the ‘existence, the fact of belonging to the universe of 
things material or immaterial’.146 The ending of the first stanza is a rhetorical question, 
as it is revealed in the second stanza that the speaker knows that promises can be 
broken, words carry lies, and thoughts cannot be seen.147 If passions and thoughts 
cannot be seen, are they real? The idea of ‘never-seeing’ might be interpreted as the 
‘blind passions’—a fairly standard image, but alternately, this context seems to remind 
readers that emotions are immaterial mental processes and therefore never seen. The 
speaker seems conflicted about the material quality of True Love, portraying it both as 
eternal (‘thou canst not dye’), somehow belonging to the realm of the spiritual (or a 
non-living unseen material, perhaps), but also as a substance of the corporeal (‘and 
therefore liuing’). This sort of contradiction embodies the rhetorical question of the 
text as a whole, which questions the nature of passionate substances like True Love, 
that we simultaneously ‘know’ to be real, yet cannot describe in quality.148  
 As is so often the case, it is through the mode of poetry, the pinnacle of ‘words 
disguised’, that the speaker questions metaphoric form as a potential bearer of truth. 
Passion’s potent powers of persuasion challenge Reason’s reign. The second stanza 
concludes with the assertion that uncertainty and deception have led Love to flee the 
earth, upholding a sceptical view of modern life. Though upon first appearance the 
image of True Love flying from the earth seems purely metaphorical, it might be worth 
keeping in mind the question of whether passions like love could exist without a body. 
This is the second reference in this poem that acknowledges True Love’s qualities as 
akin to those of an autonomous, spiritual substance like the soul (along with the idea 
that it ‘canst not dye’). Love’s departure is our ‘token’, which is possibly a reference to 
the boils from plague as a metaphor for God’s judgement, our payment for the 
dishonest modern way of life. Perhaps this suggests that the sensory knowledge 
                                                
145 John Dowland, A Pilgrimes Solace (London: printed by Thomas Snodham, 1612), sig.F1v. 
146 Definition 2 in “being, n.”, OED Online. Oxford University Press, March 2016. (accessed 30 March 2016). 
147 Twice in the poem the speaker uses ‘seeing’ as a mode of commonly accepted tangible ‘proof’, in spite of 
the fact the poem is questioning the reliability of all the senses. 
148 One can describe what true love feels like in metaphoric and physiological terms (butterflies in the 
stomach), as well as through the actions that ensue from the feeling of true love (the giving of gifts or praise), 
yet the substantive makeup and location (seat) of such powerful affection proves much more difficult to 
determine. 
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employed by unbridled passion obfuscates our perception of God’s true nature, as we 
had before earthly knowledge. 
 In the third stanza the speaker declares ‘Mount then my thoughts, here is for thee 
no dwelling’, as the speaker tells his or her thoughts to ascend to a higher level, most 
likely a heavenly one, as, if the senses are unreliable, how is truth to be found on 
earth?149 This is one of the most overt lines that suggest a Godly rather than romantic 
True Love, as the speaker commands his thoughts to rise above corporeal sense 
perception. In rejecting the knowledge attained from sense perception, the speaker 
supports the idea that, in James’s words, ‘the emotions that constitute knowledge are 
not passions deriving from our sensible perceptions of the relations between our bodies 
and external things. Instead, they are the fruit of our capacity to withdraw from sense, 
to rise above the order of the flesh, and to love not just what appears beneficial to our 
embodied natures, but the true good’.150 Only one ‘she’ can capture True Love, and it is 
not just her fair breast (both physical attractiveness but also the place where the heart 
resides) that holds love, but the ‘fairer mind’, which it is tempting to read as a 
knowledge of the heart, but I will return to this idea with further explanation 
shortly.151 
 The fourth stanza concludes that Love resides in the mind, and the sensible person 
will be sure to keep it mostly there, as the mind is enriched by love’s presence. 
Furthering the agricultural theme from the previous stanza, it advises that one must 
take a risk on passion and the heart, however, by allowing a little love to spill into the 
heart, which acts like a soil, allowing it to spring into fruition, multiplying one’s love.152 
Like some Christian Platonists, Dowland’s text author searches for an explanation for 
the aspects of passion that cannot be controlled through attempts to separate 
                                                
149 The ‘earthliness’ is reinforced through a horticultural pun. ‘Both Art and Nature’s forced’ or 
manufactured: as man counterfeits nature through art, he also ‘forces’ nature (the process of 
manipulating/trimming a plant—often rhubarb— so it grows properly. This term was also applied to the 
shearing of wool sheep).“† force, v.2”, OED Online. Oxford University Press. September 2014. (accessed 
September 19, 2014). 
150 James, Passion and Action, 240. 
151 Alternately, this could simply be a reference to a more standard Aristotelian understanding of the passions 
requiring guidance from ratio. But as these matters need not be exclusive to one vein of thought, I believe 
either reading is possible in this case. 
152 See James quotation, Ch. 2, footnote 141.  
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knowledge of nature from the ‘heart knowledge’ of God.153 Decades later, Blaise Pascal 
had still not determined the relationship between reason and knowledge when he 
wrote, ‘[w]e know the truth not only through our reason, but also through our heart. It 
is through the latter that we know first principles, and reason, which knows nothing 
about them, tries in vain to refute them … Principles are felt, propositions proved, and 
both with certainty though by different means.’154 The problem of reconciling 
knowledge known by reason from the knowledge ‘felt’ via the heart is captured 
poetically by Dowland’s final verse, though the author relies on metaphor to avoid too 
bold a statement.155 The final couplet of text readdresses ‘Love’ as happy, as it was 
widely thought that with knowledge of the heart came happiness.156 Moreover, the man 
that cultivates or unlocks knowledge of the heart has a chance at holiness. As James 
summarises, ‘[t]he acquisition of knowledge is, as we have seen, widely held to release 
powerful emotions. Knowledge changes us and, with or without the help of divine 
grace, makes us happier than we were’, an idea supported by Dowland’s final text 
couplet.157  
 
2.4 Dreaming and Sensing in Song 
A secondary substantial theme worth highlighting that poetically connected sense 
perception to music was the act of dreaming. Composer Robert Jones seemed to 
understand, and use to his advantage, the idea that music and dreaming are mentally 
and metaphorically linked. Writing in the introduction to his fourth collection of ayres, 
A Mvsicall Dreame (1609), the composer asserted that his musical offering should be 
approached subjectively, as a dream.158 Through a play on words, he pondered: ‘what 
                                                
153 As James summarises, ‘[h]umans are thus burdened by emotional and cognitive dispositions which make 
it extremely difficult for them to reason, so much so that it would be fruitless to try to explain their behaviour 
as the outcome of rational judgement’. James, Passion and Action, 237. 
154 From Blaise Pascal, Pensées, 110; cf. 513 as quoted in James, Passion and Action, 238.  
155 And ultimately, Dowland’s text author maintains that the seat of knowledge is in the mind, rather than the 
heart as was suggested by some Christian Neo-Platonists like Richard Hooker (1554-1600). James, Passion 
and Action, 235. 
156 In her book, James explores the various ways happiness is portrayed by various philosophers in order to 
gain insight into their conceptions of knowledge. Ibid., 243. 
157 Ibid. Though I won’t be considering song in performance until the end of this chapter, it is worth pointing 
out that Daniel Fischlin was right when he surmised that ‘[s]uch questioning [in this poem] may elicit from 
the respondent, the idealized courtier with highly developed discursive skills, a form of gnosis that emerges 
from the metaphysics of linguistic and musical ordering’, Fischlin, In Small Proportions, 64. 
158 As with music, dreaming has long been linked with self-deception. In De anima, Aristotle saw dreams as a 
product of imagination without regulation from the senses, and ascertained that it is generally only upon 
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are dreames, but airie possessions, and seuerall ayres, breathing harmonious 
whisperings, though to thee discord, yet to others indifferent’, allowing for individual 
response (though only to an extent, because as he also not so subtly suggested ‘I will 
not say excellent, because it is an others office not mine’).159 This reflects an 
understanding (poetic or otherwise) of both ayres and dreams as ‘aerie’ intangible 
materials that nevertheless affect us greatly. Jones capitalised on the idea of a dream-
inspired collection as he wrote: 
 
where upon I betooke me to the ease of my Pillow, where Somnus hauing taken 
possession of my eyes, and Morpheus the charge of my senses; it happened mee 
to fall into a Musical dreame, wherein I chanced to haue many opinions and 
extrauagant humors of diuers Natures and Conditions … all these I hope, shall 
not giue any distaste to the eares, or dislike to the mind, eyther in their words, 
or in their seuerall sounds, although it is not necessarie to relate or diuulge all 
Dreames or Phantasies that Opinion begets in sleepe, or happeneth to the 
mindes apparition.160 
 
Adding to the drama of the account, Jones invoked Somnus, the mythical god of sleep, 
and Morpheus, the god of the dream, who steal his eyes and other external senses, 
allowing the musical dream to occur, providing a mythological explanation for the 
incapacitation of the senses.161 Jones wouldn’t be the first artist to claim his work came 
to him in the state of dreaming, nor the last artist to believe his work to be of an 
otherworldly inspiration. Whether Jones’s account of how this collection came into 
being was fabricated for marketability, rooted in a real experience, or some poetic 
embellishment on the latter, it highlights a particular aspect of the way this composer 
tried to explore the curious intermingling involving the senses, imagination, and the 
subject that are presented through both musical affect and the experience of dreaming.  
 The early modern curiosity about dreaming is particularly familiar territory within 
literary scholarship. Dreaming was another subjective faculty of the mind, which, like 
music, was little understood in mechanical terms, though known to be linked to 
                                                                                                                                                  
waking that one can decide that the images seen in a dream are a dream and not reality. Therefore without 
input from the external world through the senses, dreams could not be true, but were ‘after images’ of 
remembered sense perception coupled with imagination. B.R. Hergenhahn, An Introduction to the History of 
Psychology, Sixth Edition (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2006), 55-56. 
159 Robert Jones, A Musicall Dreame (London: printed by Iohn Windet, 1609), sig.A2r. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Somnus is the Roman equivalent of Hypnos, the Greek god or personification of sleep. Somnus is also the 
Latin noun for sleep. 
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imagination. Consequently music and dreaming were often poetically conflated. It was 
understood that through the stimulation of imagination, both music and dreams 
mislead the senses, causing individuals delusion, confusion, or to rise to action. With so 
much mystery surrounding the influential power of dreams and music, perhaps it is no 
surprise that music played an active role in metaphoric discussions of sleep and its 
mysteries. In Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream (1595), Titania wakes after a 
vivid dream to Oberon, who orders, ‘Titania, music call, and strike more dead / Than 
common sleep of all these five the sense’ (IV.i.80-81), alluding to music’s power over 
the senses as not only similar to, but stronger than, that of sleep. Titania replies ‘Music, 
ho! music, such as charmeth sleep’ (IV.i.82), one of several reminders in this play of 
the soporific potential of some music, inducing a sleep that removes sensory input from 
the body and reality. It is often through music and dreams that Shakespeare creates 
spaces like Fairyland or Prospero’s island, places in which he could question our very 
understanding of a reality based upon sense perception. Thus, through theatre, a 
transportive, sensory art form, Shakespeare could demonstrate several of the agents 
that were to play major roles in the development of philosophical issues that had yet to 
be codified in his day.162  
 As S.J. Wiseman points out in Reading the Early Modern Dream, ‘[d]uring the 
seventeenth century what the dream said about the self became significant’, as the 
quality, cause, and meaning of dreams baffled writers of all sorts, as they had in 
medieval times.163 The way thinkers (including poets, artists, and natural philosophers) 
interpreted dreaming, however, would prove to shift significantly over the course of 
the century. As Mary Baine Campbell addresses, the dream was sometimes thought of 
as ‘a motion or fiction of the soul’.164 She argues that the early modern fixation with the 
                                                
162 It is worth keeping in mind that in Descartes’s First Meditation, dreams played an integral role in the 
development of his systematic method for doubting the legitimacy of all sense perception, in that, to the 
mind, vivid dreams are indistinguishable from waking experience, therefore leaving open the possibility that 
everything we perceive is of the imagination and there is no external world at all (radical doubt). Moreover, 
in November of 1619, Descartes reported that visions for his life’s work came to him in a series of divinely 
inspired dreams, which revealed he should reform knowledge beginning with philosophy, as the other 
sciences are necessarily derived from it. Though Descartes was the first to articulate radical doubt based on 
his assessment of the roles of dreaming and imagination in discerning reality, he was certainly not the first to 
ask important questions through which these problems of sense perception were often presented. James Hill, 
Descartes and the Doubting Mind (London: Continuum, 2012), 54-57; Poole and Scholar (eds.), Thinking with 
Shakespeare, 3. 
163 Katherine Hodgkin, Michelle O’Callaghan, Sue Wiseman (eds.), Reading the Early Modern Dream: The 
Terrors of the Night (Oxford: Routledge, 2007), 2. 
164 Campbell in Hodgkin, O’Callaghan, Wiseman (eds.), Reading the Early Modern Dream, 15-16. 
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dream is yet another instance of the relationship ‘in this period of epistemological 
transformation, between sensational experiences of wonder and the production or 
conditions of knowledge. Enthusiasts and rationalists, scientists and girls in love, were 
likely to remember dreams, narrate them to others, even publish them’.165 In the 
seventeenth century, as in earlier times, dreaming played an important role in 
understanding the quality of the soul and, therefore, determining certain knowledge.166 
Much like music’s effects on the soul, dreaming democratically presented fundamental 
questions about the senses and certain knowledge, even if people didn’t conceive of 
them in those terms.167 The musicalised poetry assessed in this chapter is a part of a 
larger body of writing from this period on the dream, its relationship to the body, and 
its connections with or influence over waking life.168 As Wiseman explains, ‘interest in 
the dream as a potential source of self-knowledge is an index of the shift in the 
emphasis in dream theory during the seventeenth century’.169 As ‘the interpretation of 
dreams … required the interpreter to make a judgement on the relationship between 
body and soul, body and mind’,170 pieces of music that discuss dreaming present this 
question two-fold. In musical performance, these texts on dreaming and the senses are 
actively engaged, physically enacting discussion about the relationship between mind 
and body, and ultimately between reality and representation. 
 
Dream Music 
Dream and sleep texts abound in contemporary domestic music. In the most basic of 
metaphors, John Attey’s ‘My dearest and diuinest love’ (1622) compares the speaker’s 
love to the sun, a blinding force which blocks out all other sights from his eyes (‘for my 
                                                
165 Hodgkin, O’Callaghan, Wiseman (eds.), Reading the Early Modern Dream, 20. 
166 Though philosophy of dreaming in relation to sense perception and reality can be traced back to the 
Aristotle. For more in Aristotle and dreams, see: Juliette Harrisson, Dreams and Dreaming in the Roman Empire: 
Cultural Memory and Imagination (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 28-32. 
167 For example, Thomas Wright asked, ‘How wee understand, discourse, and dispute in Dreames’, ‘How 
wee conceive things in dreames we never see nor heard of before’. Wright, Passions of the Minde (1604), 
sig.V8r, sig.X1v.  
168 Sometimes the answers are poetic; for example in Spencer’s Faerie Queene (1596), the cause of misleading 
dreams are ‘Legions of Sprites’ sent to ‘forge true-seeming lyes’ which ‘trouble gentle sleep’, but other times 
the causes were seen to be more practical, like diet. Like with music, explanations for dreaming ranged from 
the spiritual, to the supernatural, to the physiological. Spencer, The Faerie Queene, (ed.) Roche, I.i.38.  
169 For example, Thomas Hill wrote his Most pleasant Arte of the Interpretation of Dreames (1576), and attributes 
the function of dreaming ‘to the Imaginative parte’ understanding them as ‘a passion of the inner partes, and 
not of the memorative, nor cognitive’. Hodgkin, O’Callaghan, Wiseman (eds.), Reading the Early Modern 
Dream, 2, 13. 
170 Ibid., 6. 
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sense sees no other Sunne’), but it turns out his ‘comforts are but dreames’.171 The 
speaker’s handicap in sensory perception is not from the power of his love, as he 
hoped, but from the delusion of his dream, expressing a common fear of waking when 
in a happy dream (or indeed a happy reality).172 Similarly, John Ward’s ‘Retire, my 
troubled soule’ (1613) succinctly cogitates the end of life and the mental processes that 
moved us: 
 
Retire, my troubled soule, 
Rest, and behold, thy dayes of dolour, dangers manifold, 
See, life is but a dreame, whose best contenting, 
Begun with hope,  
Pursu’d with doubt,  
Enioy’d with feare,  
Ends in repenting.173  
 
Like the text in Byrd’s ‘Where fancy fond for pleasure pleads’, the emotional concepts 
of hope, doubt, and fear are juxtaposed by somewhat opposing physical actions.174 It is 
worth pointing out the declamatory ‘See’ is of particular interest, as one cannot see 
dreams yet sight is the sense often affiliated with the dream state.175 Yet ‘see’ seems to 
be the most appropriate verb when describing the process of beholding in 
imagination.176 Additionally, in the colloquial sense, ‘see’ used in this way is often a way 
of advising ‘I can prove to you’, which presupposes that seeing is a form of objective 
truth. The idea that ‘life is but a dream’ resonates with the fleeting experience of 
waking life compared to an eternal afterlife, but also the general uncertainty (hopes, 
doubts, fears) through which we experience life via our emotions. Experience comes 
with such uncertainty that we are forced to question whether our experiences are ‘real’ 
or imaginative and akin to a dream. It is worth noting that this poem shares sentiment 
                                                
171 John Attey, The First Booke of Ayres of Foure Parts (London: printed by Thomas Snodham, 1622), sig.D1v-r.  
172 For the full text see Appendix I(c).   
173 John Ward, The First Set of English Madrigals to 3.4.5.and 6.parts … (London: printed by Thomas Snodham, 
1613), sig.D2r.  
174 See Appendix I(a) for text.  
175 Imagination and dreams are pictures in the mind. Another example will be discussed shortly in Dowland’s 
‘Praise blindness eyes’, where the subject ‘watched [the dream] amazed’. For more on dreams as images, see 
Cocking, Imagination, viii; Hodgkin, O’Callaghan, Wiseman (eds.), Reading the Early Modern Dream, 2. 
176 “see, v.”, OED Online. Oxford University Press, June 2014. (accessed 6 August 2014). 
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with Robert Jones’s ‘Life is a Poet’s fable’ (1600) and Byrd’s ‘Retire, my soul’ 
(1611).177   
 Similarly, Jones’s ‘Dreames and Imaginations’ (1601) considers that dreaming 
alone is not an action in itself, at least not one that would win back a straying love. It 
states, ‘Dreams and Imaginations are all the recreations ab-sence can gain me.’ Though 
it concedes that ‘dreames when I wake confound me, thoughts for her sake doth 
wound me’; even thoughts of her make the speaker feel emotional pain, ‘least she 
disdain me’.178 But ultimately, dreams are the coward’s response, as they don’t actually 
change the situation or translate to physical action (‘Dreames are but cowards and doe, 
/ Much good they dare not stand too, / Asham’d of the morrow’). The speaker 
reiterates ‘Dreams with their false pretences, / And thoughts confound my senses’, yet 
in spite of the dream’s supposed falseness, the dream ‘In the conclusion, / Which like a 
glass did shew mee, / What came to pass and threw mee / Into confusion’, as the 
speaker’s imagined prediction for the relationship came true. Though the poem seems 
to discount the dream’s ability to inciting men to action, it still leaves open the 
possibility for dreams to represent a kind of predictive or ironic truth. 
 John Wilbye’s madrigal ‘I liue, and yet me thinks I doe not breath’ (1609) cogitates 
the confusion of discerning waking life from a dream, and indeed the paradoxical 
emotions experienced by the fleshly body.  
 
I liue, and yet me thinks I doe not breath; 
I thirst, and drinke; I drinke and thirst againe; 
I sleep & yet I dreame I am awake; 
I hope for that I haue; I haue and want, 
I sing & sigh; I loue and hate at once. 
O tell me, restlesse soule, what vncouth iarre 
Doth cause such want in store, in peace such warre?179 
 
Like in the examples by Attey, Jones, and Ward above, Wilbye’s madrigal portrays 
sleep and dreaming as one of the paradoxical elements about human consciousness of 
                                                
177 As observed by Joseph Kerman in Alan Brown, Richard Turbet (eds.), Byrd Studies (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 125. For Byrd’s and Jones’s texts respectively, see Fellowes, English 
Madrigal Verse, 65, 496.  
178 Robert Jones, The Second Booke of Songs and Ayres … (London: printed by P[eter] S[hort], 1601), sig.D1v-
r. For full poem, see Appendix I(d).  
179 John Wilbye, The Second Set of Madrigales to 3. 4. 5. And 6.parts … (London: printed by Tho. Este, 1609), 
sig.B3r.  
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importance to internal sense perceptions and discerning reality. The paradox 
experienced by sense perception makes little rational sense, which, in this madrigal’s 
case, manifests in frustration with the ‘uncouth jar’ of the body, which is clearly to 
blame for these mixed messages. Other musical texts draw an even clearer line 
between external sense perception and dreaming, however. 
 
Thomas Vautor and Martin Peerson: 'Lock vp fair lids' 
Composers Martin Peerson and Thomas Vautor both set Philip Sidney’s sonnet ‘Lock 
vp fair lids’ from Book III of Arcadia.180 Vautor’s setting is found in his The first set: 
Beeing Songs of diuers Ayres and Natures (1619) and Peerson’s in his Priuate musicke 
(1620).181 Peerson sets the entire poem in one piece, in a strophic setting for four 
voices, viols, or combination of the two. Vautor’s setting is through composed for 
voices, and bipartite, setting the two quatrains of Sidney’s text separately from the two 
tercets.182  
 
Locke vp, faire lids the treasures of my heart, 
Preserve those beames, this ages onely light, 
To her sweet sense, sweet Sleep, some ease impart, 
Her sense too weake to beare the spirits might, 
And while (O sleepe) thou closest vp her sight, 
Her light where love doth forge his fairest dart, 
O harbour all her parts in easefull plight, 
Let no strange dreame make her faire body start. 
 
                                                
180 For this reading, however, I’ll only be viewing the poem in its stand-alone context. Fellowes says that 
Vautor’s text compared with that of the Arcadia shows signs of careless transcription, but he doesn’t state 
which edition of Arcadia he was using. Thomas Vautor, Songs of Divers Airs and Natures (1619), (ed.) Edmund 
Fellowes (London: Stainer & Bell, 1924), xi. As discussed elsewhere, a single authoritative text of Arcadia is a 
very complicated topic: see Ch. 4, 215-16. Compared to each other, Vautor’s and Peerson’s texts have few 
inconsistencies minus a couple of spellings and punctuation marks, none of which should be of matter here. 
One of note, however, is that Vautor’s second part begins ‘And yet o dreame’ while Peerson’s says ‘But yet, 
O dreame’. Also, Vautor’s says ‘beare the spirits might’, while Peerson’s says ‘beare her spirits might’. Martin 
Peerson, Priuate Musicke (London: printed by Thomas Snodham, 1620), sig.D3v-r. Philip Sidney, The Poems 
of Sir Philip Sidney, (ed.) William Ringler, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 79, 407-08.  
181 Text here is from Vautor’s publication. Thomas Vautor, The first set: Beeing Songs of diuers Ayres and Natures 
(London: printed by Thomas Snodham, 1619), sig.C1v-r.  
182 Though this reading focuses mainly on the text, I would like to address two points of form. In Peerson’s 
setting, the strophic musical setting doesn’t allow for an exact repetition of the text, as the quatrains require a 
repetition of two lines of text to ‘fill’ the six lines of music. For the two tercets, no instructions are given, but 
if one just replaces the two repeats from the way the quatrains are set, one can accommodate the six lines of 
the two tercets, for a total of three iterations of the music. In Vautor’s setting, the composer uses a 
particularly clever madrigalisation on ‘I live in darkest night’, which is set in black notation to look like dark 
eyes on the page. Though one wouldn’t necessarily hear this trick, one would see it on the page. 
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And yet, O dreame, if thou wilt not depart 
from this rare subiect from thy common right, 
But wilt thy selfe in such a seate delight, 
then take my shape, and play a louers part; 
Kisse her from me, and say vnto her sprite, 
Till her eyes shine I liue in darkest night.  
 
Though obviously poetic or metaphoric, Sidney’s poem demonstrates several aspects of 
an early modern understanding of sense perception and its internal mechanics. In 
closing her eyes, the speaker’s ‘treasure of my heart’ is trapped inside her body, 
suggesting her body is a shell, which contains her true being, her spirit within.183 Here, 
Sidney suggests an understanding of sight as beams emitting out of eyes which, when 
closed, are preserved (mechanically, but also ‘saved’ for her lover).184 He reminds us 
that although sleep can bring her mind and external senses rest, imagination, in the 
form of dreaming, can still have a physiological effect on the body. In the second 
stanza, the speaker turns to address the Dream, and asks it to speak to her spirit, 
suggesting the imagination’s (poetic) ability to communicate with the spirit. As a poet, 
Sidney could leave the mechanics of sense perception in their metaphoric states 
without a need for further understanding. This is not only an incredibly intimate poem 
on love (if not overly so), but also a metaphoric exploration of the fundamental 
relationships between sense perception, the ‘seat’ of being, and emotion.   
  
 John Dowland: ‘Praise blindnesse eies’ 
One setting that focuses exclusively on the unreliability of sense perception was John 
Dowland’s ‘Praise blindnesse eies’ (1600).185 The anonymously authored text considers 
the deception of the senses in matters of love and passion, with special emphasis on 
hearing’s role as ‘false Haralds to thy hart’.  
 
Praise blindnesse eies, for seeing is deceit, 
Bee dumbe vaine tongue, words are but flattering winds, 
breake hart & bleed for ther is no re-ceit, 
                                                
183 A common Christian understanding that is also reminiscent of Thomas Wright’s question of how the 
immortal soul is contained within the stinking carcass. See Introduction, 10.  
184 The mechanics of sight were little understood, and many like Thomas Wright pondered, ‘How doth our 
eyes see, admitting something into them or emitting something out of them’. Wright, The Passions of the Minde 
(1604), sig.X2v.  
185 John Dowland, The Second Booke of Songs or Ayres … (London: printed by Thomas Este, 1600), sig.F2v-r.  
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to purge in-constancy from most mens mindes. 
 
And if thine eares, false Haralds to thy hart, 
Conuey into thy head hopes to obtaine, 
Then tell thy hearing thou art deafe by art, 
Now loue is art that wonted to be plaine, 
Now none is bald except they see his braines, 
Affection is not knowne till one be dead, 
Reward for loue are labours for his paines, 
Loues quiuer made of gold his shafts of leade. 
 
Lenuoy: 
And so I wackt amazd and could not moue, 
I know my dreame was true, and yet I loue. 
 
The ‘enuoy’, or conclusion of the poem, suggests that the message contained in this 
poem is in itself a dream. A dream that contains truth, in spite of the common 
understanding that dreams are born from imagination.186 Through a metaphysically 
aware situation (a knowing dream) Dowland’s poet questions and conflates sense 
perception, the truth-bearing capabilities of dreams and imaginary visions, the 
relationship or communication between the ears, mind, and heart, the metaphysical 
purpose of art, as well as the reality (versus the presentation) of emotions like love.  
 Writing about this ayre, Sebastian Klotz says, ‘[i]f vision fails, there seems to be 
just one ultimate source of certainty: it is the body not contaminated by the decorum of 
speech and of ambivalent gesture’.187 Klotz, too, picked up on the ‘interplay between 
visionary allegorical speech and first-hand tactile and sensual knowledge’ in this text.188 
He argues that  
 
[t]he dead body that lies open for inspection and, on the other hand, theological 
speech and cosmic truth, emerge as the only agencies that can guarantee 
>sense< and >meaning< in a world deprived of its certainties. Dowland slips into 
the role of the poet-anatomist who explores himself in a painful self-dissection 
and self-demonstration … doubt plays itself out in the auditory anatomy 
undertaken by Dowland’s speaking personae … This interest in physical 
symptoms and evidence gained by the senses is an outcome of the crisis of 
visionary language which brings events within the direct physical reach now 
                                                
186 Perhaps the most interesting phrase is ‘I know my dream was true’, as an example of a posteriori 
knowledge. See George Bealer’s chapter “The A Priori” in John Greco and James Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell 
Guide to Epistemology (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1998).  
187 Klotz, “Were Euery Thought an Eye”,182. 
188 Ibid., 181. 
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that the transcendental grasp of an ideal, specular language holds no longer 
true.189 
 
 
Though Klotz’s analysis focuses on the text’s use of the physical body to make its point, 
his argument harmonises with my own reading in articulating the poem’s doubt of 
sense perception. The text interrogates reality through the consideration of 
uncertainties—these include both internal processes like dreaming, as well as external 
processes of discerning knowledge through sense perception. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Performance is a sensory activity that requires embodiment or a visceral experience 
that necessarily engages sense perception and the passions, both for historical subjects 
and ourselves. Though this chapter covers a wide range of topics, they are all 
indispensable components of understanding this repertory as a part of an early modern 
ecology of interior somatic experience. A contemporary understanding of sense 
perception and the relationship between passion and action are necessary for revealing 
structures of experience in the phenomenological sense. It is the historical context 
crucial for understanding how contemporary awareness was shaped and organised. In 
musical performance that textually addresses sensation explicitly, the words surround 
the ‘unrepresentable’ moment of somatic experience, revealing meaning that is the 
product of texts in experience.190 As we will see moving on from here, in addressing the 
historical context of musicalised texts that address the fundamentals of human 
consciousness, it is only through a phenomenological lens that music can be 
approached historically as subjective experience rather than as a static object.  
                                                
189 Ibid., 182. 
190 David Carr has outlined that ‘[t]he problem of how language represents the world is of course not limited 
to history; it has consumed philosophers since the linguistic turn and long before. How indeed does 
language represent anything? The peculiarity of historical language is not only that the objects it represents 
are past rather than present, but also that they are primarily people and actions and events, rather than things 
and their properties (the traditional paradigm for representational theories of language). The primary 
linguistic form in which such things are represented is narrative, and narrative is … altogether different in 
form from the reality it purports to represent’. David Carr, Experience and History: Phenomenological Perspectives 
on the Historical World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 3-4. 
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Chapter 3: ‘Madrigals’ and Myths: Confronting 
Representations and Realities 
 
In 1640, bishop-writer Edward Reynolds wrote that God gave us ‘Musicall, Poeticall, 
and Mythologicall perswasions’ to arouse our imaginations, with an end to teach and 
moralise. He saw music, poetry, and myth as means to make lofty spiritual matters 
tangible to mortals, as these three fictions ‘best affect the Imagination’. He justified this 
in Biblical terms, explaining, 
 
wee finde some roome in the Holy Scriptures for Mythologies; as that of the 
Vine, the Fig-tree, and the Bramble, for Riddles, for Parables, Similitudes … 
whereby heavenly Doctrines are shadowed forth, and doe condiscend unto 
humane frailties.1 
 
He described how these arts work in subtle ways by ‘secretly instilling [morality] into 
the Will, that it might at last finde it selfe reformed, and yet [we] hardly perceive how 
it came to be so’.2 Reynolds explained that imagination worked to ‘open and unbind the 
Thoughts’, as imagination is freer than the ‘rigor and strictness’ of Reason or the 
‘severity of Truth’.3 Like many of his contemporaries, Reynolds upheld an essentially 
Aristotelian approach to the arts, maintaining that as long as music, poetry, and myth 
worked to teach us virtue, these imitative, metaphoric arts were worthy pursuits.4 
Whether a force for gaining knowledge or for deception, myth, music, and poetry were 
thought to be the key modes for accessing and stimulating imagination, the internal 
sense responsible for feigning reality.5 As a central part of determining what reality 
exists in the external world, as well as the reliability of the senses in perceiving that 
world, imagination, as many have observed, played a key role in the so-called Scientific 
Revolution. As Dennis Sepper points out, imagination ‘compounds the uncertainties 
the meditator discovers in sensation’ and ‘produces possibilities rather than certainties’, 
                                                       
 
1 Edward Reynolds, A Treatise of the Passions and Facvlties of the Soule of Man (London: printed by R.H[earne], 
1640), sig.D3r. 
2 Ibid.   
3 Ibid., sig.D4v.  
4 William Webbe used pastoral justifications to support the arts by stating: ‘If that the Shepheards God did 
merit prayse’, then ‘Why should the feare of base detraction / Bury thy Arte in blacke oblivion?’ Thomas 
Greaves, Songes of sundrie kindes (1604), sig.A3v. 
5 See Chapter Two.  
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thereby acting as a crucial point of contrast to later seventeenth-century philosophers 
like Descartes and Hobbes in establishing certainty.6 As will be discussed shortly, 
imagination, and its partner fiction, played an important role in the (non-linear) 
movement away from a belief in Aristotelian knowledge, one that assumed the outside 
world was how the senses perceived it, to one in which the only certain truth was the 
self. This opening section will outline more generally how fiction builds truth before 
addressing how early modern fictions, particularly mythology, worked to refine 
conceptions of truth in a wide spectrum of writing from the explicitly fictive to the 
‘scientific’. Subsequently, I look at two sets of case studies, primarily by Thomas 
Weelkes, that examine how stereotypes or expectations attached to musical form could 
be used in ways that interrogated the tension between reality and its representations.7  
How Fiction Builds Truth  
Many writers of the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries, including Sidney 
and Bacon, contributed to a timeless aesthetic question: can art, as representations of 
life, ever bear truth in the way some believed logic and philosophy could? Or will 
representations always just be imitations? As mentioned earlier, controversy over the 
truth-bearing capabilities of the arts was rooted in interpretations of Plato and 
Aristotle, with Plato of the belief that only logic or reason can bear truth.8 In response 
to this Platonic assertion, brought to a head by Protestant suspicion of the passions, 
many early modern thinkers wrote in the defence of the creative arts, arguing for their 
validity and positive utility.9 These writers included Philip Sidney, George Puttenham, 
William Byrd, in addition to other poets and composers.10 Although practically 
speaking artists were justifying their trade by defending mimesis, the philosophical 
problems presented by art’s power were significant, even if they were not explicitly 
                                                       
 
6 Sepper, Descartes's Imagination, 1-2.  
7 But the way music in particular interrogates or presents issues of representation was apparent in musical 
treatises as well, as in Descartes’s Compendium Musicae (1618). Moreno, Musical Representations, Subjects, and 
Objects, 76. 
8 Art’s purpose had important practical implications in addition to aesthetic ones, for example the 
controversy over the place of music in worship.  
9 As Cocking says, ‘[t]here is no conception of the “truth of imagination” in Plato, and no role in his world 
for “imaginative art” as it was later conceived by those who considered themselves his followers’, Cocking, 
Imagination, 12, 21. Also, Kelley and Sacks (eds.), The Historical Imagination in Early Modern Britain, 3.  
10 For example, as Byrd wrote, ‘[s]ince singing is so good a thing, I wish all men would learne to sing’, 
explaining how singing is good for praising God. William Byrd, Psalms, sonets, and songs (1588), sig.A4v. See 
also Sidney, A Defence of Poesy (1595) and Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesy (1589), or the anonymously 
authored Praise of Musicke (1586).  
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discussed as philosophical treatises, but in other types of writing like fiction. As Tadié 
and Scholar have argued, fiction played an array of roles at the ‘frontier of knowledge’ 
in the early modern period.11 Though contemporary opinions asserted that imagination 
was absolutely imperative for the fictive arts, recent scholarship has often concluded 
that it was equally imperative for non-literary texts.12 Stephen Greenblatt reminds us 
that issues of representation are rarely straightforward: ‘representations are not only 
products, but producers, capable of decisively altering the very forces that brought 
them into being’.13 Greenblatt warns the scholar that it is ‘a theoretical mistake and a 
practical blunder to collapse the distinction between representation and reality’, since 
‘[t]hey are locked together in an uneasy marriage in a work without ecstatic union or 
divorce’.14 Contemporaries like Sidney and Bacon, for example, acknowledged the 
resemblance between history and fiction in the manner of its making, though fiction 
differed from history in that history relied on memory, and fiction on imagination.15 
Yet because fiction was based on imagination, it belonged to the structures of 
knowledge.16 Bacon believed fables were a recoverable presentation of ancient 
knowledge that could promote certain types of philosophical knowledge.17 Sidney 
asserted in his Defence of Poesy that fiction could more easily impose upon the mind of a 
reader than philosophy or history, which was ultimately an argument for the truth 
bearing capabilities of the arts.18  
 The following section will briefly survey Philip Sidney’s and Francis Bacon’s 
approaches to fiction and knowledge. Though one was a courtier-poet, and the other a 
natural philosopher, their approaches to fiction’s role in building knowledge are central 
                                                       
 
11 Tadié and Scholar (eds.), Fiction and the Frontiers of Knowledge, 10. 
12 For example, as Tadié and Scholar point out, ‘fiction … is fundamental to the making of literary texts in 
early modern Europe, it has an equally important—and controversial—role to play in the formation of legal 
and philosophical ideas’. Tadié and Scholar (eds.), Fiction and the Frontiers of Knowledge, 1. 
13 Stephen Greenblatt, Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World (Chicago: University Of Chicago 
Press, 1992), 6. 
14 Ibid., 7. Work by modern theorists reinforces Greenblatt’s assertions. For example, George Lakoff and 
Mark Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980), explains how metaphors 
structure our most basic understanding of experience and how they shape our actions and perceptions, 
making literature central to understanding human psychology. For more modern theory on how fictions 
build realities, see also: John Gibson, Wolfgang Huemer, Luca Pocci (eds.), A Sense of the World: Essays on 
fiction, narrative, and knowledge (New York: Routledge, 2007).  
15 Tadié and Scholar (eds.), Fiction and the Frontiers of Knowledge, 9. 
16 Ibid., 10. 
17 Ibid.,11. 
18 As Peter Mack summarises,  to Sidney ‘[i]t is this effect in the world of the audience which justifies the 
making of images, and poetry itself'. Peter Mack in Nauta and Pätzold (eds.), Imagination in the Later Middle 
Ages and Early Modern Times, 71-72. 
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to this study because they provide contemporary insight into the function of the fictive 
arts in the production of truth. As both authors and their works are well-established 
objects of study in modern scholarship, the proceeding section will provide only a 
summary of modern scholarship on their philosophies towards fiction.19 Though the 
seventeenth century is thought to be the period from where we get our modern sense of 
‘truth’ or ‘fact’ as an opposing force to fiction, contemporary debates on fiction’s role in 
establishing reality has as much relevance in the post-modern day.20   
Fictions of Sidney and Bacon 
The writing of Philip Sidney has bearing on this thesis not only because he was a 
salient courtier within circles of musical patronage whose poetry was often set to 
music, but also because he is an influential figure in our understanding of 
contemporary views on representation.21 In his Defence of Poesy (1595), Sidney focused 
on the utility of representation to inspire action.22 Sidney reasons, ‘sometimes, under 
the pretty tales of wolves and sheep, [pastoral poetry] can include the whole 
considerations of wrong-doing and patience; sometimes show that contentions for 
trifles can get but a trifling victory’.23 Sidney challenged the Platonic supremacy of 
philosophy, arguing that fiction is actually a stronger force for change than philosophy 
because didactic philosophy is often discursive and lacks the emotion to move the 
reader to action. He believed that the poet moves his readers by providing them with 
engaging sensory experiences:  
 
                                                       
 
19 Both figures and their work will be referred to repeatedly throughout this thesis, whether in their explicitly 
philosophical works (i.e. Bacon’s Sylva sylvarum, Sidney’s Defence of Poesy) or philosophy as interpolated from 
their fictional work (i.e. Bacon’s New Atlantis, or Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella, etc.). 
20 As David Novitz explains, many modern assumptions about the nature of fact and truth stem from 
epistemic changes that occurred in the seventeenth century: ‘fancy, we have been told time and time again, 
tends to mislead rather than inform. If we must have information about our world, it is to empirical science, 
not the literature of fiction, that we should turn. For it is empirical science that is the source of all useful 
knowledge: knowledge on which we can depend, and in terms of which we can organise our world. This 
attitude to fiction is, of course, a by-product of the scientific revolution in the seventeenth century.’  Novitz, 
Knowledge, Fiction & Imagination, 1. 
21 Sidney’s persona and biography is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four. Defence of Poesy was 
probably written around 1581, then after his death, two editions of Defence of Poesy were published in 1595, 
one with the title An Apology for Poetry. Katherine Duncan-Jones in Philip Sidney, Sir Philip Sidney: The Major 
Works, (ed.) Katherine Duncan-Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, xxii-xxiii.   
22 Diana B. Altegoer, Reckoning Words: Baconian Science and the Construction of Truth in English Renaissance Culture 
(London: Associated University Presses, 2000), 68. 
23 Philip Sidney, An Apology for Poetry, or, The Defence of Poesy, third edition, (eds.) Geoffrey Shepherd and R.W. 
Maslen (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 97.  
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Now doth the peerless poet perform both: for whatsoever the philosopher saith 
should be done, he giveth a perfect picture of it in some one by whom he 
presupposeth it was done, so as he coupleth the general notion with the 
particular example. A perfect picture I say, for he yieldeth to the powers of the 
mind an image of that whereof the philosopher bestoweth but a wordish 
description, which doth neither strike, pierce, nor possess the sight of the soul 
so much as that other doth.24 
 
Sidney wrote that poetry was different from other forms of rhetoric because it was a 
‘truthful counterfeit’. To him, historians cannot help but lie, but in poetry the author 
‘never affirmeth’.25 For Sidney, poetry is an art of imitation, ‘a representing, 
counterfeiting, or figuring forth—to speak metaphorically, a speaking picture—with 
this end, to teach and delight’.26 As poetry is inherently a representation or counterfeit 
of reality, it cannot possibly attest to be actual reality, and therefore it is safe from 
accusations of falsehood. Yet it can still motivate ‘profitable invention’.27 Diana 
Altegoer discerns that, for Sidney, ‘[s]ignificance does not come from an authorized 
source beyond the historical task … [a]ll words contain nuances and subtleties of 
meaning that make an unproblematic and unambiguous assignment to things virtually 
impossible … Instead, meaning and signification are related to the reading process, to 
the stages of self-awareness through which the poet asks himself and his readers to 
pass’.28 As Gavin Alexander attests, ‘[a]s a theory of literature, the Defence is all about 
the reader’.29 As such, the ‘Defence tells us that poetry (which means fiction in verse or 
prose) has the power to change us’.30 Sidney’s work is vital to this thesis because it 
establishes contemporary precedent that emphasised the importance of process and 
experience in the creation of meaning, and the positive effect that mere representations 
of reality could motivate: action that he thought shaped reality itself. Sidney’s approach 
to the process of reading relies on self-awareness, thus emphasising the individual’s 
role in establishing reality by defining the self.31  
                                                       
 
24 Sidney, An Apology for Poetry, (eds.) Shepherd and Maslen, 86. 
25 Altegoer, Reckoning Words, 72-3. 
26 Ibid., 30. 
27 Sidney says, ‘[a]nd therefore, as in history, looking for truth, they may go away full fraught with 
falsehood, so in poesy, looking but for fiction, they shall use the narration but as an imaginative ground-plot 
of a profitable invention’ (Defence, 52-53), as quoted in Altegoer, Reckoning Words, 73.  
28 Ibid., 70. 
29 Alexander, Writing After Sidney, xxviii. 
30 Ibid., xxvii. 
31 I will return to a discussion of Sidney and the centrality of the self in Chapter Four. 
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 Francis Bacon’s approach to fiction is of importance here not only because he 
provides a link between the study of music’s physical properties and overt efforts to 
change knowledge, but also because he, like Sidney, demonstrates how fiction could 
actively shape realities, rather than merely reflect them. Bacon’s work on sound and 
music demonstrate how the arts played a central role in contemporary debates about 
representation’s capacity to construct reality.32 Furthermore, Baconian science 
emphasised the verbal and political construction of knowledge.33 Yet the 
historiography of his work is complicated. Bacon played a role in the inauguration of 
‘empirical science’ by arguing for a conceptual split between the language arts (words) 
and the study of natural philosophy (things) in order to better understand the 
mechanics of nature. Consequently, nineteenth and early twentieth-century historians 
often viewed him as an empiricist, a title that has in more recent scholarship been 
problematised.34 In spite of Bacon’s outward belief in the separation of words from 
things, Diana Altegoer argues that a rhetorical examination of Baconian science is 
necessary because of the contradictions and complexities within his scientific 
reasoning, ‘problems’ earlier historians who cherished Bacon’s ‘mastery of nature’ did 
not know how to solve, as it did not seem a sufficiently ‘scientific’ trait by nineteenth-
century standards.35 Altegoer says that despite Bacon’s arguments for separating res 
from verba in establishing truth, ‘the continued employment of myth, paradox, and fable 
in his philosophical writings shows that Bacon was still enmeshed in that rhetorical 
frame of mind which constantly reassessed philological possibilities in order to discover 
mental processes and therein the reflected truths of nature’.36 Furthermore, it is 
Altegoer’s belief that ‘[t]his intellectualising of myth proved to be Bacon’s greatest 
influence on subsequent philosophers’,37 as imagination and fiction were to play a 
similarly substantial role in the works of later thinkers like Thomas Hobbes.38 She 
                                                       
 
32 For Baconian sensing, see Ch. 2 81-84.  
33 Altegoer, Reckoning Words, 13. 
34 Ibid., 15. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 14. 
37 Ibid., 23. 
38 As Altegoer outlines, Bacon’s opinion on the usefulness of mythology hadn’t always been in favour of their 
use. But by his De Sapientia Veterum (1609), he is ‘firmly convinced that the veil or dense mist of fable 
facilitates the modern advancement of learning’. Altegoer, Reckoning Words, 80. 
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argues, contrary to other interpretations of Bacon’s work, that myth was of ‘pervasive 
importance’ to ‘Bacon’s general reform of science and philosophy’.39 
 Like Sidney, Francis Bacon also believed that mimesis served to, in Bacon’s words, 
‘strengthen and establish’ reason.40 As Altegoer says, ‘[p]oesy, aligned with 
imagination, held a pivotal place in Bacon’s scheme to advance learning; by linking 
reason with the will and appetite, the poetic imagination creates a pleasurable imitation 
of history and serves to interpret the hidden wisdom of ancient fables. In grasping the 
basic principles of imitation, the scientist was able to unveil the figure and reveal the 
transcendent truth hidden beneath’.41 Thus, to Bacon, fiction presented ancient 
knowledge, but also promoted a kind of universal philosophical truth that stretched 
across the disciplines.42 To reconcile Bacon’s sometimes contradictory writing on the 
nature of the relationship between knowledge and fiction, Scholar and Tadié surmise 
that, to Bacon, ‘[a] fable is thus both a presentation of ancient knowledge that may be 
recovered, and a tale that promotes a certain type of philosophical knowledge. This 
leads, in the Baconian corpus, to two kinds of activity: the interpretation of fables, of 
which De Sapientia is a perfect example, and the writing of (philosophical) fables, in 
Bacon’s case, the New Atlantis.’43 Thus, the very existence of New Atlantis supports 
fiction’s place in Bacon’s new science and the organisation of knowledge as a 
persuasive representation of reality with the power to motivate change.44 In spite of its 
connection to imagination, Bacon valued fiction as a mode capable of unveiling 
transcendent truth, and in its potential to motivate change, fiction was considered a 
fundamental player in Bacon’s new structure of knowledge, giving contemporary 
justification for the arts’ ability to construct reality. Moreover, Bacon’s writing style, 
which included the use of mythology and paradox, exposes the inescapably rhetorical 
and dialogical intellectual milieu within which Bacon was fashioned.45  
                                                       
 
39 Ibid., 81. 
40 Francis Bacon (IV.455) as quoted by John L. Harrison “Bacon’s Views of Rhetoric, Poetry, and the 
Imagination” in Brian Vickers (ed.), Essential Articles for the study of Francis Bacon (Hamden: Archon Books, 
1968), 260. 
41 Altegoer, Reckoning Words, 22. 
42 Tadié and Scholar (eds.), Fiction and the Frontiers of Knowledge, 10. 
43 Ibid., 11. 
44 For more on utopian writing instigating social change, see Chloë Houston, The Renaissance Utopia: Dialogue, 
Travel, and the Ideal Society (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014),168. 
45 For further discussion on dialogue in the work of Francis Bacon, see Ch. 4, 175-6.  
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A Caveat: Words in Practice 
Though Bacon and Sidney made rhetorical claims that separated history from poesy, 
fact and fiction, in practice their respective writings allowed for much conflation of the 
two, an inconsistency of notable significance in other contemporary areas of study. 
This muddiness between rhetorical ‘intent’ and practice extended even to objects like 
scientific instruments. In their book Instruments and Imagination (1995), Thomas 
Hankins and Robert Silverman trace inventions and instruments of science that 
‘moved easily from natural philosophy to art to popular culture’.46 They observe that 
even though the rhetorical aims of natural magic and experimental philosophy seemed 
to diverge rather sharply, the instruments created in pursuit of those goals 
demonstrates a fuzzier demarcation between them, particularly in objects that were 
meant to ‘replicate or investigate in some way the phenomena of sight and sound’.47 In 
use, these instruments were of both magic and natural philosophy, and Hankins and 
Silverman conclude that the boundaries between natural science and ‘other human 
activity’ was far from acute, particularly in matters surrounding the nature of sense 
perception.48 This example demonstrates how inconsistencies between rhetorical aim 
and practice, even within a single text or object, require further interpretation and 
investigation to reconcile meaning. This helps to explain the inconsistencies between 
the rhetoric and practice of both Bacon and Sidney, within their literary and non-
literary works. I interpret these inconsistencies as indicative of Greenblatt’s ‘uneasy 
marriage’ between reality and its representation (whether rhetorical or not). If 
representations like fiction are not only products of culture but producers of it, then 
inconsistencies between rhetorical aim and practice can be read as the type of 
contradiction in discourse and social practices that could indicate new ways of 
knowing.49  
 It is for this reason that this thesis proceeds with the understanding that, in 
Novitz’s words, fiction ‘affords … genuine cognitive experiences which are of 
considerable heuristic value’ giving us candid insight ‘into the world within which we 
                                                       
 
46 Hankins and Silverman, Instruments and the Imagination, 5. 
47 Ibid., 6. 
48 Ibid., 5.  
49 See quotation by Elizabeth Hanson in Ch. 1, 42.  
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live’.50 This is demonstrated both in modern theory and in analysis of early modern 
writing. Shakespeare’s Touchstone knows fiction’s power of verisimilitude in 
producing tangible change when he says ‘the truest poetry is the most feigning’ (As you 
like it, III.iii.19-20).51 Though empiricism was to eventually take over as the foremost 
mode for establishing truth after the seventeenth century, Scholar and Tadié observe 
that in that period, imagination and fiction participated ‘fully in this effort to transform 
former perceptions of the world’ and fiction indeed played a role in the ‘relationship of 
the scientific observer to objects’.52 Not only was fiction’s role in establishing reality a 
subject of great concern for natural philosophers like Francis Bacon trying to reform 
all of knowledge, but also for every musician, poet, artist, and playwright who felt they 
had to justify their craft against naysayers.53  
The Function of Mythology and the Pastoral 
The history of mythology and the pastoral mode (its literary presence, theoretical 
functions, origins, etc.) and its appearance in music has earned multiple volumes unto 
itself.54 Though the pastoral mode is a literary, scholarly, and artistic force wholly its 
own, for this chapter, the use of the pastoral is in terms of the mythological figures it 
commonly employs, like Cupid, Diana, nymphs, etc.55 Therefore, I will be using theory 
                                                       
 
50 Novitz, Knowledge, Fiction & Imagination, 11. Moreover, as Gibson et al. state, understanding our human 
need for fiction ‘to explain why we turn to literature with the expectation of having our understanding of the 
world refined, augmented, even shocked; to give support to the perhaps vague but nonetheless pervasive 
belief that in literary experience we often come to know ourselves and our world better’. Gibson, Huemer, 
Pocci (eds.), A Sense of the World, 1. 
51 Cocking, Imagination, xi. 
52 Tadié and Scholar (eds.), Fiction and the Frontiers of Knowledge, 72. 
53 Moreover, it is worth pointing out that although the present day West still holds a general faith in objective 
science, we often turn to fiction, like the work of Shakespeare, for anecdotes of truth of a different sort, as I 
just did above. 
54 For further discussion on the pastoral mode and myth in literature, see: Paul Alpers, What is Pastoral? 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Laurence D. Lerner, The Uses of Nostalgia: Studies in Pastoral 
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1972); Geoffrey Miles (ed.), Classical Mythology in English Literature: A critical 
anthology (New York: Routledge, 1999).  
55 Many of the English domestic music books published in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries are 
of an explicitly pastoral nature, rife with figures from classical myth, skipping nymphs, kissing shepherds, 
fields of daisies—the pleasures of ‘the simple life’ that is ‘remembered’ in a perceived past that exists not in 
history, but in the mind. As Kerman outlines, the pastoral involved a scene in which a woman frolics 
‘amongst a group of Nymphs, Shepherds, Satyrs, and Fauns, who weave her garlands of rose and myrtle, 
and dance gracefully to the singing of dolci concerti, while birds twitter in the trees and the woodland beasts 
play among cool brooks and shady green banks. Sometimes Cupid or Venus joins them’. This quaintness 
readily invokes a sense of nostalgia for simple country life, even if the person experiencing the nostalgia has 
never actually lived such a life. Even though the pastoral permeated basically all forms of art in the 
Renaissance (along with its partner humanism), the influence of the pastoral mode was often more subtle 
than sometimes assumed. Kerman, The Elizabethan Madrigal, 200; Lerner, The Uses of Nostalgia, 41. 
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from myth and the pastoral interchangeably, though I acknowledge there are nuances 
that differentiate their histories.56 The following will look into contemporary and 
modern theories on mythology’s function before analysing how these functions were 
adopted and adapted in musical forms often affiliated with the pastoral. The 
mythological characters of the pastoral mode brought with them allegory, ideas, and 
traits that were ingrained into children from a young age in English grammar schools.57 
According to Jane Kingsley-Smith, ‘sections of Ovid’s Metamorphoses were learned by 
heart as a stylistic model’ and students imitated Ovid’s Heroides in order to practice 
composing rhetoric appropriate to the mythological character’s circumstances and 
persona.58 Consequently, England’s educated classes could easily pick up on 
mythological allusion in plays, music, and poetry, and it was common for elites to 
fashion themselves with ‘mythological self-images’ in portraits, civic plays, masques, 
etc.59 But, as Angus Vine discerns, ‘myth and legend was not only the preserve of those 
who had had the benefit of a university or even grammar school education’,60 as there 
also existed a wider interest in mythology that extended to popular entertainment like 
pageants and theatre that were not reserved only for the schooled.61  
 Practically speaking, myth is a highly metaphorical form, and it thus allowed 
authors to use the pastoral ‘palette’ to veil and colour a variety of themes, often topical, 
political, erotic, or of religious and moral allegory. Contemporary understanding of the 
power of mythology, however, was similar to other theories derived from an 
Aristotelian understanding of the arts, namely that if mythologies could be harnessed 
for good, they served a moral purpose (as Edward Reynolds was quoted stating at the 
beginning of this chapter). The veil offered by mythology was particularly useful when 
trying to describe abstract and little understood ideas, like the power of music over our 
                                                       
 
56 Richard Andrews suggest that characters from classical mythology infiltrated pastoral drama by 1500, a 
period which saw an increase in texts that mingled the two traditions. Richard Andrews, “Pastoral Drama” 
in Peter Brand and Lino Pertile (eds.), The Cambridge History of Italian Literature, Revised Edition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 292.  
57 Indeed, Erasmus’s De ratione studii of 1512 was a foundation text for the curriculum of the St Paul’s School 
London. In it, Erasmus wrote of the importance of mythology to learning and knowledge. Angus Vine, 
“Myth and Legend” in Andrew Hadfield, Matthew Dimmock and Abigail Shinn (eds.), The Ashgate Research 
Companion to Popular Culture in Early Modern England (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 104. 
58 Jane Kingsley-Smith, “Mythology” in Hattaway (ed.), A New Companion to English Renaissance Literature and 
Culture, 134. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Vine, “Myth and Legend” in Hadfield, Dimmock and Shinn (eds.), The Ashgate Research Companion to 
Popular Culture in Early Modern England, 105. 
61 Ibid., 111. 
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bodies, passions, and spirits. Even to a composer-vicar like Richard Carlton, music 
commanded an almost magical power that lay somewhere between humanity, 
mythology, and God. In the Latin dedication to his Madrigals to Fiue Voyces (1601), 
Carlton wrote: ‘We may read of [music’s] power, that it once called back the dead from 
the underworld, and touched not only the sensible, but even those bereft of their senses 
in wondrous ways. Today, too, we still see that it incites the sad to joy, the immoderate 
to moderation and the unfaithful to piety.’62 Even as a man of the cloth, Carlton 
resorted to mythically-veiled justifications as he explained music’s ancient power, with 
its transportive, even transfigurative effects upon our persons that somehow 
transcended the sense perception it was commonly thought to rely upon. George 
Puttenham wrote in his The Arte of English Poesie (1589) that pastoral verse was 
considered by many to be ‘the first familiar conuersation’.63 But he also stated that the 
pastoral was later devised by men who saw its powerful function as a means to change 
behaviour: ‘but vnder the vaile of homely persons … These Eglogues came after to 
containe and enforme morall discipline, for the amendment of mans behauiour, as be 
those of Mantuan and other moderne Poets’.64 Puttenham believed that when the 
passions were moved by myth, they could motivate change. Altegoer points out that 
even Bacon saw myth as a means to efficiently reveal truths: 
 
Basing his experiential method on a similar, instinctive comprehension of truth, 
Bacon intended his Instauratio to redeem knowledge and restore learning to its 
primitive (prelapsarian) purity … in this scheme, metaphor, schemes, tropes, 
including myth and allegory, were employed to … challenge the receiver into 
strenuous efforts of discovery, and to render truth, once discovered the more 
dearly held for the effort.65 
 
For Bacon, truth comprehended through myth was a redemption of knowledge; for 
Reynolds, it was God. Regardless, Reynolds was in good company in believing that 
myth worked to veil the truth, thus making tangible holy or meta truths otherwise 
                                                       
 
62 ‘…cuius vim ut olim mortuos ab inferis revocasse, et res non preditas tantum, sed et privatas sense miris 
modis affecisse legimus’. Translated by Bettina Varwig. Richard Carlton, Madrigals to Fiue Voyces (London: 
printed by Thomas Morley, 1601), sig. A2r. 
63 George Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesie (London: printed by Richard Field, 1589), sig.F4v.  
64 Eglogues are the mythological, pastoral works by the poet Virgil. Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesie 
(1589), sig.F4r.  
65 Altegoer, Reckoning Words, 22. 
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incomprehensible to normal man.66 Though it seems curiously counterintuitive, in 
order to reveal higher truth, we must first veil truth.  
 Modern theorists, too, have contemplated myth and the pastoral’s pervasive 
function throughout human cultures. Eero Tarasti reports that anthropological 
approaches to myth theory believe ‘there is no doubt that the main cultural function of 
mythology is the establishment of precedent, the vindication of the truth of magic, of 
the binding forces of morality and law, and the real value of religious ritual by 
referring to events which have occurred in a dim past, in the Golden Age’.67 One might 
argue that mythologies and pastorals, by rooting present behaviour in an ahistorical 
past, urge people to question the nature of knowledge through self-examination. 
Giuseppe Gerbino argues that in the fantasy experienced through pastoral ‘the real 
issue is not self-deception, but self-representation. Pastoral did not offer an easy way 
out from oneself; but a symbolic space within which to play oneself.’68 To Vanda Zajko 
and Ellen O’Gorman, myth ‘becomes one of the means of narrating, comprehending, 
but also elevating human experience. It thus finds a place in the disciplines of science 
and medicine, as well as of the human sciences, which have as their common ground 
the understanding of the self in its various dimensions’.69 Gerbino points out the irony 
in our historical perspective on pastoral as quaint and innocent, when it was often seen 
contemporarily as a subversive form.70 Yet, as Gerbino argues, ‘Western culture used 
pastoral fiction as a metaphor of human existence, as a way to articulate discourses 
about human nature and its relation to the world’.71 To a group with a shared 
experiential context, myth works as a sort of shorthand, immediately invoking a strain 
of meaning. Zajko and O’Gorman surmise that ‘[e]ven the very name of a mythic 
figure can function as a profoundly intertextual moment, which connects a text to a 
well-known set of important issues’.72 And, as I will argue over the course of this 
                                                       
 
66 ‘As Dionysius says, ‘the divine ray cannot reach us unless it is covered with poetic veils’, as quoted in 
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71 Ibid., 4. 
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chapter, a variation on this sort of ‘intertextual moment’ also happened with the 
madrigal and related genres, so strongly associated with the mythological and pastoral, 
that effects of those modes could be harnessed even without strong or indeed any 
textual mythological references.  
 The function of mythologies in the fashioning of the self was related to the idea 
that contemplation of an Other necessarily reflects or draws attention to the self, and it 
is perhaps for this reason that mythology and the pastoral recurred so frequently 
throughout our literary past—often when one seeks to understand the individual 
experience or contemplate elements of human consciousness. As many have argued, 
there is no objective pastoral, only what it ‘was thought to be’—nostalgia for an 
ahistorical place remembered fondly as if it once existed, not in pure fantasy, but in an 
alternate past that may have never occurred.  
Eero Tarasti on Myth and Music  
Eero Tarasti explains that mythologies ‘signify a sacred, traditional knowledge, a 
primitive belief, which naturally prompts one to ask the nature of this knowledge and 
belief’.73 It makes sense, then, that mythological tropes provide a suitable mode of 
dialogue for furthering the nature of knowledge. Gerbino knows that ‘music played a 
fundamental role in the construction and preservation of this collective illusion’ known 
as Arcadia.74 But as I argue in this chapter, it appears possible that music, too, might 
have been altered by this significant affiliation with the pastoral. Tarasti argues that 
‘[m]yth and music constitute two forms of discourse which are closely related’.75 He 
suspects that ‘[t]here are compositions wherein only the code of myth is reconstructed’ 
as ‘[t]he influence of myth upon music is … ascertainable in the stylistic features of 
musical discourse’.76 One challenge for Tarasti, who is looking primarily at the music of 
Strauss and Wagner, is that ‘in order to see how musical thematics are involved in the 
mythical, one must find several musical realizations of the same myth or sufficiently 
similar myths’.77 This is certainly not much of a challenge in the madrigalian genres. A 
simple ballett-like ‘fa-la’ or a word-painted ‘aye me’ acts as a signifier that might as well 
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invoke Diana and her train of dancing nymphs.78 Tarasti hypothesises that because 
music  
 
possesses a formal world, history and rules of its own … in the hands of myth it 
acquires a new function and its original properties are put in “brackets” because 
its only task now is to support the mythical meaning and content. Does not this 
explain the structural paucity and a certain syntactical scarcity of musical 
discourse during those periods when music was closely allied with myth?79  
 
To this end, he concludes that ‘music in some cases could entirely replace a mythical 
text’,80 suggesting that because music is like language without semantic meaning, the 
notes could indeed detach themselves from their verbal foundation, whilst retaining 
myth’s cultural function.81 This is an idea to which I shall return by the end of the 
chapter.  
 In this chapter’s case studies, I examine how the domestic genres’ dynamic 
partnership with the mythological influenced textual and musical meaning through 
compositional tropes, particularly as texts evolved away from strictly pastoral topics. 
First, I focus on satire and the music of Thomas Weelkes in three pieces from his Ayeres 
or phantastike spirits (1608). This analysis draws on work by Julian Johnson and Esti 
Sheinberg on musical irony. The subsequent case study, on Weelkes’s ‘Thule, the 
period of cosmographie’, draws on modes of inquiry common to scholarship on travel 
writing, early modern utopia, and Shakespeare studies. As Allison Kavey says, ‘[t]he 
early modern tension between imagination and belief was a symptomatic anxiety 
concerning the limits of human credulousness and the nature of the equivocal space 
between reality and appearance, reason and delusion, literal and figurative 
representations of things’.82 Though these two sets of examples by Weelkes rely on 
rather different modes for interpretation, they have in common the way that musical 
                                                       
 
78 For more on signifiers, see: Tarasti, Myth and Music, 75. Though Tarasti’s theories rely primarily on, in 
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form and text can work together to interrogate the tension, the ‘equivocal space’ 
between realities and their representations. 
 
3.1 ‘Phantasticke Spirites’: Myth and Satire  
Both the pastoral mode and satire were strongly embedded in early modern English 
culture. But more importantly, they served a common function as fictions that create 
spaces of ambiguity in which subjects could engage in significant and challenging 
discourses. Perhaps it is no coincidence that the half-goat, half-man Arcadian Satyr 
made a common appearance in madrigalian texts, and was sometimes confused with 
‘satire’, as they were often spelled interchangeably.83 Like the pastoral, satire forces the 
hearer to contemplate the relationship between reality and fiction. The following 
considers the satirical possibilities created by the frequent use of mythology in 
domestic Elizabethan and Stuart vocal music, as well as satire’s role in formulating new 
conceptions of credible knowledge. Though it is well established that mythological 
figures in domestic music were often used as political allegory, the malleability of these 
well-known mythical tropes allowed for the genre to take on and discuss a variety of 
meaningful topics.84 As will be demonstrated shortly, Thomas Weelkes engaged with 
fictional and musical tropes of the domestic genres in a very similar way, highlighting 
satirical texts through literal musical imagery. In doing so Weelkes’s ayres contributed 
to a musical discussion that inherently interrogated the relationship between reality 
and appearances.  
Satire is a discursive genre that was as popular in seventeenth century England as it 
is today; in spite of attempts at censorship, satire remained a definitive literary genre of 
the time.85 As Andrew McRae explains, Thomas Scot wrote that:  
 
“This is a wondrous witty age that sees / Beyond the truth of things, forty 
degrees”. Seeing “beyond the truth”, as this poet anxiously begins to perceive, 
                                                       
 
83 It is for this reason that in Greek drama Satyrs are often the characters attributed with giving satirical 
speeches. “satyr, n.”, OED Online. Oxford University Press, June 2014 (accessed 24 June 2014). 
84 For an overview of political allegory in the poetry of this period, see: David Norbrook, Poetry and Politics in 
the English Renaissance, Revised Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
85 Under Elizabeth I, satirical publications were so widespread that the so-called ‘Bishops’ Ban of 1599’ was 
enacted to censor satire and epigram specifically, though it was not well enforced after its initial push. 
Andrew McRae, Literature, Satire and the Early Stuart State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
29. 
 126 
involves accepting that literature shapes realities as much as it merely reflects 
them, and that satire might now be revealing itself as interested and polemical 
rather than disinterested and aloof.86 
 
In his Skialethia or A Shadowe of Truth, in Certaine Epigrams and Satyres (1598), Everard 
Gulpin wrote that the Satirists’ aim was to ‘speake the truth’.87 Though satire can exist 
in a strictly textual context, often it is through appropriate performance or delivery 
that satirical elements are asserted. Henry Peacham explained that ‘ironia’ is  
 
when a sentence is understood by the contrary, or thus, when our meaning is 
contrary to our saying, not so well perceaved by the wordes, as eyther by the 
pronunciation, by the behavyor of the person, or by the nature of ye thing … 
[B]y this fygure we doe forbid by a mocking graunt, and commaunde by a 
frumping forbidding, and also commend that, that is worthy of disprayse, and 
dispraise that, that is worthy of high commendation.88  
 
Particularly in sarcastic or ‘deadpan’ performance, true meaning of the words is 
unclear until the ‘behavyor of a person’ imbues the text with satirical meaning, ready 
for uptake by the savvy hearer. The performer’s role in properly portraying satirical 
uptake is of note.   
It is difficult to draw a concise and authoritative taxonomy of satire, as the precise 
relationships between its common elements are debated amongst linguists and 
philologists. For example, some categorise satire as a subset of irony whilst others see 
irony as a common satiric device.89 For this reason I will use the terms satire and irony 
interchangeably. Generally, there are two basic features of satire: an object of attack 
and an element of the grotesque, fantastical, or absurd.90 Satire relies on a distortion of 
meaning, often through exaggeration or understatement.91 As Gilbert Highet succinctly 
states, parody, another subset of satire, is ‘the difference between a portrait-sketch and 
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a caricature’.92 Replacement of one component (like a normal-sized nose) with 
something absurd is a common satirical trope, resulting in ironic or parodical 
meaning.93 Overly sincere or seemingly unconscious ‘deadpan’ performance could be 
considered the absurd element in some satirical utterances.94 Sarcasm, on the other 
hand, is a form of irony that states one thing, but implies the opposite through tone and 
expression. Sarcasm often requires a body to hint at its existence via facial expression, 
gestures, vocal tone, etc.95 For our purposes here, it is useful to view all satirical 
features as Simpson defines them: ‘[s]atirical texts are understood as utterances which 
are inextricably bound up with the context of situation, with participants in 
discourse and with frameworks of knowledge’.96  
Though satirical humour is ostensibly comical, it plays a significant role in truth-
building.97 Paul Simpson reminds us that, amongst other things, humour ‘rehearses and 
redesigns the categories and concepts of serious discourse’.98 Simpson views satire as a 
discursive practice, in the Foucauldian sense—a process through which cultural and 
social significance is built through routine daily interaction and, ultimately, works to 
define collective knowledge.99 Satire is critical and functions as a discourse that 
challenges representation and its ability to ‘straddle the poles of truth and falsity’; this 
suggests that one way music could participate as an active agent in discourses of 
knowledge was through satire.  
Julian Johnson defines musical irony as the process through which ‘the expected 
sense of the music’ is then ‘inverted by presenting familiar conventions of a genre 
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(waltz, march) but conspicuously deformed’.100 Consequently, ‘the powerful expressive 
effect arises from the cognitive dissonance of normative meaning in a non-normative 
context’.101 He observes that  
 
there are remarkably few studies devoted to musical irony; of those there are, 
almost all are written in relation to individual composers. Perhaps the lack of 
any overview tells its own story: until quite recently, it seems, discourse about 
music has been unwilling, to the point of denial, to treat music as anything less 
than a form of sincere, authentic and direct expression.102  
 
Johnson importantly concludes that ‘[t]he authorial interruption of the music’s formal 
and grammatical logic inscribes the presence of a divided self-consciousness, one that 
both creates the work and, at the same time, underlines its own awareness of the fictive 
and constructive nature of that creation’.103 Moreover, he supposes that ‘[t]he 
significance of this far exceeds questions of musical style or familiar accounts of 
idiosyncratic composers “playing” with musical conventions’.104 Though Johnson’s 
survey doesn’t extend to the early modern period (as his conclusion is that irony has 
implications for modernity via the self-aware subject), my discussion of Weelkes’s 
engagement with irony will explore the presence of musical satire within his 
contemporary cultural-historical situation.  
Musical satire has some hermeneutic challenges unique to its form, however. As 
Esti Sheinberg shows, there is often ambiguity in satire, as it has two coexisting 
meanings, one explicit and one concealed.105 This much seems obvious in literature, but 
it is a more complicated relationship when it comes to music. As she points out, ‘how 
can a musical message be “concealed” or “explicit”’ as music does not have ‘true’ and 
‘false’ statements?106 Though perhaps frustrating for the modern scholar who seeks a 
definitive thesis for ‘music’s purpose’, perhaps it is music’s partial subjectivity that 
allows it to so aptly contribute to inconclusive discourses, such as the nature of the 
relationship between perception and reality. Ambiguity, as Sheinberg states, ‘is an 
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autonomous reflection on unsolvable paradoxes’.107 In other words, it is musical 
meaning’s inherent elusiveness, combined with ironic ambiguity, which creates a space 
for dialogue on life’s most intangible questions.  
My argument relies on the premise that, by 1600, the structural and topical tropes 
of the domestic genres were well known to Weelkes and his contemporaries, and 
therefore could be employed satirically. Perhaps it is not coincidental that the English 
madrigal, a genre born from imitation, could become so swiftly and easily satirised.108 
McRae observes that ‘a study of satire highlights kinds of texts and textual practices 
which were utterly familiar to contemporary readers and writers, but which are often 
overlooked by forms of history that prioritise reason and clarity in political expression’, 
and this is also true within modern studies of Elizabethan and Stuart song.109 Joseph 
Kerman was possibly the first to pick up on, in his words, ‘a little satire in the madrigal 
style’, particularly in ‘later madrigal books’.110 He attributes this satirical treatment to a 
more general rejection of the Italianate styles in favour of the ‘native’ tradition of lute 
song.111 Kerman does not, however, engage with the musical treatment of these satirical 
texts nor make further propositions for satire’s social function. This chapter’s case 
studies hope to demonstrate how tropes of mythology and music worked together in 
the creation of a satiric discourse with significant implications for impending changes 
in episteme, also suggesting the need for a reconsideration of the same domestic 
music’s vapid reputation.  
 Thomas Weelkes: Satirical Subversion of the Pastoral 
If musical irony relies on a disturbance in common musical form, it is necessary first to 
understand that form. Ostensibly, Weelkes's Ayeres or phantasticke spirites (1608) is no 
different from many others of its day, combining elements of canzonet, ballett, and 
other ‘light’ forms of Italian derivation.112 In both Weelkes’s collection and Morley’s 
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Canzonets or little short songs to three voices (1593), for example, each piece is composed for 
three voices, some strophic and some through composed, and often with repeated 
sections.113 When possible, Weelkes takes opportunities to musically illustrate suitable 
words in the madrigalian fashion (see ‘The nightingale’ and its chorus of descending 
minor third ‘cuckoo’ noises), as does Morley in his collection (semiquaver runs to 
illustrate a ‘full’ laugh in ‘Deep lamenting’). Though in his 1608 book Weelkes does not 
musically diverge drastically from the formal precedents for the ayre (as exemplified 
not only by Morley and Weelkes’s earlier collections, but also by Youll, Pilkington, 
and several others), it is in his choice of texts that the traditional model is disturbed. 
Mythological figures were invoked, but, as will be shown shortly, to a distinctly 
different effect than the way Morley used them.  
In Weelkes’s dedication to Ayeres or phantasticke spirits, the composer wishes his 
patron Edward Denny ‘happines of both worldes’. Though clearly wishing him well in 
this world and the spiritual afterlife, perhaps ‘both worldes’ could also imply interplay 
between the real world (‘ayre’, with its double meaning, is a somewhat material object) 
and the imagined or otherworldly (‘phantasticke spirites’)114 addressed by various 
pieces in this collection. It is perhaps for this reason that Edmund Fellowes thought 
that the pieces in this collection with ‘political or topical meaning, the explanation of 
which has been lost’ are ‘aptly styled by the composer Fantastic Spirits’.115 If Fellowes 
is right, then there is no structural difference between ‘ayres’ and ‘spirites’ in musical 
terms, the distinction is in the poetic content (if there even is a conscious distinction at 
all). It seems curious, however, that Weelkes would name his topical pieces 
‘phantasticke spirites’, as the reverse seems more logical.116 It is clear, however, that the 
deeply embedded connection between music and myth in this genre allowed for 
meaningful conversation to occur through both the presentation and absence of formal 
and poetic tropes.  
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Weelkes: ‘Ha ha! This world doth passe’  
In the three case studies addressed here, Thomas Weelkes and his anonymous text 
authors don’t completely do away with textual inference to traditional mythology, but 
in each instance, the classical pastoral is in some way perverted, indicating that 
appearances may prove more complex than they are immediately presented. In 
Weelkes’s ‘Ha ha! This world doth passe’, the composer set a seemingly whimsical text 
to a seemingly whimsical tune (see Fig. 3.1):  
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Figure 3.1: Weelkes, ‘Ha ha’ from Ayeres or Phantasticke Spirites (1608), sig.D2r.  
Huntington E. Library and Art Gallery STC / 1046:04. 
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On first examination of the poem, it appears to be a silly strophic ditty without much 
interpretive potential. Indeed, multiple modern readers have called this text 
‘nonsense’.117 The poem juxtaposes objects from the New World with classical 
mythology: Leda and Tullia are both characters stemming from Greek myth and they 
appear in company with marmosets, Indian asses, as well as the ever-ambiguous 
Unicorn, all figures with equivocally mythical and real origin.118 Yet the irony of 
Weelkes’s capricious setting is substantial. When read literally, the text may come 
across as nonsensical, though perhaps amusing in its social commentary, and the 
musical setting appears to support this.119 Though the music is strophic (with the 
repeated refrain of ‘Faradiddle’), the music’s word painting works well on all three 
strophes of text, a rare occurrence in this repertoire.120 In spite of the strophic form, 
however, ‘Ha ha’ manages to accommodate both overt word painting and multiple 
verses. To do this, the poet has opened all three verses with laughing pseudo nonsense-
syllables (haha, haha / teehee, teehee / so so, so so), the effect of which is exaggerated 
by the musical setting which repeats them even more, to almost ridiculous effect. It 
begins ‘slowly’ with the hocket-like staggered entries, doubling the frequency of each 
iteration within the first three bars, culminating in successive crotchets. After this 
opening sequence, it then falls into a dance-like sense of three, which continues for 
most of the piece in relative homophony, making the text very understandable. The 
‘faradiddle’ refrain may be an indication that whoever wrote the text intended it for 
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musical setting, and perhaps it was with that in mind that they wrote a text that 
worked well for a strophic yet still madrigalised setting (see Fig. 3.2).121  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Weelkes ‘Ha ha’, transcribed by Francis Bevan. 
 
The close connection between truth and deception lies at the heart of the ‘Ha ha’ poem 
and the self-conscious musical setting amplifies this haziness yet further. The overall 
musical effect of the madrigalised laughter, skipping rhythms, major mode, and 
transparent homophonic writing may initially give the impression of a more 
stereotypical pastoral English work. Yet in conjunction with the pointed words, these 
self-conscious musical features lack sincerity. Though the music laughs along with the 
text, it doesn’t take a deep reading to realise the message of the poem is darkly cynical. 
When interpreted as a piece of irony, a different impression emerges from the work, 
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one which highlights the sceptical environment in which ‘false play is no reproch’, a 
place where there are neither consequences for deception nor rewards for honesty. It 
notes the role of the gullible as well as that of the scammer, as it takes two to sell a 
donkey for a unicorn. As the onlooker watches life, and all its falsities, he cannot help 
but chuckle to himself. Objects from the New World are somehow portrayed as more 
‘real’ than the ones from myth—but also more mundane than the vivid English 
imagination might desire.  
Moreover, the text is ironically self-aware, as the first way the poet justifies his 
truth claims is with ‘Ille bee sworne’, the very sort of self-testament of truth he is 
criticising. Kingsley Amis, editor of The New Oxford Book of English Light Verse (1978), 
thought that the fourth line of the second stanza implies one ‘[c]all Audrey’s goose 
Leda’s swan’, and this was just a poorly worded poem. Edward Doughtie is correct in 
criticising Amis for this assumption, asserting that ‘the poet is merely citing another 
example of flattery, and that what we call Leda’s swan was always a goose’.122 But 
Doughtie is underestimating the poem as well in assuming that the text is simply a 
‘satire on flattery’, as it has a much heftier subject of ironic criticism, manipulation and 
false representation.123 Taking this a step further, one might suggest that the poet was 
not only correct in ordering the phrase ‘Leda’s goose a swan’, establishing that the 
object has always been just a goose, but that this stanza questions a more general 
reliance on mythological truths. The text’s scepticism works like a pin, popping the 
bubble of the Golden Age, thereby revealing an uglier truth (a goose), a motion that 
suggests doubt in myth’s authority as the ideal past. It recognises myth’s capacity as a 
medium of delusion and fantasy. This criticism is both self-conscious and divided, in 
that it is denouncing misrepresentation through myth, and via the ayre, a musical form 
often allied with mythology.   
In this, the musical form adds to textual meaning as the ironic criticism relies on the 
ayre’s established relationship with mythology. To this effect, Weelkes’s chirpy setting 
adds a further layer of false impression to poetic meaning, one that thrives on the ironic 
use of expected musical tropes, rather than sincere representation. The cheerful and 
sprightly musical setting enhances a contrast already hinted at in the poem alone, one 
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that juxtaposes the ostensibly carefree musical presentation of the text with the actual 
message of the poem, one wary of manipulation and deception in modern life. And 
through a word-painted yet strophic setting, Weelkes’s composition drives home 
eeriness existent in the poem, one of redundancy in a world of human nature that 
doesn’t change. The repetitive, strophic setting emphases the incongruity between the 
poem’s meaning and its outward appearance, as the music remains unmoved with each 
verse in spite of textual alterations. Though this work is from Ayeres or phantasticke 
spirites, the fantasy lies not in the realistic representation of a fantastic mythological 
text, as one might expect from a typical example from the genre, but rather through the 
satirical exposure of an uncertain reality in a dubious world. Perhaps the ‘ha ha’ laughs 
are a version of what Highet calls ‘the happy perception of incongruity’, between 
appearances and meaning, as ‘the satirist, though he laughs, tells the truth’.124  
Weelkes: ‘Aye me, alas’ 
Weelkes’s ‘Aye me, alas’, features a pseudo-historical ancient character, Messalina (see 
Fig 3.3). As the third wife of Roman Emperor Claudius (who ruled from 41-54 AD), 
Messalina is technically an historical rather than mythological woman, yet in early 
modern England her literary and artistic reputation as a stock character for ‘the 
adulteress’ falls somewhere between antiquity and myth.125 Though all mythological 
tropes are thought to exist in an ahistorical ‘Golden Age’, when an ancient figure from 
‘real’ history is invoked, it complicates the traditional ahistorical ‘memory’ invoked by 
conventional pastoralism.  
 
                                                       
 
124 One of the author’s explanations of ‘parody’. Highet, An Anatomy of Satire, 67, 234. 
125 ‘As Richard Rainolde reported in 1571, Messalina ‘was so beastlye that she vsed her adulterous lust 
openlye, for the which abhominable facte many good men withdrewe themselues, from thence and therefore 
they were murthered’, Richard Rainold, A chronicle of all the noble emperours of the Romaines (London: printed by 
Thomas Marshe, 1571), sig.E3v. For the history of Messalina the symbol of insatiable female sexuality, see 
Judith P. Hallett and Marilyn B. Skinner, Roman Sexualities (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 
222. For more on early modern English appropriation of all things Roman, see Lisa Hopkins, Cultural Uses of 
the Caesars on the English Renaissance Stage (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 2. For a description of the early 
modern use of Livy as a source of Roman history, existing somewhere between myth and history, see 
Warren Charnaik, The Myth of Rome in Shakespeare and his Contemporaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), 25-34. 
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Figure 3.3: Weelkes, ‘Aye me alas’ from Ayeres or Phantasticke Spirites (1608), 
sig.C3v. 
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Musically, the piece adheres to many tropes of the canzonet style: it opens with a 
descending semi tone on ‘aye me’, an Anglicisation of the Italian sigh ‘ohimé’. Weelkes 
illustrates the words ‘up and down’ with descending octave leaps in all voices and 
‘crying’ with an ascending and returning semi-tone movement, aptly depicting 
recurring cries (see Fig. 3.4, bars 1-8). He demonstrates animated monkey-like 
swinging with dotted skips on ‘for her monkey’, which seems irreverent (and overly 
literal) considering this particular monkey is not very lively (Fig. 3.4, bar 9). The 
‘lively monkey’ word painting is a persuasive indicator of satire within the music, as a 
more apt illustration of a dying monkey would be akin to ‘morire’ tropes, with longer 
lines, suspensions, or descending semitone movement. Here, the ‘monkeying’ is 
contrasted with a homophonic declamatory statement (in the Italian tradition) on 
‘death thou art too cruel’, a dramatic move akin to comic overacting, considering that 
the death here is not a terribly tragic one (though it seems that way to Messalina—Fig. 
3.4, bar 13). 
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Figure 3.4: Weelkes ‘Aye me alas’, transcribed by Francis Bevan. 
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In fact, the exaggerated drama of the musical setting, complete with tropes like ‘aye 
me’ and ‘alas’ and a minor mode, must be ironic when one considers the absurdity of 
her reaction to the ‘death’ of a silly object of affection, a monkey.126 In Sheinberg’s 
terms, this is satire achieved through ‘quantitative exaggeration by accumulation’ in 
that it is through the inclusion of so many of the expected madrigalisations that a 
satirical effect is achieved.127  
The monkey is Messalina’s thinly veiled object of desire, and could equally refer to 
a man or just his phallus. As a generally unfavourable character (though perhaps 
sexually fascinating) sympathy for Messalina’s sexual habits was probably rather 
sparse. She was a stereotypical hysterical woman, helpless to do anything but mourn 
her fate and cry an indignant (and ineffective) ‘fie’ at Death. One must also wonder 
about her responsibility in her monkey’s ‘death’. The bawdiest reading would be that 
this is a flaccid penis metaphor and her sexual insatiability has spent all her lover’s 
energy, leaving her pouting in self-pity.128 The jewel is ostensibly her monkey/lover, 
taken by death (the ‘monkey’ is sexually spent).129 Yet the poem somewhat awkwardly 
states the same thing twice by saying that Death ‘bereave[s] her of her jewel’ and also 
‘make[s] a seizure of her only treasure’. This doubled use of the same metaphor gives 
reason to suggest that the poet is also implying that her ‘jewel’ or ‘only treasure’ is not 
just her lover, but also her sexuality.130 Her behaviour at the potential death of her 
‘lover’ isn’t one of a grown woman in love, it is the reaction of a child who has lost a 
plaything.  
In both continental and English music, there was certainly precedent for non-
satirical pastoral madrigals that set highly sexual topics, as erotic desire was one of the 
foremost actions played out through mythological allegory, stemming from works like 
Ovid’s Metamorphoses.131 Thomas’s setting ‘My lovely wanton iewell’ draws allusion 
                                                       
 
126 Definition B. ‘Freq. humorous. Typified as lecherous or libidinous (esp. in similes), or as a substitute 
partner to a woman with insatiable desires. Also (in extended use): a lecherous person, esp. a lecherous 
woman. Obs’. “monkey, n.”, OED Online. Oxford University Press, March 2015 (accessed 25 March 2015). 
127 Sheinberg, Irony, Satire, Parody and the Grotesque, 120. 
128 This is not Weelkes’s only flaccid penis metaphor in this collection. See also, ‘Upon a hill the bonny boy’. 
129 Williams, A Dictionary of Sexual Language and Imagery in Shakespearean and Stuart Literature, 373. 
130 It is also possible that the ‘jewel’ taken from her is a metaphor for orgasm. Note that death does eventually 
take Messalina’s sexuality away from her, in that she is forced to commit suicide for her adultery, a detail of 
her end that may have been well known in early modern times.  
131 See Kinglsey-Smith in Hattaway (ed.), A New Companion to English Renaissance Literature and Culture; Also, 
Agnes Lafont, Shakespeare’s Erotic Mythology and Ovidian Renaissance Culture (London: Ashgate, 2013), 1. 
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between death and orgasm with ‘I could never wish a sweeter dying’, a fairly common 
insinuation. But there is sincerity in both the poem and ballett/canzonet musical 
structure that leave the ‘dying’ veiled as simply possibility.132 In ‘Aye me, alas’, the 
monkey is the key absurdity that other sexualised settings lack, and it is this farcical 
feature that demarks Weelkes’s trope-filled musical setting as satire. There are plenty 
of madrigals about unfulfilled or unattainable love, even with extreme, dramatic, and 
somewhat romanticised consequences, like dying of a broken heart. But the use of the 
pseudo-mythological Messalina and the absurdity of her monkey suggest that the 
subject of mockery here is self-reflective, as it parodies the Italianate musical-poetic 
trend in England more generally. By extension, Weelkes could be seen to be parodying 
himself, or at least a tradition that he was very much a part of. In this sense, Weelkes’s 
‘Aye me, alas’ embodies the kind of self-awareness in musical irony that Julian 
Johnson has characterised as fundamentally indicative of a type of modernity. 
Weelkes: ‘Since Roben Hood’  
Though ostensibly a short ditty about a folktale, ‘Since Roben Hood’ isn’t a piece about 
Roben Hood at all, but a more general rejection of idealised heroes and fondly 
remembered traditions in favour of commercial gain. Topically, it is perhaps no 
coincidence that Weelkes’s ‘Since Roben Hood’ follows ‘Ha ha’ in Weelkes’s 1608 
collection, as the cynicism about ‘modern’ life continues in this setting (see Fig.3.5). 
Though there are plenty of secular songs that question or show wariness of 
contemporary life (particularly by Byrd, Carlton, and even Weelkes), usually these are 
paired with minor modes and longer rhythms that are, in Byrd’s words, ‘framed to the 
life of the words’.133 In ‘Since Roben Hood’, however, Weelkes’s setting uses musical 
contrast to highlight textual irony.134  
                                                       
 
132 Kerman states that Francis Pilkington’s 1613 setting ‘All in a cave’ is satirical because the long iambic 
heptameter allows for the author to go a bit ‘over the top’ in illustrating an inexperienced lover’s attempts at 
seduction. The poem reflects the awkwardness of the encounter by abandoning the obvious iambic option of 
'Oh no! Said he' for the less wieldy 'Oh no! He said'. Though perhaps parodying metaphysical poetry, as 
Kerman suggests, Pilkington’s setting doesn’t appear to enhance or play off of any humorous elements in the 
poetry. Though one can only guess, one would think if Pilkington had wanted to emphasise the parodical 
elements in the poem, he could have. Kerman, The Elizabethan Madrigal, 36. 
133 See Byrd quotation in Ch. 4, 220. For an example of a more expected contemplative setting, see Carlton’s 
madrigal ‘The love of change’ (1601). Fellowes, English Madrigal Verse, 68. 
134 Which begs the question, what is the ‘life of the words’ when setting ironic texts, that inherently contain a 
double, and often contrasting meaning. Does one musically attend to surface (‘explicit’) or ironic 
(‘concealed’) meaning? Can one attend to both? 
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Figure 3.5: Weelkes, ‘Since Roben Hood’ from Ayeres or Phantasticke Spirites 
(1608), sig.D3v. Huntington E. Library and Art Gallery STC / 1046:04.  
 
Roben Hood was a common hero in ballad lore, and a character, along with 
compatriots Little John and Maid Marian, common in May Day celebrations involving 
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Morris dancing. Though a short text, the poem is brimming with references to 
contemporary popular culture. The first stanza ‘sets the scene’: nostalgic figures of 
folklore are deemed no longer relevant, and the hobby-horse, a symbol of a more 
innocent past, is also forgotten. Mary Ellen Lamb argues that the forgotten hobby-
horse, widespread in plays and literature of the period, was a symbol of nostalgia for 
the old ways.135 Though her full argument is too lengthy to explain here, the result is 
that by the late sixteenth-century, the hobby-horse, a formerly ‘much loved’ figure of 
legitimate entertainment, became sexualised, a process related to the commercialisation 
of popular culture. As late Elizabethans remember both a more innocent, delightful 
hobby-horse and also its vulgar evolution, the phrase ‘the hobby horse was quite 
forgot’, indicates a nostalgia for a recent past, one that problematises culture-for-profit.  
The last line of the first stanza mentions William Kemp, one of Shakespeare’s 
original comedians, who made headlines in 1600 by Morris dancing over 100 miles 
from London to Norwich. As an actor, Kemp played clown roles, like Bottom in A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream, and is thought to have played, and even been the inspiration 
for, Falstaff. As Lamb points out, however, Kemp was also the face of lowbrow 
popular culture, one side of a cultural tension within early modern theatre 
companies.136 Eventually, ‘Kemp’s very ability to draw a crowd no doubt constructed 
him, like the once popular hobby-horse, as an object of contempt to those defining 
themselves by a discerning aesthetic taste’.137 Perhaps it was tension between forms of 
cultural value in the theatre that drove Kemp to attempt his Nine daies wonder (1601), as 
the pamphlet documenting his journey was called.138 As a freelance entertainer, he 
could make money in any way he preferred, though as Weelkes’s text suggests, Kemp 
probably didn’t ‘gain’ much from his publicity stunt, despite his attempt to charge 
onlookers a fee.139 He probably died of plague, as many did, in 1603 and without much 
to his name.140 Thus Weelkes’s text cynically describes the death of the folk tradition 
                                                       
 
135 Mary Ellen Lamb, The Popular Culture of Shakespeare, Spenser and Jonson (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 65. 
136 Ibid., 158. 
137 Ibid. 
138 William Kemp, Kemps nine daies vvonder … (London: printed by E. E[llde], 1600).  
139 Ibid., 76. 
140 David Wiles, Shakespeare's Clown: Actor and Text in the Elizabethan Playhouse (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 41. 
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and the folk hero, a role replaced by entertainers like Kemp, a fame and money-seeking 
professional clown.  
 As one can see, Weelkes’s seemingly light-hearted poem is only outwardly so, with 
a cynical underlying message. The illusion of light heartedness is reinforced in the text 
through the forced rhyme scheme (alone-a), nonsense syllables, and the alteration of 
rather well known details of the event. Though France clearly rhymes with dance 
(certainly more so than Norwich), perhaps this isn’t just an expedient of rhyme, but an 
indication that Kemp sought fame abroad through his antics. Either way, it would be 
physically impossible to dance to France, yet exaggeration of detail is almost expected 
in the retelling of this type of event. As he did in ‘Haha’, Weelkes wrote a cheery 
setting that is literally word-painted and highlights the text’s overt rhyme scheme, 
illustrates dance rhythms (for example, the use of triple time at ‘he did labour’), and 
skips and trips where appropriate, as expected from the genre (see Fig.3.6).  
 
 146 
 
 
 147 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Weelkes, ‘Since Roben Hood’, transcribed by Francis Bevan. 
 
Though the events described in this poem seem quite ballad-like, and Roben Hood is a 
figure that made frequent appearances in ballads, by through-composing the text, 
Weelkes sets the poem within a fixed musical framework that is not transferrable to 
other lyrics in the way a traditional ballad would be, thus reinforcing the musical 
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setting’s important role in the text’s interpretation. Though the music is a literal 
depiction of the poem’s words, the meaning of the poem is enhanced through the overtly 
straight representation of text, one similar in effect to deadpan humour.  
What is interesting about this masked cynicism, however, is that at its core, the 
speaker of the song is still longing for a past, as indicated by the nostalgic figure of the 
hobby-horse, much like a traditional pastoral madrigal. But it is not a naive self, 
longing for a place and time that never was, but one more aware of its own history. 
This self demonstrates the split self-consciousness described by Johnson, one that 
creates through a particular medium but simultaneously demonstrates awareness of the 
constructive nature of that medium.141 In a way somewhat similar to contemporary 
utopian fiction, Weelkes uses the space of ambiguity created by mythologically-allied 
music to explore a self-aware scepticism about the sources of true knowledge and their 
representations. This is not dissimilar to the spaces represented by the islands of 
Shakespeare’s Tempest or Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis.142 In Allison Kavey’s words, the 
‘eerie opaqueness’ or ‘precarious poise’ that surrounds these types of spaces, is 
 
due to a skillful mixing of real events, idealized reality, and suspended 
imagination [and] is reinforced by the use of ironic, ambivalent, and tragicomic 
effects … for the sense of suspended tension between reality and appearance is 
constantly heightened by stylistic devices that deliberately subvert established 
relationships between truth and its representation.143 
 
But in Weelkes’s case, irony and subverted perspectives are reinforced through 
musical rather than purely literary devices. In these ayres, the integration of the ‘real’ 
into a space of fantasy relies upon a music that attends only to the, in Sheinberg’s 
terms, ‘explicit’ half of textual irony to achieve the desired effect, making even more 
defined the dissonance between ‘explicit’ and ‘concealed’ poetic meanings. This 
dissonance is indicative of the discursive process, as described by Simpson, through 
which satire questions the fundaments of knowledge.144 Though both poetic meanings 
                                                       
 
141 Johnson in Downes, (ed.) Aesthetics of Music, 257. 
142 This is probably why it was common in both pastoral and utopian modes for the reader to be taken to 
another place, like Arcadia. 
143 Kavey (ed.), World-Building and the Early Modern Imagination, 94. 
144 See Ch. 3, 127.   
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are existent in the texts alone, one should not underestimate the powerful meaning 
contributed by music and performance. 
 In his book English Renaissance Song (1986), Edward Doughtie rightly cautions 
against textual analysis of these lyric works apart from their musical context. Though 
the poems examined here outwardly or topically appear to adhere to poetic tropes of 
the genre by invoking mythological figures, in each case this appearance is misleading 
when one stops to contemplate actual textual meaning. The music contributes to this 
false outward appearance, as the ‘packaging’ for the text seems directly in line with 
expected musical forms. Music’s lack of traditional semantic meaning makes it well 
suited for questioning inherently ambiguous and paradoxical concepts, like that of the 
relationship between appearances and truth.145 Through these ‘phantasticke spirites’, 
Weelkes was able to use tropes of the light genres to contribute to discourse on the 
reliability of exterior perception. Though the sceptical caution against modern life 
communicated in some of these texts is a far cry from the extreme scepticism 
articulated by Descartes only a few decades later, it is through this type of self-aware 
processing that discursive practices like irony are able to engage in the negotiations of 
relevance to episteme. These examples demonstrate how mythology and music 
laboured actively and jointly to challenge assumptions about reality. However, they 
also require us to rethink our modern expectations of the ‘light’ domestic genres as 
frivolous.146 Though little is certain about the contemporary performance practice of 
these pieces, we can safely assume that the performer also played a role in satirical 
uptake, as ironic elements would have been enhanced by an aware and engaged 
performance of these pieces. As Henry Peacham knew, the ‘behavyor of a person’ in 
performance, whether in an official capacity or in casual conversation, was, and still is, 
                                                       
 
145 Though his is only one opinion within a divisive aesthetic debate, Lawrence Kramer believes it a folly to 
assume music is either nonsemantic or all semantic, leaving its precise quality open for debate. If, as Kramer 
asserts, there is always a semantic gap between interpretation and the object interpreted, it makes sense to 
me that the semantic opacity of music might effectively interrogate ideas with similarly complex 
relationships. Kramer, Interpreting Music, 15; Kramer, Expression and Truth, 19.  
146 David Brown wrote that ‘for Weelkes’ limited potentialities as a composer of lute ayres, we have only to 
compare some of the more melodic of his Ayres of 1608 with the best of Campion’s to see just how inferior 
Weelkes was in this particular field to the lesser composer. It is not only that the individual phrases of 
Weelkes’ ayres are mostly less distinctive … Weelkes’ tune are made to grow largely through sequences 
which can all too easily become mechanical’. Brown, Thomas Weelkes, 203-4. Brown, assessing only the ayres’ 
musical form, is perhaps missing out on musical meaning apparent in an assessment of music and lyric 
together, the exact opposite problem described by Doughtie from literary scholarship, which only considered 
text. 
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key to satirical understanding.147 The centrality of performance in the creation of 
meaning here suggests that a phenomenological approach, one that considers the 
importance of expression not found in the score, is essential to historically 
understanding satirical music, as the meaning of the music is inherently reliant on the 
experience of the music.  
 
3.2 Thule and Truth in Travel  
In the next part of this chapter, I demonstrate how the madrigal’s tenacious association 
with the pastoral and mythical was maintained through tropes of the musical form, 
even when its text was, at its core, not mythical at all. Thomas Weelkes’s ‘Thule, the 
period of cosmography’ (1601) proves to be a fascinating example of a madrigal that 
cogitates the semi-fantastical (but ultimately ‘real’) events witnessed in travel abroad. 
But before addressing the case study, I must outline some relevant material on travel 
writing and the influences of travel writing within domestic music. Early modern 
fixation on travel and foreign spectacle is of particular interest to this thesis not only 
because of frequent references to travel-related imagery in contemporary domestic 
song, but because, in Jonathan Sell’s words, ‘[t]he textual transcription of new worlds 
pushes the problem of credible representation to its limits’, presenting a rhetorical 
challenge with significant implications for how all knowledge is built.148 During 
Weelkes’s lifetime the focus on outward exploration and the accumulation of 
undiscovered knowledge grew substantially. While the composer did not collect his 
observations himself, by writing about foreign travel and the observation of natural 
phenomena, his music expresses an idea that was at the forefront of the national (and 
greater European) mind, providing an experiential dialogue that cogitated issues of 
appearances and reality in relation to the wonder of travel.  
 A relatively robust field, early modern travel—in practice, symbol, and theory—
played an important role in changes to knowledge building throughout the seventeenth 
                                                       
 
147 Peacham, Garden of Eloquence (1577), sig. D2r. 
148 Sell, Rhetoric and Wonder in English Travel Writing, 2. 
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century.149 Travel literature was a significant contributor to travel’s influence at home 
in England. As William Sherman suggests, ‘the number of new titles printed (and old 
titles reprinted) during the early modern period suggests that there was a significant 
audience for travel writing, eager to hear news of the wider world and to reflect on 
England’s place in it’.150 Some accounts were second (or third, or fourth)-hand, like 
Richard Eden’s Decades of the Newe Worlde (1555), which will be discussed in more depth 
shortly, and some were written by those who had travelled abroad, such as Coryat’s 
Crudities (1611) or Walter Raleigh’s The Discoverie of the Large, Rich, and Beautifull Empire 
of Guiana (1596), relating his adventure seeking the mythical El Dorado. Raleigh’s 
work was written within a few weeks of his return to England, and was reprinted twice 
the same year, demonstrating the popularity of these types of volumes.151 As Elizabeth 
Spiller discusses, ‘New World travel narrative clearly stands on the border between the 
fabulously fictive and the scientifically exemplary’.152 Consequently, travel narratives 
were also caught up in wider aesthetic debates about the moralising or sin-inducing 
possibilities of fiction.153 Additionally, the positives and negatives of travel for gaining 
knowledge proved to be a matter of discussion. For example, Roger Ascham, tutor to 
the young Elizabeth I, propagated the benefits of learning from home, when he said: 
‘one yeare at home in England, would do a yong ientleman more good, I wisse, then 
three yeares trauell abrode spent in Italie’.154 Though Ascham clearly had personal 
incentive to prefer tuition at home, this still hints at the affiliation travel had with 
knowledge and learning, even by the mid-sixteenth century. The relationship between 
humanism, the new science, and travel writing was a highly complex one, but it has 
been established by other scholars that travel, particularly travel metaphor, was a 
fundamental aspect of the rhetoric of new knowledge, both within late-humanist works 
and in the new science.155  
                                                       
 
149 For more on contemporary attitudes towards experiential forms of learning as related to travel, see 
Melanie Ord, Travel and Experience in Early Modern English Literature (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
150 William H. Sherman, “Stirrings and Searching (1500-1720)”, in The Cambridge Companion to Travel Writing, 
(eds.) Peter Hulme and Tim Youngs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 19. 
151 Tim Youngs in Hulme and Youngs (eds.) The Cambridge Companion to Travel Writing, 33. 
152 Spiller, Science, Reading, and Renaissance Literature, 33. 
153 As discussed at the beginning of Chapter One.  
154 Roger Ascham, The Scholemaster … (London: printed by Iohn Daye, 1570), sig.H1r.   
155 Melanie Ord observes that while ‘humanist pedagogical texts are frequently anxious about the purpose of 
travel, the nature of the travel experience, and the relationship of travel to book learning, the new science 
makes dynamic use of travel observation and travel writing in establishing its own program’. Descartes saw 
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 Although travel was affiliated with the beginning of scientific materialism, there 
remained, however, a fantasy element so persuasive that it would be a blunder to 
assume the epistemic path towards empiricism was anything but serpentine.156 As 
Tadié and Scholar remind us, ‘[i]n order to better understand this remarkable to-and-
fro between myth and history … we must remember that the discovery of America was 
often perceived in the Renaissance as confirmation of the truth in legends’.157 
Mythological or fantastical elements had a strong function in travel-related language, 
not only as useful and familiar rhetorical tools pregnant with symbolic significance, but 
because of myth’s wonder-provoking qualities. Travel writers like Walter Raleigh 
could use a word like ‘labrinth’ and with it imply not only a maze, but also invoke the 
wonder of a mythological tale, rife with familiar story.158 As Patrick Holland and 
Graham Huggan argue: ‘[t]he transformation of ‘history’ into ‘private or collective 
mythology’ suggests the presence of powerful fantasy elements in travel writing, and 
indeed the close relationship between travel writing and the remembered and regretted 
exercise of power’.159 This echoes strongly Giuseppe Gerbino’s description of the 
‘collective illusion’ of Arcadia in Italian madrigals.160 It is for this reason, perhaps, that 
the ambiguously fantastical and foreign spaces mentioned before (the island of 
Shakespeare’s Tempest, Arcadia, or Bacon’s Bensalem from New Atlantis) were powerful 
and relevant symbols, abounding with contemporary meaning that entangled together 
foreign travel, myth, politics, and fantasy, spaces that contemplated the blurry lines 
between fiction and reality.  
 Before taking a look at the influence of travel literature on publications of domestic 
vocal music, I would first like to consider the contemporary reputation of the traveller 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
travel as ‘key to the development of his philosophy, for it leads him both to extirpate false opinions and to 
accumulate experiences on which to exercise his reason, thereby providing a surer basis of knowledge than 
the accumulated wisdom of others available through literature’. Ord, Travel and Experience in Early Modern 
English Literature, 7-8, 10. 
156 As Sell explains, early modern travel writing relies on ‘discursive practices and epistemological 
expectations’ utterly foreign to us today, so any idea of travel writing as ‘fiction’ or ‘non-fiction’ using 
modern categorisations would be totally misleading within contemporary mental frameworks. Sell, Rhetoric 
and Wonder in English Travel Writing, 2. 
157 Tadié and Scholar (eds.), Fiction and the Frontiers of Knowledge in Europe, 27. 
158 Sell, Rhetoric and Wonder in English Travel Writing, 116-8. 
159 They are quoting Svetlana Boym, who argues that nostalgia ‘desires to obliterate history and turn it into a 
private or collective mythology, to revisit time like space, refusing to surrender to the irreversibility of time 
that plagues the human condition’. Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 
xv. Hooper and Youngs (eds.), Perspectives on Travel Writing, 151. 
160 Gerbino, Music and Myth of Arcadia in Renaissance Italy, 1.  
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as a liar, which might appear at first rather contrary to the assertion that discoveries 
made during travel helped to usher in new empirical approaches to knowledge.161 
Richard Braithwaite, writing in 1631, believed that ‘travellers, poets, and liars are three 
words of one significance’.162 The epistemological significance represented in these 
typologies was probably even more entwined than even Braithwaite was aware. Spiller 
asserts that for ‘early modern writers, the existence of science depends on the 
possibility of fiction’.163 Travellers were a source of fascination and scepticism because 
they expanded knowledge about the world, but like any human being, they liked to tell 
stories and sell books, with some accounts veering more towards fiction than 
experiential ‘truth’. A part of and by-product of this negotiation of ‘truth in experience’ 
was the need to promote self-testaments of truth.164   
 For example, in 1588, explorer-astronomer Thomas Harriot wrote A briefe and true 
report of the new found land of Virginia, including this testament to his honesty: ‘[t]hus 
much vpon my credit I am to affirme: that things vniuersally are so truly set downe in 
this treatise by the author therof, an Actor in the Colony & a man no lesse for his 
honesty then learning commendable: as that I dare boldly auouch it may very well 
passe with the credit of truth euen amongst the most true relations of this age’.165 Even 
though Harriot is now considered one of the first champions of the empirical method 
(along with Francis Bacon), his assertion of truth in this introduction is not based on 
any empirical technique, but on a personal testimony of his own quality of character, as 
trustworthiness became linked with social stature.166 Harriot’s assertion also highlights 
a more generally perceived mistrust of other travel writers and their accounts of the 
New World (an assertion that comes with clear financial perks to his own account). As 
Judy Hayden points out, ‘[a]s fact, witness, and credibility were essential concerns for 
the travel narrative, so too did they became an integral part of the wider literary 
                                                       
 
161 As Spiller says, ‘the early modern period is an age of discovery: these discoveries include not simply new 
knowledge but new definitions of knowledge’. Spiller, Science, Reading, and Renaissance Literature, 1. Moreover, 
travel accounts highlighted the reliability of the senses, particularly in regard to testaments of what one saw 
or claimed to have seen. Self-testaments of truth were exceptionally uncertain in this period. Clark, Vanities of 
the Eye, 2. 
162 Sell, Rhetoric and Wonder in English Travel Writing, 23. 
163 Spiller, Science, Reading, and Renaissance Literature, 1. 
164 For more on suspicions of travel writers/writing, see Andrew Hadfield, Literature, Travel and Colonial 
Writing in the English Renaissance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 3-4. 
165 Thomas Harriot, A briefe and true report of the new found land of Virginia. (London: printed by [R. Robinson], 
1588), sig.A2r-A3v.  
166 Hayden (ed.), Travel Narratives, The New Science, and Literary Discourse, 10. 
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culture’.167 Clearly Braithwaite was concerned with the epistemological implications of 
his reading material, but the popularity of early modern travel accounts suggests he 
was in a minority. Like consumers of today’s tabloids, perhaps actual truth did not 
matter to the average early modern readers—it was the perception of truth that sold 
copies, which is why these travel accounts underwent so many reprints and 
retranslations. When it came to the economy of print, perhaps it was just the ability to 
be perceived as true that counted as much as what actually happened on a journey. 
Travel literature provided readers with a space that functioned not unlike that of a 
tabloid—a fictive Other world that was even more engaging and wondrous because it 
was rooted in reality providing verisimilitude. Those who enjoyed the genre suspended 
disbelief when reading it and allowed the ‘reality’ to transport them, whilst sceptics like 
Braithwaite stood nearby, glaring disapprovingly.  
 
John Wilbye on Travel 
As travel and travel literature were at the forefront of public awareness, it is to be 
expected that objects affiliated with the New World, travel, and exploration made their 
way into domestic music texts.168 Moreover, the madrigal’s existing affiliation with 
myth made the form a particularly conducive environment for a blending of Others: 
mythical figures of a ‘remembered’ nostalgic past, with New World figures of 
ambiguously ‘real’ origin. One can observe this mix of Others in the following 
examples: John Wilbye’s ‘Lady Oriana’ (1601), ‘What needeth all this travail’ (1598), 
‘There is a iewell’ (1609), in addition to those examples already discussed by Thomas 
Weelkes, like ‘Ha, ha, this world doth passe’ (1608) and ‘Since Roben Hood’ (1608). 
In each of these examples, mythological figures or tropes are juxtaposed with objects 
associated with travel or the New World, creating a fictive experience enhanced by 
foreign elements that are possibly real. I observe that this type of text utilises the 
ambiguous truthfulness of travel narratives by bringing objects from those narratives 
into a musical-poetic form traditionally used for the playing out of pastoral fantasies. It 
is not an unreasonable conclusion, then, that the fictive space created by this melding 
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of New World and pastoral Otherly tropes could further discussion on the tensions 
between truth, perception, and appearances.169 
  In John Wilbye’s ‘Lady Oriana’, from Thomas Morley’s 1601 compilation 
Triumphs of Oriana, Wilbye set a poem that blends overt images of Elizabeth I and her 
interests in the land of Guiana, the South American region famously explored by 
Walter Raleigh. Raleigh published an exaggerated account of his travels in The discovery 
of Guiana (1596), and was well-known to be a favourite of the Queen.170 Knowing the 
world through exploration was demonstrative of wealth and power; therefore praising 
Elizabeth in relation to a sought after and supposedly rich New World conquest (and 
importantly, one with Spanish affiliations), was a way to demonstrate her power. 
Raleigh’s accounts of Guiana contributed to what became the myth of the golden city 
of El Dorado, an idea that instigated the exploration of more territory than any other 
single reason.171  
 
The Lady Oriana 
Was dight all in the treasures of Guiana, 
And on her Grace a thousand Graces tended: 
And thus sang they, faire Queene of peace and plenty; 
The fairest queen of twentie, 
Then with an Oliue wreath, for peace renowned, 
Her virgin head they crowned, 
Which ceremony ended. 
Vnto her Grace the thousand Graces bended. 
Then sang the shepherds & Nymphs of Diana, 
Long liue faire Oriana.172 
 
Wilbye’s musical setting is through composed and aligns musically with the cadence 
and line of the text, introducing new musical ideas where grammatically and poetically 
appropriate (for example, a more homophonic statement on ‘And thus sang they’, and 
charming duets at ‘Then with an olive wreath’). Though the poem praises Elizabeth in 
terms of ‘real-world’ accomplishment (as reported by Raleigh), the language of the 
                                                       
 
169 The type of space I’m describing here is not unlike the mixing of travel and New World allusion with the 
magical and mythological in Shakespeare’s The Tempest. 
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Williams, Sir Walter Raleigh: In Life and Legend (London: Continuum, 2011), 23-44.  
171 John Silver, “The Myth of El Dorado”, History Workshop, no. 34. (1992): 1–15, 2. 
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setting agrees with tropes of the pastoral genre: with a thousand ‘graces’ singing of 
peace and plenty, the naturalistic and mythologically significant element of the olive 
wreath, and the ceremony of a pastoral gathering. The final couplet, ‘Then sang the 
shepherds & Nymphs of Diana, / Long liue faire Oriana’, is shared amongst each 
contribution to the Triumphs collection, and anchors this poem in both the political and 
pastoral realm, since Oriana was politically allegorical.173  
 In Wilbye’s ‘There is a jewel’, the juxtaposition is not just between mythology and 
reality, but also between newer and older or more established sources of truth. 
References to Biblical-style stories and mythology represent more established forms of 
truth, whilst new science/alchemy and New World objects represent newer forms of 
truth.  
 
There is a iewell which no Indian mines  
can buy, no Chymic art can counterfait;  
It makes men rich in greatest pouerty; 
Makes water wine, turnes wooden cups to gould, 
The homely whistle to sweet musicks strain, 
Seldom it comes, to few from heauen sent, 
That much in little all in naught, CONTENT.174  
 
The first line declares the subject (the spiritual ‘iewell’) superior to any real foreign 
gem, or anything created by modern science or alchemy (a coupling of new truth-
bearing figures).175 Biblical references of ‘water into wine’ are meshed with, perhaps, a 
reference to the King Midas myth (wood into gold—a coupling of older sources of 
truth). This free melding of popular images raises the question of what counted as a 
tangible truth for early modern English people, as the juxtaposition of new and old 
truths negotiate the measurement of another intangible force, love.  
 Finally, Wilbye’s bipartite madrigals ‘What needeth all this trauail’ and ‘O Fooles, 
can you not see a traffick neerer’ (1598), mix images of myth and travel, but in a 
notably subtle way. Frequent poetic use of Phoebus, another name for Apollo (god of 
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music, poetry, and the sun), transformed the figure into a more generalised 
embodiment of the sun personified, somewhat removed from its mythological origins.176 
In this time, Phoebus could have represented either the mythological god or the sun 
personified, but given the form of the reference (musicalised poetry of the madrigal 
type), I am inclined to suspect the former. Regardless, this piece demonstrates a 
gradation of mythological inferences in the madrigalian repertory, with content focused 
instead on an Other represented by travel and figures of foreignness rather than the 
strictly mythological or pastoral.  
 
What needeth all this trauail and turmoyling,  
Shortning the lyfes sweet pleasure.  
To seeke this far fetched treasure,  
In those hot clymates Vnder Phoebus broyling.   
   
O Fooles, can you not see a traffick neerer  
In my sweet Ladyes face, Where Nature showeth  
what euer treasure eye sees or hart knoweth?  
Rubies and Diamonds daintie  
And orient Perles such plentie,  
Corral & Ambergris, sweeter and deerer,  
Then which the South seas or Moluccas lend vs,  
Or either Indies, East or West, do send vs.177 
 
It is no mistake that the author of this text plays off the similarity between the words 
‘travel’ and ‘travail’, as the poem expresses hesitancy towards the seeker, symbolised 
by the traveller’s complicated life. The speaker prefers the local beauty of his lover’s 
face over all the exotic riches found abroad. The beauty of the ‘lady’s face’ is declared 
to be natural, positing the foreign gems as somehow less so. The ‘eye sees’, but the 
‘heart knoweth’, as his love for her feels assured and true, and those who do not 
immediately ‘see’ this, are ‘fools’. In spite of all the ‘far-fetched treasure’ to be found in 
Asia, the speaker seems to have all his wants from his lover’s face, all posited against a 
foreign Other accompanied by a tinge of the mythological.  
In each of these brief examples by Wilbye, objects from the ‘real’ New World serve 
multiple functions, as they provide verisimilitude, but also demonstrate a blurred 
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distinction between Others, as older myths meld with images from the New World. In 
each piece, the riches of the Other serve a metaphoric point of contrast to make the 
wealth experienced by the human heart in love even greater, a perfect opening for 
dialogue on sources of truth and their relationship to human consciousness.  
 
‘Thule’ and Richard Hakluyt  
The following section will consider Thomas Weelkes’s anonymously texted bipartite 
madrigals ‘Thule, the period of cosmography’ and ‘The Andalusian merchant’ (1600) in 
relation to one particular work of travel writing, Richard Hakluyt’s The Principall 
Navigations, Voiages, and Discoveries Of The English nation (1589, 1590-1600).178 Weelkes 
paints a scene of strange spectacle complete with merchants from far off places, flying 
fishes, treasures and goods from abroad, foreign islands, and exotic volcanoes. At first 
glance, this could be a madrigal like many others of its kind, full of light-hearted 
fantasy and myth. Although it appears in the same printed collection as more 
traditional pastoral examples such as ‘As Vesta was from latmos hill descending’ and 
‘When Thoralis delights to walk’, perhaps the most curious thing about ‘Thule’ is that, 
in addition to the notoriously clever musical illustrations, the ‘fantastical’ elements and 
events described in the text are only outwardly of mythological origin, as all of the 
features described in the work in fact stemmed from global exploration and were 
indeed ‘real’. I have determined that each image in Weelkes’s madrigals is mentioned in 
Hakluyt’s substantive volumes. 
 First printed in a 1589 folio edition, Hakluyt’s The principall navigations, published 
by George Bishop and Ralph Newberie, is a collection of travel writing in English 
covering nearly every area known by and explored by European travellers, from the 
Americas to Persia, the Indies and Africa. It includes travel accounts by Walter 
Raleigh, Martin Frobisher, Francis Drake, and others. Hakluyt’s work preserved and 
promoted English travel accounts through his work as an editor, translator, and seller 
of travel writing.179 The much enlarged second edition first appeared in 1598, followed 
by additional editions in 1599 and 1600, to create what amounted to a multi-volume 
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set.180 Though it cannot be proven that Weelkes’s text author (or indeed Weelkes 
himself) read this volume, Hakluyt’s influence at court as well as his work on The 
principall navigations, made him, in Daniel Carey and Claire Jowitt’s estimation, 
‘perhaps the most significant figure in the history of English travel writing’, a 
reputation which mostly rests on The principall navigations.181 Though this is only one 
example of the type of travel writing available to Weelkes’s text author, it is perhaps no 
coincidence that each image within Weelkes’s poem is mentioned in Hakluyt’s widely-
read publication on, in his words, the ‘sweet studie of the historie of Cosmographie’.182 
 The following is a comparison of the textual images in ‘Thule, the period of 
cosmographie’ and ‘The Andalusian merchant’ as described in Hakluyt’s volume. In his 
‘Epistle Dedicatorie’ to Robert Cecil, Hakluyt mentions that Seneca predicted that one 
day the known world would expand, and the ‘yle of Thule would no more be the 
vttermost limite of the earth’.183 Thule (also known as Iceland) was the northernmost 
region of the habitable world to ancient Greek geographers, and was first mentioned in 
Polybius’s account of the voyage of Pytheas.184 The phrase ‘Period of cosmographie’ 
refers to the end of the mappable universe, making this an apt title for a piece in which 
Weelkes musically reports on marvellous phenomena from around the world. 
 
Thule, the period of Cosmograpie, 
Doth vaunt of Hecla, whose sulphureous fire 
Doth melt the frozen Clime, and thaw the Skie; 
Trinacrian Ætna’s flames ascend not higher: 
These things seem wondrous, yet more wondrous I, 
Whose hart with feare doth freeze, with loue doth fry. 
 
The Andalusian Merchant, that returnes 
Laden with cutchinele and China dishes, 
Reports in Spaine how strangely Fogo burnes 
Amidst an Ocean full of flying fishes: 
These things seem wondrous, yet more wondrous I, 
                                                       
 
180 Explained in more detail in Carey and Jowitt (eds.), Richard Hakluyt and Travel Writing in Early Modern 
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Whose hart with feare doth freeze, with loue doth fry.185 
 
 As a source of intense fascination, fear, and allegory, many writers included within 
Hakluyt’s volume dedicate words to the description of volcanoes. Ætna and Hecla, 
known to many from their description in Virgil, made frequent appearances in travel 
writing, both in descriptive contexts and as allegory for the fires of hell. Hakluyt 
includes both the Latin and an English translation of ‘A Briefe Commentarie of Island’, 
attributed to Arngrimus Ionas ‘of Island’.186 Though Hecla and Ætna are mentioned 
dozens of times individually within Hakluyt’s greater work, this passage makes a direct 
comparison between the two volcanoes. As ‘Ionas’ says ‘[t]here is Hecla a mountaine in 
Island, which burneth like vnto Ætna at certain seasons, & hereupon the comon people 
haue conceiued an opinion this long time, that soules are there purged’.187 In the 
‘seuenth section’, the author describes the ‘flame of mount Hecla’, as ‘by the same force 
that bullets are discharged out of warlike engines’.188 The discharge from the volcano is 
a ‘mixture of colde, and fire, and brimstone’ or ‘ex frigoris & ignis & sulphuris 
commixtione’, a sulfurious mixture.189 In an account attributed to Edward Cliffe 
Mariner, ‘[t]he voyage of M. Iohn Winter into the South sea by the Streight of 
Magellan, in consort with M. Francis Drake, begun in 1577’, the author describes a 
jaunt past the isle of ‘Fogo, so called, because it casteth continually flames of fire and 
smoake out of the top thereof, all the whole island being one high mountaine’.190 On the 
same page, the writer describes nearby sea life: 
 
                                                       
 
185 Weelkes, Madrigals of 5. And 6. Parts (1600), sig.D2r.  
186 Also known as Arngrímur Jónsson ‘the Learned’, an Icelandic scholar who lived from 1568-1648. He 
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190 Ibid., sig.Rrr2v. Fogo refers to a volcano and island in Cape Verde, which at Weelkes’s time was a 
territory of Portugal. Eric Lewin Altschuler and William Jansen, “Thomas Weelkes’s Text Authors: Men of 
Letters”, The Musical Times 143, no. 1879 (July 1, 2002): 17-24, 17.  
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Here we saw flying fishes in great abundance, some a foote long, some lesse. 
Their fynnes wherewith they flye be as long as their bodies. They be greatly 
pursued by the Dolphine and Bonitoes, whom as soone as the flying fishes 
espie, immediatly they mount out of the sea in great numbers, and fly as long as 
their fynnes continue moyst: and when they bee dry, they fall downe into the 
sea againe.191  
 
Though Hakluyt’s collection does not mention Andalusian merchants as such, it does 
mention ‘Andaluzia’ many times as a busy port and discusses the activities of Spanish 
merchants thoroughly.192 In Edward Wright’s ‘The voiage of the right honorable 
George Erle’, the author describes the capture of a foreign ship that had recently 
returned from the New World: ‘[t]his ship was of some three or foure hundred tunnes, 
and had in her seuen hundred hides worth tenne shillings a peece: sixe chests of 
Cochinell, euery chest houlding one hundred pound weight, and euery pound worth 
sixe and twentie shillings and eight pence, and certaine chests of Sugar and China 
dishes, with some plate and siluer’.193  
 It is difficult to specifically attribute many of the accounts in Hakluyt’s collection, 
as most of his reports were compiled from earlier foreign sources, which had already 
been borrowed, adapted, or translated from other sources. For example, Italian-born 
Spanish historian Pietro Martire d’Anghiera’s The history of trauayle in the West and East 
Indies, and other countreys lying eyther way was first translated into English by Richard 
Eden in 1555, from the Latin original (published by Anghiera between 1511-1530).194 
Eden’s translation was subsequently republished several times, for example a 1577 
edition which was ‘Gathered in parte, and done into Englyshe by Richarde Eden. 
Newly set in order, augmented, and finished by Richarde VVilles’. One can perceive 
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Brepols, 1998), xi.  
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the shared language between this edition from 1577 and the one compiled by ‘Ionas’ in 
Hakluyt, though the language is more detailed: 
 
Islande is interpreted the land of Ise, and is called of the olde wryters Thyle … 
This Ilande is famous by the strange myracles of nature. There are in it three 
mountaynes of marueylous height, the toppes whereof are couered with 
perpetuall snowe: but the nether partes of them, are of lyke nature to the 
mountayne Etna, in the Ilande of Sicilie, boylyng with continuall flames of fyre, 
and castyng foorth brymstone … Hecla, whose flames neyther consume flaxe or 
tow, matters most apte to take fyre, nor yet are quenched with water. And with 
lyke force as the shot of great artillerie is driuen foorth by violence of fyre, euen 
so by the commixtion and repugnance of fyre, colde, and brymstone, great 
stones are heere throwne into the ayre.195 
 
The descriptions of Hecla in Hakluyt are particularly similar to Eden/Wolles’s 
translation of Anghiera in likening Hecla’s discharge to firing bullets. It is probable 
that Anghiera was Hakluyt’s source, as Hakluyt explicitly uses accounts from 
Anghiera elsewhere in his compilation.196 Similarly, there were other publishers of 
Francis Drake’s expedition that included descriptions of Fogo that have notable 
rhetorical similarities to the description in Hakluyt. G. Miller’s The vvorld encompassed by 
Sir Francis Drake printed in London (1628) shares a basic narrative with Hakluyt, though 
adds that Fogo ‘giueth light like the Moone a great way off’ and that pumice stones 
spill out ‘with other grosse and slimy matter vpon the hill’.197 Regardless of whether or 
not Weelkes’s text author for ‘Thule’ was informed by Hakluyt’s collection specifically, 
it is clear that several examples of similar travel literature could have sparked the 
poet’s imagination, providing the palette of language for colouring this other-worldly 
scene. Moreover, the similarities between different accounts demonstrate a fluid 
adoption of supposedly ‘first hand’ experiences between historians and translations.  
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197 Francis Drake, The vvorld encompassed by Sir Francis Drake … (London: printed by G. Miller, 1628), sig.B4r-
C1v. 
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 Weelkes: ‘Thule, the period of Cosmographie' 
In the light of pressing concerns about truth, knowledge, and fiction in relation to 
travel literature and its encounter with other worlds, a discussion of the specific roles 
played by music in settings such as Weelkes’s ‘Thule, the period of Cosmographie’ 
seems highly desirable. I would argue that much is to be gained from examining the 
music as a crucial signifier in the semantic content of this work, whose text is so 
intimately bound up with contemporary arguments around epistemology. Denis 
Arnold observes that ‘[Weelkes] always delights in finding poems where the music can 
portray literally the meaning of the words.’198 But I offer here the argument that a 
literal portrayal can indeed be wrought with meaning not engaged by the text alone. 
Initially, Weelkes’s setting might appear to take the poem at face value, as just another 
fantastic vignette, ambiguously located between fantasy and reality, as suited a typical 
work in the madrigal genre. Yet the vivid musical illustrations, though indeed literal, 
cannot help but create a deeper wonder. I will reflect on the idea that in Weelkes’s 
‘literalness’ is a type of subversion, using the musical tropes of a genre he knew 
intimately to interrogate the lines between reality and appearances at a time when 
reports from abroad were both a sought after commercial object and questioned as 
untrustworthy fabrications. This case study highlights the lingering impression of illusion 
that remained affiliated with the madrigal form, even when paired with a pseudo-
mythical or indeed non-mythical text.  
 Donald Tovey imagines that the first word, Thule, ‘looms in semibreves at the top 
of the octave as large as Iceland (magnified by the exigencies of Mercator’s projection) 
straddling at the top of the cosmographies of Elizabethan and Jacobean days.’199 
Weelkes’s semi-quaver illustration of Hecla’s ‘sulphureous fire’, drastically changes the 
rhythmic texture from the preceding relaxed counterpoint (Fig. 3.7). The musical 
depiction of ‘sulphureous fire’ resonates with Haklyut’s description of Hecla’s 
discharge as ‘ex frigoris & ignis & sulphuris commixtione’ that sounds or looks like 
                                                       
 
198 Denis Arnold, “Thomas Weelkes and the madrigal”, Music & Letters, 31,1 (Jan.,1950): 1-12, 5. See also, 
Introduction, 23 and Altschuler and Jansen, “Shakespeariana in a Thomas Weelkes Dedication from 1600”, 
83; Eric Altschuler and William Jansen, “Further Aspects of ‘Thule’: Wondrous Weelkes”, The Musical 
Times, 144.1882 (2003), 40–43; Altschuler and Jansen, “Thomas Weelkes’s Text Authors: Men of Letters”, 
17–24. 
199 Donald Francis Tovey, Essays in Musical Analysis, Vol.5: Vocal Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1972), 7. 
 164 
bullets or artillery shooting in quick succession.200 Weelkes then illustrates the melting 
of snow through a contrastingly homophonic rhythm, which comes together on a 
sustained semi-breve on ‘melt’ (as melting can appear as the merging of separate 
particles into a single liquid body—see Fig.3.7). 
 
                                                       
 
200 Though the writers in Haklyut’s collection are often not Haklyut himself, for simplicity I attribute the 
comparisons in the following section to Haklyut, though I acknowledge that the ‘original’ authors are not 
necessarily the editor’s words, though they are in some instances his translations. 
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Figure 3.7: Weelkes, ‘Thule, the period of Cosmographie’ bars 13-19, transcribed 
by Francis Bevan. 
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Weelkes’s image of vigorous fire melting the ‘frozen clime’ loosely echoes Haklyut’s 
description of Hecla’s ‘frozen top, and the firie bottome’.‘Trinacrian’, in triple time, 
cleverly references Sicily’s triangular shape.201 Through the words ‘ascend not higher’, 
Weelkes’s poem, like Haklyut’s description (‘Hecla … burneth like vnto Ætna’), draws 
a comparison between the fires of Hecla and Ætna, which is also echoed in Weelkes’s 
musical depiction. The phrase ‘ascend not higher’ appropriately ascends, with the 
highest note in the canto and tenor lines reaching a high A. The only other place that A 
occurs is during the ascending semiquaver runs on Hecla’s ‘sulphureous fire’. Those As 
are the highest notes in the piece, and the only two places they are used are atop each 
mountain, musically drawing a comparison between the two fires. In the second part, 
there is another clever madrigalism on the phrase ‘full of flying fishes’, where the 
percussive off-set ‘fh’ and ‘sh’ sounds phonate like a school of fish jumping in and out 
of water. The most striking section of the madrigal is ‘how strangely Fogo burns’, 
which crawls in descending chromatic lines, like molten magma, a beacon to ships as 
the ‘burning Island’ glows in the dark. This musical depiction is in line with Fogo’s 
unexplosive continual burn, and is harmonically unlike anything else by Weelkes’s 
English contemporaries. 
 David Brown says ‘Thule’ is a work of ‘Radical aesthetic’.202 He notes, 
‘[c]hromaticism relies for its emotional impact upon the inflection it makes against a 
firm, perceptible diatonic background … [‘how strangely Fogo burns’] presents no 
such diatonic background; the chromatic passage, once entered, never promises 
cadence. Chromaticism is not pulling against diatonicism, and the listener, remaining 
passive, can only wonder at the “strangeness” of it all’.203 I disagree with Brown’s 
conclusions, however: ‘[i]t is all too unusual, and the strange phenomena of the text 
and music finally tend to overshadow the human feelings expressed in the final couplet 
of each madrigal’.204 As in the examples by Wilbye where the speaker proclaims his 
love more beautiful than all the treasures of the New World, one could argue that the 
outstanding ‘strangeness’ of this passage promotes, even more, the greatness of the self 
that wonders, which I will discuss shortly. Additionally, I find it interesting that Brown 
                                                       
 
201 For full score, see Appendix III.  
202 Brown, Thomas Weelkes, 96. 
203 See bars 53-59 of Appendix III; Brown, Thomas Weelkes, 114. 
204 Ibid., 115. 
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resorts to hypothesising about this passage’s effect on the listener, given he normally 
focuses strictly on formal description and function. Perhaps this reveals a deficiency of 
formalism in discerning meaning from such striking ’strangeness’, invoking the need to 
consider the human listener.  
 
 The Couplet 
Despite Brown’s observation about it, perhaps the most interesting part of Weelkes’s 
setting is the repeated couplet at the end of each verse: ‘these things seem wondrous, 
yet more wondrous I, / Whose hart with feare doth freeze, with love doth fry’.205 The 
refrain dismisses all the marvellous places and events described in the madrigal, 
reinserting the self as the most wondrous, most central figure. The self-awareness of 
the singing bodies is accentuated by the turn to a first-person ‘I’. Weelkes emphasises 
this verse as a moment of contemplation, markedly interrupting the overall active 
counterpoint with a more homophonic section of clear, sustained triads, emphasised by 
the move to the triad on the flattened seventh in the first ‘wondrous’, which gives a 
sense of arrival with a plagal cadence. The second ‘wondrous’ pauses on the resolution 
with an interrupted cadence, followed by a perfect cadence on the third iteration of ‘yet 
more wondrous I’. The same unexpected harmonies are repeated nearly identically in 
each instance of the text couplet (see Fig.3.8).206   
 
                                                       
 
205 Kerman suggests this section as the most uncharacteristic attribute of the work, as the ‘formal fibre’ of the 
repeated refrain was ‘not desired by any Italian madrigalist’. Kerman, The Elizabethan Madrigal, 232. 
206 Note the last three bars are not musically identical.   
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Figure 3.8: Weelkes, ‘Thule, the period of Cosmographie’ bars 28-33, transcribed 
by Francis Bevan. 
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A hint of uncertainty in Weelkes’s use of the word ‘seeme’ is also detectable—‘these 
things seeme wondrous’. ‘Seeme’ simultaneously diminishes the wonder of the outside 
world as it draws attention to the idea that reports based on eye-witness testimony can 
always be doubted. How something appears, or seems, is not necessarily how it is, as it 
relies on fallible human perception and assessment. Ultimately, the poem and musical 
setting take comfort in the centrality of Self, with its distinctly human heart and 
emotions, in lieu of change and the strange foreign phenomena of the outside world, 
much in the way Wilbye’s madrigals demonstrate certainty in the superior greatness of 
their love. Late sixteenth-century discourse on sense perception grew increasingly 
aware of how easily mental processes like ‘common sense’ were swayed by the 
powerful passions. This example by Weelkes hints at a similar kind of scepticism, one 
that acknowledges the tension between the power and quality of truths experienced 
internally (including the passions), and external sources of knowledge transmitted via 
mediums like travel narrative.  
 As an example of writing that discusses tension between inner and outer truths, or 
self and Other, the piece thereby could be viewed as a form of self-fashioning, most 
famously explored by Stephen Greenblatt, which presupposes a division where the self 
is defined against a hostile Other that must first be discovered or invented in order to 
be defeated.207 Once this Other has been identified, ‘the “exotic” not only embraces … 
the New World and the Old, but touches all with “wonder” and treats the ancient and 
Renaissance versions of otherness … as interchangeable.’208 Moreover, it is worth 
drawing attention to the similarity between the juxtaposition at the heart of 
Greenblatt’s self-fashioning and the way that knowledge was made from a 
juxtaposition of ‘fact’ with fiction, as explored by Elizabeth Spiller in her book Science, 
Reading and Renaissance Literature (2004). She argues that ‘literature acquires meaning 
and validity against the framework of fact’ through the process of making, a process 
that is necessary to both science and fiction in the production of knowledge.209 
Ultimately, knowledge of the self is still a type of knowledge, so it makes sense that the 
process through which we build consensual truth about the world and the process by 
                                                       
 
207 Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning, 9. 
208 John Gillies, Shakespeare and the Geography of Difference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
33. 
209 Spiller considers literary texts as instances of knowledge production, an idea discussed in greater depth in 
the introduction to this thesis, Introduction, 26. Spiller, Science, Reading, and Renaissance Literature, 1, 3. 
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which we form ourselves are mechanistically similar. Both require, first, the 
identification of a ‘hostile’ Other as a contrastive body upon which to formulate truths 
and identities. The ‘hostility’ perceived in that Other manifests in what we observe in 
this period as a scepticism or mistrust of poets and travellers, but also in the vast 
wonder experienced by those who sought to understanding the foreign whether 
through fiction, travel narratives, or philosophy.  
 Weelkes’s musical setting draws attention to the ambiguity between appearances 
and reality by juxtaposing a text based on ‘real’ events with a musical form typically 
affiliated with mythology and fantasy. By using ‘literal’ and expected madrigalian 
compositional techniques, Weelkes’s setting raises questions about the nature of the 
self with clearly epistemological implications. It is well established that contemporary 
vocal music often discussed ‘true’ topics veiled under a façade of allegorical story.210 
‘Thule’ is different from these examples because there is no allegorical veil in its 
discussion of the tension between inner and outer truths, only the appearance of one.211 
Moreover, if Tarasti is right in thinking music can retain the transportive function of 
mythology, even without its textual antecedents, this is demonstrated in Weelkes’s 
coupling of a mythologically-affiliated musical style with a text that surveys the 
wonders of the ‘real’ external world. The compositional tropes of the madrigal form 
bring the ‘reality’ of the text into the realm of fantasy (without the need for allegorical 
veil), musically rendering the New World as a suspended space of imaginative 
possibility, neither of fact nor fiction, thus demonstrating one way music actively 
worked as an agent through which people could play out—and re-play out—ideas 
about reality.  
 
                                                       
 
210 For example, Byrd’s use of biblical texts as political allegory in his Cantiones Sacrae (1589) is thought to 
express the plight of the Catholics in England through texts mourning the destruction of Jerusalem. Or in 
secular music, the entire Triumphs of Oriana (1601) could be seen as politically-charged, as it is rife with 
allusions to Elizabeth I, via references to mythological Diana. In Weelkes’s own ‘The ape, the monkey and 
the baboon’ (1608), the poet references London locations and potentially courtly individuals, personified by 
the various animals. Through the ‘veil’ provided by mythological or biblical allegory, composers set texts that 
carried ‘truths’ about the external world, whether praising a monarch, partaking in courtly gossip, or 
commenting on the current politico-religious situation, in addition to the contemplation of inner experiences, 
like love. For more on political allegory in Byrd, see Trendell, “Aspects of William Byrd's Musical 
Recusancy”. As mentioned earlier, Jeremy Smith has convincingly argued that Triumphs was originally 
written with Anne of Denmark in mind. See Ch.3, footnote 173. 
211 The ‘freezing and frying’ of the heart aside. 
 171 
3.3 Conclusion 
Though the meanings extrapolated from the case studies in this chapter rely on form, 
meaning is also constituted in self-aware performance. One can imagine how the 
uptake of meaning in a contemporary experience of performance (from either a 
musician or a hearer) would vary from person to person, perhaps even more so in these 
examples than it would more generally. As Julian Johnson says, ‘[t]he communication 
of the voice itself is always prior to whatever is spoken’ and meaning ‘lies partly in the 
words. But much more, it lies in the physicality of the voice and its mode of 
performance’.212 This much is clear for the satirical case studies, for as Peacham said, it 
is the ‘behavyor of the person’ that elucidates truth.213 A knowing wink, naughty hand 
gesture, facial expression, or overly dramatic sighing would completely alter reception 
of ‘Aye me, alas’. The singers’ dynamics and stresses would enhance ulterior meaning 
in ‘Ha, ha’. Moreover, contemporaries would have had immediate and relevant 
knowledge on topical references like Kemp’s dance and the widespread enthusiasm for 
travel narratives like Hakluyt’s. As these examples interrogate reality through 
representation, they simultaneously ask fundamental questions about certain 
knowledge. I believe that in analysing these works we can embrace both a rational 
analysis of the historical context and musical form alongside the emotional possibilities 
inherent in a performance of wonder, love, fear, or other aspects of human 
consciousness. Particularly in the case of ‘Thule’ (though relevant to all the examples in 
this chapter), one could argue that it was the ephemeral experiential aspect of ‘wonder’ 
viscerally presented to the body through musical performance (text in experience), 
which contributed to the way awareness was shaped and organised. The self-
awareness brought by the ‘I’ in the final text couplet of ‘Thule’ is complicated by the 
multi-voiced setting, which suggests that self-formation could be a social endeavour, an 
idea to which I shall return at the conclusion of this thesis.  
 
                                                       
 
212 Julian Johnson, Mahler’s Voices: Expression and Irony in the Songs and Symphonies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 4.  
213 Se Ch. 3, 126.  
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Chapter 4: Dialogues of Knowledge 
‘Conversation … is the medicine for a burdened spirit’ - Erasmus1 
 
The first part of this chapter considers the role and experience of dialogue in early 
seventeenth-century cultural production. It demonstrates dialogue as a prominent form 
through which knowledge was built, as well as music’s role in the performance of 
dialogue. As a part of the English grammar school education, dialectic literature was so 
widespread that it formed a fundamental aspect of European intellectual life.2 On-
going dialogue—and the incompleteness, paradoxes, binaries and alternatives it fosters 
within modes of thought—served a functional part of cultural production in the late 
sixteenth century.3 Additionally, epistolary dialogue played a central role in the 
development of contemporary intellectual practices.4 Whether imagined or real, letter 
writing was a form of intellectual negotiation that produced tangible results. In 
philosophy, for example, epistolary dialogue was a major contributor to intellectual 
development. For example, Lisa Jardine discusses a series of letters between Francis 
Bacon and Henry Wotton in which they consider intellectual developments on the 
continent that directly affect Bacon’s project to reform knowledge.5 Bacon articulated 
the intellectual benefits of epistolary conversation in his 1597 essay ‘Of Negotiating’: 
‘Letters are good’, he wrote, ‘when a Man would draw an Answer by Letter backe 
againe; Or when it may serve, for a Mans Justification, afterwards to produce his 
owne Letter’.6 Later philosophers like Descartes also participated in well-known letter 
exchanges with colleagues through which they debated and refined their ideas, such as 
Descartes’s correspondence with Princess Elizabeth Stuart of Bohemia.7 Arguably, it 
was in these conversational exchanges that his most innovative work was crafted, 
                                                
1 Adagia 2099, in Opera omnis, (ed.) J. Clericus, 10 vols. (Leiden, 1703-06; repr. Hildesheim, 1961-62), II, 
744D-745C: “Anumo aegrotanti medicus est oratio”. 
2 Dorthea Heitsch and Jean-Francois Vallee (eds.), Printed Voices: The Renaissance Culture of Dialogue (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2006), ix. 
3 Chloe Porter, Making and Unmaking in Early Modern English Drama: Spectators, Aesthetics and Incompletion 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), 98. 
4 Alexander, Writing After Sidney, 7. 
5 Jardine in Francis Bacon, The New Organon, (eds.) Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), ix-xi. 
6 Andrew Gordon, “A fortune of Paper walls: The Letters of Francis Bacon and the Earl of Essex”, English 
Literary Renaissance, 37 (2007): 319–336, 319. 
7 The letters by both parties have been translated in their entirety by Lisa Shapiro (ed.), The Correspondence 
between Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).  
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rather than his more monologic treatises that state the results of such exchanges.8 At 
the same time, dialogue played an important role in the foundations of sixteenth-
century musical culture as a musical form of its own, which will be discussed in detail 
later in this chapter. The performance of music was one way through which early 
modern people could enact conversations about the nature of consciousness, whether 
explicitly or through the discussion of consciousness’s related elements: the purpose of 
life, labour, feelings, behaviours, beliefs, dreams, fears, and so on. Not only did the 
dialogical structure translate into a musical form, but it was also present in the social 
mechanics of musical and print culture. In her discussion of the Venetian madrigal, 
Martha Feldman provides links between musical culture in Venice and ‘new 
mechanisms of literary exchange’, which developed out of advances in the vernacular 
press. She notes that many of those mechanisms took form as ‘dialogic genres’, 
meaning letters, poetic addresses, fictional interchanges, dedications, and other modes 
that ‘involved speaking to and among others—to patrons, lovers, enemies, and 
comrades; among teachers and students, scholars and mentors, authors and patrons, 
courtesans and clients’.9 She draws a clear relationship between a social phenomenon 
she calls the ‘urge to dialogue’, and the ‘unorthodox forms’ of dialogue (‘broadly 
conceived’) that took place amongst musicians and patrons at that moment.  
 The ‘hermeneutic window’10 applied in this chapter takes into account the field of 
discourse analysis, an approach to language which, in Lynne Magnusson’s words, 
‘places its accent on dialogic interaction and on the situated use of language in its 
varied contexts and which chooses conversational discourse and other types of socially 
situated verbal exchange as its object of study in preference to decontextualized 
sentences from written texts’.11 Applied to music, I ask ‘what were they doing when 
they engaged or performed music in a dialogical fashion’? Music’s appearance as 
dialogue goes against a commonly held assumption about the nature of Renaissance 
dialogue: that it became, with the advent of print, monologic.12 My argument 
harmonises with Cristle Collins Judd’s observation that, ‘music in dialogue insists on 
                                                
8 A process akin to ‘showing your work’ in school maths. 
9 Martha Feldman, City Culture and the Madrigal at Venice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 48. 
10 Kramer, Interpreting Music, 27.  
11 Lynne Magnusson, Shakespeare and Social Dialogue: Dramatic Language and Elizabethan Letters (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 2. 
12 As discussed by Cristle Collins Judd, “Music in Dialogue: Conversational, Literary, and Didactic 
Discourse About Music in the Renaissance”, Journal of Music Theory, 52.1 (2008): 41–74, 44-45.  
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utterance and opens the possibility that the spatial becomes temporal, the visible 
audible, and that the didactic becomes conversational, and the conversational, in turn, 
musical’, challenging a reductive presumption that the history of the Renaissance 
dialogue transformed simply from an oral tradition to one based on sight alone.13 
 Debates over the function of dialogue have contemporary context that resonate 
with Mikhail Bakhtin’s idea that language is a living act, that, in Martha Feldman’s 
words ‘thrives[s] in the face of potential contestations that always reside somewhere 
between immediate uses and other possible uses. Language always asserts itself against 
the alien terrain of a listener—or in one of Bakhtin’s most famous phrases, it "lies 
between oneself and another”’.14 Bakhtin’s discourse is fundamentally social in that it is 
dialogic. Furthermore, the speaking subject is partly formed out of this dialogical 
process, as the self is engaged and built in relation to another. Bakhtin’s theories 
resonate with performance theorists because of the parallels between the relational 
space within Bakhtin’s concept of language and the relational space created through 
the act of performance.15 
For my purposes here, I use the term ‘discourse’ to describe a more general system 
of thought through which truths and selves are constructed.16 This can be written, 
spoken, or expressed through ideas, actions, practices, and beliefs, and negotiated 
through conversation.17 ‘Dialogue’ is viewed as a more definite conversation between 
two or more interlocutors, a ‘back and forth’, either written, spoken (or thought within 
a single subject), and can contribute to broader considerations of discourse. Later in 
this chapter, I also include the ‘musical dialogue’, which was a form of poetry and 
music where multiple perspectives were set antiphonally, either with two singers or a 
single singer voicing two different perspectives.18 ‘Conversation’ is simply the 
interchange of thoughts and words.19 ‘Dialectic’, on the other hand, is a more 
contemporarily specific term that applied to investigations of truth; a ‘critical 
                                                
13 Judd, “Music in Dialogue”, 72. 
14 Feldman, City Culture and the Madrigal at Venice, 48-49.  
15 Bakhtin’s theories have influenced several authors mentioned in this thesis, including Judd, Feldman, and 
Alexander.  
16 Michael Foucault discusses this in The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972). For an approachable discussion on 
Focauldian and non-Focauldian approaches to discourse, see Alec McHoul and Wendy Grace, A Foucault 
primer: Discourse, power, and the subject (Melbourne: University of Melbourne Press, 1993), 26-31.  
17 “discourse, n.”, OED Online. Oxford University Press, December 2015 (accessed 12 February 2016). 
18 My later discussion of musical dialogue will explain why it is difficult to describe the musical form simply. 
This is sometimes shortened to ‘dialogue’, but it should be clear within the context. 
19 “conversation, n.”, OED Online. Oxford University Press, December 2015 (accessed 12 February 2016).  
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investigation of truth through reasoned argument, often by means of dialogue or 
discussion’.20 Though all these words can be colloquially conflated, I will stick to these 
uses to avoid unintentional misuse of these weighty and potentially slippery terms.   
From epistolary exchanges to lessons in dialectic, there was a lot of dialogical 
exchange around 1600 and it was through this process that ideas were developed and 
exchanged. How precisely dialogue builds knowledge, however, is unsurprisingly still 
a matter of discussion.21 In the early modern period, dialogues of all sorts played a 
practical role in the developments of knowledge and indeed in discerning what 
knowledge is. Lisa Jardine argues that the influence of dialogue upon the written 
corpus of Francis Bacon is not only in relation to dialectic’s power as a teaching tool, 
but also as, in Jardine’s words, ‘a logic of discovery’, also understood as the process 
through which one reveals ‘new’ knowledge.22 In her book Francis Bacon: Discovery and 
the Art of Discourse (1974), Jardine explains that Bacon was more concerned with the 
extension of knowledge rather than the efficacy of its presentation.23 Jardine posits the 
development of Bacon’s so-called ‘scientific method’ amongst contemporary debates 
within dialectical tradition, demonstrating dialogue’s central role in Bacon’s ‘striking 
intellectual innovation’ in reorganising classifications of knowledge.24 Jardine 
demonstrates how Bacon’s inventions were closely linked with contemporary debates 
within dialectic.25 She maintains, however, that Bacon was not entirely conscious of the 
influence the dialectical background of his intellectual upbringing at Cambridge had on 
his work.26 Jardine’s argument draws a clear connection between dialectic forms, 
dialogue, and developments in approaches to knowledge over the seventeenth century, 
even if not consciously held as such by the agents themselves. From Jardine’s work, I 
take the theoretical and methodological precedents that a) within particular spheres of 
influence, agents need not be aware of contemporary theory on thought processes to be 
influenced by them, b) in Bacon’s time, the link between knowledge building and 
dialogue was a strong one regardless of the precise nature of that link, and c) dialectic 
                                                
20 “dialectic, n.1.”, OED Online. Oxford University Press, December 2015 (accessed 12 February 2016). 
21 For modern philosophical discussions, see: Louise Phillips, The Promise of Dialogue: The Dialogic Turn in the 
Production and Communication of Knowledge (Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 2011).  
22 Jardine, Francis Bacon, 2, 6. 
23 In Jardine’s interpretation, Bacon ‘insists that no amount of displaying and arranging of received 
pedagogic material will yield the fundamental principles of knowledge’.  Ibid., 6. 
24 Ibid., 1. 
25 Ibid., 7. 
26 Ibid. 
 176 
was an integral part of a gentlemanly worldview and played an influential role in 
contemporary thought processes. The example of Francis Bacon shows how dialectic, a 
form of dialogue, worked to build knowledge. Bacon’s educational foundation in 
dialectic demonstrates one way that dialogue, more generally, came to function as a 
mode of knowledge building, even if in ways less explicit than in dialectic.  
 As many scholars have noted, didactic literature in the classical style, which takes 
form as conversation, enjoyed a period of development in the mid-sixteenth century, 
continuing for some time throughout the seventeenth century.27 Dialectic, one of the 
three arts of the trivium, along with grammar and rhetoric, was a central part of a 
gentlemanly education and accordingly influenced traditions of thought in sixteenth-
century England.28 The trivium occupied a central position within early modern 
schemes of learning, viewed as a prerequisite to other types of learning as it taught 
students how to build an argument, handle language, and express one’s views in a 
coherent manner.29 The precise use and nature of the dialectical method, however, was 
a subject of controversy,30 as there was disagreement about both the process of the 
acquisition of knowledge as well as how knowledge should be taught. Still, dialectic’s 
contemporary influence, as well as its sway on the historiography of contemporary 
thought processes, asserts its importance to the study of the period more generally. For 
example, K.J. Wilson’s study examines Aristotle, Cicero, and Plato within the works of 
Thomas Elyot, Roger Ascham, and Thomas More, with an eye towards the dynamic 
process of question-and-answer that moulded the ‘inward experience of art which 
encompasses not only ideas but the responses they generate’.31   
 Though there are significant hermeneutic problems regarding how to measure the 
response of historical subjects, Wilson concedes that dialogue has, as a form, always 
presented a problem to literary theory as it retains an ambiguous position between 
                                                
27 As Kenneth Wilson says, ‘the sheer number of humanist dialogues testifies to their popularity’. Kenneth 
Jay Wilson, Incomplete Fictions: the formation of the English Renaissance dialogue (Washington, DC: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1985), ix. Though many early modern scholars have been quick to draw 
connections between early modern didactic literature and its classical ‘origins’, it is worth noting, however, 
that medieval philosophers carried dialogical forms throughout the centuries before the Renaissance. See 
Steven Kreuger “Dialogue, debate, and dream vision” in Larry Scanlon (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Medieval English Literature 1100-1500 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 71-82.  
28 Foster Watson, English Grammar Schools to 1660 (London: Frank Cass & Co, 1968), 1.  
29 Jardine, Francis Bacon, 18. 
30 Ibid., 59. 
31 Wilson, Incomplete Fictions, x. 
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narrative and drama.32 But the verisimilitude invoked by this ambiguity is precisely 
what makes dialogue an effective didactic form. Dialogues centre on ideas and 
responses, or, in Wilson’s words the ‘mental events they create’.33 They allow for the 
enactment of multiple perspectives within a single work and for the learning process to 
unfold in a natural way. Wilson states that the humanists saw their art as a ‘pedagogic 
duty’, and it is for this reason that the dialogical form was particularly well suited to 
their purposes: ‘Dialogue could re-create an almost limitless variety of mental 
processes, and in so doing it could place the reader in an intimate, sophisticated 
relation to his intellectual ancestors’.34 This format was adopted in sixteenth-century 
English schools and was thought to be, in Thomas Morley’s words, ‘most conuenient 
for the capacitie of the learner’.35 Morley’s A plaine and easie introduction to practicall 
musicke Set down in forme of a dialogue (1597) takes form as a conversation between 
student and master. One can see echoes of a dramatic narrative in the opening lines: 
 
Polymathes. 
 Staye (brother Philomathes) what haste? Whither go you so fast? 
Philomathes. 
 To seeke out an old friend of mine. 
Pol. 
 But before you goe, I praie you repeat some of the discourses which you had 
 yester night at master Sophobulus his banket: For commonly he is not 
 without both wise and learned guestes. 
Phi. 
 It is true in deede. And yester night, there were a number of excellent 
 schollers, (both gentlemen and others:) but all the propose which then was 
 discoursed vpon, was Musicke.36 
 
Once the form is established, the conversation quickly veers towards a review of music 
theory, often with openings or invitations for the reader to respond to the master as the 
student does (see Fig.4.1). Thus through the dialogical form, Morley engages the 
reader/performer in an active practice, eliciting a mental or even physical response via 
                                                
32 Though dialogue appears to be a ‘discursive experience’ akin to drama, there are a few problems with this 
response, as outlined by Wilson. Wilson, Incomplete Fictions, ix, 19. Gavin Alexander assess well the problem 
of measuring dialogic response in a quotation found in Ch. 4, 217.  
33 Wilson, Incomplete Fictions,19. 
34 Ibid., 2. 
35 Thomas Morley, A plaine and easie introduction to practicall musicke set downe in forme of a dialogue (London: 
printed by Peter Short, 1597), sig.B2v.  
36 Morley, A plaine and easie introduction to practicall musicke (1597), sig.B2r.  
 178 
conversation. In doing so, dialogue, an unfolding argument, draws attention to the 
elements of consciousness that accompany the experience of that unfolding. As Wilson 
reminds us, not all of these mental events are rational: ‘doubts, fears, objections—in 
short, the elements of consciousness—each prompted by its own particular cause’.37 It 
is by this reasoning that Wilson calls dialogues ‘incomplete fictions’,38 as the response, in 
its multitude of forms, is a necessary and integral part of engaging in this sort of 
narrative, a part of the fiction not present in a text alone. The relationship between 
didactic dialogue and incompleteness is inherent to the form, but it is simultaneously a 
metaphysical link, implied by the enactment of the dialogue, and elicited by the very 
act of reading. Without the agent reading the text, the text alone is inherently 
incomplete.  
 
                                                
37 Wilson, Incomplete Fictions, 19. 
38 Ibid., 20 
  179 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Morley, A plaine and easie introduction to practicall musick (1597), 
sig.B5v. 
Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery STC / 440:04. 
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As Cristle Collins Judd summarises, ‘dialogues engaged almost every aspect 
imaginable of literary life’,39 and although there has been substantial output from non-
musicological scholarly fields on early modern dialogical writing, the topic has barely 
been touched on in relation to music.40 In her 2008 Journal of Music Theory publication 
‘Music in Dialogue: Conversational, Literary, and Didactic Discourse about Music in 
the Renaissance’, Judd examines musical treatises in dialogical format, particularly 
Morley’s A plaine and easie introduction, as a means for understanding music’s role in the 
broader history of the dialogue, particularly as a temporal act that creates 
verisimilitude.41 Rather than approaching the book as a fixed typographical object, 
Judd asserts that dialogical treatises on music ‘reopen the question of aurality and 
reader participation’.42 She effectively argues that, 
 
readers of Morley’s dialogue … take control of the sounds represented, whether 
they are imagined or actualized in or out of real time, completely or partially. 
What is implicit in dialogue and especially notable in Morley’s treatise is the 
degree to which a mask of verisimilitude attempts to disguise the rupture of 
words and notation … A Plaine and Easie Introduction reveals an overarching self-
consciousness that places it squarely in the communicative sphere of the 
dialogue. At the heart of A Plaine and Easie Introduction is the juxtaposition of a 
written treatise on practical music with the form of an oral dialogue that is 
constrained by its physical presentation and the music notation it contains … 
Characters are instructed to “sing”, “peruse”, “see”, “hear”, and “mark” 
examples given to them … Thus, Morley’s readers not only observe a fictional 
exchange between a master and student, but are also invited to participate in 
it.43  
 
This chapter builds on Judd’s foundation, expanding upon her position that music in 
dialogue insists on utterance, highlighting the temporal, active, and conversational 
nature of musical performance. Therefore, my hermeneutic approach considers that 
dialogue is found not only in the physical institutions or printed documents of the past, 
but like musical experience, in those things less easily preserved in tangible and lasting 
forms. Additionally, interpretation of a dialogue exists in between formal and historical 
mode. As Charles Trinkaus maintains, it is through an examination of experience that 
                                                
39 Judd, “Music in Dialogue”, 43. 
40 Most of the existing literature is cited in this chapter. Ibid., 43. 
41 Ibid., 41. 
42 Ibid., 45. 
43 Ibid., 65-67. 
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literature like dialogue can be more fully understood. Though speaking about cultural 
formation more generally, Trinkaus believes that it is ‘only through conceptions, 
purposes, moods, feelings of the living humans who enact and suffer them’ that 
institutions can be understood.44 When dealing with elements of consciousness, the 
dynamic aspect of experience is key because the experiences of musical performance, 
emotions, and dialogical response, are all fleeting. Trinkaus says elements of 
consciousness ‘must be grasped … dynamically because they are evanescent and only 
exist in relation to and interaction with experience’.45 Ergo, this study views musical 
dialogue as not a form, but a process through which one can better understand the 
functions of language in culture, and the elements of consciousness that animate textual 
objects.  
 Mauro Calcagno asserts that ‘[i]t is the same subject, the same body, that performs 
… whether it is poetry or texted music: a subject that performs to someone and is thus 
located in a dialogic, relational situation’.46 Dialogical response is complicated in 
musical performance, however, because of the multiple layers of selves interpreting and 
responding to any particular event. Musical dialogue can take place in a wide variety of 
scenarios, involving composer, musicians, and audience.47 A reader of Morley’s treatise 
may sing to him- or herself in the same way a lutenist may strum and sing solely to 
themselves or to another. Or one singer may sing to a consort of viol-players, who are 
also taking part in the music-making, but less overtly so in regards to the textual 
animation. Or a performer may play to his or her friends in an intimate domestic 
setting, or equally on stage to a full Globe Theatre amidst a full-length drama. The 
possible combination and make-up of ‘speakers’, listeners, and responders seems 
limitless. As an act, performance itself imitates the response-seeking function of a 
textual dialogue. Perhaps it is no coincidence that, as Calcagno has also noted, one 
                                                
44 Charles Trinkaus, “Humanism, Religion, Society: Concepts and Motivations of Some Recent Studies”, 
Renaissance Quarterly, 29.4 (1976): 676–713, 687. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Calcagno, From Madrigal to Opera, 4. 
47 Consort song was for domestic use; therefore audience and player are often one and the same, 
complicating this relationship in this repertory. Milsom explicitly unpacks the possible performance contexts 
of this type of song in Milsom, “Byrd, Sidney, and the Art of Melting”, 443. Also see, Fischlin, In Small 
Proportions, 249. 
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contemporary meaning of ‘perform’ was ‘to complete; finish’.48 Performers are agents 
that both contemplate a text for themselves, but also interpret it for others. They are 
sometimes seen as an intermediary between the initial speaker or writer and the 
listeners experiencing, but in taking up a narrative role, the musicians inevitably leave 
a print on a work when conveying it to their listeners; in addition to being 
contemplative subjects themselves, they are actively involved in furthering the 
dialogue.49 Undoubtedly, musical performance complicates the relationship between 
text and reader, as multiple selves participate in dialogues through the sheer act of 
performance.50 Though Judd’s article on dialogical musical treatises explores the 
‘incomplete’ aspects of music in dialogue that insist on utterance, she does not address 
the dialogue as a musical form, a popular type of domestic music that has been 
somewhat neglected in scholarship. While the existing studies mentioned in the next 
section of this chapter survey the form’s presence in published volumes, few consider 
in any depth the practical and philosophical implications of inconsistencies within the 
‘genre’. A musical dialogue carries with it an implied performance involving multiple 
agents, markedly different in some ways from the dialogue implied by a treatise. How 
does the presence of multiple perspectives, bodies, selves, speakers, or agents required 
for musical dialogue complicate the discourse of performance? I will address these 
pertinent questions at a later stage. For now, I turn to a discussion of the dialogue as a 
musical form.  
  
The Musical Dialogue 
According to Denis Stevens, the Renaissance dialogue as a musical form appears to 
have originated in Venice in the 1530s.51 In sixteenth-century Italian music, there was a 
long tradition of explicitly dialogical polyphonic choral music featuring composers like 
Giovanni Croce, Orazio Vecchi, Giovanni Gastoldi, and Adriano Banchieri.52 In 
                                                
48 Though at what point a performance ‘finishes’ seems complex, as one could argue emotional response from 
hearers continue the conversation. “perform, v.”, OED Online. Oxford University Press, June 2015 (accessed 
14 July 2015). 
49 Sebastian Klotz touches on Renaissance tension between visionary and vocal language, with attention to 
the moment of musical delivery in Klotz, “Were Euery Thought an Eye”, 179-189.  
50 Is a dialogue still a dialogue when it is more of a ‘telephone game’ (to use the more politically correct term 
for what the British would call ‘Chinese whispers’) or when there are more than two agents in a chain? 
51 Denis Stevens, “Choral Dialogues of the Renaissance”, The Musical Times, 122.1664 (1981): 667–670, 668. 
52 See David Nutter, “The Italian Polyphonic Dialogue of the Sixteenth Century” (PhD diss., University of 
Nottingham, 1977). 
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structural terms, a polyphonic dialogue can be defined as a piece written by a single 
poet in which a) two or more characters converse, and b) the music emphasises the 
conversation through differentiation of the characters.53 Usually separate higher and 
lower antiphonal choirs each represent one speaking party, often one female with 
higher voices and one male with lower voices, as in Vecchi’s dialogo ‘Lucilla, io vo 
morire’ (1611),54 where the male pursuer is sung by the three lower voices, and Lucilla 
by the upper voices. This is not necessarily a divide between male and female singers, 
however, as madrigal comedies, taking after the commedia del’arte tradition, were often 
played by men singing in falsetto. As David Nutter points out, the polyphonic dialogue 
‘was eminently suited to court festivities requiring music that could convey, by reason 
of its volume of sound, its clear harmonic structure and its contrasting ensembles of 
voices, a sense of pomp and grandeur’.55 In a domestic situation, sometimes settings for 
fewer voices were preferable, as was the case in Banchieri’s madrigal comedy for 
domestic use, La pazzia senile (1598), which uses alla bastarda style singing that requires 
the same set of men to sing both male and female characters within a single dialogue, 
jumping, to comic effect, between falsetto and chest voices.56 These polyphonic 
dialogues raise many practical and aesthetic questions, particularly regarding the role 
of the individual when acting as a collective group representing a singular perspective 
or persona.57 Moreover, it demonstrates how the domestic setting for group music 
making requires a certain level of practical flexibility when representing selves, 
whether in representing gender(s) or the number of voices involved in representing a 
single perspective. Though the polyphonic dialogue’s appearance in England would 
prove brief, its history in Italy demonstrates the complexity of representation in 
musical dialogue that would become relevant to the English versions as well.  
 Though the polyphonic musical dialogue was not ubiquitous in England as it was in 
Italy, the Italian version trickled into England by 1595, as seen in Thomas Morley’s 
                                                
53 Jennifer King, “The Proposta E Risposta Madrigal, Dialogue, Cultural Discourse, and the Issue of 
Imitatio” (PhD diss., University of Indiana, 2007), 13.  
54 Orazio Vecchi, Canzonette a qvattro voci con aggiunta di altre à 5. 4. & 3. voci del medesmo (Apresso: Pietro 
Phalesio, 1611).  
55 David Nutter and John Whenham, “Dialogue.” Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online. Oxford University 
Press (accessed 23 Nov 2015) <http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/07713>. 
56 Paul Schleuse, Singing Games in Early Modern Italy: The Music Books of Orazio Vecchi (Chicago: University of 
Indiana Press, 2015), 129. 
57 David Nutter, “Madrigal comedy.” Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online. Oxford University Press 
(accessed 23 Dec 2015). <http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/17409>. 
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‘Phillis, I faine wold die now’ from his First booke of balletes (1595), which Thurston 
Dart has discerned is related to an example that appears last in Croce’s Il Secondo Libro 
de Madrigali (1588).58 Like Morley’s imitation, Croce’s model features conversation 
between two pastoral lovers, Amintas and Phillis, and is scored for seven voices, with 
Phillis voiced by three upper voices, and Amintas by the four lower voices.59 Morley’s 
setting is a singular example of the Italian-style polyphonic dialogue by an English 
composer, however.  
 More common in the English repertory were accompanied duets in a dialogical 
format. Though set for instrumental accompaniment, rather than in a strictly choral 
fashion, in most cases the two voices engage contrapuntally or end up in harmony for a 
final verse or choral refrain, requiring multiple singers rather than a single person 
playing two roles. Early seventeenth-century examples of dialogical duets can be found 
in the works of William Byrd (1589), John Dowland (1600 and 1603), John Coprario 
(1606), Thomas Ford (1607), Alfonso Ferrabosco (1609), and Martin Peerson (1620), 
amongst others.60 Perhaps significantly, the popularity of the dialogue seemed to 
explode in the latter half of the seventeenth century, with multiple examples from 
nearly every major restoration composer, but most notably Henry Lawes, John 
Gamble, John Hilton, Henry Purcell, and John Blow.61 Spink points towards the 
advent of English opera and recitative forms as one possible answer for this increased 
interest in dialogical domestic forms over the course of the century.62 Another 
hypothesis is that, practically speaking, dialogues allowed for increased participation 
amongst amateur music makers, as the additional voice and choral refrains at the end 
of each verse allowed for, in Richard Rastall’s estimation, those with less experience to 
contribute to the least musically demanding parts.63 Moreover, the dramatic interaction 
                                                
58 Thomas Morley, First Book of Ballets (1595), (eds.) Edmund Fellowes and Thurston Dart (London: Stainer 
& Bell, 1965), xi. 
59 Giovanni Croce, Il Secondo Libro de Madrigali a Cinqve Voci … (Venetia: Apresso Giacomo Vincenti, M. D. 
XCIL), from Gaspari Online: Museo internazionale e biblioteca della musica di bologna, sig.I4v-r. 
60 Iain Spink’s article surveys the English musical dialogue, and lists all the examples I use here, though I 
doubt his survey is exhaustive, as this would be a substantial project. His definition of dialogue, however, 
appears to be form that is musically antiphonal and does not consider the possibilities of musical dialogue 
discussed later in this chapter. For example, Spink doesn’t mention John Coprario (also known as John 
Cooper) and his dialogue ‘Foe of mankind’ from Funeral teares (1606). Ian Spink, “English Seventeenth-
century Dialogues”, Music & Letters, 38.2 (1957): 155–163.  
61 Surveyed in Spink, “Early-Seventeenth Century Dialogues”.  
62 Ibid., 163. 
63 Richard Rastall in Martin Peerson, Private Musicke or The First Booke of Ayres and Dialogues (1620), Richard 
Rastall (ed.), (Moretonhampstead: Antico Edition AB4, 2008), vi. 
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between characters seems a sociable form of entertainment for domestic music 
making.64 
 
The Problem of Genre 
There is a variety of dialogical or potentially dialogical repertoire that is somewhat 
problematic when considering the scope of this study for one reason or another, 
making the issue of genre particularly tricky in this chapter. One dilemma lies in how 
to categorise ‘multi-voiced’ music. Does a duet for two voices in a polyphonic manner 
count? Does the inclusion of a choral refrain? Moreover the issue of genre raises 
questions about the poetic traditions linked to different musical forms. If the piece has 
solo duet, choral refrain, lute, and viol, is the poetic tradition more aesthetically linked 
with lute song, consort song, the madrigal, or is it a tradition of its own? Significantly, 
how much has historiography influenced our approach to genres in the period? If 
dialogue were considered a genre of its own, how might one define ‘A Dialogue’?  
 For example, Thomas Ford’s ‘Shut not sweet brest’ (1607), is simply titled ‘A 
Dialogue’ on his title page.65 Though the pair of singers join together at the end of 
Ford’s setting, ultimately, this dialogue is for two lutes and two voices, and, like the 
examples by Ferrabosco discussed later, is arguably slightly outside the scope of this 
study.66 John Barlet (1606) has four ‘songs for two trebles’, accompanied by one lute 
(and sometimes bass viol), but both voices sing the text throughout, more in duet than 
dialogue.67 There are multiple examples of lute and consort song with texts that present 
                                                
64 Though musical dialogues could be on secular or sacred topics. See David Nutter and John Whenham, 
“Dialogue.” Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online. Oxford University Press (accessed 23 Dec 2015). 
<http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/07713>. 
65 Fellowes didn’t include the dialogue in his edition of Ford’s ayres because it ‘falls far below the other songs 
in artistic value’. Fellowes in Thomas Ford, The English School of Lutenist Song Writers: Thomas Ford, (ed.) 
Edmund Fellowes, (London: Winthrop Rogers, 1921), ‘preface’. Though Ford or someone else involved in 
its contemporary publication found ‘dialogue’ worthy of the volume’s title page: Thomas Ford, Mvsicke of 
Svndrie Kindes, Set forth in two Bookes. The First Whereof Are Aries for 4.Voices to the Lute, Orphorion or Basse-Viol, with 
a Dialogue for two Voices, and two Basse Viols in parts, tunde the Lute way (London: printed by Iohn Windet, 1607); 
score found at ibid., sig.G1v-r. The text also appears in Francis Davison’s A Poetical Rapsody (1602) and it is 
possible this publication is Ford’s text source. In Davison’s publication, the poem is credited to Francis and 
Walter Davison, and is described as ‘A Dialogue betweene a Louers flaming Heart, and his Ladies frozen 
Breast’. Francis Davison, A Poetical Rapsody … (London: printed by V.S[immes], 1602), sig.E8v.  
66 Later I make an argument for why it is necessary to consider non-choral examples in this section, however. 
67 Though Bartlet never explicitly calls these examples dialogues, they are somewhat similar to examples by 
Peerson looked at later in this chapter. Examples like Bartlet’s demonstrate how complex issues of genre can 
be with this repertory. Bartlet also has a tripartite work which he calls ‘Songs for Lute Viol de Gambo and 
Voyce’ set for Cantus and Basso. Though Barlet specifies on the cover that these three pieces are for ‘one 
Voyce’, he fully underlays the basso part with text. John Barlet, A booke of ayres vvith a triplicitie of musicke … 
(London: Iohn VVindet, 1606), sig.A1r.  
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multiple perspectives, but without any musical differentiation between the two 
perspectives. For example, Thomas Morley’s ‘Who is that this darke night’ (1597) is a 
lute ayre with a dialogical text by Philip Sidney,68 and has been recorded with two 
singers in an antiphonal format by Anthony Rooley,69 though there is no indication in 
Morley’s musical paratext that it was conceived for dialogic performance.70 Another 
example of a setting with multiple perspectives that are not given musically 
differentiated voices by the composer is William Byrd’s contemporarily unpublished 
consort song ‘Triumph with plesant melody’, the text of which is a dialogue between 
Christ and a Sinner.71 It too is often recorded as a dialogue with two singers, though in 
‘the score’ it is not musically dialogical.72 In the manuscript sources, the Dow 
Partbooks (Oxford, Christ Church Mus. 984-988) and Hammond Partbooks (BL Add. 
MSS 30480-4 and Bod MSS Mus. f. 20-24), the scribes give no indication that Byrd 
composed it (or they thought it) to be sung by two parties, as it was edited in The Byrd 
Edition vol. 15 (1970).73 Would contemporary performers acknowledge the ‘voices’ 
present in the poem without instruction? This seems plausible. Furthermore, this raises 
a pertinent question of how one approaches the creation of modern editions of this type 
of dialogical repertory. Should a performance—or even a modern edition—acknowledge 
the multiple speaking parties even if Byrd or Morley (or the copyists whose work we 
have preserved) did not give them explicitly separate voices?  
 If we consider the aim of the musical ‘Dialogue’ (rather than form, without any 
implication for authorial intent) as the codifying element in categorising this music, the 
name alone implies two possibilities. Firstly, it could be music that has multiple 
perspectives, as one would find in dialectic or dramatic conversation, and secondly, it 
                                                
68 ‘Who is that this dark night?’ is the eighth song from Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella, a collection of poetry that 
shall be explained in more depth later in the chapter. Sidney’s text is printed in full in Morley’s publication. 
Thomas Morley, The first booke of ayres … (London: printed by VVilliam Barley, the assigne of Thomas 
Morley, 1600), sig.C2v-r.  
69 Anthony Rooley and Consort of Musicke, ‘Amorous Dialogues’ (Decca Studios, 1979).  
70 Moreover, does modern scholarship on Sidney’s propensity for dialogue and binary justify or give any 
indication that a dialogical performance of Morley’s ayre might have been considered in contemporary 
performance? Or should be considered in modern performance? What can scholarship on text authors bring 
to modern ‘informed’ performance practice? 
71 William Byrd, Consort Song for Voice and Viol “The Byrd Edition, Volume 15”, (ed.) Philip Brett, (London: 
Stainer & Bell, 1970), 43. 
72 Examples of dialogically performed recordings of ‘Triumph’ include: iFagiolini and Fretwork, ‘The Early 
Byrd’ (Chandos, 1999) and Rose Consort of Viols and Red Byrd, ‘Byrd’ (Naxos, 1994). 
73 As of now, the ‘new’ Byrd Edition (Stainer & Bell) has only re-edited up through volume 13, and there 
don’t appear to be plans to re-edit volumes 14-17, according to their website. 
<http://www.stainer.co.uk/shop/byrdedition.html> (accessed 14 April 2016).  
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could be music that accommodates two speaking parties, regardless of textual 
perspective. It has been suggested that in the Renaissance, the word ‘dialogue’ 
sometimes came to be used more generally as a term for antiphonal choral music, 
divorced from the explicit dramatic ‘roles’ of the Italian dialogues,74 but perhaps a more 
nuanced examination is needed. The following case studies are examples of musicalised 
English dialogues that represent what I observe to be representative of their 
composers’ complex and uncodified approaches to dialogical musical setting. Though a 
couple of these examples are only tenuously a part of this study of ‘potentially multi-
voiced music’, it seems necessary to briefly mention some atypical examples to get an 
overview of the variety of ways dialogue was conceived, particularly when explicitly 
described as ‘A Dialogue’ by the composers (through title or paratextual material from 
the same collection). Secondly, these examples further cement the need—already 
identified in this study—to rethink the traditional way of categorising music by form.  
 
 Early English Musical Dialogues 
Of the examples of English dialogue with instrumental accompaniment, the uses of 
dialogue seem to stratify into a few generic uses. A large number of the examples are 
pastoral in content, as pastoral dialogues were a popular literary form.75 Some use 
dialogue to represent multiple perspectives from clearly defined and separate 
characters, sometimes in a question and answer format along the lines of a dialectical 
treatise. Some use dialogue more generally for an antiphonal effect, in echoes or word 
painting. And others use it to discuss multiple perspectives within a single poetic train 
of thought. The following will give some examples of each use of the dialogical form 
when explicitly named ‘dialogue’ by the composer in the musical paratext.  
 Byrd’s dialogue, ‘Who made thee Hob’ (1589), echoes a didactic dialectic in its 
emphasis on question and answer between one knowing figure and one learner. A 
nameless shepherd asks Hob, ‘who made thee Hob, forsake the Plowe’, to which Hob 
replies, ‘Sweet beautie which hath powre to bowe the gods above’, and the 
conversation ensues as the shepherd asks a question and Hob answers it: a 
straightforward pastoral dialogue. Curiously, this dialogue is one of the few pieces 
                                                
74 David Nutter and John Whenham, “Dialogue.” Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online. Oxford University 
Press (accessed 19 Nov 2015). <http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/07713>. 
75 Alexander, Writing After Sidney, 2, 35. 
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from the 1589 collection that Byrd decided to leave without text underlay for multiple 
voices. Kerman surmises this was to preserve the ‘clownish’ effect of the instrumental 
parts, though more practically speaking, it would be very difficult to preserve the effect 
of dialogue at all if the viol parts were underlaid with text without some other musical 
indicator (such as an antiphonal double choir of higher and lower voices) to define the 
multiple characters.76 A rewrite like that would have taken much more effort on Byrd’s 
part. Iain Spink observes that the texture of ‘Hob’ is essentially polyphonic, and 
considers this work a member of the ‘transitional form’ between the choral dialogues 
and the solo examples by the later seventeenth century lutenists.77 Though perhaps an 
oversimplification, this example by Byrd demonstrates an earlier English use of the 
dialogue form, one within a consort song collection of nearly all potentially multi-
voiced settings.  
 John Dowland’s Second booke of songs or ayres (1600) and Third and last booke of songs 
or aires (1603) each conclude with a single dialogue, named as such on the page itself.78 
‘Come when I cal’ (1603) is scored for ‘cantus prima’ and ‘secunda pars’ as the two 
dialogical voices of equal tessitura (C1 clef), lute, bass lute, and three viols.79 The 
texture is antiphonal, with the lute and ‘cantus prima’ working collectively as one 
speaking voice and the ‘secunda pars’, bass lute, and viols speaking together, so each 
voice has their own instrumentation. This is probably to help differentiate between 
dialogical voices in the same range, regardless of the gender of the singers. The chorus 
in five-voice texture enters when the text turns collective on the objective, first-person 
pronoun ‘us’, when the debate seems to approach agreement. The poem is banter 
between eager lovers, and is conducive to the antiphonal instrumental scoring and 
dialogical vocal setting, musically placing it firmly in the category of dialogues 
containing multiple perspectives from two clearly defined characters.  
 
Cantus prima: Come when I cal, Or tarrie til I come, 
                                                
76 Jeremy Smith argues for a political reading of ‘Hob’, and asserts that Byrd’s use of ‘delightfully non-
teleological harmonic progressions’ was an opportunity for political commentary. J. Smith, Verse and Voice, 
249. For further commentary on Hob, see J. Smith, Verse and Voice, 245-9 and Kerman, The Elizabethan 
Madrigal, 107. 
77 Spink, “Early-Seventeenth Century Dialogues”, 156. 
78 Though Dowland’s dialogue ‘Humour, say’ is listed as the last song on the ‘A Table of All The Songs’, the 
book actually concludes with a piece for lute and bass viol called ‘Dowlands adew for Master Oliver 
Cromwell’; see Poulton, John Dowland, 123. 
79 Even though the Latin genders don’t agree on ‘Cantus prima’. John Dowland, The third and last booke of 
songs or aires … (London: printed by P. S[hort], 1603), sig.M2v-r.  
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  if you bee deafe, I must proue dumb 
Secunda pars: Stay a while my heau’nly ioy, I come with wings of loue, 
  when enuious eyes time shall remoue. 
Cp: If thy desire euer knew the griefe of delay, 
  no danger could stand in thy way. 
Cs: O die not, ad this sorrow to my griefe 
  that languish here, wanting relief. 
Cp: What need wee languish? can loue quickly flie: 
  feare euer hurts more than iealousie. 
All: Then securely enuie scorning,  
  let vs end with joy our mourning, 
  iealousie still defie,  
  and loue till we die.80 
 
‘Humour, say’ (1600) is scored for two voices, canto and basso, with four-voice ‘chorus’ 
refrain (called so in Dowland’s edition), lute, and viols.81 The treble viol (quinto) 
remains untexted throughout, whist the other viols become the chorus when they reach 
the refrain. The poem maintains an ababcc (+dd refrain) rhyme scheme, sung 
strophically with three verses of text. Unlike in ‘Come when I call’, the vast difference 
in range between the two voices in ‘Humour, say’ allows for the same instrumental 
texture throughout whilst still preserving the musical differentiation between dialogical 
voices. Thus in both of these examples by Dowland, the style of the musical setting 
draws out and highlights the dialogical nature of the text, whether through 
differentiated registers for the speaking voices, or through contrasting instrumental 
accompaniment for each speaker. Set within collections of ayres for four voices plus 
lute, these dialogues are aesthetically positioned somewhat uncomfortably between 
multi-voiced and lute song traditions.82 The romantic duets, particularly ‘Come when I 
cal’ have a sort of intimacy more often stereotypically associated with lute song, 
particularly since the cantus prima could feasibly be a single person both playing lute 
and singing. When the chorus voices enter on ‘then securely envy’, it almost feels like 
an interruption of a moment between lovers by a crowd, echoing in mostly 
homophonic blocks with staggered entrances. The chorus refrain seems to draw 
                                                
80 Ibid.  
81 Poulton, John Dowland, 273. 
82 It is my sense that the dichotomy between the poetic traditions of lute song and multi-voiced domestic 
genres tradition (often using the catch-all term ‘ayre’) has contemporary justification, but has been 
aggravated into extremes by modern scholarship. Practically speaking, perhaps there was less of a 
distinction. I will return to this idea later. 
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attention to the universality of the final message, drawing focus away from a singular 
moment, and making larger observations about love more generally. Why does 
Dowland bring in a chorus at the end of these two otherwise far more vocally soloistic 
pieces? Just because they are published within collections for four voices? Is it a 
chorus in a purely musical sense, or does it derive in some sense from the theatrical 
use, where the chorus is a single person who exists outside of the main plot and speaks 
the prologue or offers commentary on the course of events?83 Or is there a practical 
reason for its inclusion, in that easy refrains include more bodies in the music-making? 
Choral refrains where all join in are common in works by other composers like Martin 
Peerson, but in Dowland’s example the contrast between lute song and multi-voiced 
styles within a single piece is certainly a curiosity whose implications are worth 
considering.  
 Of Alfonso Ferrabosco’s three dialogues in his 1609 set, two are conventional 
pastoral dialogues between a shepherd and a nymph (‘Faire cruell Nymph’, ‘Tell me, O 
Loue’) set for a higher-voiced nymph and a lower-voiced shepherd plus lute.84 ‘What 
shall I wish’, on the other hand, is a dialogue for two equal voices (plus bass viol and 
lute). Though technically multi-voiced (as one singer cannot sing both parts when they 
overlap at the end), this piece is the only example of an early English musical dialogue 
(named and scored as such) that appears in a published edition exclusively with lute 
song, rather than one comprised primarily of potentially multi-voiced music. As will be 
discussed later, most of the examples in this chapter are arguably neither wholly of one 
tradition or the other (though this example is still exceptional in this chapter, as it does 
not have a choral refrain). But complicated issues of genre aside, it is worth 
considering this dialogue’s ‘voices’ as an example of the variety of ways musical 
dialogues could approach a text.  
 
1: What shall I wish? 
 what shall I fly? 
2: True Loue I seeke, 
1: False I defie, 
2: Wordes haue their truth, 
1: Such euer speake, 
                                                
83 “chorus, n.”, OED Online. Oxford University Press, September 2015 (accessed 2 December 2015). 
84 They are described as such on the ‘table of all the songs contained in this Booke’. Alfonso Ferrabosco, 
Ayres (London: printed by T. Snodham, 1609), sig.K2v.  
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2: Deeds haue their faith, 
1: Such neuer breake, 
Both: Flattery yeelds pleasure, 
1: Onely truth (onley truth) yeelds waight, 
Both: Happy are they that neuer knew deceit.85  
 
Other than in the repeated refrain of the last line, shared by both voices, only one other 
phrase’s text is repeated and that is voice 1 on the words ‘onley truth’, leading one to 
suspect Ferrabosco found these words worthy of emphasis. The poem could easily 
demonstrate conflict within a single speaker, though the ‘question and answer’ opening 
gives one potential indicator of why the composer set this text as in dialogical musical 
setting. Moreover, the syntax turns from the singular ‘I’ of the beginning of the text to 
the ‘Happy are they’ concluding line, giving reason for both singers to sing at the end.86 
But overall, this text could have easily been set for a single voice, as it describes a 
situation that could be explained by internal conflict and questioning, rather than 
through conversation between two people. The multiple perspectives defined here are 
discussing the nature of falsity and truth (as ‘only truth yields weight’), and how one 
determines truth. No conclusion on how to discern truth is given, but the last two lines 
reinforce how important truth is to happiness.  
 Another dialogue that works equally well to demonstrate this sort of potentially 
‘internal’ dialogue was John Coprario’s ‘Foe of mankind’ (1606). In a collection of 
ayres set for lute, bass viol, and two polyphonically written voices (Canto and Alto), 
this dialogue discusses the relative merits of earthly reputation and fleshly love versus 
man’s true being in the eternal, spiritual realm.  
 
Canto. Foe of mankind, why murderest thou my loue 
Alto. Forbeare he liues. 
C. Oh where? 
A. In heauen aboue. 
C. Poore wretched life that onely lives in name. 
A. Man is not flesh, but soule, all life is fame: 
C. That is true fame which liuing men enjoy. 
                                                
85 The two parts are of the same clef (C3) and not explicitly named in Ferrabosco’s edition. Ferrabosco, Ayres 
(1609), sig.I2v-r. 
86 This is different from my earlier example with Dowland’s ‘Come when I call’, as this poem switches not to 
‘us’, but outside the characters within the text altogether, as ‘they’, not unlike the function of a dramatic 
chorus. Given the tradition set up by Dowland and Peerson and others of a chorus joining in at the last 
refrain, though Ferrabosco makes musical indication here, it wouldn’t be outside the realm of possibility in 
text nor performance tradition. 
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A. That is true life, which death cannot destroy. 
Chorus. Liue euer through thy merited renowne. 
   Faire spirit shining in thy starry crowne.87  
 
The text is laid out in this format below the music. The dialogical voices come together 
in imitative counterpoint for the Chorus, which functions as a dramatic chorus does, 
stepping outside the world of the play to explain the moral of the story. It also gives the 
voices a textual reason to end their dialogue and unite. The poem discusses key 
elements of human consciousness, such as the nature of love, and the quality of (‘flesh’ 
or ‘soule’) man’s being. Similar to the Ferrabosco example, the two voices in ‘Foe of 
mankind’ represent two perspectives, but could arguably represent an internal conflict 
within a single speaker, debating or consoling his- or herself through internal dialogue. 
These two works by Ferrabosco and Coprario demonstrate a contemporary 
understanding of dialogical musical setting that was not always a ‘he said, she said’ 
conversation. This opens the door for a broader contemporary interpretation of the 
content of the musical dialogue, one that engages in dialogue between multiple 
perspectives rather than just speakers.  
 
Dialogues of Martin Peerson 
The following considers Martin Peerson’s Priuate Musicke. Or the First Booke of Ayres and 
Dialogues: Contayning songs of 4, 5 or 6 parts, of severall sorts and being verse and chorus, is fit for 
voyces and viols (1620).88 In the dedicatory preface, Peerson explains his reasoning for 
publishing this volume, the first reason being ‘the wandring of divers of these 
Dialogues from hand to hand in unperfect Coppies, neither as I meant, or made 
them’.89 He uses ‘dialogues’ in such a way that suggests a more generalised and 
commonly understood term of genre, in the way ‘ayre’ is often used. Though Peerson 
describes Private musicke as containing ‘dialogues’ on the title page and in the dedicatory 
material, the composer does not denote each ‘dialogue’ as such, as so many other 
composers have done, by printing ‘A Dialogue’ or the like at the top of the page of 
                                                
87 Coprario, Funeral tears (1606), sig.E2r.  
88 ‘And for want of viols, they may be performed to either the virginall or lute’.  
Martin Peerson, Priuate Musicke … (London: printed by Thomas Snodham, 1620). All modern editions and 
song texts for this section are from Richard Rastall in Peerson, Private Musicke, (ed.) Rastall.  
89 Peerson, Priuate Musicke (1620), sig.A2r.  
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music.90 This has led to some speculation about what Peerson precisely meant by 
describing his music as ‘dialogues’. Richard Rastall points out that songs 15-23 are for 
two voices, 15-19 for two trebles, and 20-23 for treble and tenor.91 In his preface to his 
critical edition of Peerson’s work, Rastall summarises existing thoughts on which 
pieces were intended as ‘dialogues’. He states that Julia Jeanne Heydon, in her DMA 
dissertation (1990, Oregon) concluded that these works for two voices are what 
Peerson intended as his ‘dialogues’, whereas Audrey Jones, in her M.litt thesis (1957, 
Cambridge), took a broader look at what Peerson meant by ‘dialogue’, suggesting that 
they are the poems with more than one textual voice, like ‘Open the dore’.92 In ‘Open 
the dore’, the first verse is sung by one speaker trying to persuade his lover to open the 
door. There is no indication in Peerson’s music that another individual need sing the 
second verse, yet textually, this second verse is clearly a response from the other side of 
the door. The two verses of music are set strophically.  
 
Open the dore, 
whose there within? 
The fairest of thy Mother’s kin, 
O come, come, come abroad,  
And heere the shrill birds sing, 
The Ayre with tunes that loade,  
It is too soone to goe to rest, 
The Sun not midway yet to West, 
The day doth misse thee,  
And will not part untill it kisse thee.  
 
Were I as faire as you pretend, 
Yet an unknowne sild-seene93 friend  
I dare not ope the dore. 
To heare the sweet birds sings, 
Oft proves a dangerous thing. 
The Sun may run his wonted race, 
And yet not gaze on my poore face, 
The day may misse mee: 
Therefore depart, 
                                                
90 Every other dialogue in this chapter is described as such specifically by the composer/editor on the page of 
music directly or in the table of contents. In Peerson’s dedicatory material, the generic terms of genre (to 
describe the contents of the collection, rather than the collection itself) used by the composer include 
‘Dialogues’, ‘Songs’, ‘Labours in this kind’, ‘Tones’, and ‘Compositions’. Peerson, Priuate Musicke (1620), 
sig.A2r. 
91 Rastall in Martin Peerson, Private Musicke, (ed.) Rastall, vi. 
92 Ibid.  
93 ‘Sild-seene’ means ‘seldom seen’. Robert Nares, A Glossary Or Collection of Words, Phrases, Names, and 
Allusions to Customs (Stralsund: printed for Loeffler, 1825), 726. 
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You shall not kisse me. 94 
 
At this point, both Heydon’s and Jones’s assessments seem plausible. It is possible 
‘Open the dore’ is not a dialogue, as it is set on a single vocal line in C1 clef (except for 
choral refrain, which is underlaid for all voices), but on the other hand, perhaps its 
dialogical text is so obvious that it need not be musically drawn out as such to be 
interpreted as dialogical.95 But the idea that Peerson’s concept of ‘dialogue’ is merely 
textual is complicated by the composer also including duets that are antiphonally 
voiced, but not textually dialogical.  
 For example, in ‘Then with reports’, the second part of ‘Come pretty wag’, the 
dialogue is entirely unconversational. Cantus [1] mostly echoes Cantus [2], and the 
echo is used antiphonally for a madrigalian effect of a cuckoo’s call (see Fig.4.2).96 The 
text varies a couple times between the two Cantus voices, though it is uncertain if this 
is intentional or a printer’s error. For example, Cantus 1 sings ‘And sing’ and Cantus 2 
echoes ‘O sing’ (bar 5) and after C1 sings ‘so prettily’ C2 sings ‘so wittely’.97 If this 
setting wasn’t affiliated with part I, ‘Come pretty wag’, there would be no indication at 
all that two voices were textually meaningful.98  
 
                                                
94 Peerson, Private Musicke, (ed.) Rastall, 1-2.  
95 ‘Open the dore’ is recorded with male and female voices each taking a verse by the Wren Baroque Soloists. 
Wren Baroque Soloists, ‘Martin Peerson’, (Collins Classics, 1994). 
96 Peerson calls each voice ‘Cantus’, the bracketed distinction between the two is my own.   
97 The difference between ‘prettily’ and ‘wittely’ is not likely to be an error, but I am not certain about ‘And 
sing’ vs. ‘O sing’. 
98 In ‘Come pretty wag and sing’ (part I), the dialogical setting seems mostly textually inconsequential, 
except for the reference of ‘let us both’, inferring that there are two people. So even with its affiliation to part 
I, the dialogical setting in ‘Then with reports’ makes little sense outside of the madrigalian antiphony. For the 
text of 'Come pretty wag', see Appendix I(e); Peerson, Private Musicke, (ed.) Rastall, 25-26.  
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Figure 4.2: Peerson ‘Then with reports’, edited by Richard Rastall for Antico 
Editions in Peerson, Private Musicke, (ed.) Rastall, 26-28. 
 
Similarly, there is little hint of dialogue within the text of Peerson’s ‘Pretty wantons, 
sweetly sing’, which also uses the two voices for an imitative effect of bird noises, and 
has no textual indication that two voices are necessary.  
 
Altus: Pretty wantons, sweetly sing,  
 In honour of the smiling spring, 
Cantus [2]: Looke how the light-wing’d chirping quire  
 with nimble skips, the Spring admire, 
Both: But O, harke, harke how the Birds sing, 
 Or marke that Note  
 Jug, jug, jug 
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 Terew, terew, terew 
 O prett’ly warbled from a sweet throat.99  
 
Unless Peerson considered birdsong a form of conversation, it is hard to believe that 
this type of setting was believed a dialogue, in spite of its duet-like or antiphonal 
characteristics requiring two singers. Though it makes little logical sense, however, one 
cannot entirely disregard the possibility that Peerson or his contemporaries may have 
felt differently about this meaning, and perhaps the connotations of ‘dialogue’ had 
expanded to mean song for two voices, regardless of textual perspective. But before 
making any conclusive remarks on this inconsistency, it is worth looking at a few other 
examples from Peerson’s collection that further complicate a definition of ‘dialogue’ 
(see Fig.4.3). 
 
 
Examples of ‘antiphonal dialogues’ from Peerson’s Private Musicke (1620) 
No & Title Dialogical Voice Names 
and Clef 
Ranges 
15. ‘Come, pretty wag, 
and sing’ 
Cantus (C1) / Cantus 
(C1) 
Cantus [1] E4-D5 / 
Cantus [2] D4-Bb4 
16. ‘Then with reports’ 
Cantus (C1) / Cantus 
(C1) 
Cantus [1] C4-F5 / 
Cantus [2] C4-D5 
17. ‘Pretty wantons, 
sweetly sing’ 
Cantus (G2) / Altus (C*) 
Cantus [2] D4-G5 / Altus 
C4-D5 
18. ‘Sing, Loue is blinde’ Cantus (G2) / Altus (C1) 
Cantus C4-F5 / Altus C4-
D5 
19. ‘What neede the 
morning rise?’ 
Cantus (G2) / Altus (C1) 
Cantus F4-F5 / Altus [1] 
E4-C5 
20. ‘Gaze not on youth’ 
Cantus (G2) / 
Contratenor (C3) 
Cantus D4-E5 / 
Contratenor E3-E4 
                                                
99 Peerson, Private Musicke, (ed.) Rastall, 29-32.  
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21. ‘I onely seeke to please 
mine eye’ 
Cantus (G2) / 
Contratenor (C3) 
Cantus [1] E4-D5 / 
Contratenor D3-E4 
22. ‘The spring of ioy’ 
Cantus (G2) / Tenor 
(C4) 
Cantus D4-E5 / Tenor 
D3-E4 
23. ‘Is not that my fancie’s 
Queene?’ 
Cantus (G2) / 
Contratenor (C3) 
Cantus D4-F5 / 
Contratenor [2] D3-F4 
*The C clef is on the first ledger line below the staff. I do not know why he didn’t just 
use a G2 clef as he did elsewhere.  
 
Other ‘Dialogue’ examples in Chapter 4: 
Composer and Title Dialogical Voice Names 
and Clef 
Ranges  
Dowland: ‘Humour, say, 
what mak’st thou here?’ 
Canto (C1) / Basso (F4) Canto G4-E5 / Basso 
G2-B3 
Dowland: ‘Come when I 
cal’ 
Cantus prima (C1) / 
Secunda pars (C1) 
Cantus prima D4 -D5 / 
Secunda pars D4-Bb4 
Ferrabosco: ‘What shall I 
wish?’ 
Unnamed [1] (C3) / 
Unnamed [2] (C3)* 
[1] G3-A4 / [2] A3-A4 
Coprario: ‘Foe of 
mankind’ 
Canto (C1) / Alto (C3) Canto D4-F5 / Alto G3-
Bb4 
*Ferrabosco doesn’t name his voice parts, or otherwise differentiate them other than 
through layout on the printed page.  
Figure 4.3 
 
 The following examples raise significant questions about dialogical meaning and 
gender, issues which relate to perspective, gender stereotypes, and clefs—a major area 
of exploration largely outside the scope of this thesis. But I will present some of these 
questions nevertheless, with the caveat that any hypotheses resulting from them will 
remain preliminary. ‘Gaze not youth’ is a short setting which doesn’t amount to much 
conversation, but nonetheless still presents two perspectives, represented by two 
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voices. One might assume that it would be the lower voice that would defend a 
wandering eye, and the higher voice would be the perspective pleading for fidelity. 
Contrary to other settings which have overtly gendered higher and lower voices, the 
stereotypically ‘male’ perspective in this setting is the Cantus, rather than the lower 
Contratenor voice. This assumption, of course, relies on other hypotheses of 
performance practice that remain uncertain. For example, is clef an indicator of 
gender? Would a singer of either gender sing from all or only some clefs? Moreover, 
would this be transposed to a comfortable octave, or at pitch?100 Gendered dialogues, 
like those between a shepherd and nymph, tended to be overtly gendered through 
clefs, for example in Peerson’s ‘Is not that my fancie’s Queen?’, in which the 
‘Shepheard’s swaine’ is voiced by ‘Contratenor’ [2] in C3 clef, and the ‘Queene’ by 
‘Cantus’ in G2 clef. But what about for voices with more similar tessituras? If there 
even is an association between clef and gender, is this association fixed or flexible in 
performance? One might consider, then, that the dialogue in ‘Gaze not youth’ is not 
between lovers, but perhaps simply a presentation of multiple perspectives. In some 
ways, as a full conversation this setting seems truncated or incomplete, as the 
Contratenor voice concedes its position all too quickly by joining the Cantus part on 
what should be the rebuttal rather than the solution to the discussion. Curiously, the 
eye is ‘on the face’ rather than ‘her face’ or ‘your face’, which would help the reader 
discern more clearly whom the speakers are or whom they are speaking about. The 
two voices conclude that ‘when the eye is on the face’, whether speaking about the eyes 
located on one’s own face, or in the act of gazing upon another’s attractive face, one 
cannot help but get distracted due to the proximity of eye and mind. Though multiple 
perspectives are present in the text, it is not necessarily two speakers, as this could 
easily represent conflict within an inner dialogue.  
 
Contratenor: Gaze not on youth, let age contain  
 Thy wand’ring eye, thy eye from objects vaine. 
Cantus: No, no, I must look about and see, 
                                                
100 As Jeremy Smith points out, ‘[i]n his 1588 “Epistle” Byrd … mentions the matter of compass. “If thou 
desire songs of smal compass & fit for the reach of most voyces, here are most in number of that sort.” By 
“smal compass” is meant a total range accommodated either within a “low clef” combination (typically with 
superius c1 and bassus F4) or a “high clef” one (g2 to F3), the former offering scope for upward 
transposition, the latter for downward’, indicating a procedure for transposition, at least in the work of Byrd. 
J. Smith, Verse and Voice, 8.  
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 In loue what heau’nly objects be 
Both: But when the eye is on the face, 
 The minde (Choral refrain:) is in another place.101  
 
 ‘Sing, Loue is blinde’ is another example of a piece set dialogically that could 
textually represent a single speaker with multiple perspectives. There is however a hint 
of dialogue within the speaker’s inner reasoning, seen as the two voices contribute 
points towards a resolution. The dialogue is between Cantus and Altus voices, so it is 
not so clearly between a man and a woman (given the topic is love), but perhaps 
something closer together.102 At the same time, Peerson could have set this work as two 
equal voices as he did in ‘Then with reports’, yet chose not to. This setting presents 
queries about clef, gender, and performance practice, as it leads one to wonder about 
the meaning behind setting dialogical texts in particular clefs.   
 
 
 
 
                                                
101 Peerson, Private Musicke, (ed.) Rastall, 38-39. 
102 Though men probably sang alto, the tenor/cantus split one usually finds in love dialogues is more overt 
than what is presented here. That said, this could still be a dialogue between a man and a woman, like in 
Dowland’s ‘Come when I call’, which is set for alto and cantus. 
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Figure 4.4: Peerson, ‘Sing, Loue is blinde’ edited by Richard Rastall for Antico 
Edition in Peerson, Private Musicke, (ed.) Rastall, 33-35. 
 
The two voices are used in a combination of ways (see Fig.4.4). First they appear 
dialogically, as the speakers present complementary points. For example, Cantus 
furthers or alters Altus’s first statement with the adverb ‘yet’, qualifying or adding to 
Altus’s first point. But from ‘then tell me’, the voices are much more intertwined, used 
for echoes in an imitative fashion. The antiphonal usage isn’t madrigalian, however, as 
it is in ‘Pretty wantons’ with the bird noises. The dialogical antiphony comes back 
briefly on Cantus’s point ‘though Cupid’s young and blind with-all’, which is once 
again furthered by Altus’s adverb ‘yet’ on ‘Yet he can with the strongest fall’, adding to 
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Cantus’s reasoning. Unlike other examples, the two perspectives aren’t really 
presenting two sides of an argument, but rather conversationally contributing to a 
single line of reasoning as one might through an internal decision-making process. 
Moreover, though this text is discussing love as a topic, one cannot say that this is a 
dialogue between two lovers. In both ‘Sing, Loue is blinde’ and ‘Gaze not on youth’ the 
dialogical voices have closely aligning tessituras, though in differentiated clefs.103 Does 
this closeness carry meaning for the textual situation? Each piece discusses love, an 
element of consciousness, yet they are not necessarily conversations between lovers, as 
one might expect from a more pastoral dialogue. Might the close tessitura imply an 
internal dialogue, at least in this collection? And what might this mean for an example 
like ‘Open the dore’, which is not set dialogically by the composer, yet is clearly 
textually dialogical between two separate speakers rather than a single undecided one? 
There are multiple questions of performance practice as well: Why (and how) might 
one perform a piece for two speakers with a single singer (‘Open the dore’, Byrd’s 
‘Triumph’, etc.)? Similarly, why might one perform a piece of internal dialogue with 
two singers? Perhaps because ‘Open the dore’ is so overtly dialogical, a dialogical 
musical setting wasn’t required. But in the cases of ‘Gaze not’ and ‘Sing, Loue’, the 
dialogical elements of the poem are highlighted through the musical setting in a way 
that cannot be emphasised by the poem alone. And what is the role of the choral 
refrain, which at times seems to ‘interrupt’ a discussion between two with the cries of a 
crowd?104 Of course it is possible that Peerson was just inconsistent in his voice setting. 
Regardless, these examples by Peerson indicate an uncodified approach to the setting 
of multiple perspectives and speakers, one that certainly deserves more time in a future 
study of the early dialogical ‘form’ and its performance.  
 
 The Aesthetic Function of Musicalising Dialogue 
This survey is intended to give an overview of the variety of ways the concept of 
‘dialogue’, in diverse form, was present in vocal music around the turn of the 
                                                
103 See Figure 4.3.  
104 Indeed, it is interesting to consider the three uses of the refrain demonstrated in these examples and their 
implications for perspective or voice. Sometimes the refrains are just the two speakers joining together at the 
end (‘What shall I wish?’), sometimes they are choral refrains for all voices that seem to interrupt the 
dialogue with a crowd (‘Gaze not on youth’), and sometimes they function as a chorus in a Greek play, 
stepping outside the dialogue to provide outside commentary or a summary (‘For of mankind’). 
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seventeenth century. But the analysis of this body of repertoire is necessarily two-fold. 
Firstly, there is an historiographical question regarding genre and the classification of 
this repertory, which appears to be muddier than traditional understanding might 
admit. This is a significant area that needs critical reassessment, as my examination has 
raised more questions than it has provided answers, though I will return to some of 
these questions in the conclusion. Secondly, and of greater significance to this thesis, is 
the aesthetic analysis of this repertoire, which will necessarily draw on some of the 
problems of genre and historiography, but relates more significantly to how this 
repertoire can be linked to ‘problems of knowledge’.  
Putting the issues of vocal scoring aside for a moment, the above demonstrates that 
there are examples of courtly domestic music which are explicitly called dialogues, set 
for two or more voices, and have dialogical texts involving two people (Byrd’s ‘Hob’, 
Dowland’s two dialogues), as well as examples of pieces not explicitly called dialogues 
or musically set as such that have clearly dialogical texts involving two speakers 
(Byrd’s ‘Triumph’, Morley’s ‘Who is it that this dark night?’). The example by 
Ferrabosco suggests there is precedent for dialogues, at least within lute song, that are 
of two perspectives, but arguably within the same speaking voice; an internal dialogue 
represented externally through multiple selves. Finally, there is the case of Peerson’s 
dialogues, which are called dialogues, though it remains unclear what precisely the 
term meant to him, as his collection contains (a) explicitly dialogical pastoral pieces set 
in a musically dialogical manner (‘Is not that my fancie’s Queene?’), (b) pieces for a 
single voice that textually contain two perspectives (‘Open the dore’), (c) songs for two 
voices used imitatively or for word painting (‘Pretty wantons’, ‘Then with report’) but 
with a single textual perspective, as well as (d) settings for two voices that would also 
work as a single internal dialogue conveying multiple perspectives from within the 
same speaker (‘Sing, Loue is blinde’, ‘The spring of ioy’). The purpose of this survey 
was to illustrate the muddy contemporary approaches to the musical dialogue, and the 
broad versatility of the word at a time when the English musical dialogue was still in its 
formative years.105  
                                                
105 It is worth noting that there are a few manuscript sources that Rastall has identified as fully texted 
versions of some of Peerson’s songs discussed here; some of these were amateur attempts at underlaying the 
instrumental parts to make vocal settings. Rastall in Peerson, Private Musicke, (ed.) Rastall, ix-x. 
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The dialogues, perhaps more so than some other English forms, are caught in a 
sticky, historiographically-induced tangle of ambiguous genre classifications and 
musical traditions. Since Morley’s singular poly-choral example, the early English 
dialogue seemed to resist formal musical and poetic codification. Dialogues are 
published for lute, viols, a combination of the two, virginals, and in a cappella 
arrangement. As was common, flexibility of instrumentation allowed for a variety of 
combinations and possibilities within a single setting. Poetically, these dialogues come 
in a range of structures and metres. Their varied forms and publication contexts 
present questions about which musico-poetic traditions these ‘dialogues’ inherited, and 
from where. The multiple manifestations of the musical dialogue in early modern 
England inherently resist both generic categorisation, and any attempt to demonstrate 
a genealogy of the genre. A plethora of questions about the musical dialogue remain: 
What was ‘a Dialogue’? Need the composer explicitly set it for multiple vocal lines? Or 
are multiple perspectives enough for the possibility of a two-voiced performance? Why 
are dialogues often ‘tacked on’ to the end of publications that are largely compromised 
of other musical forms, as they were in Ferrabosco’s and Dowland’s collections? And 
does this association with another form shed any light on the traditions of the dialogue 
genre? Dialogues do require, however, at least at this point in time, a singing voice and 
text, whether in single, duet, or choral voicing.106  
In each of the ‘Dialogues’ examined above that are explicitly called so by the 
composer, the examples by Ferrabosco are the only early dialogues (‘early’ here 
meaning prior to Henry Lawes’s 1653 Ayres and Dialogues) that appear in a publication 
of solely lute-based solo song.107 The rest, including the Dowland, appear in collections 
nearly entirely comprised of multi-voiced or potentially multi-voiced music.108 Spink 
claims that an English taste for Italian-style declamatory music marked a shift in the 
dialogue genre in the publications after Peerson’s in 1620, making the collections from 
Lawes on a slightly different genre that he calls recitative-dialogues, which slowly 
                                                
106 As differentiated from later interpretations of musical or instrumental ‘dialogue’, for example as explored 
by Simon Keefe in Mozart’s Piano Concertos: Dramatic Dialogue in the Age of Enlightenment (Rochester: Boydell, 
2011).  
107 Spink points out that the only secular vocal music printed in England between 1632 and 1651 was an 
edition of Porter’s Madrigales in 1639 (now lost), of the 1632 first edition. Spink, “English Seventeenth-
century Dialogues”,159. 
108 Perhaps because multi-voiced settings assume that there are other singers around, rather than a solo 
singer/lutenist. 
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influenced both English madrigalian and lutenist song-writers alike.109 These recitative-
dialogues were to become a significant genre in the latter half of the seventeenth 
century. Spink identifies much of the repertoire discussed in this chapter as a 
‘transitional form’ between the choral dialogues of the late sixteenth century and those 
of the lutenists of the later seventeenth century. Though I might take semantic issue 
with Spink’s use of ‘transitional’, it seems likely that the early English dialogues were a 
form ‘in motion’. Publication with otherwise potentially multi-voiced music might 
suggest an affiliation between the dialogue and the multi-voiced genres, though the 
added instrumentation would seem to indicate that they were not entirely divorced 
from lute song either.   
Overly-simplified historiography which portrays the early seventeenth century as a 
time that saw the death of the madrigal and the rise of the lute song is complicated by 
secular social music like the dialogue or the ‘ayre’ that seems to fit into neither category 
entirely. Perhaps this point seems obvious, but it is one worth making to defend against 
the potential criticism that my approach to genre in this chapter has been too fluid. 
Certainly there are major differences, particularly regarding approach to poetics, 
between the lute, madrigal or consort song genres in their most absolute forms. That 
much was obvious both in contemporary debates (such as Thomas Campion’s 
arguments against the madrigal) and in modern analysis of these works.110 The term 
‘ayre’ often worked as a catch-all that could describe a variety of forms, and, as 
Fischlin points out, there has been a lack of modern critical attention given to the 
poetics of the ayre.111 What is presented here, however, suggests that secular forms like 
the dialogue have been influenced by multiple traditions, practically accommodating 
the demands for instrumentally versatile social music, and therefore exist outside the 
more generalised binary of solo accompanied vs. choral repertory that has been 
imposed upon secular music of this period.   
 In his discussion of the Italian frottola form, consisting of a single vocal line with 
three accompanying viols, Denis Stevens raises questions of performance practice are 
                                                
109 Spink, “English Seventeenth-century Dialogues”, 157-8. 
110 As Daniel Fischlin observes, ‘In literary terms … the distinction between the madrigal and the ayre 
consists in the former’s reliance on the Petrarchan repertoire of literary conceits (defined as poesia per musica) 
and the latter’s development of a more autonomous English tradition that had been influenced by 
Petrarchism but was fast abandoning that influence’. Fischlin, In Small Proportions, 43. 
111 Ibid.  
  209 
relevant to the English dialogues, particularly those that appear in manuscript by Byrd 
and some examples by Peerson, where dialogical performance with two singers is only 
inferred. Stevens observes that ‘[i]f dialogue is to be performed dramatically, the vocal 
line must be divided between two singers, although this method is never expressly 
suggested by the earlier prints and manuscripts. This was entirely a matter for the 
performers, and it is quite possible they shared the declamation between suitably 
contrasting voices, in spite of the relatively limited tessitura’.112 When there is a single 
singer portraying two ‘characters’ or perspectives, several decisions of how to enact the 
music are left up to the performer(s), echoed by the idea that music-making itself is a 
dialogical, relational process. In the case of Byrd’s ‘Triumph’, does the singer use 
different timbres or characterised ‘voices’ for Christ and the Sinner, for example? It 
appears that in many cases of musical dialogue, performers are the ones left to decide 
how to emphasise (or not) dialogical text.113 Moreover, it highlights the performer’s or 
a performance’s role in analysing the implications of dialogue in music, as it pertains to 
issues of self representation and multi-voiced music, an issue I will come back to in the 
conclusion of this dissertation.  
 But in instances where the music dictates that performance with two singers is 
necessary, what is the possible function of music in performing a dialogue? This 
question is particularly pertinent when the text alone does not demand multiple voices, 
as it does not in Ferrabosco’s ‘What shall I wish?’ and Peerson’s ‘Gaze not’ amongst 
others. Judd surmises that in the case of the musical treatise via dialogue, music assists 
in conveying verisimilitude, as ‘the spatial becomes temporal, the visible audible … the 
didactic becomes conversational, and the conversational, in turn, musical.’114 In the 
musical dialogues, further parallels occur between the verisimilitude offered by the 
dialogical form and the dialogical experience of musical performance to other hearers, a 
layer that may or may not be present when singing from Morley’s treatise. A 
performance of this repertoire requires other listening bodies (in the form of the 
instrumental consort members) to be present, unlike solo lute song or engaging with a 
musical treatise. Moreover, each instrumentalist in much of this repertory could 
potentially also be a singing voice. A lutenist can sing, viols and voices are frequently 
                                                
112 Stevens, “Choral Dialogues of the Renaissance”, 216. 
113 We are reminded of Campion’s words about a performer’s ‘action’ or ‘inuention’, which were just as 
important as the ‘Notes’. See Introduction, 34.  
114 Judd, “Music in Dialogue”, 72. 
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interchangeable or play and sing at the same time, and even more passive ‘hearers’ 
could partake in the choral refrains. Nearly everybody involved is a potential ‘voice’ in 
participation with this kind of domestic music.  
  On their own, the writer of a dialogical text has an ambiguous narrative position 
which, through the dialogical form, asserts that it is conveying a real experience, thus 
maintaining an uncertain relationship with truth (as, why would truth need to provide 
testament?). In some ways, however, musicalisation of a textual dialogue would seem 
to detract from verisimilitude, as normal conversation isn’t usually set to viols. As 
Mark Ringer points out, early practitioners and theorists of opera in seventeenth 
century Italy were ‘keenly aware of the violations of verisimilitude presented by 
singing characters’, a problem mollified by using inherently musical characters like 
Orfeo in the first operas.115 This violation of verisimilitude does not seem to present 
much of a problem to Peerson or his English contemporaries, however, separating 
these early dialogues fundamentally from early operatic forms. Though further 
investigation is needed, perhaps this illuminates the heritage of the English musical 
dialogue as related to the multi-voiced traditions (in spite of the fact there is only a 
single surviving English example of a polychoral dialogue), rather than a simple 
precursor to recitative.116 This suggests that, in effect, the dialogue’s ‘problem of genre’ 
is inherently linked to its aesthetic function in approach to verisimilitude, and the 
dialogue might be best defined through aesthetic tradition rather than through codified 
musical structure. Though one cannot be certain, perhaps the early English musical 
dialogue, like the madrigal, created a space in which to play one’s self through 
relational exchange. Elements of consciousness, the most abstract of feelings and 
thoughts that make us human, are fashioned not only in relation to outside opinions, 
but through multiple perspectives within our own minds, sometimes illustrated in a 
tangible way through multiple singers who represent multiple perspectives as done by 
Ferrabosco and Peerson. The parallels between musical performance and dialogue 
                                                
115 Mark Ringer, Opera's First Master: The Musical Dramas of Claudio Monteverdi (Pompton Plains: Amadeus 
Press, 2006), 26. 
116 This is supported by work on the Italian madrigal comedies that were once thought to be precursors to 
opera, but have more recently been reassessed as having more in common with sixteenth century polyphony. 
William R. Martin, “Vecchi, Orazio.” Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online. Oxford University Press 
(accessed 21 Dec 2015). <http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/29102>. 
David Nutter, “Madrigal comedy.” Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online. Oxford University Press 
(accessed 21 Dec 2015) 
<http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/17409>. 
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present questions about perspective’s role in self-creation, and also how musical 
performance can enact and therefore interrogate the space between representation and 
reality, particularly in understanding elements of consciousness like love. Though it 
might seem a distant leap from this to the traditional dialectical treatises taught at 
Cambridge and the early English pastoral dialogue on love, both forms of dialogue 
worked toward an understanding of the world around us and its relationship to the 
spiritual force inside of us, whether a force of mind or passion.  
  
4.1 Dialogues and Incompleteness 
The next section of this chapter outlines how the early modern dialogical tradition 
influenced writing beyond the didactic genres, even when the dialogical format went 
out of style or was no longer present, an idea briefly introduced at the beginning of this 
chapter. This is followed by a case study that applies these theories to a musical 
example, William Byrd’s ‘O you that heare this voice’ (1588).  
 The early modern dialogical tradition allowed for contradiction, alternatives, 
unfinishedness, and binary possibilities, as remnants of a dialogical worldview could 
manifest in subtle ways, even when the form was not present.117 For example, in her 
monograph The Renaissance Utopia: Dialogue, Travel, and the Ideal Society (2014), Chloë 
Houston argues that utopian literature of the same period was ‘characterized by an 
engagement with dialogue … and that the concept of dialogue continued to be central 
to utopian literature even as it ceased to employ the conventional forms of dialogue, 
and, eventually, utopia itself.’118 She follows the utopian genre through a transition in 
the mid-seventeenth century, away from dialogue and towards a more straightforward 
narrative, influenced by travel literature. Though authors of utopian literature start to 
‘close down the dialogue form’s capacity for multiple voices’,119 Houston traces how 
authors like Francis Bacon still incorporated elements of dialogue in their works, as 
Bacon did in New Atlantis. She concludes that even though eventually ‘utopias rejected 
the traditional utopian form, through the concept of dialogue, through the use of 
conversation as narrative device and metaphor, [dialogue] continued to remain an 
                                                
117 This is not unlike how poetic tropes of the madrigal genre was able to linger even in settings like 
Weelkes’s ‘Thule’, where there is not a nymph or shepherd in sight. 
118 Houston, The Renaissance Utopia, 7. 
119 Ibid., 11. 
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important feature of utopian literature’, even if it was in a narrative form. 120 I contend 
that dialogical features are also preserved in non-dialogical music and poetry. The 
wake of the dialogical tradition carved a path that allowed for, amongst other things, 
paradox and contradictory perspective within one body of writing, providing 
alternatives against which our perceptions can be formed.  
 This dialogical imprint is exemplified by the life and work of Sir Philip Sidney, the 
poet who wrote the text set to music by Byrd in the forthcoming case study. Gavin 
Alexander explains that ‘[i]t is characteristic of Sidney’s humanist mind-set that he 
sees options as alternatives and discussion as dialogue. The world he makes sense of 
operates according to a binary logic. His works are consequently built on pairings 
and oppositions, with plot, character, and language partitioned into binaries’.121 As 
William Poole and Richard Scholar remind us, this inclination towards pseudo-
dialogue was not unique to Sidney or utopian genres, as ‘paradox was a flourishing 
genre in the academe, a form that reminded its users of the provisionality and ductility 
of apparently stable systems of thought’.122 Hamlet’s ubiquitous ‘To be or not to be’ 
soliloquy exemplifies dialogue’s influence on modes of supposedly internal thought. 
The elements of incompleteness, binary, and paradox that Jardine, Houston, and 
Alexander identify within early modern English writing are concepts strongly linked 
with the process through which one discerns truth, providing the conversation and 
alternatives which fashion knowledge. As Shapin remarks, the conversation need not 
end in agreement, because ‘[k]nowledge of the world is given its shape as conversation 
proceeds’.123 
 Applied to music, one might be tempted to see a linear transition of some sort, or 
perhaps a decline of the dialogical musical form in England, but the surge in popularity 
of the musical dialogue (in antiphonal form) after the Civil War (though, as Spink 
shows, in a recitative style) calls this into question. The multiplicity of ways that 
dialogical concepts show their presence in musicalised text (whether explicitly 
dialogical, or just implied through concepts like contradiction) are about as muddy and 
                                                
120 Ibid., 12. 
121 Alexander, Writing After Sidney, 2. 
122 Poole and Scholar (eds.), Thinking With Shakespeare, 3. 
123 Shapin, A Social History of Truth, 33. 
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varied as its musical form, at least in the early examples.124 Still, one can see how the 
dialogical worldview persisted in a variety of texts as a mode of processing thought. If 
music’s temporal, visceral, and dialogical nature inherently insists on utterance, as 
Judd suggests, it also insists on experience, making music particularly apt for 
experiencing and cogitating the sometimes contradictory elements of consciousness 
explored in contemporary poetry. For the remainder of this chapter, I examine a work 
by William Byrd and Philip Sidney that demonstrates these lingering elements of 
dialogue and overtly discusses components of consciousness and sense perception.  
 
Philip Sidney Unfinished  
Amongst William Byrd’s English-language domestic repertory, Byrd set three texts 
that have been attributed to courtier poet Philip Sidney.125 Two of these poems are 
from Astrophil and Stella, a sequence of 108 sonnets with 11 ‘Songs’ in a range of poetic 
metres. Both settings contain textual variants from the subsequently published editions 
of Sidney’s work, and it is not known from where or whom Byrd received manuscript 
copies of the text, as Byrd’s settings were published before Sidney’s full cycle went to 
print.126 It has often been assumed that the ‘songs’ within Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella 
were not intended for musical setting, but rather played a structural role in the cycle; 
the songs ‘do not expect to be sung’ and ‘actual music is not called for’, as Winifred 
                                                
124 There is no progressive timeline, as Houston is able to demonstrate within utopian literature, for when 
dialogical music went from explicitly dialogical to abstractly so. Both forms seemed to coexist throughout the 
late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries. Composers like William Byrd and Martin Peerson, thirty 
years apart, both produced explicitly dialogical compositions, in addition to setting dialogical texts for single 
voices, as did other composers like Morley, Ferrabosco, and Dowland. 
125 Sidney’s modern editor, William Ringler, accepts the attributions of ‘O you...’, ‘O Deere life..’ and ‘O 
Lord how vain’. William Ringler, ‘The Text of “The Poems of Sidney” in M.J.B. Allen, Dominic Baker-
Smith, and Arthur Kinney (eds.), Sir Philip Sidney’s Achievements (New York: AMS Press, 1990), 137. As the 
specifics of how Byrd came into possession of Sidney’s manuscripts are not directly relevant to this 
argument, I will only mention that the two most likely connections are through the circles of Penelope Rich 
and Edward Paston, or through the poet Thomas Watson. For speculation on Byrd’s relationship with 
Sidney, see: Jeremy Smith, “The Dilatory Space of While That the Sun: Byrd, Tessier and the English 
Sequence”, Early Music 40, no. 4 (November 1, 2012): 671–85; H.R. Woudhuysen, Sir Philip Sidney and the 
Circulation of Manuscripts, 1558–1640 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 235-7; Sidney, The Poems of Sir 
Philip Sidney, (ed.) Ringler, 447-57, 523-68. 
126 Byrd’s settings are amongst the earliest known excerpts from the sequence to be published, and a musical 
manuscript source of Byrd’s setting of ‘O you’, is thought to be dated to the mid 1580s, prior to Byrd’s print 
publication, and therefore may have been transcribed while Sidney was still alive. Milsom, “Byrd, Sidney, 
and the Art of Melting”, 439. For more on the manuscript, see David Mateer, “William Byrd, John Petre 
and Oxford, Bodleian MS Mus. Sch. E. 423”, Royal Musical Association Research Chronicle, no. 29 (January 1, 
1996): 21–46. John Milsom claims Astrophil and Stella did not spread widely in manuscript, though Sidney’s 
full cycle was published by Thomas Newman in an unauthorised and error riddled quarto edition in 1591. 
Woudhuysen, Sir Philip Sidney and the Circulation of Manuscripts, 264, 367-71. For more on textual variants in 
these works, see Sidney, The Poems of Sir Philip Sidney, (ed.) Ringler, 225, 485. 
 214 
Maynard asserts.127 John Stevens challenges this idea by considering that ‘far more 
[songs] were in fact sung than we know about’,128 suggesting that some poems could 
have been created to fit existing melodies.129 Additionally, Alexander notes that Sidney 
‘quite clearly wrote poems to fit the tunes of songs’ in various languages (contrafacta) 
and ‘he equally clearly intended his own poems to be set to music’.130 Alexander cites 
the poet from Sidney’s Defence of Posey (1595), who ‘cometh to you with words set in 
delightful proportion, either accompanied with, or prepared for, the well enchanting 
skill of music’.131  
 Musical analysis of Byrd’s settings of Sidney’s work has proven to present 
significant hermeneutic challenges familiar to those who study or perform strophic 
song.132 Strophic form doesn’t allow for the composer to, in Robert Jones’s words, 
match ‘the Note to the Word’ as precisely as one would be able to in a through-
composed form like the madrigal.133 In addition to musical hermeneutic obstacles, 
Philip Sidney’s work is notoriously rife with its own challenges of interpretation, both 
within his literary output and extra-literary life, which will be discussed in further 
detail shortly. In spite of these issues, this case study presents an observation of an 
anomaly within one of Byrd’s settings. Significantly, this little curiosity in Byrd’s music 
echoes many similar challenges Sidney scholars have encountered when analysing the 
poet and his work in its unmusicalised form. This incongruity in Byrd’s setting of 
Sidney’s verse can be read as related to contemporary concern regarding the role of the 
arts in understanding sense perception, as well as the role of the performer(s) in the 
creation of musical meaning.  
One sees time and again in the life and works of Philip Sidney that the world order 
of the time was viewed through a dialogical lens, was one in which gaps and 
                                                
127 Winifred Maynard, Elizabethan Lyric Poetry and Its Music (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 83. 
128 See John Stevens’ chapter, “Musical Recollections of Sidney by William Byrd”, in Caldwell, Olleson, and 
Wollenberg, (eds.) The Well-Enchanting Skill, 169. 
129 Ibid.,163. 
130 Alexander, Writing After Sidney, 197. 
131 Ibid. There were several poetic miscellanies printed without music frequently set to music, for example 
Richard Tottel’s Miscellany (1557) or Richard Edward’s The Paradyse of daynty deuises (1576) which contained 
verses ‘so aptly made to be set to any song in .5. partes, or song to instrument’. Both amateur and 
professional musical settings of these poems existed in manuscript; a reminder that print evidence gives only 
a partial picture of textual/musical circulation. Richard Edward, The Paradyse of daynty deuises (London: 
printed by [R. Jones for?] Henry Disle, 1576), sig.A3v. Eric Nebeker, “Broadside Ballads, Miscellanies, and 
the Lyric in Print”, ELH Vol. 76, No. 4 (Winter, 2009), 989-1013, 991. 
132 All of Byrd’s musical settings with texts by Sidney are strophic. 
133 Jones, The First Booke of Songes & Ayres (1600), sig.A4r.  
  215 
inconsistencies within a single body of writing were perfectly comfortable. Efforts have 
been made to reconcile Sidney’s often-contradictory philosophical influences, but such 
attempts tend to be frustrated by Sidney’s own language, centred as it is around 
paradox, contradiction, and aposiopesis.134 Gavin Alexander maintains that one need 
accept this aspect of Sidney’s biography and work in order to engage properly with it. 
As a thinker raised within the dialectic tradition, one can see more than traces of a 
fundamentally dialogical thought processes even in his seemingly monological works 
and treatises.135 For these reasons, Sidney should be viewed as a figure that embraces 
on-going dialogue. Though a singular example, it is argued that he is demonstrative of 
a wider development in approaches to and perceptions of selfhood, and therefore this 
analysis seeks to enrich the picture of contemporary mental processes by exploring the 
contribution of music to complex systems of thought.136   
With this perception of Sidney’s work in mind, consider Gavin Alexander’s 
characterisation of Sidney as ‘himself a figure of incompletion’,137 as ‘[t]he gap between 
what we know of his life and what we find in his literary works remains something of a 
paradox’.138 Though known today as a poet-courtier, perhaps most famously for Arcadia 
and his treatise on poetry Defence of Poesy, most of his writing is difficult to date and 
none of Sidney’s work was published until after his sudden death at age 31.139 Both 
within his literature and in his life one sees a trail of incompleteness, binary, and 
paradox.140 Within his writing, plots and relationships within his fictions are sometimes 
left unresolved, binaries coexist within a single work, and conclusions are left open-
ended.141 He was known to continually revise his work, reworking and expanding 
Arcadia around 1583, rearranging and expanding the existing narrative, in addition to 
                                                
134 Rebecca Wiseman, “Introspection and Self-Evaluation in Astrophil and Stella”, Sidney Journal, 30, no. 1 
(2012): 51–77, 55. 
135 Alexander, Writing after Sidney, 3.  
136 Daniel Fischlin concurs that paradox is a frustratingly common element of English song more generally, 
stating that the cultural context in which this form blossomed was ‘burdened with contradictions’ from the 
‘banal and stereotypical Petrarchisms to those of startling insight, beauty and novelty’. Fischlin, In Small 
Proportions, 19. 
137 Gavin Alexander, “Sidney’s Interruptions”, Studies in Philology, 98, no. 2 (April 1, 2001): 184–204, 185. 
138 Alexander, Writing After Sidney, xxix. 
139 Sidney died from infection after an injury in the Battle of Zutphen, fought in the Netherlands. Duncan-
Jones in Sidney, Sir Philip Sidney, (ed.) Duncan-Jones, xxiii.  
140 Alexander, “Sidney’s Interruptions”, 184-185.  
141 Duncan-Jones in Sidney, Sir Philip Sidney, (ed.) Duncan-Jones, xii. Also see Alexander, Writing After 
Sidney, 2-3. 
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adding fresh verse and new prose.142 Curiously, he nearly finished an entirely new 
section of Arcadia, Book III, but stopped mid sentence.143 After Sidney’s death, his 
friend Fulke Greville supervised a published version of the revised Arcadia in 1590, 
which printed the incomplete text from the three revised books and some of the 
poetry.144 Alexander explains that, in 1593, the Countess of Pembroke supervised a 
new edition of the original Arcadia that was ‘completed by the addition of a revised text 
of the last three books of the original … These are much shorter in length than the 
revised books, but they do provide the ending that remains predicted throughout the 
revised version’.145 Contemporary readers were, as modern scholars are, left to decide 
which version of Arcadia is most authoritative, Greville’s ‘incomplete’ version as Sidney 
left it, or Mary’s ‘completed’ version as perhaps the author intended it.146 His sudden 
death, as well as the lore surrounding these multiple versions of Arcadia, only 
contributes to the intrigue surrounding Sidney’s propensity for unfinishedness.  
As mentioned earlier, Alexander sees a basic dialogical foundation in Sidney’s 
language. Alexander quotes Bakhtin, who explains that if we view every word as 
‘directed by an answer’ then one ‘cannot escape the profound influence of the 
answering word that it anticipates’.147 By extension, Alexander uses this as justification 
to extend this relationship to Sidney’s readers, not unlike my own approach extending 
to musicians and listeners, both contemporary and modern. When reading a text, 
‘[i]nterpretation requires an active contribution from the reader, which is why dialogue 
is an appropriate metaphor’.148 He acknowledges a potential criticism, however, one 
also very relevant to my thesis, particularly to this chapter in that: 
 
To do this will be to utilise a critical metaphor for the hermeneutic process 
rather than to describe an actuality, but it is often in metaphors that our most 
searching glimpses into literary processes and meanings are achieved, especially 
when those metaphors are developed from the texts under discussion, and 
glimpsed by their authors, as I believe is the case here.149  
 
                                                
142 Alexander, Writing After Sidney, xx. 
143 Ibid., xxi. 
144 Sidney, The Poems of Sir Philip Sidney, (ed.) Ringler, 370-82, 529-38. 
145 Mary, Sidney’s sister and the Countess of Pembroke finished several of Sidney’s other works as well, like 
his Metrical Psalms. Alexander, Writing After Sidney, xxiii. 
146 For a discussion of the historiography surrounding this work, see: ibid., xxv-xxvi. 
147 Ibid., 3. 
148 Ibid., 4. 
149 Ibid., 3. 
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I agree that it is through this sort of hermeneutic investigation that textual meanings 
are both contextualised historically and renewed for modern readers through a look at 
the dynamic aspects of experience, embracing both experiential possibility and 
traditional history.150 With this approach to reader experience in mind, Alexander 
proposes a critical challenge: 
 
We therefore have a complex choice when we encounter the aposiopesis in 
fictional, non-rhetorical situations: do we analyze it as if it is on some level 
rhetorical, intentional, a pretense, do we question the motives of speaker or 
writer, do we expect something to be implied by it; or, conversely, do we hear 
an eloquent silence? Do we on some level complete the sense, or do we just find 
the incompletion expressive?151 
 
He challenges us to consider whether we should leave incompletion as expressive (as 
being moved by the incompleteness could be seen as an end in itself) or whether it 
inherently, on some level, invites us to ‘complete the sense’. At the end of this case 
study, I will examine how Alexander’s rhetorical questions change when the 
aposiopesis is musicalised.  
 
Interpreting Byrd 
Byrd’s musical-poetic relationships are sometimes overt, as in his elegy for Sidney, 
‘Come to me, grief’ (1588). As Alexander points out, ‘this poem [possibly by Watson or 
Dyer] is written in sapphics, a classical stanza used by Sidney in OA 12 and CS 5, and 
is set to musique mesurée, as described by Sidney in the debate on metrics and music 
between Dicus and Lalus found in some manuscripts of Arcadia (OA, 89)’.152 Though 
Byrd demonstrates aptitude in following Sidney’s poetic directives, it is worth 
mentioning that Byrd probably didn’t hold Sidney’s work to any modern ideal of 
textual fidelity.153 Still, it does seem inconsistent for the same composer who paid such 
close attention to Sidney’s poetic edicts in one instance to then truncate one of his 
                                                
150 One is reminded of Charles Trinkaus’s argument mentioned earlier in this chapter. He claims that is it 
through an examination of experience that literature like dialogue can be more fully understood. When dealing 
with elements of consciousness, the dynamic aspect of experience is important because the experiences are 
ephemeral. Trinkaus, “Humanism, Religion, Society: Concepts and Motivations of Some Recent Studies”, 
687. 
151 Alexander, “Sidney’s Interruptions”, 188. 
152 Alexander, Writing After Sidney, 59. 
153 One might argue that Byrd was the type to do something once or twice to prove he can, then return to his 
own style of composition, as he did with musique mesurée, and his singular true madrigal ‘This sweet and 
merry month of may’ from Thomas Watson’s The first set of Italian madrigals Englished (1590). 
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poems in another setting. As discussed by John Milsom, Byrd included only three of 
the eight stanzas of ‘O Deere life’ in his 1589 publication.154 Milsom surmises that the 
sexual content in the missing text might be one possible reason for omission, 
particularly in the potentially mixed company of a part-song performance.155 But 
Milsom is quick to caution that the inclusion of a partial text is not necessarily evidence 
that the whole poem wasn’t performed.156 There may be, of course, pragmatic 
explanations for this, such as space or layout on the printed page, or a lack of access to 
the complete poem in manuscript copy (see Fig.4.5). But equally, Byrd’s version of ‘O 
Deere life’ can legitimately be seen to raise questions concerning contemporary 
conceptions of textual fidelity particularly in relation to this composer and poet. 
 
                                                
154 Milsom, “Byrd, Sidney, and the Art of Melting”, 439. 
155 Like Byrd’s 1588 set, his 1589 set was also probably originally consort song, set as partsong for 
publication. Though unlike ‘O you’, no consort song version of ‘O Deere’ is left in existence. Milsom, “Byrd, 
Sidney, and the Art of Melting”, 439. 
156 He observes that in manuscript copies of consort and partsong, often only the first verse is printed, so it is 
possible singers memorised or read texts from other sources. Ibid., 442. 
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Figure 4.5: Byrd, ‘O Deere life’, from Songs of sundrie natures (1589), sig.G1v. 
Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery STC / 185:10. 
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As Byrd said in the Latin introduction to his 1605 Gradualia I, ‘[i]n the words 
themselves, as I have learned from experience, there is such obscure and hidden 
power’.157 One cannot help but wonder what role music played in Byrd’s ‘experience’ 
discovering that power. Yet a challenge still remains in how one might evaluate Byrd’s 
approach to text setting given his propensity for writing music that is, as he said in his 
Psalms, songs, and sonets (1611), ‘framed to the life of the words’, rather than following 
the madrigalian trend of musically illustrating each word literally. If Byrd understood 
the ‘obscure and hidden power’ of word, it is surely pertinent to enquire how he might 
have handled that power through the medium of music, particularly when the 
connection is less obvious than in musique mesurée or madrigalian word painting. If 
Byrd wrote his music ‘framed to the life of the words’, what does this look like in 
practice?158 Though Byrd demonstrates a penchant for setting classical poetic metres 
and a keen sensitivity to points of drama in his through-composed sacred music, which 
Kerry McCarthy claims ‘owe[s] much to Italianate and humanistic ideals of clear, 
accurate text-setting’, much of Byrd’s secular output was strophic.159 So how might one 
‘frame’ music ‘to the life of the words’ in a strophic setting? The problem of musical 
interpretation with strophic poetry is well presented by McCarthy: 
 
A long strophic song makes special demands on its composer. There is no room 
here for the illustrative gimmicks cultivated by the English madrigalists, who 
usually set their texts through from A to Z with no musical repetition. A clever 
piece of word-painting in one verse may well sound ridiculous when the music 
recurs in the next verse. Even the basic issue of poetic meter can be a minefield 
when a single tune has to serve for many stanzas. The composer risks problems 
as soon as the poet begins to use variable rhythm or reversal of accent, as 
Sidney does with the all-important words “music” and “beauty” set by Byrd in O 
you that hear this voice. Rather paradoxically, the tune of a strophic song must not 
be too well suited to any individual verse. What is required is a well-wrought 
piece of music that can stand up to multiple performances and accommodate 
subtle (or not so subtle) changes in diction and mood.160 
 
In a way, strophic music also makes special demands of its performers, as they often 
get less assistance from the composition to guide them on an interpretation of the 
                                                
157 As translated in McCarthy, Byrd, 74. 
158 Ibid., 66, 113. 
159 Ibid., 205. 
160 Ibid., 88. 
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text.161 As mentioned before, poet-composer Thomas Campion wrote, ‘A naked Ayre 
without guide, or prop, or colour but its owne, is easily censured of everie eare, and 
requires so much the more invention to make it please’.162 Campion realised the central 
importance of persuasive performance to strophic repertory, as it relies on the musicians 
to bring engaging interpretation or ‘invention’ to the verse (this is in contrast to, in his 
words, ‘vulgar’ music, that is unnecessarily complex). We ‘ought to maintaine as well in 
Notes, as well as action a manly cariage’, as he believed word painting to be ‘childish’, as 
mentioned earlier.163 While there is always nuance in musical interpretation that affects 
a work’s effectiveness to an audience, a performance of ‘O you’ presents an 
idiosyncratic moment amongst Byrd’s strophic material. Though this case study does 
not promise an hermeneutic model that can be easily transferred to other strophic 
settings, the following section will look at how Byrd and Sidney’s song ‘O you that 
heare this voice’ contributes to contemporary dialogue on the musical-textual 
relationship and the hierarchy of the senses, with implications for how musical 
performance, a mundane daily practice, might contribute to gradual change in a 
collective understanding of truth.  
 
William Byrd: ‘O you that heare this voice’ 
‘O you that heare this voice’, the sixth song from Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella, describes 
a trial-like setting, reminiscent of the Judgment of Paris, for a discussion about which 
aspect of Stella, her voice or face, ‘may have the former place’ (see Fig.4.6).164 As the 
text’s narrative is self-contained, it allows the poem to stand alone from the context of 
the cycle, rendering it particularly appropriate for musical setting. Alexander notices 
that, just as Robert Sidney did in his own song works, Philip Sidney constructed the 
Astrophil and Stella songs with a ‘masterful grasp of song form and what makes words 
                                                
161 There are exceptions to this, such as Thomas Weelkes’s ‘Ha ha this world’ (1608), discussed earlier, which 
manages to accommodate madrigalian word-painting with a strophic structure by setting a text that contains 
similar ‘sentiments’ in each line of text. 
162 Rosseter, Booke of ayres (1601), sig.B1v. 
163 Emphasis my own. Ibid. See Introduction, 34.  
164 As William Poole and Richard Scholar explain, this trope is sometimes called by scholars a ‘false trial’, ‘a 
trial in which one person is subjected to quasi-legal testing … false trials also exploit movements in the legal 
philosophy of the time, especially the shift in the common law towards a probabilistic, precedent-based 
procedure, where civil law and legal philosophy still held to the idea of a demonstrable certainty’. Poole and 
Scholar, Thinking with Shakespeare, 5. 
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apt for setting to music’.165 For the purposes of this chapter, I will only be looking at 
Sidney’s text as presented by Byrd’s 1588 publication (see Fig.4.6). 
Figure 4.6: Byrd, ‘O you that heare’, from Psalms, sonets, and songs (1588), 
sig.D4v. Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery STC / 413:05. 
                                                
165 Gavin Alexander, “The Elizabethan Lyric as Contrafactum: Robert Sidney’s ‘French Tune’ Identified”, 
Music & Letters, 84, no. 3 (August 1, 2003): 378–402, 385. 
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From the first stanza, it is clear that the two parties, the voice and face, are in an 
amicable dispute, as the debate is ‘void of hate’. In a way, the real judgment throughout 
the poem is not between the two parties being represented (voice and face), but 
actually between the abilities of their legal representation. The ‘lawyers’ are music and 
beauty; the ‘witnesses’ are the ear and the eye. The ‘character witnesses’, as William 
Ringler calls them, show love is partial to beauty, but wonder is the domain of music.166 
Both beauty and music are equally persuasive in their own ways, and often work in a 
symbiotic fashion. In verse two Sidney presents the well-suited lawyers as, ‘orators to 
make the strongest judgments weak’, a reminder that even logic is no match against 
passion’s persuasion. This echoes Sidney’s defence of rhetoric against the Platonic 
assertion that only philosophy can bear truth, thus adding to an ancient and on-going 
debate regarding the Truth-bearing capabilities of the arts and reason, which Sidney 
discussed in more detail in his Defence of Poesy.167 The juxtaposition set up in stanzas 
four to seven alternate between paradigms of beauty then music, music then beauty, 
and so forth, symmetrically demonstrating their equally persuasive power. In stanza 
four, attention is drawn to the conceit of ‘harmony’, a word frequently used to describe 
both music and beauty, as a sort of circular bond between them: ‘while each contends, 
it selfe to other lends’, meaning that a beautiful face (like Stella’s, or indeed, the 
singer’s) not only enhances the ‘heavenly harmonies’ of melody, but also reflects a 
vision of harmonious perfection through its ‘flawless’ beauty.  
The moment it is sung, this relationship springs to life as a performance of 
harmony: the coming together of parts to form an orderly whole. The face of the 
singer, singing a part of Byrd’s heavenly concord, becomes more beautiful through the 
visual expression of singing beautiful music. Moreover, the ‘harmonised’ face is vital to 
one’s experience of this kind of repertoire, as the singer is the only figure capable of 
imbuing the music with words.168 The result of this coming together of parts is an 
                                                
166 Sidney, The Poems of Sir Philip Sidney, (ed.) Ringler, 485. 
167 A full discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this study. See: John Hunt, “Allusive Coherence in 
Sidney’s Apology for Poetry”, Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900, 27, no. 1 (January 1, 1987): 1–16; 
Forrest Glen Robinson, The Shape of Things Known: Sidney’s Apology in Its Philosophical Tradition (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1972). 
168 In John Case’s words, ‘although every kind of music has its very just praise, nonetheless that which is 
called the mixed, i. e., that achieved by hand and voice, should be deemed by far the most divine, since in it 
both art and nature sing. For nature has given the voice, art the instrument, and wonderful is the agreement 
and harmony of art and nature in voice and instruments’. John Case, Apologia Musices tam Vocalis Quam 
 224 
experience (and enactment) of the very harmony described in the poem, conveyed in 
the moment of performance through dialogue between subjects. Contemplation on this 
type of symbiosis through performance continues in verse five, with ‘Musicke more 
loftie swells, / in phrases finely plac’d, / Beautie as farre excels, / in action aptly grac’d’. 
Music’s ability to sound up to the heavens is only heightened by phrases of well-crafted 
verse, again emphasising the mutually bolstering relationship between words and 
music, as well as drawing attention to the individual who delivers it. Only through 
‘action’—like performance ‘aptly graced’ by the coming together of musicians, text, and 
music—is beauty, too, able to reach such lofty heights.169  
In his opening invocation, ‘O You’, Sidney challenges the reader or listener as well 
as those in the courtroom to take a stance (‘who dare judge this debate’), drawing 
attention to one’s role as observer through anacoenosis. It is revealed that the most 
likely arbiter, Common Sense, one of the three internal senses, who is here cast as 
male, is not very useful in breaking the tie, as he is too partial to both parties.170 And 
even though ‘princess’ Reason can conceive of the mathematical harmony of the 
spheres and identify beauty (‘and Musicke can in skye, / with hidden beauties find’), 
Sidney leaves unresolved the question of whether she can make logical sense of the 
passions and therefore reach a decision. Casting Reason as a royal authority (but 
notably not a Prince or Queen) makes her lack of a ruling even more poignant, 
suggesting doubt in Reason’s ultimate reign, as she is left without an opportunity to 
answer. Sidney’s inferred doubt of Reason conceivably stems from his belief that 
poetry, rhetoric, and music are persuasive arts whose moralising properties engage 
through emotion rather than by logic—tangible effects too powerful to be immediately 
deemed inferior to philosophy.171 In leaving the ruling open-ended, Sidney leaves the 
reader/listener to contemplate an answer, thereby framing the poem as a whole with 
acknowledgements of ‘you’, the observer.  
                                                                                                                                                  
Instrumentalis et Mixtae (1588), Critical Edition, (ed.) Dana Sutton 
<http://www.philological.bham.ac.uk/music/> (accessed 21 July 2015). 
169 ‘Action’ has secondary meaning of ‘a gesture or movement’ that ‘accompanies speech or song’. “action, 
n.”, OED Online. Oxford University Press, December 2014 (accessed 3 March 2015). 
170 The ‘internal senses’ are common sense, memory, and fantasy—as they were to many like Edmund 
Spencer, Thomas Tomkis, etc. Jonathan Walker and Paul Streufert, Early Modern Academic Drama (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2008), 135. 
171 Michael Dickreiter in Gozza (ed.), Number to Sound, 143. 
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The device of rhetorical questioning is normally used to affirm or deny a point, 
rather than to lead the reader to genuine contemplation of an answer.172 By contrast, in 
Sidney’s poem, as Alexander has pointed out (through his own unanswered 
questioning), ‘we’ the readers have a choice to make when presented with this 
inconclusive ending: ‘Do we on some level complete the sense, or do we just find the 
incompletion expressive?’173 When poetry is set to music and performed, however, the 
‘we’ in Alexander’s contemplation shifts from ‘we’ the readers to a more complicated 
double-layered ‘we’. First, a text is interpreted by the singers and musicians who 
translate the text into musical performance, which is in turn transmitted in time to ‘we’ 
the hearers, complicating the relationship, or indeed highlighting the space between the 
rhetorical device and the individual(s) contemplating the text.  
William Byrd’s musical setting is crucial to such a reading of this verse, however, 
not only because of the obviously self-reflective element of ‘Musicke more loftie swells’, 
with semantic guidance ‘in phrases finely plac’d’, but because of a curious anomaly in 
Byrd’s setting. In standard practice for Byrd’s consort songs, the music is printed with 
the first verse of text under laid to it, and the additional stanzas printed separately at 
the end of the music; by convention these additional stanzas were sung to the same 
music, repeated as many times as necessary. In ‘O you’, however, the music is bipartite: 
part (a) in duple metre, and part (b) in triple metre, each of which takes one verse of 
text; the anomaly is that the text’s nine stanzas do not divide evenly between these two 
sections of music. While it is very possible the composer didn’t intend for all the verses 
to be sung, recent scholarship on Byrd’s text setting, as well as evidence of his support 
of the poetic directives of Sidney, make this seem suspect.174 If the piece is sung 
through all the way, performers need to make a musical accommodation to complete 
the text. In the simplest scenario, the musicians continue to alternate the two musical 
parts, thus ending the song at the conclusion of part (a): 
                                                
172 See definition 4 in “rhetorical, adj.”, OED Online. Oxford University Press, December 2014 (accessed 10 
March 2015). 
173 Alexander, “Sidney’s Interruptions”, 188. 
174 More broadly, this is an issue of performance practice with lengthy texts: did a singer memorise their 
texts? Read from a part book? Or perhaps from a separate copy of the poem? Were all published verses 
meant to be sung? Moreover, are readers/performers familiar with Sidney’s whole poem outside of Byrd’s 
publication supposed to ‘finish the sense’, either internally or vocally? Though in domestic works such as 
these, ‘audiences’ and ‘performers’ were often one and the same, there are a lot of unanswered questions in 
the performance practice of these works. Milsom, “Byrd, Sidney, and the Art of Melting”, 441-2. Fischlin, In 
Small Proportions, 249. 
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Text verse: 123456789 
Musical part:  ababababa 
 
Though harmonically both (a) and (b) cadence to the tonic, this has the effect of 
feeling unfinished, since part (b) has established the pattern of repeating the last 
couplet of its verse, in a conventional concluding gesture.175 Though the 
‘unfinishedness’ of an unaccommodated performance would eloquently fit the ethos of 
this reading, it is only one possibility. Alternative scenarios would involve ending the 
song with an immediate repetition of part (b): 
 
Text verse:  123456789 
Musical part: ababababb 
 
Or as one significant recording has done, repeat part (a) at some point earlier in the 
song to end up on the final part (b) by the last verse.176  
 
Text verse:  123456789 
Musical part:  abaababab 
 
One could also just repeat the text of the last verse twice, first with music (a) and then 
with (b), as suggested by editor Jeremy Smith in The Byrd Edition (2004).177 
Directions for how to end the song are not given in Byrd’s printed edition, which is, 
barring a mistake or omission in typesetting, somewhat curious given that none of the 
other similarly lengthy settings in this collection, even ones with an odd number of 
verses, present the same problem of co-ordination.  
                                                
175 Philip Brett, “The English Consort Song, 1570-1625”, Proceedings of the Royal Musical Association, 88 
(January 1, 1961): 73–88, 74. 
176 In their recording, Fretwork and Emma Kirkby repeat music (a) after ‘For beautie beautifies’, perhaps 
because the ‘for’ allows for a continued thought from the previous stanza. William Byrd, Fretwork and 
Emma Kirkby, Byrd: Consort Songs (Harmonia Mundi Fr., 2005). Jeremy Smith says this choice is 
undesirable, as it too smoothly closes an ending that should perhaps be left inconclusive. J. Smith, Verse and 
Voice, 75. 
177 William Byrd, Psalms, Sonets, and Songs 1588, The Byrd Edition Vol. 12, (eds.) Philip Brett, Jeremy Smith 
(London: Stainer & Bell, 2004), 67. 
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 The practical explanation for the anomaly is that, very simply, this sort of 
occurrence wasn’t a problem for contemporary musicians. In the metrical psalm 
tradition, text was often paired with existing, transferrable music and half-stanzas and 
uneven verse numbers in text were frequently encountered.178 As the metrical psalm 
book Form of prayers (1560-61) notes after Psalm 47: ‘The last verse is sung with the last 
two clauses’,179 suggesting that the last two lines of text from the half stanza are 
repeated for the duration of the remaining music (a technique that echoes the repeated 
couplets already common at the end of Byrd’s settings). Alternately, singers could 
repeat other lines of the last stanza, if it made poetic sense, taking into account 
masculine and feminine endings. In his own psalm settings, it appears that Sidney 
preferred the poetic closure provided by asymmetrical endings, as, in Alexander’s 
estimation, one-fifth of the 43 psalms phrased by Philip Sidney have irregular endings, 
or ‘formal deviation for closural effect’.180 The idea that the problem presented by 
Byrd’s musical setting has a common practical solution already in practice in other 
musical-poetic traditions like the metrical psalm does not weaken hermeneutic interest 
in this presentation of text and music, however. Through Byrd’s open-ended setting, a 
performance of this piece irrefutably draws attention to the open-ended suggestion 
reached in the same ‘troublesome’ last verse of the poem’s text and indeed Sidney’s 
own penchant for ‘unfinishedness’. Byrd’s setting, the conclusion of the trial, and 
indeed the story of Astrophil and Stella on the whole ends in what Katherine Duncan-
Jones deems an ‘emotional impasse’, Astrophil’s ‘dialogue with [Stella] unresolved’.181  
 
Unfinished Dialogue 
The prevalence and influence of dialogue and the place of paradox within early modern 
English literary forms is a well-explored aspect of scholarship on this period, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter. The musical idiosyncrasy described in this case study 
aligns with the influence of dialectic thought within Sidney’s poem, even though the 
                                                
178 A similar ‘uneven divide’ of text also happens in Byrd’s setting of Psalm 119, ‘How shall a young man’ 
(1588), as the last verse is a half stanza. But as the music is not bipartite, the only reasonable ‘completion’ 
here is to repeat the last half stanza as precedented by the metrical psalm tradition, leaving the performer 
with no choice. 
179 Timothy Duguid, Metrical Psalmody in Print and Practice: English “Singing Psalms” and Scottish “Psalm Buiks”, 
C. 1547-1640 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), 47. 
180 Alexander, Writing After Sidney, 92. 
181 Sidney, Sir Philip Sidney, (ed.) Duncan-Jones, xii. 
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dialogical form is not present. Moreover, through Sidney’s textual discussion of the 
hierarchy of the senses, this case study highlights the dialogue that occurs during the act 
of performance as an important link between attempts to understand the effects and 
mechanics of sense perception as presented by Sidney’s text and impending change in 
ways of knowing truth that culminated in the work of the mid-century Cartesian 
philosophers. The act of performance engages the listener in a dialogue, viscerally 
presenting questions of mind and body through the sensory experience of musical 
performance. The trial-like setting, reminiscent of the dramatic form implied by 
dialectic literature, provides verisimilitude whilst accommodating multiple 
perspectives, even though Byrd did not compose the music dialogically.  
 But it is only when the text is set musically in the way Byrd has done that performers 
are left to decide how to conclude the piece, as recitation of the poetry alone does not 
present the same issues of completion.182 Indeed, a discussion must be had amongst the 
musicians prior to even a casual performance of the work in order for them to decide 
how the piece should proceed and end. Regardless of which completion they choose, 
however, the dialogue animated by the musicians effectively reflects upon the idea that 
few things are certain in matters involving the passions. Though Sidney’s poem does 
not doubt the witness testimony of the ear and the eye, it still effectively contemplates 
the nature and mechanics of sense perception and its relationship to reason. Moreover, 
Sidney’s open ending from ‘Princess’ Reason and Byrd’s incomplete setting leave only 
one ‘sure thing’: a sense of wonder, which is in Descartes’s view our response to those 
features of the world most worthy of our consideration, even if we don’t recognise 
them as such right away.183 Though Descartes was a rationalist, in order to establish 
reason as the foundation of truth, he had to initially doubt even reason itself. Within 
the context of this poem, Sidney’s tentative trust in reason is demonstrated by casting 
her as a princess without a ruling. Though this doubt of reason is primarily in defence 
of the persuasive emotional arts, it also adds to an interpretation of this setting as a 
performance that assesses the nature of the relationship between mind and matter. 
                                                
182 For more on recitation vs. the silent reader, see Elspeth Jajdelska, Silent Reading and the Birth of the Narrator 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007). 
183 Amy Schmitter, “17th and 18th Century Theories of Emotions”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), (ed.) Edward N. Zalta  
 <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/emotions-17th18th/> (accessed 31 July 2015). 
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 Even though performers, not philosophers, are left to navigate this problem 
presented by Byrd’s setting, it seems only appropriate, still, to set such a text to music, 
as, if according to the poem music’s domain is wonder, then these philosophical 
questions can only be heightened by music employing its power. Socrates and others in 
the Platonic legacy have called wonder the ‘beginning of philosophy’.184 Descartes, too, 
believed wonder’s primary concern was to prompt us to seek knowledge.185 And 
according to Sidney in ‘O you’, what better way to invoke wonder than with music? 
Wonder, like the power of music over the passions, was a force of both fascination and 
great fear: for in wonder, knowledge is fundamentally incomplete, a concept echoed in 
Byrd’s unusual setting of Sidney’s poem. Francis Bacon thought of wonder as ‘broken 
knowledge’,186 and if music wields the power of wonder, as Sidney suggests in his song, 
it is not surprising that philosophers such as Bacon and Descartes saw music as a 
central tenet in understanding the role of the self in the philosophy of nature.187  
Both William Byrd and Philip Sidney seem to look ‘inside’ to find inspiration, 
though in slightly different ways.188 Throughout his works, Sidney implies that the best 
way to write is to, as the Muse states in Astrophil and Stella, ‘look in thy heart, and 
write’, maintaining that those who simply imitate foreign trends ‘bewray a want of 
inward touch’.189 Byrd similarly rejects imitation of Italian musical trends in his 
compositions, looking inside, and to God, for inspiration. Byrd writes that when poetic 
sentences and ‘divine things’ are turned ‘over attentively and earnestly in his mind, the 
most appropriate measures come, I know not how, as if by their own free will, and 
                                                
184 David Bollert, “Plato and Wonder”, Extraordinary Times, IWM, (Vol. 11: Vienna 2001), 2. 
<http://www.iwm.at/publications/visiting-fellows-conferences/vol-11/> (accessed 21 July 2015). 
185 Amy Schmitter “17th and 18th Century Theories of Emotions”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), (ed.) Edward N. Zalta,  
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotions17th18th/LD2Descartes.html#WonGen> (accessed 31 July 
2015). 
186 Mary Baine Campbell, The Witness and the Other World: Exotic European Travel Writing, 400-1600 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1991), 260. 
187 Descartes wrote about music early in his career, mainly in Compendium musicae (1618). Music plays a role 
throughout Bacon’s written work, including Sylva (1627), New Atlantis (1627), and Advancement of Learning 
(1605). 
188 On a related tangent, Rebecca Wiseman views Astrophil and Stella as a contribution to the revisions of 
subjectivity that occurred over the course of the seventeenth century, reminding us that the humanist self of 
sixteenth-century England is more compatible with later Cartesian conceptions of self than is sometimes 
supposed. In line with this idea, Wiseman looks at the character of Astrophil, as well as Sidney’s sequence as 
a whole, and asserts that Astrophil’s introspection is the jurisdiction of the ‘self-aware subject who subjects 
his sensations to scrutiny, and by considering it a psychological process that entails a distinction between 
perceiving and thinking, Sidney hints at a model of subjectivity that links self-knowledge with a critical 
engagement with one’s soul’. Wiseman, “Introspection and Self-Evaluation in Astrophil and Stella”, 51. 
189 Sidney, Sir Philip Sidney, (ed.) Duncan-Jones, 158. 
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freely offer themselves to his mind if it is neither idle nor inert’.190 It seems curiously 
appropriate that one artist look to his heart, and the other to his mind to stimulate 
imagination, as imagination was often seen as the immaterial link between heart and 
mind and between sensation and reason.   
Sidney bookends his poem between the invocation ‘O you’ and the wanting 
‘conclusion’, and in doing so markedly draws attention to one’s role as observer, a self-
awareness belonging to contemporary tradition, but also indicative of something to 
come. The shift away from a straightforward study of an object of sense perception 
(like voice/face), to one that studies both object and observer (voice/face and you), 
represents a fundamental change of approach to knowledge building visible in 
Descartes’s early work on music (Compendium musicae, 1618), an adjustment that 
proved integral to his later work.191 What is presented in this case study is an example 
of contemporary self-awareness that demonstrates how music could play an active role 
in the questioning that led to change in ways of establishing truth. Awareness of one’s 
role as observer is viscerally augmented through performance, where a singer 
essentially calls ‘you’ to action, dynamically demanding contemplation of the self.192 
To reiterate, this analysis is not claiming that this song by Byrd and Sidney is a pre-
emptive allegory for Cartesian truth and knowledge. Music making was a practical and 
significant part of daily life enjoyed by Descartes and his circles, as it was in Sidney’s 
circles in the generation before. This is simply a reading of an inconsistency in a 
common practice: incompleteness interpreted as an on-going dialogue understood here 
as a negotiation of ideas relevant to looming transformations in ways of knowing. 
Though both the text and music of ‘O you that heare this voice’ ostensibly draw upon 
earlier compositional traditions and contemporary aesthetic debates, it is the 
inconsistent aspects of the piece that imply change in approach to establishing truth. 
The act of performance, in itself a kind of dialogue, is key to understanding how music 
actively shaped collective knowledge, as most subjects cannot experience the aesthetic 
features of a song completely when mediated by a piece of paper. The singer’s 
                                                
190 William Byrd, Gradualia I: Part 1 - the Marian Masses v. 5: 1605, Byrd Edition, Vol. 5, (ed.) Philip Brett 
(London: Stainer & Bell Ltd, 1989), xxxvi. 
191 Jorgensen, “Descartes on Music”, 410. Also, see Wiseman, “Introspection and Self-Evaluation in 
Astrophil and Stella”. 
192 As Elizabeth Hanson asserts, the period around 1600 can be viewed as ‘a redrafting of the terms on which 
the subject relates to the world’. Hanson, Discovering the Subject in Renaissance England, 2. 
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performance is the essential link to this reading, providing the animated body and 
spirit—the self that wonders—that the musical notation and text alone cannot enact. 
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Conclusion 
In Robert Jones’s ‘Life is a Poets fable’ (1600), the speaker presents the pervasive idea 
that life is but an imagined fiction. This text is notable, however, for its unusual self-
referentiality, not to the poem’s own form or words, but to the idea that this poem 
would be set to music, and the text contemplated within musical performance.1 The 
fourth verse explicitly articulates the concurrent process of musical utterance, drawing 
attention to the idea that life, too, is proceeding towards expiration just like a song in 
progress: 
 
This instant of my song, 
A thousand men lie sicke, 
A thousand knels are rong: 
And I die as they sing, 
They are but dead and I dying.2 
 
This verse draws poignant attention to the musical nature of this piece, as a text 
inseparable from its musicalised performance context, which puts the moment of 
musical utterance at the forefront of its interpretation. When confronted with a self-
aware piece of music like this, one that inherently resists objectification as a static 
historical object, it seems necessary to adopt a mode of interpretation that appreciates 
the dynamic quality of musical utterance, even if in the past; one that, in Bruce Smith’s 
words, ‘attends to the materiality of the evidence they have left behind’ but also 
‘acknowledges the embodiedness of the investigator in the face of that evidence’.3 
Jones’s self-aware setting commands what the other musicalised texts in this thesis have 
only firmly recommended—that one must properly engage with the dynamic aspect of 
musical experience in order to access music’s active contribution to dialogues on 
knowing. It is with this idea in mind that I explain why I chose to focus this study on 
multi-voiced vocal music.   
 
                                                       
1 The song also has several musical puns. For example, ‘death times the notes that I doe breake’ might refer 
to the temporality of both life and music. ‘Each age of death makes one degree’ might be a musical pun on 
scale degrees. The ‘worlds arithmeticke’ is possibly a reference to mathematical harmony of the spheres. 
Morley is the earliest use of musical ‘degree’ listed in the OED. “degree, n.”, OED Online. Oxford University 
Press, December 2015 (accessed 8 February 2016). For the poem’s complete text, see Appendix I(f).  
2 Jones, The First Booke of Songes & Ayres (1600), sig.E4v-r.  
3 B. Smith, Key of Green, 8.  
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 Phenomenological ‘Striking’  
As contemporary writers supported again and again, the reason I chose to focus this 
study on multi-voiced music is because of the deep feelings group singing elicits. In 
1617, Robert Robinson believed that singing exceeded instrumental music in pleasing: 
‘melody is made most pleasing, and thereby it commeth to passe, that the voice of man 
is worthily accompted more excellent, then any artificiall musicke hitherto inuented’.4 
Not only did some contemporaries feel something special in the human voice, but 
particularly in polyphonic singing. Martin Fotheby, writing in 1622, echoed 
Robinson’s sentiments, reasoning: 
 
Now, for Man: hee hath not onely a naturall delight in Musicke, as other 
Creatures haue; and a naturall abilitie, to expresse all the parts of it, more then 
other Creatures haue, by the sweetenesse of his tuneable and melodious voice, 
farre excelling the sweetenesse of all musicall instruments: But he hath also 
inlarged his naturall Musick, with all the seuerall kindes of Artificiall Musick, 
both Vocal, and Organicall.5  
 
Like Robinson, Fotheby argued that man’s voice was the utmost instrument, but he 
also believed it was special because he had ‘inlarged his naturall Musick’ with 
polyphonic composition and instruments. As quoted earlier, the author of Praise of 
Music believed that polyphonic vocal music or ‘artificiall singing’ exceeded ‘plain 
Musicke, for it striketh deeper, and worketh more effectually in the hearers’.6 In 1625 
David Lindsay reiterated this idea, and asked ‘what mans eares are not transported, 
when he heares a number of sweete voyces, singing artificiall musicke in diuerse parts 
formerly and melodiously ’.7 Hear this, and you should ‘find thy selfe wonderfully 
transported’.8 Anecdotes seem to support Erin Minear’s argument that vocal music, 
and indeed polyphonic vocal music, affected some more greatly than instrumental 
                                                       
4 Robert Robinson, The art of pronuntiation digested into two parts (London: Printed by Nicholas Okes, 1617), 
sig.B3v. 
5 Martin Fotheby, Atheomastix clearing foure truthes, against atheists and infidels (London: printed by Nicholas 
Oakes, 1622), sig.Ee7v. ‘Organicall’ means, ‘Of music: performed on an instrument, instrumental’. 
“organical, adj.”, OED Online. Oxford University Press, December 2015 (accessed 22 February 2016). 
'Artificial music' can refer to instrumental music or polyphonic music, depending on the context.  
6 Anonymous, The praise of musicke (1586), sig.J8r. Also Minear, Reverberating Song in Shakespeare and Milton, 
35. 
7 David Lindsay, The godly mans iourney to heauen containing ten seuerall treatises (London: printed by R F[ield], 
1625), sig.Nn7r.  
8 As discussed in Chapter Two, this ‘transportation’ could be figurative (as probably implied by Lindsay 
here) or literal, as argued by men like Bacon and Sidney, who believed that the mimetic arts could elicit 
action that leads to social change.  
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music or music for a single voice because of the ‘inwardness’ or ‘deepness’ of music’s 
penetration.9 This focus on ‘inwardness’ is in line with contemporary physiological 
conceptions of hearing. Bacon, Davies, and others noted how hearing, unlike some 
other senses, occurred when a physical object, sound, entered the inside of the body.10 I 
came to realise that what I was after in focussing this study on vocal music was an 
expanded explanation for what early moderns felt as multi-voiced singing ‘striking 
deeper’ than plain music.11 Though this ‘striking deeper’ was and is subjective, it is 
what I feel when I sing polyphony. Historical subjects share with me the materialism of 
a human body.12 It is as subjective an experience to me, to my body today, as it was to 
Robinson, Fotheby, or Lindsay in the Stuart period.13 The inward or deep ‘striking’ 
feeling, mentioned time and again in relation to the sense of hearing and music is, I 
argue, a rhetorical attempt at the articulation of the bodily experience of music.14 Bruce 
Smith asks us to negotiate ‘the difference between ontology, which assumes a detached, 
objective spectator who can see the whole, and phenomenology, which assumes a subject 
who is immersed in the experience she is trying to describe’.15 What some early 
moderns articulated as a ‘striking’ feeling might be an attempt at objectifying an 
experience that resists objectification, the moment of musical experience.16  
Though ‘potentially multi-voiced music’ might seem an arbitrary limit (and nearly 
any thesis necessarily accommodates some of these), I believe a study of multi-voiced 
                                                       
9 Minear, Reverberating Song in Shakespeare and Milton, 35. 
10 See Chapter Two.  
11 Though there were also those that fought for solo-voiced music as the foremost form, like Thomas 
Campion. 
12 As Smith says, human experience is about people: ‘people whose voice-based cultures are available to us 
only if we come at them by indirections’. B. Smith, The Acoustic World of Early Modern England, 29. 
13 This is not an argument for some sort of romantic notion of universal humanity. As Nicholas Cook points 
out, any sense of communality from a music as a ‘language of feeling’ would lead to a more limited form of 
musical meaning across time and cultures than would be shared between subjects who were ‘fully 
enculturalated’. I am not arguing that my bodily experience is in any way the same as an early modern 
subject’s experience would be, but that historical phenomenology is inherently, in Smith’s words, ‘an 
amalgam of biological constants and cultural variables’. Cook, "Theorizing Musical Meaning", 187. B. Smith, 
The Acoustic World of Early Modern England, 8. 
14 In addition to the examples of immediate ‘striking’ in Praise of Music, George Sandys, and Francis Bacon, 
one also sees the word ‘strike’ in relation to the experience of music in Shakespeare’s The Tempest: ‘Music, 
awake her; strike’ (V.iii.99). Perhaps there is some connection between interior striking, and the verb used 
when one ‘strikes’ a lute. See Ch. 2, 83, 86, 90. 
15 B. Smith, The Acoustic World of Early Modern England, 10. 
16 Smith asks you to take words of experience, as I take ‘striketh’ to be, ‘not as symbols, signs with only an 
arbitrary relation to the thing toward which they point, but as indexes, signs with a natural or metonymic 
connection with somatic experience’. Another word frequently found in early modern descriptions of the 
effect of music that could work instead of ‘striketh’ would be ‘ravisheth’, as quoted by Shakespeare, Wright, 
and Burton. In some ways, ‘ravish’ better captures the involuntary nature of musical experience. See 
“Passions and Music”, Chapter Two. B. Smith, “Premodern Sexualities”, 326. 
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music resonated with me because of the aspect of music making that is inherently 
collaborative in its dialogical nature. Multi-voiced music, in all its forms, makes this 
most obvious. Even in private contemplation of the self, we are necessarily creating 
those selves against some form of Other. Ergo, though subjectivity is about the 
individual, it can be discerned or formed in social ways.17 The performance of multi-
voiced music makes the process of self-creation physical and sensory as those qualities 
are enacted and represented through multiple human bodies experiencing performance 
together. Multi-voice music performs the very idea that the creation of the self is 
collaborative and dialogic.18 Though in solo/instrumental music there are often multiple 
bodies working together, perhaps it is only through the addition of another human voice 
that an experience absolutely draws attention to these collaborative, dialogic processes 
of human consciousness simultaneously: those of music-making and of knowledge 
building.  
 
 Social Acts 
If a performance of multi-voiced music can enact the dialogic process of knowledge 
building, this affinity is supported by the notion that the Cartesian subject was highly 
social.19 It is a misconception that self-knowledge is an inward and solitary act. Though 
in articulating ‘cogito ergo sum’ Descartes determined absolute certainty through 
immediate intuition, a seemingly solitary act, the events, processing, and most 
importantly, the emotions experienced before that articulation required dialogical and 
collaborative exchange. Susan James explains that: 
 
Because knowledge of our power includes knowledge of its limits, it contains 
both the promise of ataraxia and the curse of melancholy and despair. The 
philosopher's strength is simultaneously a weakness, and his ability to control 
nature is threatened by passions which remove his ability to control himself. An 
understanding of our own fragility has many manifestations which undercut the 
confident assertions of independence that can be traced in the work of Bacon 
and Descartes. Most winningly, perhaps, Descartes’s haughty rejection of the 
idea that anyone can help him is the prelude to an admission that he has 
                                                       
17 This is in spite of the complications for ‘voice’ and perspective within multi-voiced music that accompany a 
fundamentally collaborative view of self-knowledge. As will be explained shortly, even Descartes had to 
concede that all knowledge building is a collaborative process. 
18 As Shakespeare’s Richard II says, ‘Thus play I in one person many people, / And none contented’ (King 
Richard II, V.v.31-32).  
19 Gobert, The Mind-Body Stage, 10. 
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changed his mind. If he does not publish his work, people may think his reasons 
for withholding it are discreditable. “I am not excessively fond of glory”, he 
protests. Nevertheless, silence is not a sufficient defence against the meddling 
savants, who are liable to put a damaging construction on it. In addition, 
Descartes confesses, “I am becoming more and more aware of the delay which 
my project of self-instruction is suffering because of the need for innumerable 
observations which I cannot make without the help of others.” The acquisition 
of knowledge must, after all, be to some extent a collective enterprise.20 
 
If knowledge was determined to require interpersonal exchange, an idea reinforced 
in modern times by social history and a resurgence of the sociology of knowledge, it 
seems reasonable that social collaborations, like that of music making—a collaborative 
activity that stimulated the passions, the mind, and moved men to action—would be 
the very sort of mundane activity that contributed to changes in episteme.21 The idea 
that knowledge building was a social, rather than a purely philosophical one, is echoed 
in Andrew Barnaby and Lisa Schnell’s assessment of Baconian inquiry as one in which 
knowing was remade in order to ‘reconstruct the very notion of the political 
community as a community of shared inquiry', rooting the social conception of 
knowledge in contemporary theories as well.22 Also, Peter Burke wouldn’t want us to 
forget that ‘[i]ntellectual debates owe a good deal to the forms of sociability and so to 
the social frameworks in which they take place, from the seminar room to the cafe’, 
and, might I add, the music room.23 
As I have argued throughout this thesis, not only could musical form and beliefs 
about music reflect and shape episteme, but so could the practice of music making. In 
Chapter Four, Martha Feldmen and Cristle Collins Judd support the idea that music 
and musical treatises reflected an intellectual milieu influenced greatly by dialectics and 
dialogical forms, which thereby highlighted music’s own dialogical character. Lisa 
Jardine’s work demonstrates how Francis Bacon’s dialectically-focused education 
influenced his advancement of knowledge, even if he wasn’t writing in an explicitly 
dialogical form. Jardine's scholarship on Bacon draws links between 
dialectics/dialogue and knowledge building, while Feldman and Judd assert that the 
                                                       
20 James, Passions and Action, 247-8. 
21 Support for social conception of knowledge can be found in Shapin, A Social History of Truth, 6. Burke, 
Social History of Knowledge, 6.  
22 Andrew Barnaby and Lisa Schnell, Literate Experience: The Work of Knowing in Seventeenth-Century English 
Writing (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 2, 8. 
23 Burke, A Social History of Knowledge, 44. 
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traditions of dialectic and dialogue were embedded in contemporary thought 
processing, through what Judd calls the ‘original conversation’ or ability to sing, 
drawing links between music and dialogue (see Fig.5.1).24 
 
  
Figure 5.1 
What remains, is the bottom arrow on this diagram: the arrow connecting music and 
knowledge, which I have tagged as ‘performance acts’. 
 Though music played a formative role in the theories of Descartes and Bacon, it is 
not exclusively for these reasons I determine music also played an active role in 
changing structures of knowledge. In Chapter Three I explored how musical form 
could effect and change textual meaning, form being the most traditional way music 
could work ‘independently’ to create meaning that contributed to ongoing dialogues on 
the nature of truth and its representations.25 But aside from form, the most tangible 
way that music was able to contribute to ideas about knowledge was, as discussed in 
this thesis’s introduction, through performance. Social historians and performance 
theorists alike would agree that knowledge is formed by daily activities. This study 
highlights one such activity that is not only a practice of daily life, but one that is 
inherently dialogical, and used texts that directly contemplated the reliability of the 
                                                       
24 Judd, “Music in Dialogue”, 72. 
25 What Cook calls the ‘problematic Hanslickian inheritance’, which he claims ‘is most evident in the work of 
those philosophers and, more recently, music theorists who have readmitted issues of meaning within 
academic debate, but on terms which maintain the underlying values of formalism’. Cook, Theorizing Musical 
Meaning, 174. 
 238 
senses, states of consciousness like love and dreaming, and interrogated, through its 
very performance and degrees of verisimilitude, representations of reality. It could 
strike straight to the heart of people in a way little understood in mechanical terms, yet 
presented fundamental questions about the quality of the body and spirit or soul. This 
evidence suggests that this is not a question of ‘whether or not’ music can build 
knowledge, but ‘to what extent’. As Angela Esterhammer says, our new question is 
about ‘how deeply knowledge is conditioned by being represented in public contexts’.26 
Moreover, she argues that ‘[p]erformance affects not only the way knowledge is 
transmitted, but even the way it is produced. Whenever knowledge is being performed 
it is also, to some extent, being formed’.27 This would fall under what Mary Helen 
Dupree and Sean Franzel call ‘how certain kinds of speech acts “do” rather than “say” 
things, seeking less to assess propositional statements about certain states of affairs and 
more to describe how certain “performative” utterances or actions create new states of 
affairs in the first place’.28 If Judith Butler has successfully demonstrated how ‘fixed 
concepts like gender can be destabilized even as they are foregrounded in the act of 
performance’,29 as in a drag show, surely this concept could transfer to similarly ‘fixed’ 
historical concepts like Aristotelian conceptions of truth. Additionally, the dialogical 
tendencies within musical performance curiously echo the ‘collective enterprise’, in 
James's words, necessary for the acquisition of knowledge. Therefore, a performance 
of music about the nature of human consciousness is, inherently, presenting issues of 
knowledge in a physical, social, and dialogical manner, that, in its moment of utterance, 
engages with issues of mind and body both in text and through physical experience 
(singing, hearing, playing, etc.). The physical phenomenon works as a destabilising 
agent for the ‘fixed’ metaphysical concepts discussed in the music’s texts, potentially 
exposing a gap between what is ‘known’ in the text and what is ‘understood’ in the 
moment of experience. It was through this process that a performance of this music 
was able to contribute actively to the trajectory of episteme.  
As Dupree and Franzel assert (though discussing the eighteenth century 
specifically), ‘[i]t is our conviction that these literary, theatrical, and scientific events 
                                                       
26 Angela Esterhammer, “Afterword: The Audience, the Public, and the Improvisator Maximilian 
Langenschwarz” in Mary Helen Dupree and Sean B. Franzel (eds.), Performing Knowledge, 1750-1850 (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2015), 341. 
27 Ibid. 
28 They derive some of their theory from the work of Judith Butler and John Langshaw Austin. Ibid., 8. 
29 Ibid.  
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are not mere epiphenomena of an intellectual-historical tradition or of abstract 
scientific propositions, but rather that they serve as vital conduits in the larger process 
of generating, differentiating, and circulating knowledge in this period’.30 In the 
moment that music, in early modern terms, ‘striketh’ the soul or heart, the power of the 
passions are not only experienced dynamically, but the subject is physically presented 
with a fundamental question of mind and body, an act that contributed to ongoing 
discourse about sense perception that would prove crucial epistemic shifts in the 
seventeenth century. In this thesis, meaning is built through the coming together of 
parts: a text cogitating elements of human consciousness, the dialogical exchange 
between voiced bodies, the wonder and passions invoked that could move man to 
(re)create his very being, the experience of fundamental questions on the quality and 
mechanics of the senses, body, and soul, as well as the often blurry juxtaposition 
between realities experienced and realities represented in musical performance. 
Perhaps the musical performance of an element of consciousness enacts the gap 
between truth and its representation in a most self-reflective form. Or in other words, 
feasibly it exposes the cracks and contradictions in discourse and social practices that 
lead to ways of knowing.31 But in order to access these moments of performance 
historically, I turn again to the concept of historical phenomenology, as performance, 
like dialogue more generally, must be grasped dynamically as it only exists in relation 
to experience.32 
 
 Phenomenology and Dialogue 
If we can, as Dowland/Ornithoparchus discerned ‘recreate our selves with singing’, 
perhaps that is precisely what early moderns were (as we are) doing when they 
engaged in musical experience. Changing the self through music isn’t just about lifting 
a sour mood with a sprightly galliard. As Sidney and Bacon discerned, there was 
something more permanent about the change that could be elicited through art.33 The 
experience of human communication through performance is what makes the 
experience of performance/playing/enacting such a powerful tool for self knowledge. 
                                                       
30 Ibid., 6. 
31 Hanson, Discovering the Subject in Renaissance England, 3. 
32 Trinkaus, “Humanism, Religion, Society”, 687. Quoted in Ch. 4, 181.  
33 Alexander, Writing After Sidney, xxvii; Barnaby and Schnell, Literate Experience, 2-3. 
 240 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, I have read Dowland/Ornithoparchus’s anecdote as 
having multiple meanings. It clearly implies ‘recreate’ as ‘to refresh or entertain oneself 
through a pleasurable or interesting pastime’, as well as ‘to refresh, reinvigorate’ more 
generally.34 But I believe the most significant meaning of ‘recreate’, when it comes to 
singing, is ‘to create again or in a new way’.35 As Bruce Smith ascertains, Helkiah 
Crooke answered his own question ‘How it comes to passe that we are more recreated with 
Hearing than with Reading’ with primarily phenomenological reasons.36 Though 
principally discussing theatre, Crooke observed that a live performer’s voice is more 
affecting ‘by reason of his inflextion and insinuation into our Sense’.37 Therefore, ‘those 
things which be heard, take a deeper impression in our minds, which is made by the 
appulsion or ariuall of a reall voyce’.38 Furthermore, Crooke noted that performance is 
a social activity: ‘there is a kind of society in narration and acting, which is very 
agreeable to the nature of man, but reading is more solitary.’39 Moreover, Crooke 
observed that there is an improvisatory element present in performance that is lacking 
in reading: ‘[b]ookes cannot digresse from their discourse for the better explication of a 
thing, as those may which teach by their voyce. For in changing of words or mutuall 
conference, many plesant passages are brought in by accident … and by these sauces, 
as it were, of discourse, is the Hearing more sumptuously feasted’.40 Hearing is more 
effective than reading because of the re-creation of experience enacted by another 
human body. This recreational re-creation is also a social dialogue that, in affecting us 
deeply, has the potential to change the self. Though Crooke was writing about 
dramatic improvisation, philosopher Bruce Benson has argued for an interpretation of 
music as inherently improvised and dialogical, even when read from a score.41 
 Benson describes ‘musical phenomenology’, a different use of phenomenology than 
the historical type described by Bruce Smith. Benson argues that, until the end of the 
Baroque period, music was conceptualised differently than it is today in that ‘the 
                                                       
34 “recreate, v.1.”, OED Online. Oxford University Press, December 2015 (accessed 27 February 2016). 
35 The first listed use for this definition of ‘recreate’ is by Philip Sidney. “recreate, v.2.”, OED Online. Oxford 
University Press, December 2015 (accessed 27 February 2016). 
36 B. Smith, The Acoustic World of Early Modern England, 283. 
37 ‘Collected and translated’ by Helkiah Crooke, Mikrokosmographia A Description of the Body of Man (London: 
Printed by W. Iaggard, 1616), sig.Ooo2v. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid.  
41 Benson, The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue, 18, 26. 
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principal focus of music making was the performance itself’.42 He interprets this as a 
muddier separation between composer and performer, as the score was a guide, rather 
than a precise recipe from which to recreate an idealised reproduction of a score.43 He 
argues that even in later music, in all musical performance, in fact, ‘performers—even 
when performing music that is strictly notated—do not merely “perform” but also 
“improvise” upon that which they perform’.44 As mentioned in the Introduction to this 
dissertation, I wrote that Ingarden determined that there is always something 
incomplete about a printed score compared with a performance.45 Ingarden’s term 
Unbestimmtheitsstellen, or ‘places of indeterminacy’ within notation, demands that 
performers improvise, for, in Benson’s estimation ‘there can be no performance 
without Unbestimmtheitsstellen’.46 Daniel Leech-Wilkinson echoes this sentiment when 
he writes, ‘[p]erformance can change the character, even the nature, of a score to a 
much greater extent than we allow’.47 Benson points out the importance of the nuance 
provided by this type of improvisation.48 It is what makes a listener utterly moved by 
one recording of a piece, yet bored when listening to another performance.49 Leech-
Wilkinson argues that it is precisely those elusive elements of performance that Benson 
would consider ‘improvised’. It is this nuance of performance, ‘inuention’ in early 
modern terms, that generates musical meaning to most listeners (rather than any sort 
of structural perception). Leech-Wilkinson says, ‘musical communication is effected 
between performer and listener at the level of the musical surface as it changes in 
sound and character from moment to moment. How that communication works, how 
character is represented in or suggested by sound, what performers do with notes to 
                                                       
42 ‘Rather, pieces of music (to whatever extent they had an identity) were things that facilitated the activity 
of music making, not ends in themselves’. Benson, The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue, 22. As Daniel Leech-
Wilkinson surmises, ‘[p]erhaps it is for exactly this reason that music theory and musicology have 
traditionally found performance so hard to handle. Failing to recognize the large extent to which “the music” 
is formed only in the performance, and in listeners’ responses to what performers do, has been a fundamental 
error preventing much about music’s identity and operation from being theoretically comprehensible’. Daniel 
Leech-Wilkinson, “Compositions, scores, performances, meanings”, Music Theory Online 18/1 (2012), 8. 
43 Benson, The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue, 18-19, 22. 
44 Ibid., 26. 
45 Ibid., 80. 
46 Ibid., 82. 
47 Leech-Wilkinson, “Compositions, scores, performances, meanings”, 4.  
48 As Leech-Wilkinson argues, ‘[i]t follows that much of what is said about pieces is actually about 
performances of pieces: manners of performance have become absorbed into the scholarly imagination of 
scores. One does not need recordings for this to happen: scholars of music absorb from their performance-
surroundings ways of understanding the nature of compositions and of their composers; presumably they 
always have’. Ibid., 3.  
49 Benson, The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue, 85. 
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generate meaning, are the most pertinent questions for those who wish to understand 
music’.50  
 Though Benson and Leech-Wilkinson argue for the importance of performance as 
the principal force of meaning in music making, as well as the ‘improvisation’ and 
‘affect’ generated by performance (not scores), we are reminded that this is also a 
contemporary notion. As quoted in the Introduction, Thomas Campion said in 
Rosseter’s Book of Aires (1601), ‘[a] naked Ayre without guide, or prop, or colour but its 
owne ... requires so much the more inuention to make it please’, citing the importance 
of emotive or effective performance, or the ‘action’, as he calls it, in the creation of 
musical meaning.51 As discussed earlier, it seems that a term, however insufficient, is 
necessary for phenomenological discussion of the contemporary somatic experience of 
music. I have chosen the word ‘striketh’, which acts as an index of that type of musical 
experience. Whether music works to ‘striketh the spirits more readily than the other 
senses’ as Francis Bacon discerned, or polyphonic music ‘striketh deeper’ as the author 
of Praise of Music determined, the verb ‘to strike’ can be useful in applying modern 
philosophy on the creation of musical meaning to early modern experience.52 ‘Striking’ 
acknowledges the embodiedness of the historical subject, as well as the textual 
evidence they left behind.53 If musical meaning was experienced by early moderns 
through a ‘striking’, that moment of experience could be translated as the ‘what 
performers do with notes to generate meaning’ outlined by Leech-Wilkinson above. 
The improvised je-ne-sais-quoi added by the person(s) that performed, breathed life into 
otherwise static notes on a page and thereby created meaning, an experience, a 
‘striking’, that actively altered contemporary understanding of certain knowledge. 
                                                       
50 Leech-Wilkinson, “Compositions, scores, performances, meanings”, 10.  
51 Rosseter, A Booke of Ayres set foorth to be song (1601), sig.B1v.  
52 Or George Sandys’ variation, ‘the sence of hearing stricking the Spirits more immediately, then the rest of 
the sences’. Ch. 2, 86.  Sidney likens 'well-weighted verse' to music, explaining that the 'rime striketh a 
certain music to the ear; and, in fine, since it doth delight, though by another way, it obtaineth the same 
purpose; there being in either, sweetness, and wanting in neither, majesty'. Sidney, An Apology For Poetry (eds. 
Shepherd and Maslen), 115.  
53 B. Smith, “Premodern Sexualities”, 325. 
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Appendix I  
Additional Song Texts 
 
a) William Byrd: ‘Where fancie fond’ (1588) 
 
Where fancy fod for pleasure pleads,  
& reason, keeps poore hope in Iayle: 
ther time it is to take my beads, & pray, 
that beautie may preuaile,  
or else dispaire, wil win the field, 
where reason, hope & pleasure yeeld. 
 
My eyes presume to iudge this case, 
whose iudgement reason doth disdaine: 
but beautie with her wanton face, 
stands to defend, the case is plaine: 
and at the barre of sweet delight, 
she pleads that fancie must be right. 
 
But shame will not haue reason yeeld, 
though griefe do sweare it shall be so: 
as though it were a perfect shield, 
to blush and feare to tell my woe: 
where silence force will at the last, 
to wish for wit when hope is past. 
 
So farre hath fond desire out runne, 
the bond which reason set out first: 
that where delight the fray begunne, 
I would now say, if that I durst: 
that in her stead ten thousand woes, 
haue sprong in field where pleasure grows. 
 
O that I might declare the rest, 
of all the toies which fancy turnes: 
like towrs of wind within my brest, 
where fire is hid that neuer burnes 
then should I try one of the twaine, 
either to loue, or to disdaine. 
 
But fine conceit dares not declare, 
the strange conflict of hope and feare: 
least reason should be left to bare, 
that loue durst whisper in mine eare, 
and tell me how my fancie shall, 
bring reason to me beawties thrall. 
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I must therefore with silence buyld, 
the Laborinth of my delight: 
till loue haue tri’d in open field, 
which of the twaine shall win the fight: 
I feare mee reason must giue place,  
If fancie fond winne beauties grace.  
 
 
b) Thomas Morley: ‘Ioy, ioy doth so arise’ (1593) 
 
Ioy, ioy doth so arise and so content mee, 
when I but see thee, ô my lifes faire treasure. 
Ioy, ioy doth so arise and so content mee, 
That seeing makes mee blind (alas) through too great pleasure.  
But if such blinding, sweet Loue, doth so delight thee,  
Come, Loue, and more thus, and yet more, blynd mee still and spight mee,  
I doe and spight mee. 
 
 
c) John Attey: ‘My dearest and diuinest love’ (1622) 
 
My dearest and deuinest loue. 
Imagine my distresse, 
When thou retir’st from my desires. 
And sorrowes me oppresse. 
 
For my sences no other Sunne, 
But that which in thine eyes, 
That in another Spheare doth runne, 
And clowds thy natiue skyes. 
 
Then come againe, 
Display thy pleasing Beames, 
Else all my pleasures are but paine, 
My comforts are but dreames.  
 
 
d) Robert Jones: ‘Dreames and Imaginations’ (1601) 
 
Dreames and Imaginations  
are all the recreations 
absence can gaine me 
dreames when I wake confound me,  
thoghts for her sake foth wound me  
lease she disdaine me,  
then sinking let me lie,  
or thinking let mee die,  
since loue hath slaine me. 
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Dreames are but coward and doe, 
Much good they dare not stand too, 
Asham’d of the morrow, 
Thoughts like a child that winketh, 
Hee's not beguiled that thinketh, 
Hath peir’st me thorow, 
Both filling me with blisses, 
Both killing me with kisses, 
Dying in sorrow.  
 
Dreames with their false pretences, 
And thoughts confounds my senses, 
In the conclusion, 
Which like a glasse did shew mee, 
What came to passe and threw mee, 
Into confusion, 
Shee made mee leaue all other, 
Yet had she got another, 
This was abusion.  
 
 
e) Martin Peerson: ‘Come, pretty wag’ (1620) 
 
Cantus 2: Come pretty wag and sing, 
 The sun’s all-ripning wing, 
 Fans up the wanton spring 
Both: O let us both goe chant it. 
Cantus 1: Dainty, dainty flowers, 
 Sproute up with Aprill showers, 
 And decke the summer bowers, 
Both: O how fresh May doth flant it.  
 
 
f) Robert Jones: ‘Life is a Poets fable’ (1600) 
 
Life is a Poets fable, 
& al her daies are lies stolne 
from deaths reckoning table,  
for I die as I speake. 
death times the notes that I doe breake. 
 
Childhood doth die in youth, 
And youth in old age dies, 
I thought I liu’d in truth: 
But I die, ii. now I see, 
Each age of death makes one degree. 
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Farewell the doting score, 
Of worlds arithmeticke, 
Life, ile trust thee no more, 
Till I die, ii. for thy sake, 
Ile go by deaths new almanacke. 
 
This instant of my song, 
A thousand men lie sicke, 
A thousand knels are rong: 
And I die as they sing, 
They are but dead and I dying. 
 
Death is lifes decay, 
Life time, time wastes away, 
Then reason bids me say, 
That I die, though my breath 
Prolongs this space of lingring death.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
270 
Appendix II  
Thomas Weelkes: ‘Ha ha’ (1608), transcribed 
and edited by Francis Bevan.  
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








Cantus
Tenor
Bassus
Ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha
Ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha
Ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha
ha ha ha this world doth passe most me ri- ly,- most me ri- ly- ile be
5
ha this world doth passe most me ri- ly,- most me ri- ly- ile be
ha this world doth passe most me ri- ly,- most me ri- ly- I wil be
sworne, for ma ny- an hon est- In di- an- Asse goes for
8
sworne, for ma ny- an hon est- In di- an- Asse goes for a v ni- -
sworne, for ma ny- an hon est- In di- an- Asse goes for a
a v ni- corne,- goes for a v ni- corne,- goes for a v ni- corne,-
11
corne, goes for a v ni- corne,- goes for a v ni- corne,-
v ni- corne,- goes for a v ni- corne,- goes for a v ni- -
    
Thomas WEELKES
(1576 - 1623)
Ha ha ha
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



goes for a v ni- corne,- far ra- did dle- did dle- dy no,- far ra- did dle- did dle-
13
goes for a v ni- corne,- far ra- did dle- did dle- dy no,- far ra- did dle- did dle-
corne, a v ni- corne,- far ra- did dle- did dle- dy no,- far ra- did dle- did dle-



dy no,- this is i dle- i dle- fi no,- this is i dle- i dle- fi no.-
16
dy no,- this is i dle- i dle- fi no,- this is i dle- i dle- fi no.-
dy no,- this is i dle- i dle- fi no,- this is i dle- i dle- fi no.-
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Tygh hygh, tygh hygh, O sweet delight,
     he tickles this age that can,
     call Tulliaes Ape a Marmasyte.
     And Ledaes Goose a swan,
             Fara diddle deyno,
             this is idle fyno.
3. So so so so fine English dayes,
     for false play is no reproach,
     for he that doth the Cochman prayse,
     may safely vse the Coch,
             fara dyddle deyno,
             this is idle fyno.
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Appendix III  
Thomas Weelkes: ‘Thule, the period of 
Cosmographie’ and ‘The Andalusian Merchant’ 
(1601), transcribed and edited by Francis Bevan. 
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Canto
Quinto
Alto
Tenore
Sesto
Basso
Thu le,-
Thu le,- -
the per iod- of Cos mo- gra- -
the per iod- of Cos mo- gra- phie,- of
the per iod- of Cos mo- gra- phie,- the per iod- of Cos -
5
the per iod- of Cos mo- gra- phie,- Cos mo- gra- phie,-
phie, Cos mo- gra- phie,-
the per iod- of Cos mo- gra- phie,- the per iod-
Cos mo- gra- phie,- the
Thu - -
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Thule, The Period of Cosmographie
Thomas WEELKES
(1576 - 1623)
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mo gra- phie,- Thu le,- - the
7
the per iod- of Cos mo- gra- phie,-
Thu le,- - the per iod- of Cos mo- gra- phie,- of
of Cos mo- gra- phie,- Cos mo- gra- phie,- the per iod- of Cos mo- gra- -
per iod- of Cos mo- gra- phie,- the per iod- of Cos mo- -
le, the per iod- of Cos mo- gra- phie,- the
per iod- of Cos mo- gra- phie,- the per iod- of Cos -
9
Thu le,- - the per iod-
Cos mo- gra- phie,- Thu le,- - the
phie, of Cos mo- gra- phie,- the per iod- of Cos mo- gra- -
gra- phie,- of Cos mo- gra- phie,-
per iod- of Cos mo- gra- phie,- of
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mo gra- phie,- of Cos mo- gra- phie,-
11
of Cos mo- gra- phie,- Doth vaunt of He cla,-
per iod- of Cos mo- gra- phie,- Doth vaunt of He -
phie, of Cos mo- gra- phie,- Doth vaunt of
the per iod- of Cos mo- gra- phie,- - -
Cos mo- gra- phie,- Doth
Doth vaunt of He cla,- doth vaunt of He cla,- whose sul-
13
of He cla,- doth vaunt of He cla,- whose sul -
cla, of He cla,- doth vaunt of He cla,- whose sul-
He cla,- doth vaunt of He cla,- of He cla, whose sul -
Doth vaunt of He cla,- doth vaunt of He cla,- whose sul-
vaunt of He cla,- doth vaunt of He cla,- whose sul -
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phu ri- ous- - - - - - fire, whose sul -
16
phu ri- ous- - - - - - fire, whose sul -
phu ri- ous- - - - - - fire, whose sul -
phu ri- ous- - - - - - fire, whose sul -
phu ri- - ous- fire, whose sul -
phu ri- - ous- fire, whose sul -
phu ri- ous- - - - - - fire Doth melt the
18
phu ri- ous- - - - - fire Doth melt the
phu ri- ous- fire Doth melt the
phu rious- fire Doth melt the
phu ri- - - - ous- fire Doth melt the
phu ri- - - ous- - - fire Doth melt the
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
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fro zen- Clime, and thaw the Skie, and thaw the Skie,
20
fro zen- Clime, and thaw the Skie, and thaw the Skie, and thaw the
fro zen- Clime, and thaw the Skie, and thaw the
fro zen- Clime, and thaw the Skie, and thaw the Skie, the
fro zen- Clime, and thaw the Skie, the Skie,
fro zen- Clime,
and thaw the Skie, the Skie, Tri na- cri- an- Æt naes- flames a scend,- a scend- not
22
Skie, and thaw the Skie, the Skie, Tri na- cri- an- Æt naes- flames
Skie, the Skie, Tri na- cri- an- Æt naes- flames a scend- not high er,- a -
Skie, Tri na- cri- an- Æt naes- flames a scend,-
the Skie, Tri na- cri- an- Æt naes- flames a scend- not
Tri na- cri- an- Æt naes- flames a scend- not high er,-
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hi er,- a scend- not hi er,- a scend- not hi -
26
a scend- not high er,- a scend- not high er,- a scend- not high er.-
scend not high er,- a scend- not high er,- a -
a scend- not high er,- a scend- not high er,- a -
high er,- a scend- not high er,- a scend- not high er.-
a scend- not
er.- These things seeme won drous,- yet more
28
These things seeme won drous,- yet more
scend not high er.- These things seeme won drous,- yet more
scend not high er.- These things seeme won drous,- yet more
These things seeme won drous,- yet more
high er,- not high er.- These things seeme won drous,- yet more
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won drous- I, more won drous- I, Whose hart with feare doth
31
won drous- I, yet more won drous- I,
won drous- I, yet more won drous- I, Whose hart with feare doth
won drous- I, yet more won drous- I,
won drous- I, yet more won drous- I, Whose hart with feare doth
won drous- I, yet more won drous- I,
freeze, with love doth fry, doth fry,
34
Whose hart with feare doth freeze, with love doth
freeze, Whose hart with feare doth freeze, with love doth fry,
Whose hart with feare doth freeze, with love, with love doth
freeze, with love doth
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
with love,
37
fry, whose hart with feare doth freeze, with
whose hart with feare doth freeze,whose hart with feare doth freeze, with love doth
fry, whose hart with feare doth freeze, with
fry, whose hart with feare doth freeze, with love,
Whose hart with feare doth freeze, with
with love doth fry, doth fry.
40
love doth fry, with love doth fry.
fry, with love doth fry.
love doth fry, with love doth fry.
with love doth fry, with love doth fry.
love doth fry, doth fry.
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	 
  
         	 	 
 

                  
 	 
       
 
        	 
   

        
 
      
       
      
   
 
   

          
    
8
 
 
280 
 
 
 
 
 
 




The An de- lu- sian- Mer - -
43
The An de- lu- sian- Mer chant-
The An de- lu- sian- Mer chant,- the An de- lu- sian-
The An de- lu- sian- Mer chant- that re - -
The
The
chant that re turnes,- that re turnes,-
45
that re turnes,- La den- with Cutch i- nele- and
Mer chant- that re turnes,- that re turnes,- re turnes,- La den-
turnes, that re turnes,- La den- with
An de- lu- sian- Mer chant- that re turnes,- that re turnes,-
An de- lu- sian- Mer chant- that re turnes- La -
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La den- withCutch i- nele- and Chi na- di shes,and Chi na- di shes,-
47
Chi na- di shes, La den- withCutch i- nele- and Chi na- di shes, La den- with
with Cutch i- nele- and Chi na- di shes, La den- with Cutch
Cutch i- nele- and Chi na- di shes,- La den- with Cutch i- nele- and
La den- with Cutch i- nele- and Chi na- di shes,La den- with Cutch i- nele-
den- with Cutch i- nele- and Chi na- di shes, La den- with Cutch i- -
La den- with Cutch i- nele- and Chi na- di shes,- and Chi na-
49
Cutch i- nele- and Chi na- di shes,- Chi na- di shes,- La den- with Cutch
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di shes,- and Chi na- di shes,- - Re -
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i- nele- and Chi na- - di shes,- Re ports- in Spaine,
and Chi na- di shes,- Re ports- in Spaine,
Cutch i- nele- and Chi na- di shes,- Re ports- in Spaine
Chi na- di shes,- Re ports- in Spaine,
nele and Chi na- di shes,- Re ports- in Spaine, in Spaine
ports in Spaine how strange ly- Fo go- burnes, how
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Re ports- in Spaine how strange ly- Fo go- burnes,
in Spaine
how strange ly- Fo go- burnes, how
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strange ly- Fo go- burnes, how strange ly-
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how strange ly- Fo go- - burnes, how
how strange ly- Fo go-
strange ly- Fo go- burnes, how strange ly- Fo go-
how strange ly- Fo go- burnes,
strange ly- Fo go- burnes, how
Fo go- burnes, how strange, how strange ly- Fo -
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strange ly- Fo go- burnes,
burnes, how strange ly- Fo go- burnes, Fo -
burnes, how strange ly- Fo go- burnes, how strange ly-
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go- burnes, A midst- an O cean- full of fly ing-
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A midst- an O cean- full of
go- burnes, A midst- an O cean- -
Fo go- burnes, A midst- - an O - - -
go- burnes, A midst- - an O cean- -
burnes, A midst- - an O cean- -
fish es,- fly ing- fish es,- full of fly ing-
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fly ing- fish es,- full of fly ing- fish -
full of fly ing- fish es,- full of
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fish es,- full of fly ing- fish es,- full of
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es,- full of fly ing- fish, full of fly ing- fish -
fly ing- fish es,- full of fly ing- fish es,-
full of fly ing- fish es,- - of
fish es,- full of fly ing- fish es,- full of fly ing-
full of fly ing- fish es,- full of fly ing- fish - -
fly ing- fish es,- These things seemwon drous,- yet more
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es,- These things seem won drous,- yet more
fly ing- fish es,- These things seeme won drous,- yet more
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won drous- I, yet more won drous- I,
66
won drous- I, more won drous- I, Whose hart with feare doth
won drous- I, yet more won drous- I, Whose hart with feare doth
won drous- I, yet more won drous- I,
won drous- I, yet more won drous- I, Whose hart with feare doth
won drous- I, yet more won drous- I,
Whose hart with feare doth freeze, with love doth
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freeze, with love, with love doth frye,
freeze, whose hart with feare doth freeze, with love doth frye,
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frye, whose hart with feare doth freeze,
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whose hart with feare doth freeze, whose hart with feare doth
frye, whose hart with feare doth
frye, whose hart with feare doth freeze,
Whose hart with feare doth
with love doth frye.
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with love, with love doth frye.
freeze, with love doth frye, with love doth frye.
freeze, with love, with love doth frye.
with love, with love doth frye.
freeze, with love doth frye.
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
         	
 	

             
 	 
     
        	

      
	 
     

   
     
           
 
   
     

    
      
 
     
16
